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The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 03, No. 18, April, 1859

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REVIEWS AND LITERARY NOTICES

The Works of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban, and Lord High Chancellor of England. Collected and edited by James Spedding, M.A., of Trinity College, Cambridge; Robert Leslie Ellis, M.A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; and Douglas Denon Heath, Barrister-at-Law, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Vols. I.-VI. London: Longman & Co. 1858.

"For my name and memory," said Bacon in his will, "I leave it to men's charitable speeches, and to foreign nations, and to the next ages." Scarcely was he dead when the first portion of this legacy received some part of its fulfilment in the touching and often quoted words of Ben Jonson:—"My conceit of his person was never increased toward him by his place or honors; but I have and do reverence him for the greatness that was only proper to himself, in that he seemed to me ever, by his work, one of the greatest men and most worthy of admiration that had been in many ages. In his adversity, I ever prayed that God would give him strength; for greatness he could not want. Neither could I condole in a word or syllable for him, as knowing no accident could do harm to virtue, but rather help to make it manifest." But it may fairly be doubted whether "the next ages" have done fitly by his memory, spite of the honor that has been indiscriminately lavished upon his name as a philosopher, and the mass of praise, for the most part ignorant, beneath which his works have been buried. The world of readers has been content to take Bacon's greatness upon trust, or to form such imperfect idea of it as was to be got from acquaintance with his "Essays," the only one of his works which has ever attained popularity. Even more thorough students have, for the most part, satisfied themselves with a general view of Bacon's philosophy, dwelling on disconnected passages of ample thought or aphoristic wisdom, and rarely attempting to gain an insight into the real character of his system. Indeed, "the system of Lord Bacon" became a sort of cabalistic phrase. It meant anything and everything. It was like the English Constitution, venerable in authority and prescription, interpreted in contradictory methods, and never precisely defined. Few men undertook to study it with a zeal like that of Homer and his friend Lord Webb Seymour, when, in days of enthusiasm, they read and re-read the "De Augmentis" and the "Novum Organum," and Homer planned to do what Dr. Whewell seems to suppose he has done, bring Bacon up to the present time, by writing a work upon the basis of his, which should furnish a complete review of modern knowledge. Still, it has been part of an English birthright to hold Bacon as the restorer of the sciences, the inventor or at least the re-inventor of the inductive method, and the father of all discovery since his time. These notions have been held firmly, while more special ones concerning his system and himself have been, for the most part, vague or unformed.

In great part, this fact is the result of the condition in which Lord Bacon left his works, the manner of their composition, and their intrinsic defects. He did not publish them in any systematic order, but printed one after another, as it was written, or as extraneous circumstances might induce. Nor did he leave his system complete in any one treatise. His mind discursive, his imagination easily fired, he seized subject after subject and discussed each in a separate treatise, all with more or less reference to a general plan, but not embodied in any consecutive and harmonious development. The growth of his ideas, the changes of his views, as his life advanced, are manifest in the want of connection, as well as in the connection, of these various fragments. Dr. Rawley, his chaplain, says,—and it is a marvellous illustration of Bacon's diligence and desire for perfection,—"I myself have seen, at the least, twelve copies of the 'Instauration,' revised year by year, one after another, and every year altered and amended in the frame thereof."

Such, then, being the state of Bacon's works at his death, much was left to the judgment of his editors, and, unfortunately, the labor of editing his books has, up to the present time, fallen into hands wanting in competence and discretion. It has consequently been a task of special difficulty to get from the ill-arranged mass of Bacon's writings a satisfactory view of the essential elements of his philosophy and a just knowledge of his final opinions.

But the reproach of non-fulfilment of the trust committed to them will rest upon "the next ages" no longer; for the edition which is now in course of publication amply redeems the faults of those that have preceded it, and is such a one as Bacon himself might have approved. In the second book of the "Advancement of Learning," in recounting "the works or acts of merit toward learning," he includes among them "new editions of authors, with more correct impressions, more faithful translations, more profitable glosses, more diligent annotations, and the like." In each of these respects the edition before us deserves the highest praise. The editors have engaged in their task as in a labor of love. It is the result of many years of study, and it exhibits the fruit of unwearied care, great learning, and excellent judgment. So far as it has advanced, it does the highest honor to English scholarship, and takes its place as one of the most remarkable editions in existence of any author whose works stand in need of editorial care. The plan upon which it is arranged is as follows. Bacon's works are divided into three broad classes:—first, the Philosophical; secondly, the Professional; thirdly, the Literary and Occasional. Each of these classes was undertaken by a separate editor. Mr. Robert Leslie Ellis engaged upon the Philosophical Works, and had advanced far in his task when he was suddenly compelled to relinquish it some years since by illness which completely disabled him for labor. What he had already accomplished is so well done as to excite sincere regret that he was unable to carry his work forward. But this regret is diminished by the ability with which Mr. James Spedding, who had taken charge of the Literary and Occasional Works, has supplied Mr. Ellis's place in the completion of the editing of the Philosophical. The burden of the edition has fallen upon his shoulders, and the chief credit for its excellence is due to him. Up to the present time, the publication of the Philosophical Works is complete in five volumes, and the first volume of the Literary Works has just appeared. The separate treatises contained in the completed portion are distributed into three parts,—"whereby," says Mr. Spedding, "all those writings which were either published or intended for publication by Bacon himself as parts of the Great Instauration are (for the first time, I believe) exhibited separately, and distinguished as well from the independent and collateral pieces which did not form part of the main scheme, as from those which, though originally designed for it, were afterwards superseded and abandoned." Each piece is accompanied with a preface, both critical and historical, and with notes. It is in these prefaces that a great part of the value of the new edition consists; for they are in themselves treatises of elucidation and illustration of Bacon's opinions, and of investigation concerning the changes they underwent from time to time. They are written with great clearness and ability, and, taken together, present such a view of Bacon's philosophy as is to be found nowhere else, and amply answers the requirements of students, however exacting.

Far too much credit has been attributed to Bacon, in popular estimation, as the author of a system upon which the modern progress of science is based.9 Whatever his system may have been, it is certain that it has had little direct influence upon the advance of knowledge. But, perhaps, too little credit has been given to Bacon as a man whose breadth and power of thought and amplitude of soul enabled a spirit that has at once stimulated its progress and elevated its disciples. That Bacon believed himself to have invented a system wholly new admits of no doubt; but it is doubtful whether he ever definitely arranged this system in his own mind. And it is a curious and interesting fact, and one illustrative, at least, of the imperfection of Bacon's exposition of his own method, that Mr. Ellis and Mr. Spedding, the two most conscientious investigators of Bacon's thought, should have arrived at different conclusions in regard to the distinctive peculiarities of the Baconian philosophy. Mr. Spedding, in his very interesting preface to the "Parasceve," suggests, since his own and Mr. Ellis's conclusions, though different, do not appear irreconcilable, "whether there be not room for a third solution, more complete than either, as including both." Both he and Mr. Ellis set out from the position, that "the philosophy which Bacon meant to announce was in some way essentially different, not only from any that had been before, but from any that has been since,"—a position very much opposed to the popular opinion. "The triumph of his [Bacon's] principles of scientific investigation," said, not long since, a writer in the "Quarterly Review," whose words may be taken as representative of the common ideas on the matter, "has made it unnecessary to revert to the reasoning by which they were established."10 But the truth seems to be, that the merits of Bacon belong, as Mr. Ellis well says, "to the spirit rather than to the positive precepts of his philosophy." Nor does it appear that Bacon himself, although he indulged the highest hopes and felt the securest confidence in the results of his perfected system, supposed that he had given to it that perfection which was required. In the "De Augmentis Scientiarum," published in 1623, two years and a half before his death, he says: "I am preparing and laboring with all my might to make the mind of man, by help of art, a match for the nature of things, (ut mens per artem fiat rebus par,) to discover an art of Indication and Direction, whereby all other arts, with their axioms and works, may be detected and brought to light. For I have, with good reason, set this down as wanting." (Lib. v. c. 2.) Bacon regarded his method, not only as one wholly new, but also of universal application, and leading to absolute certainty. Doubt was to be excluded from its results. By its means, all the knowledge of which men were capable was to be attained surely and in a comparatively brief space of time. Such a conviction, extravagant as it may seem, is expressed in many passages. In the Preface to his "Parasceve," published in 1620, in the same volume with the "Novum Organum," he says, that he is about to describe a Natural and Experimental History, which, if it be once provided, (and he assumes, that, "etiam vivis nobis," it may be provided,) "paucorum annorum opus futuram esse inquitionem naturae et scientiarum omnium." Again, in the Protemium of the "Novum Organum": "There was but one course left, to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations." And in the Dedication to the same work, he says, with characteristic confidence, "Equidem Organum praebui,"—"I have provided the Instrument."

 

The cause of Bacon's error in this regard, an error in spite of which his philosophical works still remain the crowded repositories of true wisdom, seems to have arisen, in considerable part, from a defect of imagination. Knowledge is to be viewed in two aspects: one, that of its relation to the finite capacities of the human mind; the other, its relation to the infinity of Nature, that is, to the infinity of the subjects of knowledge. Bacon regarded it chiefly from the first point of view,—and, so far as we are aware, there is nowhere in his works any recognition of the fact, that each advance in knowledge only opens new and previously unknown regions of what is yet to be known. He supposed that by his process Nature could be simplified to her few primary elements, and that from these all other knowledge was to be deduced. But, although her laws and elementary forms may be few, their mollifications, as affecting knowledge and consequently human power and interests, are unlimited. Moreover, in supposing that the discovery of Nature could be made certain, and that, by a proper collection of facts, the intellects of men might be brought upon a level of capacity for discovery,—that is, that the process of discovery could be reduced to a simple process of correct reasoning upon established facts,—Bacon omitted to take into account the essential part which the imagination plays in all discovery.

No discovery, properly so called, is the pure result of observation and induction. Maury takes the accumulated observations of fifty years, deduces from them the existence of certain prevailing winds and currents, and states the fact. It is not properly a discovery, although a collection of similar facts may lead to the knowledge of a general law. Newton sees an apple fall; his imagination, with one of the vastest leaps that human imagination ever made, connects its fall with the motion of the planets, and makes an immortal discovery. James Watt said, "Nature has her blind side." True, but it is only the instinct of the imagination that discovers where the blind side lies. The tops of kettles had been dancing ever since kettles were first hung over fires, but no one caught the blind side of the fact till a Scotch boy saw it as he sat dreaming at his aunt's fireside.

But if Bacon's imagination was imperfect in some directions, it possessed in others a vision of the largest scope. No man ever saw more clearly or vindicated more nobly the dignity of knowledge, the capacity of the human mind, and the glory of God in the works of His hand. The impulse which he gave to thought is still gathering force, and many of the recommendations earnestly pressed in his works upon the attention of men are only now beginning to receive their recognition and accomplishment. When he sent a copy of the "Novum Organum" to Sir Henry Wotton, Wotton, in his letter of thanks, said, "Your Lordship hath done a great and everlasting benefit to the children of Nature, and to Nature herself in her utmost extent of latitude,"—and his eulogium had more truth than is common in contemporary compliments.

Great as a student of physical nature, Bacon was a master in the knowledge of human nature. Pope only chose the epithet which all the world had applied, when he wrote of the

"Words that wise Bacon or grave Raleigh spake."

And nowhere is his wisdom more apparent than in the book of his "Essays." The sixth volume of the edition before us contains, beside the "Essays," the "History of King Henry VII.," with other fragmentary histories, and the "De Sapienda Veterum," with a translation, which, like the translations of the principal philosophical works in previous volumes, is executed with admirable spirit and appropriateness.

All these works give the same evidence of editorial ability and skill as those in the division of Philosophy. Mr. Spedding's Preface to the "Henry VII." is not only an interesting essay in itself, but an able and satisfactory vindication of Bacon's general historic accuracy. Bacon's view of the true office of history is very different from the theory which has lately prevailed to a considerable extent, and it would be well, perhaps, were its wisdom more considered. "It is the true office of history," he says, (Advancement of Learning, Book II.,) "to represent the events themselves, together with the counsels; and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment." And to this he adds, with much pith, in the "De Augmentis," II. 9,—"Licet enim Historia quaeque prudentior politicis praeceptis et monitis veluti impregnata sit, tamen scriptor ipse sibi obstetricari non debet." Bacon wrote history according to his own rule, and proved its value by the practical exemplification which he gave of it. There are few better pieces of historic narrative in English than this "History of Henry VII."

Special thanks are due to Mr. Spedding for having reprinted, in full, the first three editions of the "Essays,"—the three that were published by Bacon himself. The first appeared in 1597, and contained but ten essays; the second in 1612, when Bacon was in the height of prosperity, and contained thirty-eight; the third appeared in 1625, after his downfall, less than a year before his death, and contained fifty-eight essays. The three thus afford, as well by the successive additions of new essays as by the alterations which are made in the earlier, a most interesting exhibition of the direction of Bacon's thought at different periods of his life, and the changes in his style. The comparison is one of very great interest, but more space is required to develop it than we have for the present at command. One fact only may be noted in passing,—that the essay on Adversity, which contains that most memorable and noble sentence, "Prosperity is the blessing of the Old Testament, Adversity is the blessing of the New," is one of those added in the last edition, after Bacon himself had experienced all the bitterness of adversity.

Mr. Spedding proposes, in the forthcoming volumes of the Occasional Works of Lord Bacon, to connect his speeches and letters with an explanatory narrative,—thus presenting, he says, "a biography the most copious, the most minute, and, by the very necessity of the case, the fairest that I can produce." He promises "new matter which is neither little nor unimportant; but," he adds, "more important than the new matter is the new aspect which (if I may judge of other minds by my own) will be imparted to the old matter by this manner of setting it forth." We await this part of Mr. Spedding's work with especial interest, for in it will unquestionably be afforded, for the first time, the means of forming a correct judgment of Bacon's character, and just conclusions concerning those public actions of his which have hitherto stood in perplexing contradiction to his avowed principles, to the nobility of his views, to his religious professions, to the reverential love with which he was regarded by those who knew him best. It is not to be hoped that his life can be redeemed from stain; but it may be hoped that a true presentation of the grounds and bearings of his actions may relieve him from the name of "meanest of mankind," and may show that his faults were rather those of his time than of his nature. We shall keep our readers informed of the progress of this invaluable edition, which should lead to the more faithful and general study of the works of him whom "all that were great and good loved and honored."

A New History of the Conquest of Mexico. In which Las Casas' Denunciations of the Popular Historians of that War are fully vindicated. By ROBERT ANDERSON WILSON, Counsellor at Law; Author of "Mexico and its Religion," etc. Philadelphia: James Challen & Son. Boston: Crosby, Nichols, & Co.

 

Before touching on the subject-matter of this book, we have something to say respecting the spirit in which it appears to have been written, the style of its execution, and the manner in which it has been introduced to the world. As it is avowedly an attempt to refute the positions taken up by Mr. Prescott in his "History of the Conquest of Mexico," and to destroy the established reputation of that work, we are naturally led into a comparison between the two writers, that extends beyond the theories and ideas which they have respectively adopted and maintained. We cannot but remember, (and such remembrances awaken now other feelings besides mere respect and admiration,) that, when Prescott was entering upon his literary career, he labored in silence and retirement; that, in the prosecution of his researches, in the gradual formation of his views, and in the preparation of his work, he spared no labor and made no account of time; that, devoting himself to his chosen pursuit with the ardor of a scholar and a searcher after truth, he felt a modest self-reliance, and a just confidence in the utility of his labors, without anticipating the reward of a wide-spread fame; that he was prompt to acknowledge every service, or offer of service, which had been made to him, and communicated to the public not only his information, but the sources from which it had been derived; that, where he rejected the conclusions of other writers, he treated those from whom he differed with the utmost courtesy and candor; and that, when his task was completed, he left it to the free judgment of the world, without soliciting approbation or courting any man's applause.

This is not the course which Mr. Robert Anderson Wilson has thought fit to take. An accidental visit to Mexico, for which he appears to consider himself entitled to no slight commendation, led him into some speculations on the origin and civilization of the Aztec race. Without waiting to inform himself of the ideas entertained on these subjects by other men, he hastened to put forth his own crude notions in a work entitled "Mexico and its Religion," and twice reprinted by its enterprising publishers, with titles varied to suit what was supposed to be the popular taste. Still entertaining an aversion to laborious study, (for which, indeed, his previous education, as well as precarious health, appears to have disqualified him,) he announced his purpose to write a History of the Conquest of Mexico "from the American stand-point," and issued what he himself called "a clap-trap advertisement," for the purpose of enlisting the sympathies of a class in whom hatred of Romanism preponderates over knowledge and judgment. He had made some progress in his "History," when he found that the ideas which he had supposed to be original in his own brain were old and trite. Being thus precluded from claiming for himself the merits of a discoverer, he has shown an eagerness, every way praiseworthy, to place the laurel on the brow to which he supposes it rightfully belongs. Accordingly, he presents to the world, as his master and pioneer, that renowned authority on the antiquities of New Spain, the Hon. Lewis Cass, who, it appears, had published an essay on the subject in the "North American Review." While his work was passing through the press, Mr. Wilson wrote what he styles a "Chapter Preliminary," but what we suppose would have been styled by persons who affect the native idiom when writing their own language, a "Preliminary Chapter." This "Chapter Preliminary" he printed and circulated, in advance of the publication of his book; and though it contains not a single fact in support of his theory, nor even any clear statement of the theory itself, he was rewarded, as he expected, with puffs preliminary from a portion of the press, prompt to recognize the merit of a gentleman who had something to sell, and consequently something to be advertised. The "advance notices,"—so he calls them,—thus obtained, are made part of his book, and may there be read alike by discerning and undiscerning readers. With equal ingenuity he has prefixed to it a title-page, the grammar of which is questionable and the punctuation vile, but in which he has contrived to represent his opinions as identical with those of Las Casas, the great historian of the Spanish Conquests in America, although, in truth, this identity of opinion is purely imaginary, being founded on his mere conjectures in regard to the contents of a work of Las Casas, which, as he bitterly complains, has been withheld from the world. Then, with his two supporters, Las Casas on the one side, and Lewis Casas—we beg his pardon, we mean Lewis Cass—on the other, Mr. Wilson comes before the public, making first a bow "preliminary" to "Colonel and Mrs. Powell," "my dear Uncle," and "my dear Aunt," in a Dedication that reminds us of a certain form of invitations which our readers may sometimes have received: "Miss Smith presents her compliments to Mr. Brown, and I hope you will do me the favor to take tea with me to-morrow evening."

But we have omitted to make mention of the letters "preliminary" which he has printed with the "advance notices." He indulges in frequent sneers at the "weight of authority" to which Mr. Prescott was accustomed to attach some importance in the discussion of a doubtful point. Nevertheless, in his extreme eagerness to obtain for his own opinions the sanction of an authoritative name, he publishes, as "Mr. Prescott's estimate of his researches," a letter which he had received from that gentleman, and, quite incapable of appreciating its quiet irony, evidently supposes that the historian of the Conquest of Mexico was prepared to retire from the field of his triumphs at the first blast of his assailant's trumpet. Next comes a letter from a gentleman whom Mr. Wilson calls "Rousseau St. Hilaire, author of 'The History of Spain,' &c., and Professor of the Faculty of Letters in the University of Paris." This, we suppose, is the same gentleman who is elsewhere mentioned in the book as Rousseau de St. Hilaire, and as Rosseau St. Hilaire. Now we might take issue with Mr. Wilson as to the existence of his correspondent. It would be easy to prove that no person bearing the name is connected with the University of Paris. Adopting the same line of argument by which our author endeavors to convert the old Spanish chronicler, Bernal Diaz, into a myth, we might contend that the Sorbonne—the college to which M. St. Hilaire is represented as belonging—has been almost as famous for its efforts to suppress truth and the free utterance of opinion as the Spanish Inquisition itself,—that it would not hesitate at any little invention or disguise for the furtherance of its objects,—and hence, that the professor in question is in all probability a "myth," a mere "Rousseau's Dream," or rather, a "Wilson's Dream of Rousseau." But we disdain to have recourse to such evasions. We admit that there is in the University of Paris a professor "agrégé à la faculté des lettres," who bears the name of Rosseeuw St. Hilaire; we admit Mr. Wilson's incapacity to decipher foreign names or words, even when they stand before him in the clearest print,—an incapacity of which his book affords numerous examples,—and that this incapacity, and not any mental hallucination, has been the cause of the blunder which we have corrected. But we must add that he does evidently labor under an hallucination when he calls this letter of M. St. Hilaire a "flattering notice." He has been misled by his inability to comprehend the employment of courteous language between persons who differ from each other in matters of opinion. With the accustomed suavity of a Frenchman and a gentleman, M. St. Hilaire declines entering into a discussion with Mr. Wilson, and leaves him to "settle this difference with his learned fellow-citizen," Mr. Prescott, mildly intimating at the same time that he will probably have "his hands full."

Something more remains to be said of the use which our author has made of the learned professor of the Sorbonne. One page of his book Mr. Wilson devotes to "Acknowledgments." These are few, but ponderous. "Acknowledgments are made" to the Hon. Lewis Cass, for having written—without any ulterior view, we imagine, to Mr. Wilson's advantage—the before-mentioned article in the "North American Review"; to the late Mr. Gallatin, for the publication—also, we suspect, without any foresight of the tremendous uses to which it was to be turned—of a paper on the Mexican dialects; to "Aaron Erickson, Esq., of Rochester, N.Y., for the advantages he has afforded us in the prosecution of our arduous investigations"; to "Major Robert Wilson, now at Fort Riley, Kanzas," for no particular reason expressed; and to "M. Rousseau de St. Hilaire, both for the flattering notice he has taken of our preliminary work" (why not, "work preliminary?") "on Mexico, and for the advantages derived from his writings." In regard to the "advantages" here mentioned, we are going to relieve Mr. Wilson's mind. His obligations to M. St. Hilaire are really far lighter than he supposes. It is true that he has picked most of the little information he possesses in regard to Spanish history out of the professor's work, and has strewed his pages with copious extracts from this recondite source. But, in making his acknowledgments, he might have gone still farther back. M. St. Hilaire is a laborious and enthusiastic scholar.

He has found time, in the midst of his professional duties, to write a really meritorious work on the history of Spain. But he had not the time, perhaps not the opportunity, for making a thorough examination of the original authorities. He was therefore obliged to take for his guide a modern author, who had made this history the peculiar field of his researches. The guide whom he selected, and he could have made no better choice, was William Hickling Prescott. So necessary was it for his purpose that the latter should precede him in a pathway so obscure, that he postponed the composition of a portion of his work until the publication of the first two volumes of the "History of Philip the Second," then in preparation, should supply him with the requisite light. His indebtedness to Mr. Prescott was frankly and fully acknowledged both in public and in private. In letters which now lie before us, he says, "I am working hard on 'Philip the Second,' and blessing at the same time the learned pioneer who has traced for me so easy a road through this confused and difficult period of history." "It is a piece of good-fortune which I cannot too highly appreciate, that your studies should have been directed to the most difficult portion of Spanish history, from which you have thus removed for me all the thorns. The conscientiousness and the thoroughness of your researches, the perfect trustworthiness of your conclusions, and the lofty calmness of your judgments, are the precious supports on which I lean; and I have now, for the reign of Philip the Second, a guide whom I shall be ever proud and happy to follow, as I have before followed him through the reigns of the Catholic Kings and the Conquests of Mexico and Peru." That these expressions are no exaggeration of the facts of the case might be easily established by a comparison of the "Histoire d'Espagne" with the writings of the American historian. The passages in the former work cited by Mr. Wilson would form a portion of the proof; and thus, in following M. St. Hilaire, he has in fact been indirectly and ignorantly availing himself of labors which he affects to speak of with contempt.

9The tendency of scientific thought had been, for a considerable period before the time of Bacon, turned in the direction which he, perhaps, did more than any other single investigator to follow out and confirm. Leonardo da Vinci, the completest and most comprehensive genius of Modern Italy, had anticipated, by more than a century, several of the prominent features of the Baconian system. Too little of Leonardo's scientific writings has been published to furnish material for a satisfactory determination of their importance in promoting the advance of knowledge,—but the coincidence of thought, in some passages of his writings, with that in some of Bacon's weighty sentences, is remarkable. "I shall treat of this subject," he says, in a passage published by Venturi, "but I shall first set forth certain experiments; it being my principle to cite experience first, and then to demonstrate why bodies are constrained to act in such or such a manner. This is the method to be observed in investigating phenomena of Nature. It is true that Nature begins with the reason and ends with experience; but no matter; the opposite way is to be taken. We must, as I have said, begin with experience, and by means of this discover the reason." Compare with this the two following passages from the "Novum Organum,"—the first being taken from the Ninety-ninth Axiom of the First Book. "Then only will there be good ground of hope for the further advance of knowledge, when there shall be received and gathered together into natural history a variety of experiments, which are of no use in themselves, but to discover causes and axioms."—The next passage is the Twenty-sixth Axiom of the same Book;—"The conclusions of human reason, as ordinarily applied in matter of nature, I call, for the sake of distinction, Anticipations of Nature (as a thing rash or premature). That reason which is elicited from facts by a just and methodical process I call Interpretation of Nature." The first and famous axiom of the "Novum Organum" contains the phrase which Bacon constantly repeats,—"man being the interpreter of Nature." Leonardo uses the same expression,—"li omini inventori e interpreti tra la natura e gli omini." In another admirable passage of rebuke of the boastful and empty followers of old teachers, Leonardo says: "Though I might not cite authors as well as they, I shall cite a much greater and worthier thing, in citing experience, the teacher of their teachers" (Maestra di loro maestri). "And as for the overmuch credit," says Bacon, "that hath been given unto authors in sciences, in making them dictators that their words should stand, and not counsellors to give advice, the damage is infinite that sciences have received thereby." Similar parallelisms of thought are to be found in some of Galileo's sentences, when brought into comparison with Lord Bacon.
10Article on Whately's Edition of Bacon's Essays. September, 1856.