The estimates, therefore, of that reign are of very little authority, though they might sometimes pass the house without censure; for it is to be considered, that by the frequency of new elections, the greatest part of the members were often unacquainted with the state of publick accounts, and that an army was so little known to this kingdom, that the true expense of it might easily be concealed.
Nor is this, sir, the only fallacy of this argument; for it supposes, likewise, that the nation is no less wealthy than in the time when that computation was offered, with which this is so triumphantly compared. For every man knows that publick as well as private expenses are to be proportioned to the revenue by which they are supplied, and that the charges which are easily supported at one time, may threaten ruin at another.
But unhappily, sir, it is evident, that, since the days of that sovereign, the nation has been exhausted by a long and wasteful war, and since, by a peace equally destructive, it is embarrassed with an enormous debt, and entangled in treaties, of which the support may call every day for new expenses; it has suffered since that time a thousand losses, but gained no advantage, and yet the expenses of that time are mentioned as an example to be compared with those which are proposed in this.
The difference of the condition of the British nation at those two periods of time, sir, is not less than that of the strength of the same man in the vigour of youth and the frigidity of old age, in the flush of health and the languor of disease, of the same man newly risen from rest and plenty, and debilitated with hunger and fatigue.
To make such a comparison, sir, betrays, at least, a very criminal insensibility, of the publick misery, if it may not be charged with greater malignity. I know not whether those who shall hear of this debate, may not impute such reflections rather to cruelty than negligence, and imagine that those who squander the treasure of the nation take pleasure in reproaching that poverty which their counsels produce, and indulge their own vanity by contemplating the calamities from which they are themselves secure, and to which they are indebted for opportunities of increasing their own fortunes, and gratifying their ambition. It is evident, that an estimate which requires less than that which has been mentioned, may yet exact more than the nation can now raise, without feeling too great inconveniencies to be compensated by the advantages which can be expected from our new forces. Nor is it sufficient that it is lower than those of former times; for, as it ought to be the care of the government to preserve the ease and happiness of the people, it should be reduced in proportion to the diminution of the national wealth.
The right honourable gentleman confesses, sir, that frugality is a virtue, and his argument supposes that to contract expenses is an argument of prudent measures; why then is he afraid of carrying virtue to a greater height, of making the burden still more light, and preferring the cheapest estimate that can be proposed, when it is asserted by those whose authority is most worthy of regard, that it will produce no weakness in our troops, nor give our enemies any superiority?
I do not pretend any other skill in military affairs, than may be gained by casual conversation with soldiers, and by a cursory observation of daily occurrences; but I speak with greater confidence on this occasion, because I do not think any other qualifications necessary for the determination of this question, than a habit of just reasoning, and freedom from the prejudices of interest.
Every man knows, sir, without a military education, that it is imprudent to purchase any thing at a greater price which may be procured at a less, and that when the same sum will buy two things, of which one is evidently preferable to the other, the best ought to be chosen.
If the application of either of these two positions will decide this controversy, there will be no need of recurring to experience, of citing the authority of foreign commanders, of comparing the actions of the German and British generals, or of inquiring how battles have been lost, or to what victories are to be ascribed.
It is evident, sir, that the scheme now proposed, is twice as costly as that which is recommended in opposition to it, and therefore, unless it will produce twice the advantage, it must be acknowledged to be imprudently chosen. The advantage in war, is to be rated by comparing the strength of different numbers in different circumstances, and inquiring what degree of superiority will be found.
If we suppose, sir, two bodies of men, equally armed and disciplined, opposed to each other without any advantage of situation, we must conceive that neither party could be conquered, that the balance of the day must remain equal, and that the contest would continue undecided.
It cannot be objected to this supposition, sir, that no such event is recorded in history, because in war many causes really act which cannot be estimated; one army may consist of soldiers more courageous, and more confident in the justice of their cause; unforeseen accidents may operate, orders may be mistaken, or leaders may be misinformed; but all these considerations are to be set aside in speculation, because they may equally be alleged on either part.
Two bodies of men, sir, equally numerous, being, therefore, supposed equal, it is to be inquired how either may be superiour to the other. It is proposed, on one part, to produce this effect by doubling the number of officers rather than increasing that of the soldiers; on the other, to double the soldiers under the same officers, the expense being the same of both methods.
When two armies, modelled according to these different schemes, enter the field, what event can be expected? Either five thousand men, with a double number of officers, must be equal to ten thousand, differently regulated, or the publick has paid more for assistance of the officers than its real value, and has chosen, of two methods equally expensive, that which is least efficacious.
This, sir, is the state of the question now before us; our present deficiency is not of men but money, and we may procure ten thousand men regulated like the foreign troops, at the same expense as five thousand in the form proposed; but I am afraid that no man will be found to assert, that the addition of officers will be equivalent to a double number of soldiers.
Thus it is evident, sir, evident to demonstration, that the most expensive method is, at the same time, the least advantageous, and that the proposal of new regiments is intended to augment the strength of the ministry rather than of the army.
If we suppose, sir, what is more than any foreigner will grant, that the additional officers raise a body of five thousand men to an equality with six thousand, is not the pay of four thousand men apparently thrown away? And do not the officers receive a reward which their service cannot deserve? Would it not be far more rational to raise seven thousand, by which our army would be stronger by a seventh part, and as the pay of three thousand would be saved, the publick would be richer by almost a third.
Surely, sir, numerical arguments cannot but deserve some consideration, even from those who have learned by long practice to explain away mere probability at pleasure, to select the circumstances of complicated questions, and only to show those which may be produced in favour of their own opinions.
In the present question, sir, there is very little room for fallacy; nor do I see what remains to the decision of it, but that those gentlemen who have been acquainted with military operations, inform us, what degree of superiority is conferred by any assignable number of officers; that we may compare their service with the price, and discover whether the same money will not purchase greater advantages.
The experience of the late war may evince, sir, that those troops which have the greatest number of officers are not always victorious; for our establishment never admitted the same, or nearly the same number with that of the French, our enemies; nevertheless, we still boast of our victories; nor is it certain that we might not have been equally successful, though the number of our officers had been yet less.
Foreigners, sir, are very far from discovering the defect of their own establishment, or imagining that they should become more formidable by imitating our methods. When I travelled, I took opportunities of conversing with the generals of those nations which are most famous for the valour of their troops, and was informed by them, that they thought a multitude of officers by no means useful, and that they were so far from desiring to see their own regulation changed, that they should make no scruple of recommending it to other nations, who, in their opinion, squandered their treasure upon useless commissions, and increased the calamities of war by unnecessary burdens.
I hope no man will think it sufficient to reply to these arguments with general assertions, or will deny the necessity of frugality, and extol the opulence of the nation, the extent of our commerce, and the happiness of our condition. Such indeed, sir, is the method of argumentation made use of by the hireling scribblers of the court, who, because they feel none of the publick calamities, represent all complaints as criminal murmurs, and charge those with sedition who petition only for relief. Wretches like these would celebrate our victories, though our country should be overrun by an invader, would praise the lenity of any government by which themselves should be spared, and would boast of the happiness of plenty, when half the people should be languishing with famine.
I do not suppose, sir, that the despicable sophistry of prostitutes like these has any effect here, nor should I have thought them worthy of the least notice, had it not been proper to inquire, whether those may not be justly suspected of some inclination to deceive, even in this assembly, by whom the most profligate of mankind are openly paid for the promulgation of falsehood, and the patronage of corruption.
It is indeed, sir, artful, in those who are daily impairing our honour and influence, to endeavour to conceal from the people their own weakness, that weakness which is so well known in foreign countries, that every nation is encouraged to insult us, and by which it may reasonably be imagined that new enemies will, in a short time, be raised.
The late changes in our military regulations have, indeed, taken away all the terrour of our arms; those troops are now no longer dreaded, by which the liberties of Europe were recovered, and the French reduced to abandon their schemes of universal empire, for the defence of their own country, because the officers by whom they were formerly conducted to glory and to victory, are now dismissed, and men advanced to their posts, who are neither feared nor known.
When the duke of ARGYLE was lately deprived of his command, the Spaniards could not conceal their satisfaction; they bestowed, however unwillingly, the highest panegyrick upon his bravery and conduct, by showing that he was the only Briton of whom they were afraid. Nor did their allies, the French, discover less exultation; for by them it was declared, that the nation was now disarmed, that either no war was intended, or that none could be successfully prosecuted, since, as they made no scruple to assert, though I know not whether I ought to repeat it, we have no other man capable of commanding armies, or conducting any great design.
I am informed that this illustrious warriour, whose abilities are sufficiently attested by these enemies, that have felt their prevalence, is of opinion, that the number of officers now required is not necessary, and has declared that he should with equal confidence undertake either invasion or defence, with forces modelled after the German custom; and since I have shown, that, unless the troops so regulated, are equivalent to a double number, added to the standing regiments, part of the expense of the officers is evidently squandered, I shall vote against the motion, unless it be proved, which I believe will not be attempted, that the force of a regiment is doubled by doubling the officers.
General WADE then spoke, to the purpose following:—Sir, the learned gentleman who spoke last, must be acknowledged to have discovered a very specious method of reasoning, and to have carried his inquiry as far as speculation without experience can hope to proceed, but has, in my opinion, admitted a false principle, by which all his argument has been perplexed.
He supposes, that the advantages must be always in proportion to the money expended in procuring them, and that, therefore, if five thousand men, raised at any given cost, will be equal to five thousand, they ought, if they are regulated according to an establishment of double the charge, to be able to encounter ten thousand.
But in this supposition, sir, he forgets that the possibility of loss is to be thrown into the balance against the advantage of the expense saved, and that though the strength of the troops be not increased in proportion to the increase of the cost, yet the additional security against a great loss may justly entitle the most expensive regulation to the preference.
Suppose five thousand men to be brought into the field against six thousand; if they can, by multiplying their officers at a double expense, be enabled to engage successfully a body superiour in number by only a sixth part, the nation may be justly said to gain all that would have been lost by suffering a defeat.
That we ought not to choose a worse method when we can discover a better, is indisputably true, but which method is worse or better, can be discovered only by experience. The last war has taught us, that our troops in their present establishment are superiour to the forces of France, but how much they might suffer by any alteration it is not possible to foresee.
Success is gained by courage, and courage is produced by an opinion of superiority; and it may easily be imagined, that our soldiers, who judge of their own strength only by experience, imagine their own establishment and discipline advanced to the highest perfection; nor would they expect any other consequences from an alteration of it, but weakness and defeats. It is, therefore, dangerous to change the model of our forces, because it is dangerous to depress the spirit of our soldiers.
Though it is confessed, sir, that the French, whose officers are still more numerous, have been conquered by our troops, it must be likewise alleged, that they had yielded us far easier victories had their officers been wanting; for to them are they indebted for their conquests wherever they have been successful, and for their resistance wherever they have been with difficulty defeated; their soldiers are a spiritless herd, and were they not invigorated by the example of their leaders, and restrained by the fear of instant punishment, would fly at the approach of any enemy, without waiting for the attack.
I cannot, therefore, sir, but be of opinion, that the necessity of a large number of officers, may be learned even from the behaviour of those troops which have been unsuccessful, since it is certain, that though they have been often overcome, they have generally resisted with great steadiness, and retired with great order.
If those, who are only speculative warriours, shall imagine that their arguments are not confuted, I can only repeat what I declared when I first attempted to deliver my sentiments in this debate, that I do not pretend to be very skilful in the arts of disputation. I, who claim no other title than that of an old soldier, cannot hope to prevail much by my oratory; it is enough for me that I am confident of confuting those arguments in the field, which I oppose in the senate.
Mr. FOX spoke next, in this manner:—Sir, I am far from thinking that this question has been hitherto fully explained by those who have either considered it only as a dispute about money, or a question merely speculative concerning the proportions between different degrees of expense, and probability of success. In a war of this kind, expense is the last and lowest consideration, and where experience may be consulted, the conjectures of speculation ought to have no weight.
The method, sir, by which our troops have hitherto been regulated, is well known to have produced success beyond our expectations, to have exalted us to the arbitration of the world, to have reduced the French to change their threats of forcing a monarch upon us, into petitions for peace, and to have established the liberties of almost every nation of the world that can call itself free.
Whether this method, sir, so successful, so easy, and so formidable, shall be changed, whether it shall be changed at a time when the whole continent is in commotion, and every nation calling soldiers to its standard; when the French, recovered from their defeats, seem to have forgotten the force of that hand that crushed them in the pride of victory; when they seem to be reviving their former designs, and rekindling their extinguished ambition; whether, at such a time, the regulations of our army shall be changed to save, upon the highest computation, only thirty thousand pounds, is the present question.
On such a question, sir, I cannot observe, without astonishment, any man deliberating for a single moment. To suspend our opinion in this case, would be to balance our lives, our liberties, our patrimonies, and our posterity, against thirty thousand pounds.
The effects of our present method, sir, are well known to ourselves, our confederates, our enemies, to every man that has heard the name of Blenheim and Ramillies; the consequences of the establishment, now contended for, our most experienced commanders own themselves unable to foresee, and I am far from believing that theoretical disquisitions can enable any man to make great discoveries in military affairs.
Our own inexperience of the method which is so warmly recommended, is not the strongest objection to it, though even this ought, in my opinion, to restrain us from trying it at this hazardous conjuncture. But since arguments, merely negative, may be thought over-balanced by the prospect of saving money, I shall lay before the house, what effects the want of officers has produced, with regard to those nations whose poverty has laid them under a necessity of parsimonious establishments.
When the Germans were defeated by the French, in the late war, I was at the Sardinian court, where the battle was, as it may easily be supposed, the reigning subject of conversation, and where they did not want opportunities of informing themselves minutely of all the circumstances which contributed to the event; it was there, sir, universally determined, that the Germans lost the day merely for want of officers.
It was observed also, sir, that some troops, which were once courted and feared by all the neighbouring potentates, had lost their reputation in later times, of which no reason could be alleged, but that they had lessened the number of their officers; such is the change in the model of the Walloons, and such is the consequence produced by it.
I am very far, sir, from thinking, that reason is not to be consulted in military operations, as in other affairs, and have no less satisfaction than the learned gentleman who spoke last but one, in clear and demonstrative deductions; but in this question, reason itself informs me, that regard ought only to be had to experience, and that authority unsupported by practice, ought to have no prevalence.
I shall, therefore, sir, make no inquiry into the abilities of the generals, by whom these contrary opinions are defended, nor draw any parallel between their actions or their knowledge. It is sufficient for me that the one is proposing a new scheme, and that the opinion of the other can plead the practice of king William, and the duke of MARLBOROUGH, and the success of the last war.
Yet, sir, if parsimony be a virtue at this time so eminently necessary, it may be urged in favour of this estimate, that it will be less expensive than those that have been formerly offered, and that as all changes ought to be gradual, this may be considered as the first step towards a general reduction of the publick charge.
Mr. HEATHCOTE spoke to the following purpose:—Sir, it is not without astonishment, that I heard the honourable gentleman who spoke lately, conclude his remarks with an attempt to renew our apprehensions of the pretender, a chimerical invader, an enemy in the clouds, without spirit, and without forces, without dominions, without money, and without allies; a miserable fugitive, that has not a friend in this kingdom, or none but such as are exasperated by those whom the men that mention him with so much terrour are attempting to vindicate.
The vanity, sir, of such fears, the folly of admitting them, if they are real, and of counterfeiting them, if they are false, has been sufficiently exposed in this debate, by my honourable friend; but as he thought it unnecessary to employ arguments in proof of what cannot be denied, and believed it sufficient to ridicule a panick which he supposed merely political, I, who judge, perhaps, more favourably of the sincerity of some, and more tenderly of the cowardice of others, shall endeavour to show, that the frequent revolutions which have happened in this nation, afford us no reason for fearing another, equally sudden and unforeseen in favour of the pretender.
The government, sir, is always stronger, as it is complicated with the private interest of more individuals; because, though there are few that have comprehension sufficient to discern the general advantage of the community, almost every man is capable of attending to his own; and though not many have virtue to stand up in opposition to the approach of general calamities, of which every one may hope to exempt himself from his particular share, yet the most sanguine are alarmed, and the most indolent awakened at any danger which threatens themselves, and will exert their utmost power to obviate or escape it.
For this reason, sir, I have long considered the publick funds established in this nation, as a barrier to the government, which cannot easily be broken: a foreign prince cannot now be placed upon the throne, but in opposition almost to every wealthy man, who, having trusted the government with his money, has reposited a pledge of his own fidelity.
But to this gentleman, sir, whom I am now answering, arguments can be of very little importance, because, by his own confession, he is retained as a mere machine, to speak at the direction of another, and to utter sentiments which he never conceived, and which his hesitation and abrupt conclusion shows him to admit with very little examination. He had not even allowed himself time to know the opinion which he was to assert, or to imprint upon his memory those arguments to which he was to add the sanction of his authority. He seems to have boldly promised to speak, and then to have inquired what he was to say. Yet has this gentleman often declaimed here with all the apparent ardour of integrity, and been heard with that regard which is only due to virtue and independence.
Some of his assertions are such, however, as require confutation, which is, perhaps, more necessary since he has produced an authority for them, which many of those who heard him may think of much greater weight than his own. He affirms, that we can suffer only by an invasion, and infers from this position, that we need only to guard our own coasts. I am of an opinion very different, and having not yet prevailed upon myself to receive notes from any other person, cannot forbear to speak what I think, and what the publick prosperity requires to be generally known. We may surely suffer by many other causes, by the ignorance, or treachery, or cowardice of the ministry, by the negligence of that person to whom this gentleman was probably indebted for his notes. We may suffer by the loss of our sugar colonies, which may be justly valued at ten millions.
These plantations, which afford us almost all the profitable trade that is now left us, have been exposed to the insults of the enemy, without any other guard than two ships, almost unfit for service. They have been left to the protection of chance, with no other security, at a time when the Spaniards had fitted out a squadron, to infest and ravage our American dominions.
The admiral, who was sent into America, was confined for almost a year in the ports, without forces, ships, or ammunition, which yet might have been sent in a few months, had not pretences of delay been studiously invented, had not the preparations been obstructed by clandestine expedients, and had not every man been tacitly assured, that he should recommend himself to his superiours, by raising difficulties, rather than by removing them.
Such was the conduct of those who now stand up in the face of their country, and, without diffidence or shame, boast of their zeal, their assiduity, and their despatch; who proclaim, with an air of triumphant innocence, that no art or diligence could have been more expeditious, and that the embarkation was only impeded by the seasons and the winds.
With assertions equally intrepid, and arguments equally contemptible, has the same person, who boasted his expedition, endeavoured to defend the establishment of new regiments, in opposition to the practice of foreign nations, and to the opinion of the greatest general among us; and, to show how little he fears confutation, has recommended his scheme on account of its frugality.
It is not to be wondered, sir, that such an orator should undertake to defend the model of the troops sent to America, that he should prefer boys to veterans, and assert the propriety of intrusting new levies to unexperienced commanders; for he has given us in this debate such proofs of controversial courage, that nothing can be now imagined too arduous for him to attempt.
His strength, sir, is, indeed, not equal to his spirit, and he is frequently unsuccessful in his most vigorous efforts, but it must be confessed that he is generally overborne only by the force of truth, by a power which few can resist so resolutely as himself, and which, therefore, though it makes no impression upon him, prevails upon others to leave him sometimes alone in the vindication of his positions.
The examples, sir, of those noble persons who were advanced early to commissions, will be produced by him without effect, because the cases are by no means parallel. They were not invested with command till they had spent some time in the service, and exhibited proofs of their courage and their capacity; and it cannot be doubted, but some men may discover at seventeen, more merit than others in the full strength of manhood.
But, sir, there is another consideration of more importance, which will annihilate the parallel, and destroy the argument founded upon it. At the time in which these persons were preferred, the nation had but newly seen an army, and had, therefore, very few old officers whose experience could be trusted, or whose services required to be rewarded: the ministers were obliged to select those, who, though they did not understand the military sciences, were likely to attain them in a short time, and the event has sufficiently proved, that in the choice no greater regard was paid to interest than to judgment.
It was prudent, likewise, sir, to choose young persons, supposing their abilities equal with those of others, because the nation was likely to possess them longer, and would not be reduced, by an interval of peace, to make war again with raw forces, under the direction of ignorant commanders.
But this provision, however reasonable, the wisdom of this ministry has found means to defeat, by detaining at home the disciplined troops, and depriving the most experienced generals of their commands, at a time when they are most necessary, at a time when the whole world is in arms, when the ambition of France is reviving its claims, and the Spaniards are preparing to invade our colonies.
But, sir, though our generals are discarded, we are sufficiently informed, that it is not because we are imagined to be in a state of safety; for the increase of our army betrays our fear, of which, whether it will be dispelled or increased by such measures, it is not difficult to determine.
An army thus numerous, sir, is, in the opinion of every honest Briton, of every man that reveres the constitution, or loves his liberty, an evil more to be dreaded, than any from which we can be defended by it. The most unpopular act of the most unpopular of our monarchs, was the establishment of a standing-army; nor do I know any thing to be feared from the exaltation of the dreadful pretender to the throne, but that he will govern the nation with an armed force.
If our troops continue to be increased, which we may reasonably suspect, since, if arguments like these be admitted, pretences for augmentations can never be wanting, the consequences are easily foreseen; they will grow too numerous to be quartered in the towns, and, with an affectation of easing them of such unwelcome guests, it will be proposed, that after having spent the summer in a camp, they shall retire in winter to barracks. Then will the burden of a standing army be imposed for ever on the nation; then may our liberties be openly invaded, and those who now oppress us by the power only of money, will then throw aside the mask, and deliver themselves from the constraint of hypocrisy; those who now sooth us with promises and protestations, will then intimidate us with threatenings, and, perhaps, revenge the opposition of their schemes by persecution and sequestrations.