In considering the address proposed, I cannot but conclude that it is too much diffused, and that it would be more forcible if it was more concise: to shorten it will be no difficult task, by the omission of all the clauses that correspond with particular parts of his majesty's speech, which I cannot discover the necessity of repeating.
In the congratulation to his majesty upon his return to his once glorious dominions, no lord shall concur more readily or more zealously than myself; nor shall I even deny to extend my compliments to the ministry, when it shall appear that they deserve them; but I am never willing to be lavish of praise, because it becomes less valuable by being prodigally bestowed; and on occasions so important as this, I can never consent to praise before I have examined, because inquiry comes too late after approbation.
Lord CHOLMONDELEY rose next, and spoke to this effect:—My lords, if the dangers that threaten our happiness and our safety be such as they have been represented; if ambition has extended her power almost beyond a possibility of resistance, and oppression, elated with success, begins to design no less than the universal slavery of mankind; if the powers of Europe stand aghast at the calamities which hang over them, and listen with helpless confusion to that storm which they can neither avoid nor resist, how ought our conduct to be influenced by this uncommon state of affairs? Ought we not to catch the alarm while it is possible to make preparation against the danger? Ought we not to improve, with the utmost diligence, the important interval? to unite our counsels for the protection of liberty, and exert all our influence against the common enemies of society, the unwearied disturbers of the tranquillity of mankind?
To what purpose, my lords, are the miseries that the present distractions of Europe may bring upon us, so pathetically described, and so accurately enumerated, if they are to produce no effect upon our counsels? And what effect can be wished from them, but unanimity, with that vigour and despatch which are its natural consequences, and that success with which steadiness and expedition are generally rewarded?
It might be hoped, my lords, that those who have so clear a view of our present embarrassments, and whose sagacity and acuteness expose them to a sensibility of future miseries, perhaps more painful than would be excited by any present and real calamities, should not be thus tortured to no purpose. Every passion, my lords, has its proper object by which it may be laudably gratified, and every disposition of mind may be directed to useful ends. The true use of that foresight of future events, with which some great capacities are so eminently endowed, is that of producing caution and suggesting expedients. What advantage, my lords, would it be to navigators, that their pilot could, by any preternatural power, discover sands or rocks, if he was too negligent or too stubborn to turn the vessel out of the danger?
Or how, my lords, to pursue the comparison, would that pilot be treated by the crew, who, after having informed them of their approach to a shoal or whirlpool, and set before them, with all his rhetorick, the horrours of a shipwreck, should, instead of directing them to avoid destruction, and assisting their endeavours for their common safety, amuse them with the miscarriages of past voyages, and the blunders and stupidity of their former pilot?
Whether any parallel can be formed between such ill-timed satire, and wild misconduct, and the manner in which your lordships have been treated on this occasion, it is not my province to determine. Nor have I any other design than to show that the only proper conduct in time of real danger, is preparation against it; and that wit and eloquence themselves, if employed to any other purpose, lose their excellence, because they lose their propriety.
It does not appear, my lords, that the address now proposed includes any approbation of past measures, and therefore it is needless to inquire, on this occasion, whether the conduct of our ministers or admirals deserves praise or censure.
It does not appear, my lords, that by censuring any part of our late conduct, however detrimental to the publick it may at present be imagined, any of our losses will be repaired, or any part of our reputation retrieved; and, therefore, such proceedings would only retard our counsels, and divert our thoughts from more important considerations; considerations which his majesty has recommended to us, and which cannot be more strongly pressed upon us than by the noble lord who opposed the motion; for he most powerfully incites to unanimity and attention, who most strongly represents the danger of our situation.
Of the good effects of publick consultations, I need not observe, my lords, that they arise from the joint endeavour of many understandings cooperating to the same end; from the reasonings and observations of many individuals of different studies, inclinations, and experience, all directed to the illustration of the same question, which is, therefore, so accurately discussed, so variously illustrated, and so amply displayed, that a more comprehensive view is obtained of its relations and consequences, than can be hoped from the wisdom or knowledge of any single man.
But this advantage, my lords, can only be expected from union and concurrence; for when the different members of a national council enter with different designs, and exert their abilities not so much to promote any general purposes, as to obviate the measures, and confute the arguments of each other, the publick is deprived of all the benefit that might be expected from the collective wisdom of assemblies, whatever may be the capacity of those who compose them. The senate thus divided and disturbed, will, perhaps, conclude with less prudence than any single member, as any man may more easily discover truth without assistance, than when others of equal abilities are employed in perplexing his inquiries, and interrupting the operations of his mind.
Thus, my lords, it might be safer for a nation, even in time of terrour and disorder, to be deprived of the counsels of this house, than to confide in the determinations of an assembly not uniform in its views, nor connected in its interests; an assembly from which little can be hoped by those who observe that it cannot, without a tedious debate, prolonged with all the heat of opposition, despatch the first and most cursory part of publick business,—an address to his majesty.
It has been for a long time a practice too frequent, to confound past with present questions, to perplex every debate by an endless multiplication of objects, and to obstruct our determinations by substituting one inquiry in the place of another.
The only question, my lords, now before us is, whether the address which the noble lord proposed, implies any commendation of past measures, not whether those measures deserve to be commended; which is an inquiry not at present to be pursued, because we have not now before us the means of attaining satisfaction in it, and which ought, therefore, to be delayed till it shall be your lordships' pleasure to appoint a day for examining the state of the nation, and to demand those letters, instructions, and memorials, which are necessary to an accurate and senatorial disquisition.
In the mean time, since it is at least as expedient for me to vindicate, as for others to accuse those of whose conduct neither they nor I have yet any regular cognizance, and I may justly expect from the candour of your lordships, that you will be no less willing to hear an apologist than a censurer, I will venture to suspend the true question a few moments, to justify that conduct which has been so wantonly and so contemptuously derided.
That the preservation of the house of Austria, my lords, ought to engage the closest attention of the British nation, is freely confessed. It is evident that by no other means our commerce, our liberty, or our religion can be secured, or the house of Bourbon restrained from overwhelming the universe. It is allowed that the queen of Hungary has a claim to our assistance by other ties than those of interest; that it was promised upon the faith of treaties, and it is demanded by the loudest calls of honour, justice and compassion. And did it not appear too juvenile and romantick, I might add, that her personal excellencies are such as might call armies to her assistance from the remotest corners of the earth; that her constancy in the assertion of her rights might animate every generous mind with equal firmness; and her intrepidity in the midst of danger and distress, when every day brings accounts of new encroachments, and every new encroachment discourages those from whom she may claim assistance from declaring in her favour, might inspire with ardour for her preservation all those in whom virtue can excite reverence, or whom calamities unjustly inflicted can touch with indignation.
Nor am I afraid to affirm, my lords, that the condition of this illustrious princess raised all these emotions in the court of Britain, and that the vigour of our proceedings will appear proportioned to our ardour for her success. No sooner was the true state of affairs incontestably known, than twelve thousand auxiliary troops were hired, and commanded to march to her assistance, but her affairs making it more eligible for her to employ her own subjects in her defence, and the want of money being the only obstacle that hindered her from raising armies proportioned to those of her enemies, she required, that instead of troops, a supply of money might be sent her, with which his majesty willingly complied.
The British ministers in the mean time endeavoured, by the strongest arguments and most importunate solicitations, to animate her allies to equal vigour, or to procure her assistance from other powers whose interest was more remotely affected by her distress: if the effects of their endeavours are not yet manifest, it cannot be imputed to the want either of sincerity or diligence; and if any other powers should be persuaded to arm in the common cause, it ought to be ascribed to the influence of the British counsels.
In the prosecution of the war with Spain, it does not appear, my lords, that any measures have been neglected, which prudence, or bravery, or experience, could be expected to dictate. If we have suffered greater losses than we expected, if our enemies have been sometimes favoured by the winds, or sometimes have been so happy as to conceal their designs, and elude the diligence of our commanders, who is to be censured? or what is to be concluded, but that which never was denied, that the chance of war is uncertain, that men are inclined to make fallacious calculations of the probabilities of future events, and that our enemies may sometimes be as artful, as diligent, and as sagacious as ourselves?
It was the general opinion of the British people, my lords, if the general opinion may be collected from the clamours and expectations which every man has had opportunities of observing, that in declaring war upon Spain, we only engaged to chastise the insolence of a nation of helpless savages, who might, indeed, rob and murder a defenceless trader, but who could only hold up their hands and cry out for mercy, or sculk in secret creeks and unfrequented coasts, when ships of war should be fitted out against them. They imagined that the fortifications of the Spanish citadels would be abandoned at the first sound of cannon, and that their armies would turn their backs at the sight of the standard of Britain.
It was not remembered, my lords, that the greatest part of our trade was carried on in sight of the Spanish coasts, and that our merchants must be consequently exposed to incessant molestation from light vessels, which our ships of war could not pursue over rocks and shallows. It was not sufficiently considered, that a trading nation must always make war with a nation that has fewer merchants, under the disadvantage of being more exposed to the rapacity of private adventurers. How much we had to fear on this account was shown us by the late war with France, in which the privateers of a few petty ports, injured the commerce of this nation, more than their mighty navies and celebrated admirals.
My lords, it would very little become this august assembly, this assembly so renowned for wisdom, and for justice, to confound want of prudence with want of success; since on many occasions the wisest measures may be defeated by accidents which could not be foreseen; since they may sometimes be discovered by deserters, or spies, and sometimes eluded by an enemy equally skilful with ourselves in the science of war.
That any of these apologies are necessary to the administration, I am far from intending to insinuate, for I know not that we have failed of success in any of our designs, except the attack of Carthagena, of which the miscarriage cannot, at least, be imputed to the ministry; nor is it evident that any other causes of it are to be assigned than the difficulty of the enterprise; and when, my lords, did any nation make war, without experiencing some disappointments?
These considerations, my lords, I have thought myself obliged, by my regard to truth and justice, to lay before you, to dissipate those suspicions and that anxiety which might have arisen from a different representation of our late measures; for I cannot but once more observe, that a vindication of the conduct of the ministry is by no means a necessary preparative to the address proposed.
The address which was so modestly offered to your lordships, cannot be said to contain any more than a general answer to his majesty's speech, and such declarations of our duty and affection, as are always due to our sovereign, and always expected by him on such occasions.
If our allies have been neglected or betrayed, my lords, we shall be still at liberty to discover and to punish negligence so detrimental, and treachery so reproachful to the British nation. If in the war against Spain we have failed of success, we shall still reserve in our own hands the right of inquiring whether we were unsuccessful by the superiority of our enemies, or by our own fault; whether our commanders wanted orders, or neglected to obey them; for what clause can be produced in the address by which any of these inquiries can be supposed to be predetermined?
Let us, therefore, remember, my lords, the danger of our present state, and the necessity of steadiness, vigour, and wisdom, for our own preservation and that of Europe; let us consider that publick wisdom is the result of united counsels, and steadiness and vigour, of united influence; let us remember that our example may be of equal use with our assistance, and that both the allies and the subjects of Great Britain will be conjoined by our union, and distracted by our divisions; and let us, therefore, endeavour to promote the general interest of the world, by an unanimous address to his majesty, in the terms proposed by the noble lord.
Lord TALBOT spoke in the following manner:—My lords, after the display of the present state of Europe, and the account of the measures of the British ministers, which the noble lord who spoke against the motion has laid before you, there is little necessity for another attempt to convince you that our liberty and the liberty of Europe are in danger, or of disturbing your reflections by another enumeration of follies and misfortunes.
To mention the folly of our measures is superfluous likewise, for another reason. They who do not already acknowledge it, may be justly suspected of suppressing their conviction; for how can it be possible, that they who cannot produce a single instance of wisdom or fortitude, who cannot point out one enterprise wisely concerted and successfully executed, can yet sincerely declare, that nothing has been omitted which our interest required?
The measures, my lords, which are now pursued, are the same which for twenty months have kept the whole nation in continual disturbance, and have raised the indignation of every man, whose private interest was not promoted by them. These measures cannot be said to be rashly censured, or condemned before they are seen in their full extent, or expanded into all their consequences; for they have been prosecuted, my lords, with all the confidence of authority and all the perseverance of obstinacy, without any other opposition than fruitless clamours, or petitions unregarded. And what consequences have they produced? What but poverty and distractions at home, and the contempt and insults of foreign powers? What but the necessity of retrieving by war the losses sustained by timorous and dilatory negotiations; and the miscarriages of a war, in which only folly and cowardice have involved us?
Nothing, my lords, is more astonishing, than that it should be asserted in this assembly that we have no ill success to complain of. Might we not hope for success, if we have calculated the events of war, and made a suitable preparation? And how is this to be done, but by comparing our forces with that of our enemy, who must, undoubtedly, be more or less formidable according to the proportion which his treasures and his troops bear to our own?
Upon the assurance of the certainty of this practice, upon the evidence, my lords, of arithmetical demonstration, we were inclined to believe, that the power of Britain was not to be resisted by Spain, and therefore demanded that our merchants should be no longer plundered, insulted, imprisoned, and tortured by so despicable an enemy.
That we did not foresee all the consequences of this demand, we are now ready to confess; we did not conjecture that new troops would be raised for the invasion of the Spanish dominions, only that we might be reduced to the level with our enemies. We did not imagine that the superiority of our naval force would produce no other consequence than an inequality of expense, and that the royal navies of Britain would be equipped only for show, only to harass the sailors with the hateful molestation of an impress, and to weaken the crews of our mercantile vessels, that they might be more easily taken by the privateers of Spain.
We did not expect, my lords, that our navies would sail out under the command of admirals renowned for bravery, knowledge, and vigilance, and float upon the ocean without design, or enter ports and leave them, equally inoffensive as a packet-boat, or petty trader.
But not to speak any longer, my lords, in terms so little suited to the importance of the question which I am endeavouring to clear, or to the enormity of the conduct which I attempt to expose; the success of war is only to be estimated by the advantages which are gained, in proportion to the loss which is suffered; of which loss the expenses occasioned by the war are always the chief part, and of which it is, therefore, usual, at the conclusion of a peace, for the conquered power to promise the payment.
Let us examine, my lords, in consequence of this position, the success of our present war against Spain; let us consider what each nation has suffered, and it will easily appear how justly we boast of our wisdom and vigour.
It is not on this occasion necessary to form minute calculations, or to compute the expense of every company of soldiers and squadron of ships; it is only necessary to assert, what will, I hope, not be very readily denied, even by those whom daily practice of absurd apologies has rendered impregnable by the force of truth, that such expenses as have neither contributed to our own defence, nor to the disadvantage of the Spaniards, have been thrown away.
If this be granted, my lords, it will appear, that no nation ever beheld its treasures so profusely squandered, ever paid taxes so willingly, and so patiently saw them perverted; for it cannot, my lords, be proved, that any part of our preparations has produced a proportionate effect; but it may be readily shown how many fleets have been equipped only that the merchants might want sailors, and that the public stores might be consumed.
As to our ill success in America, which has been imputed only to the chance of war, it will be reasonable, my lords, to ascribe to other causes, so much of it as might have been prevented by a more speedy reinforcement of Vernon, or may be supposed to have arisen from the inexperience of our troops, and the escape of the Spaniards from Ferrol.
If our fleets had been sent more early into that part of the world, the Spaniards would have had no time to strengthen their garrisons; had our troops been acquainted with discipline, the attack would have been made with greater judgment; and had not the Spaniards escaped from Ferrol, we should have had no enemy in America to encounter. Had all our ministers and all our admirals done their duty, it is evident that not only Carthagena had been taken, but that half the dominions of Spain might now have owned the sovereignty of the crown of Britain.
This, my lords, may be observed of the only enterprise, which it is reasonable to believe was in reality intended against the Spaniards, if even of this our ministers had not before contrived the defeat. But of all the rest of our armaments it does not appear that any effect has been felt but by ourselves, it cannot be discovered that they even raised any alarms or anxiety either in our enemies or their allies, by whom perhaps it was known that they were only designed as punishments for the merchants of Britain.
That our merchants have already been severely chastised for their insolence in complaining of their losses, and their temerity in raising in the nation a regard for its commerce, its honour, and its rights, is evident from a dreadful list of three hundred ships taken by the Spaniards, some of which were abandoned by their convoys, and others seized within sight of the coasts of Britain.
It may be urged, my lords, that the Spaniards have likewise lost a great number of vessels; but what else could they expect when they engaged in a war against the greatest naval power of the universe? And it is to be remembered, that the Spaniards have this consolation in their misfortunes, that of their ships none have been deserted by their convoys, or wilfully exposed to capture by being robbed of their crews, to supply ships of war with idle hands.
The Spaniards will likewise consider, that they have not harassed their subjects for the protection of their trade; that they have not fitted out fleets only to amuse the populace. They comfort themselves with the hope, that the Britons will soon be reduced to a state of weakness below themselves, and wait patiently for the time in which the masters of the sea shall receive from them the regulation of their commerce and the limits of their navigation.
Nor can it be doubted, my lords, but that by adhering to these measures, our ministers will in a short time gratify their hopes; for whatsoever be the difference between the power of two contending nations, if the richer spends its treasures without effect, and exposes its troops to unhealthy climates and impracticable expeditions, while the weaker is parsimonious and prudent, they must soon be brought to an equality; and by continuing the same conduct, the weaker power must at length prevail.
That this has been hitherto the state of the war between Britain and Spain, it is not necessary to prove to your lordships; it is apparent, that the expenses of the Spaniards have been far less than those of Britain; and, therefore, if we should suppose the actual losses of war equal, we are only wearing out our force in useless efforts, and our enemies grow every day comparatively stronger.
But, my lords, let us not flatter ourselves that our actual losses have been equal; let us, before we determine this question, accurately compare the number and the value of our ships and cargoes with those of the Spaniards, and see on which side the loss will fall.
And let us not forget, what in all the calculations which I have yet seen on either part has been totally overlooked, the number of men killed, or captives in the British and Spanish dominions. Men, my lords, are at once strength and riches; and, therefore, it is to be considered, that the most irreparable loss which any nation can sustain is the diminution of its people: money may be repaid, and commerce may be recovered; even liberty may be regained, but the loss of people can never be retrieved. Even the twentieth generation may have reason to exclaim, How much more numerous and more powerful would this nation have been, had our ancestors not been betrayed in the expedition to Carthagena!
What loss, my lords, have the Spaniards sustained which can be put in balance with that of our army in America, an army given up to the vultures of an unhealthy climate, and of which those who perished by the sword, were in reality rescued from more lingering torments?
What equivalent can be mentioned for the liberty of multitudes of Britons, now languishing in the prisons of Spain, or obliged by hardships and desperation to assist the enemies of their country? What have the Spaniards suffered that can be opposed to the detriment which the commerce of this nation feels from the detention of our sailors?
These, my lords, are losses not to be paralleled by the destruction of Porto Bello, even though that expedition should be ascribed to the ministry. These are losses which may extend their consequences to many ages, which may long impede our commerce, and diminish our shipping.
It is not to be imagined, my lords, that in this time of peculiar danger, parents will destine their children to maritime employments, or that any man will engage in naval business who can exercise any other profession; and therefore the death or captivity of a sailor leaves a vacuity in our commerce, since no other will be ready to supply his place. Thus, by degrees, the continuance of the war will contract our trade, and those parts of it which we cannot occupy, will be snatched by the French or Dutch, from whom it is not probable that they will ever be recovered.
This, my lords, is another circumstance of disadvantage to which the Spaniards are not exposed; for their traffick being only from one part of their dominions to another, cannot be destroyed, but will, after the short interruption of a war, be again equally certain and equally profitable.
It appears, therefore, my lords, that we have hitherto suffered more than the Spaniards, more than the nation which we have so much reason to despise; it appears that our fleets have been useless, and that our troops have been only sent out to be destroyed; and it will, therefore, surely be allowed me to assert, that the war has not been hitherto successful.
I am, therefore, of opinion, my lords, that as the address now proposed, cannot but be understood both by his majesty and the nation, to imply, in some degree, a commendation of that conduct which cannot be commended, which ought never to be mentioned but with detestation and contempt, it will be unworthy of this house, offensive to the whole nation, and unjust to his majesty.
His majesty, my lords, has summoned us to advise him in this important juncture, and the nation expects from our determinations its relief or its destruction: nor will either have much to hope from our counsels, if, in our first publick act, we endeavour to deceive them.
It seems, therefore, proper to change the common form of our addresses to the throne, to do once, at least, what his majesty demands and the people expect, and to remember that no characters are more inconsistent, than those of a counsellor of the king, and a flatterer of the ministry.
Then lord ABINGDON spoke to this effect:—My lords, I have always observed that debates are prolonged, and inquiries perplexed, by the neglect of method; and therefore think it necessary to move, That the question may be read, that the noble lords who shall be inclined to explain their sentiments upon it, may have always the chief point in view, and not deviate into foreign considerations.
[It was read accordingly.]
Lord CARTERET spoke next, to the purpose following:—My lords, I am convinced of the propriety of the last motion by the advantage which it has afforded me of viewing more deliberately and distinctly the question before us; the consideration of which has confirmed me in my own opinion, that the address now proposed is only a flattering repetition of the speech, and that the speech was drawn up only to betray us into an encomium on the ministry; who, as they certainly have not deserved any commendations, will, I hope, not receive them from your lordships. For what has been the result of all their measures, but a general confusion, the depression of our own nation and our allies, and the exaltation of the house of Bourbon?
It is universally allowed, my lords, and therefore it would be superfluous to prove, that the liberties of Europe are now in the utmost danger; that the house of Bourbon has arrived almost at that exalted pinnacle of authority, from whence it will look down with contempt upon all other powers, to which it will henceforward prescribe laws at pleasure, whose dominions will be limited by its direction, and whose armies will march at its command.
That Britain will be long exempted from the general servitude, that we shall be able to stand alone against the whole power of Europe, which the French may then bring down upon us, and preserve ourselves independent, while every other nation acknowledges the authority of an arbitrary conqueror, is by no means likely, and might be, perhaps, demonstrated to be not possible.
How long we might be able to retain our liberty, it is beyond the reach of policy to determine, but as it is evident, that when the empire is subdued, the Dutch will quickly fall under the same dominion, and that all their ports and all their commerce will then be in the hands of the French, it cannot be denied that our commerce will quickly be at an end. We shall then lose the dominion of the sea, and all our distant colonies and settlements, and be shut up in our own island, where the continuance of our liberties can be determined only by the resolution with which we shall defend them.