"But what is particularly deserving of notice is, the acquiescence granted to the people's demand. They wish to be ruled by kings, exactly as all other nations were. The Lord chastises their spirit of revolt by leaving them to their desires. He commands Samuel to comply with their request, but to point out to them, at the same time, the rights of the king who was to rule over them like unto the nations, and said: 'This will be the right of the king that shall reign over you: he will take your sons, and will put them in his chariots, and will make them his horsemen, and his running footmen, to run before his chariots; and he will appoint them to be his tribunes, and his centurions, and to plough his fields, and to reap his corn, and to make him arms and chariots. Your daughters also will he take to make him ointments, and to be his cooks and bakers; and he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your best olive-yards, and give them to his servants. Moreover, he will take the tenth of your corn, and of the revenues of your vineyards, to give to his eunuchs and servants. Your servants also, and hand-maids, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, he will take away, and put them to his work. Your flocks also he will tithe, and you shall be his servants; and you shall cry out in that day from the face of the king whom you have chosen to yourselves; and the Lord will not hear you in that day, because you desired unto yourselves a king. And the people would not hear the voice of Samuel, and they said, Nay, but there shall be a king over us, and we also will be like all nations.' (1st Kings, chap. viii., from verse 11 to middle of verse 20 inclusively.)
"Some persons, being determined to extend the power of kings beyond its limits, draw from these words the formula of royal right. A blind pretension, and reflecting little honor on legitimate monarchs such as the Catholic sovereigns. Unless a person wishes knowingly to deceive himself on this portion of the Scripture, or is blind, he may see by the context, and by comparing this passage with others, that it is not legitimate right that is here meant, but de facto right. I mean to say, that the Holy Spirit does not explain what just monarchs ought to do; but what had been done, and was still done, by the kings of Pagan nations, mere tyrants, and commonly so called. Observe, that the people demanded nothing but to be placed on an equality with the Pagan nations in a political point of view. They had not the prudence to demand a king such as he ought to be, but such as was common in those days; and this was what God granted them. If God, as the prophet observes, has sometimes given the people kings in His wrath, what people were more deserving of this than those who had abandoned God himself, and refused to be ruled by Him? Indeed, God did chastise His people severely by granting them their foolish demand. He did give them a king, but a king who was to exercise what, according to the perverse custom of the times, formed the royal right described in the sacred text just quoted.
"What man in our days, conversant with what has been written upon the different natures of governments, upon their abuse, and without even understanding what is said in the Scriptures, could imagine that the text of Samuel contains the legitimate form of royalty or of monarchy? Does this power impart the right of seizing the property of the subjects, their lands, their riches, their sons and daughters, and even their natural liberty? Is this the model of a monarchy, or of the most tyrannical despotism? To dispel every illusion on this point, we need only compare with what we have just read the 21st chap. of the third Book of Kings, in which the history of Naboth, an inhabitant of Jezrael, is narrated. Achab, the king of Israel, wished to enlarge the palace, or pleasure-house which he possessed in that town. A vineyard of Naboth's, near the palace, came within the plan of the gardens that were to be added. The king did not seize it at once, of his own authority, but asked the proprietor to let him have it on the honest condition of paying him the price at which he should value it, or giving him a better in another place. Naboth would not consent to this, because it was the inheritance of his ancestors. The king, not being accustomed to meet with a refusal, threw himself upon his couch oppressed with grief; the queen, Jezabel, came, and told him to calm his agitation: 'Thy authority is great indeed,' said she to him; Grandis authoritatis es: she promises to put him in possession of the vineyard. This abominable woman wrote to the judges of Jezrael to commence an action against Naboth for a calumny, to be proved against him by two suborned witnesses; and she demanded that he should be condemned to death. The queen was obeyed; Naboth was stoned to death. All this was necessary that the vineyard might enter into the royal treasury, and that, watered by the blood of the proprietor, it might produce flowers for the palace of these princes. But, in reality, it produced none, neither for the king nor for the queen; it furnished them with nothing but briars and mortal poisons. Elias presents himself before Achab when he was going to take possession of Naboth's vineyard; he announces to him that he, and all his house, even to the dog that approacheth the wall, shall be erased from the face of the earth.
"You look upon royal right as explained to the people by Samuel as legitimate; tell me, then why Achab and Jezabel are so severely punished for taking the vineyard and the life of Naboth, since the king had a right to take from his subjects their most valuable vineyards and olive trees, according to the declaration of the prophet. If Achab possesses this right after he is established the king of the people of God, whence comes it that he, so violent a prince, should entreat Naboth with so much civility? And why is it necessary to accuse Naboth of some calumny? His resistance to the king's right, by refusing to accept the just value of what was suitable to the enlargement of the palace and gardens, would have been a sufficient motive for instituting an action against him. We find, however, that Naboth committed no injustice against the king by refusing to sell his patrimony, not even in the estimation of the queen, who boasted of her husband's great authority. This great authority, which Jezabel admitted in the king, was neither more nor less than the royal right spoken of by Samuel to the people; it was, as I have said, a de facto right to take and seize upon every thing by mere force, as Montesquieu says of the tyrant.
"Do not therefore, mention this passage, nor any other of the Scriptures, to justify the idea of a government so ill-conceived. The doctrine of the Catholic religion is attached to legitimate monarchy, with its suitable characteristics, and in accordance with the qualities which modern publicists recognise, viz. as a paternal and sovereign power, but conformable to the fundamental laws of the state. Within limits so suitable, nothing can be more regular than this power, the most extensive of all temporal powers, and that which is most favored and supported by the Catholic Church."
Such is the horrible despotism taught by these men so basely calumniated! Happy the people who are ruled by a prince whose government is regulated by these doctrines!
Note 31, p. 330
The importance of the matter treated of in this part of my work obliges me to insert here, at some length, passages proving the truth of what I have advanced. I did not think it advisable to give a translation of the Latin passages, that I might avoid augmenting excessively the number of pages; besides, among the persons who may wish to make themselves thoroughly acquainted with the subject, and who will consequently take an interest in consulting the original texts, there are few ignorant of the Latin language.
Observe how St. Thomas expresses himself on royal power, and with what solid and generous doctrine he points out its duties in the third book, chap. 11, of his treatise De Regimine Principum.
DIVUS THOMAS
"De Regimine Principum, liber iii. caput XI
"Hic Sanctus Doctor declarat de dominio regali, in quo consistit, et in quo differt a politico, et quo modo distinguitur diversimodo secundum diversas rationes.
"Nunc autem ad regale dominium est procedendum, ubi est distinguendum de ipso secundum diversas regiones, et prout a diversis varie invenitur traditum. Et primo quidem, in Sacra Scriptura aliter leges regalis dominii traduntur in Deuteronomio per Moysen, aliter in 1 Regum per Samuelem prophetam, uterque tamen in persona Dei differenter ordinat regem ad utilitatem subditorum, quod est proprium regum, ut Philosophus tradit in 8 ethic. Cum, inquit, constitutus fuerit rex, non multiplicabit sibi equos, nec reducet populum in Ægyptum, equitatus numero sublevatus, non habebit uxores plurimas, quæ alliciant animam ejus, neque argenti, aut auri immensa pondera: quod quidem qualiter habet intelligi, supra traditur in hoc lib. describetque sibi Deuteronomium legis hujus, et habebit secum, legetque illud omnibus diebus vitæ suæ, ut discat timere dominum Deum suum, et custodire verba ejus et cæremonias, et ut videlicet possit populum dirigere secundum legem divinam, unde et rex Salomon in principio sui regiminis hanc sapientiam a Deo petivit, ad directionem sui regiminis pro utilitate subditorum, sicut scribitur in 3 lib. Regum. Subdit vero dictus Moyses in eodem lib. Nec elevetur cor ejus in superfluum super fratres suos, neque declinet in partem dexteram, vel sinistram, ut longo tempore regat ipse et filius ejus super Israel. Sed in primo Regum, traduntur leges regni, magis ad utilitatem Regis, ut supra patuit in lib. 2 hujus operis, ubi ponuntur verba omnino pertinentia ad conditionem servilem, et tamen Samuel leges quas tradit cum sint penitus despoticæ dicit esse regales. Philosophus autem in 8 ethic. magis concordat cum primis legibus. Tria enim ponit de rege in eo. 4, videlicet, quod ille legitimus est rex qui principaliter bonum subditorum intendit. Item, ille rex est, qui curam subditorum habet, ut bene operentur quemadmodum pastor ovium. Ex quibus omnibus manifestum est, quod juxta istum, modum despoticum multum differat a regali, ut idem Philosophus videtur dicere in 1 politic. Item, quod regnum non est propter regem, sed rex propter regnum, quia ad hoc Deus providit de eis, ut regnum regant et gubernent, et unumquemque in suo jure conservent: et hic est finis regiminis, quod si ad aliud faciunt in seipsos commodum retorquendo, non sunt reges sed tyranni. Contra quos dicit Dominus in Ezech. Væ pastoribus Israel, qui pascunt semetipsos. Nonne greges pascuntur a pastoribus? Lac comedebatis, et lanis operiebamini, et quod crassum erat occidebatis: gregem autem meum non pascebatis: quod infirmum fuit, non consolidastis, et quod ægrotum non sanastis, quod confractum non alligastis, quod abjectum non reduxistis, et quod perierat non quæsistis; sed cum austeritate imperabatis eis et cum potentia. In quibus verbis nobis sufficienter forma regiminis traditur redarguendo contrarium. Amplius autem regnum ex hominibus constituitur, sicut domus ex parietibus, et corpus humanum ex membris, ut Philos. dicit in 3 politic. Finis ergo regis est, ut regimen prosperetur, quod homines conserventur per regem. Et hinc habet commune bonum cujuslibet principatus participationem divinæ bonitatis: unde bonum commune dicitur a Philosopho in 1 ethic. esse quod omnia appetunt, et esse bonum divinum, ut sicut Deus qui est rex regum, et dominus dominantium, cujus virtute principes imperant, ut probatum est supra, nos regit et gubernat non propter seipsum, sed propter nostram salutem: ita et reges faciant et alii dominatores in orbe."
Note 32, p. 336
I have noticed the opinion of D. Felix Amat, Archbishop of Palmyra, with respect to the obedience due to de facto governments. I have remarked, that this writer's principles, besides being false, are opposed to the rights of the people. The Archbishop of Palmyra appears to have been at a loss to discover a maxim to which it is possible to conform under all circumstances that may occur, and which do occur but too often. He dreaded the obscurity and confusion of ideas when the legitimacy of a given case was to be defined; he wished to remedy an evil, but he appears to have aggravated it to an extraordinary degree. Observe how he sets forth his opinion in his work entitled Idea of the Church Militant, chap. iii. art. 2:
"The more I reflect," says he, "on the difficulties I have just pointed out, the more I am convinced that it is impossible to resolve them, even those which are ancient, with any degree of certainty; and it is equally impossible to derive any light from them to aid us in resolving those which are formed at the present day by the struggle between the prevailing spirit of insubordination in opposition to the judgment and will of the governor, and the contrary effort made to limit more and more the liberty of those who obey. Starting from the divers points and notions that I have laid down relative to the supreme power in all really civil societies, it appears to me, that, instead of losing time in mere speculative discussions, it will be more useful to propose a practical, just, and opportune maxim for the preservation of public tranquillity, especially in Christian kingdoms and states, and for affording the means of re-establishing it when it has been troubled or destroyed.
"The Maxim. – No one can doubt the legitimacy of the obligation of every member of any civil society whatever to obey the government which is de facto and unquestionably established. I say 'unquestionably established,' because there is here no question of a mere invasion or temporary occupation in time of war. From this maxim follow two consequences: 1st, to take part in insurrections, or assemblages of people, addressing themselves to the constituted authorities with a view to compel them to grant what they consider unjust, is always an act contrary to right reason; always unlawful, condemned by the natural law and by the Gospel. 2dly, individual members of society, who combine together and take up arms, in small or large numbers, for the purpose of attacking the established government by physical force, are always guilty of rebellion, a crime strongly opposed to the spirit of our divine religion."
I will not here repeat what I have already said on the unsoundness, the inconveniences, and the dangers of such a doctrine, but merely add, that with respect to governments only established de facto, to grant them the right of commanding and exacting obedience involves a contradiction. To say that a de facto government is bound, whilst it does exist, to protect justice, to avoid crimes, to prevent the dissolution of society, is merely to maintain truths universally admitted, and denied by no one; but to add, that it is unlawful, and contrary to our holy religion, to combine together and raise forces for the overthrow of a de facto government, is a doctrine which Catholic theologians have never professed, which true philosophy has never admitted, and which no nation has ever observed.
Note 33, p. 343
I insert here certain remarkable passages from St. Thomas and Suarez, in which these authors explain the opinions to which I have alluded in the text, respecting the differences which may arise between governors and the governed. I refer to what I have already pointed out in another place; we are not about to examine so much whether such or such doctrines are true, as to discover what were the doctrines at the time we are speaking of, and what opinion the most distinguished doctors formed on the delicate questions of which we are treating.
D. THOMAS
(2. 2. Q. 42. art. 2o ad tertium. – Utrum seditio sit semper peccatum mortale?)
3. Arg. Laudantur qui multitudinem a potestate tyrannica liberant, sed hoc non de facili potest fieri sine aliqua dissensione multitudinis, dum una pars multitudinis nititur retinere tyrannum, alia vero nititur eum abjicere, ergo seditio potest fieri sine peccato.
Ad tertium dicendum; quod regimen tyrannicum non est justum quia non ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum privatum regentis ut patet per Philosophum; et ideo perturbatio hujus regiminis non habet rationem seditionis, nisi forte quando sic inordinate perturbatur tyranni regimen, quod multitudo subjecta majus detrimentum patitur ex perturbatione consequenti quam ex tyranni regimine; magis autem tyrannus seditiosus est, qui in populo sibi subjecto discordias et seditiones nutrit, ut tutius dominari possit; hoc enim tyrannicum est, cum sit ordinatum ad bonum proprium præsidentis cum multitudinis nocumento.
Cardinalis Cayetanus in hunc textum. "Quis sit autem modus ordinatus perturbandi tyrannum et qualem tyrannum, puta secundum regimen tantum, vel secundum regimen et titulum, non est præsentis intentionis: sat est nunc, quod utrumque tyrannum licet ordinate perturbare absque seditione quandoque; illum ut bono reipublicæ vacet, istum ut expellatur."
LIB. I
De Regimine Principum. (Cap. x.)
Quod rex et princeps studere debet ad bonum regimen propter bonum sui ipsius, et utile quod inde sequitur, cujus contrarium sequitur regimen tyrannicum.
Tyrannorum vero dominium diuturnum esse non potest, cum sit multitudini odiosum. Non potest enim diu conservari, quod votis multorum repugnat. Vix enim a quoquam præsens vita transigitur quin aliquas adversitates patiatur. Adversitatis autem tempore occasio deesse non potest contra tyrannum insurgendi; et ubi adsit occasio, non deerit ex multis vel unus qui occasione non utatur. Insurgentem autem populus votive prosequitur: nec de facili carebit effectu, quod cum favore multitudinis attentatur. Vix ergo potest contingere, quod tyranni dominium protendatur in longum. Hoc etiam manifeste patet, si quis consideret unde tyranni dominium conservatur. Non n. conservatur amore, cum parva, vel nulla sit amicitia subjectæ multitudinis ad tyrannum ut ex præhabitis patet: de subditorum autem fide tyrannis confidendum non est. Non n. invenitur tanta virtus in multis, ut fidelitatis virtute reprimantur, ne indebitæ servitutis jugum, si possint, excutiant. Fortassis autem nec fidelitati contrarium reputabitur secundum opinionem multorum, si tyrannicæ nequitiæ qualitercumque obvietur. Restat ergo ut solo timore tyranni regimen sustentetur; unde et timeri se a subditis tota intentione procurant. Timor autem est debile fundamentum. Nam qui timore subduntur, si occurrat occasio qua possint impunitatem sperare, contra præsidentes insurgunt eo ardentius, quo magis contra voluntatem ex solo timore cohibebantur. Sicut si aqua per violentiam includatur, cum aditum invenerit, impetuosius fluit. Sed nec ipse timor caret periculo, cum ex nimio timore plerique in desperationem inciderint. Salutis autem desperatio audacter ad quælibet attentanda præcipitat. Non potest igitur tyranni dominium esse diuturnum. Hoc etiam non minus exemplis, quam rationibus apparet.
LIB. I. CAP. VI
Conclusio; quod regimen unius simpliciter sit optimum; ostendit qualiter multitudo se debet habere circa ipsum, quia auferenda est ei occasio ne tyrannizet, ei quod etiam in hoc est tolerandus propter majus malum vitandum.
Quia ergo unius regimen præ eligendum est, quod est optimum, et contingit ipsum in tyrannidem converti, quod est pessimum, ut ex dictis patet, laborandum est diligenti studio, ut sic multitudini provideatur de rege, ut non incidat in tyrannum. Primum autem est necessarium, ut talis conditionis homo ab illis ad quos hoc spectat officium, promoveatur in regem, quod non sit probabile in tyrannidem declinare. Unde Samuel Dei providentiam erga institutionem regis commendans, ait, 1 Regum xiii.: Quæsivit sibi Dominus, virum secundum cor suum: deinde sic disponenda est regni gubernatio, ut regi jam instituto tyrannidis subtrahatur occasio. Simul etiam sic ejus temperetur potestas, ut in tyrannidem de facili declinare non possit. Quæ quidem ut fiant, insequentibus considerandum erit. Demum vero curandum est, si rex in tyrannidem diverteret, qualiter posset occuri. Et quidem si non fuerit excessus tyrannidis, utilius est remissam tyrannidem tolerare ad tempus, quam tyrannum agendo multis implicari periculis, quæ sunt graviora ipsa tyrannide. Potest, n. contingere ut qui contra tyrannum agunt prævalere non possint, et sic provocatus tyrannus magis desæviat. Quod si prævalere quis possit adversus tyrannum, ex hoc ipso proveniunt multoties gravissimæ dissensiones in populo, sive dum in tyrannum insurgitur, sive post dejectionem tyranni erga ordinationem regiminis multitudo separatur in partes. Contingit etiam ut interdum dum alicujus auxilio multitudo expellit tyrannum, ille potestate accepta tyrannidem arripiat, et timens pati ab alio quod ipse in alium fecit, graviori servitute subditos opprimat. Sic enim in tyrannide solet contingere, ut posterior gravior fiat quam præcedens, dum præcedentia gravamina non deserit, et ipse ex sui cordis malitia nova excogitat: unde Syracusis quondam Dyonisii mortem omnibus desiderantibus, anus quædem ut incolumnis et sibi superstes esset, continue orabat: quod ut tyrannus cognovit, cur hoc faceret interrogavit. Tum illa, puella, inquit, existens cum gravem tyrannum haberemus, mortem ejus cupiebam, quo interfecto, aliquantulum durior successit; ejus quoque dominationem finiri magnum existimabam, tertium te importuniorem habere cœpimus rectorem; itaque si tu fueris absumptus, deterior in locum tuum succedet. Et si sit intolerabilis excessus tyrannidis, quibusdam visum fuit, ut ad fortium virorum virtutem pertineat tyrannum interimere, seque pro liberatione multitudinis exponere periculis mortis: cujus rei exemplum etiam in veteri Testamento habetur. Nam Ajoth quidam Eglon regem Moab, qui gravi servitute populum Dei premebat, sica infixa in ejus femore interemit, et factus est populi judex. Sed hoc Apostolicæ doctrinæ non congruit. Docet n. nos Petrus, non bonis tantum et modestis, verum etiam discolis Dominis reverenter subditos esse. 2 Petr. ii. Hæc est enim gratia, si propter conscientiam Dei sustineat quis tristitias patiens injuste: unde cum multi Romani Imperatores fidem Christi persequerentur tyrannice, magnaque multitudo tam nobilium, quam populi esset ad fidem conversa, non resistendo, sed mortem patienter et armati sustinentes pro Christo laudantur, ut in sacra Thebæorum legione manifeste apparet; magisque Ajoth judicandus est hostem interemisse, quam populi rectorem, licet tyrannum; unde et in veteri Testamento leguntur occisi fuisse hi qui occiderunt Joas regem Juda, quamvis a cultu Dei recedentem, eorumque filiis reservatis secundum legis præceptum. Esset autem hoc multitudini periculosum et ejus rectoribus, si privata præsumptione aliqui attentarent præsidentium necem etiam tyrannorum. Plerumque enim hujusmodi periculis magis exponunt se mali quam boni. Malis autem solet esse grave dominium non minus regum quam tyrannorum, quia secundum sententiam Salomonis: Dissipat impios rex sapiens. Magis igitur ex hujus præsumptione immineret periculum multitudini de amissione regis, quam remedium de subtractione tyranni. Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum sævitiam non privata præsumptione aliquorum, sed auctoritate publica procedendum. Primo quidem, si ad jus multitudinis alicujus pertineat sibi providere de rege, non injuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destitui, vel refrænari ejus potestas, si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur. Nec putanda est talis multitudo infideliter agere tyrannum destituens, etiamsi eidem in perpetuo se ante subjecerat: quia hoc ipse meruit in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens, ut exigit regis officium, quod ei pactum a subditis non reservetur. Sic Romani Tarquinium superbum quem in regem susceperant, propter ejus et filiorum tyrannidem a regno ejecerunt substituta minori, scilicet consularia potestate. Sic etiam Domitianus, qui modestissimis Imperatoribus Vespasiano patri, et Tito fratri ejus successerat, dum tyrannidem exercet, a senatu Romano interemptus est, omnibus quæ perverse Romanis fecerat per Senatusconsultum juste et salubriter in irritum revocatis. Quo factum est, ut beatus Joannes Evangelista dilectus Dei discipulus, qui per ipsum Domitianum in Pathmos insulam fuerat exilio relegatus, ad Ephesum per Senatusconsultum remitteretur. Si vero ad jus alicujus superioris pertineat multitudini providere de rege, spectandum est ab eo remedium contra tyranni nequitiam. Sic Archelai, qui in Judæa pro Herode patre suo regnare jam cœperat, paternam malitiam imitantis, Judæis contra eum querimoniam ad Cesarem Augustum deferentibus, primo quidem potestas diminuitur, ablato sibi regio nomine, et medietate regni sui inter duos fratres suos divisa: deinde cum nec sic a tyrannide compesceretur a Tiberio Cesare relegatus est in exilium apud Lugdunum Galliæ civitatem. Quod si omnino contra tyrannum auxilium humanum haberi non potest, recurrendum est ad regem omnium Deum, quid est adjutor in opportunitatibus in tribulatione. Ejus enim potentiæ subest, ut cor tyranni crudele convertat in mansuetudinem, secundum Salomonis sententiam. Proverb. xii. Cor regis in manu Dei quocumque voluerit inclinavit illud. Ipse enim regis Assueri crudelitatem, qui Judæis mortem parabat, in mansuetudinem vertit. Ipse est qui ita Nabuchodonosor, crudelem regem convertit, quod factus est divinæ potentiæ prædicator. Nunc igitur, inquit, ego Nabuchodonosor laudo, et magnifico, et glorifico regem cœli, quia opera ejus vera et viæ ejus judicia, et gradientes in superbia potest humiliare. Dan. iv. Tyrannos vero quos reputat conversione indignos, potest auferre de medio vel ad infimum statum reducere, secundum illud Sapientes Eccles. x. Sedem ducum superborum destruxit Deus, et sedere fecit mites pro eis. Ipse enim qui videns afflictionem populi sui in Ægypto, et audiens eorum clamorem Pharaonem tyrannum dejecit cum exercitu suo in mare; ipse est qui memoratum Nabuchodonosor prius superbientem non solum ejectum de regni solio, sed etiam de hominum consortio, in similitudinem bestiæ commutavit. Nec enim abreviata manus ejus est, ut populum suum a tyrannis liberare non possit. Promittit enim populo suo per Isaiam, requiem se daturum a labore et confusione, ac servitute dura, qua ante servierat, et per Ezech. xxxiv. dicit: Liberabo meum gregem de ore eorum pastorum, qui pascunt seipsos. Sed ut, hoc beneficium populus a Deo consequi mereatur, debet a peccatis cessare, quia in ultionem peccati divina permissione impii accipiunt principatum, dicente Domino per Osee xiii.: Dabo tibi regem in furore meo, et in Job. xxxiv. dicitur, quod regnare facit hominem hypocritam propter peccata populi. Tollenda est igitur culpa, ut cesset a tyrannorum plaga.
SUAREZ
(Disp. 13. De Bello. sect. 8. – Utrum seditio sit intrinsece mala?)
Seditio dicitur bellum commune intra eamdem Rempublicam, quod geri potest, vel inter duas partes ejus, vel inter Principem et Rempublicam. Dico primo: Seditio inter duas partes Reipublicæ semper est mala ex parte aggressoris: ex parte vero defendentis se justa est. Hoc secundum per se est notum. Primum ostenditur: quia nulla cernitur ibi legitima auctoritas ad indicendum bellum; hæc enim residet in supremo Principe, ut vidimus sect. 2. Dices, interdum poterit Princeps eam auctoritatem concedere, si magna necessitas publica urgeat. At tunc jam non censetur aggredi pars Reipublicæ, sed Princeps ipse; sicque nulla erit seditio de qua loquimur. Sed, quid si illa Reipublicæ pars sit vere offensa ab alia neque possit per Principem jus suum obtinere? Respondeo, non posse plus efficere, quam possit persona privata, ut ex superioribus constare facile potest.
Dico secundo: Bellum Reipublicæ contra Principem, etiamsi aggressivum, non est intrinsece malum; habere tamen debet conditiones justi alias belli, ut honestetur. Conclusio solum habet locum, quando Princeps est tyrannus; quod duobus modis contingit, ut Cajet. not. 2. 2. q. 64 articulo primo ad tertium: primo si tyrannus sit quoad dominium, et potestatem: secundo solum quoad regimen. Quando priori modo accidit tyrannus, tota Respublica, et quodlibet ejus membrum jus habet contra illum; unde quilibet potest se ac Rempublicam a tyrannide vindicare. Ratio est; quia tyrannus ille aggressor est, et inique bellum movet contra Rempublicam, et singula membra; unde omnibus competit jus defensionis. Ita Cajetanus eo loco, sumique potest ex D. Thom. in secundo, distinctione 44, quæstione secunda, articulo secundo. De posteriori tyranno idem docuit Joann. Hus, imo de omni iniquo superiore; quod damnatum est in Concilio Constant. Sessione 8 et 15. Unde certa veritas est, contra hujusmodi tyrannum nullam privatam personam, aut potestatem imperfectam posse juste movere bellum aggressivum, atque illud esset propie seditio. Probatur, quoniam ille, ut supponitur, verus est Dominus: inferiores autem jus non habent indicendi bellum, sed defendendi se tantum; quod non habet locum in hoc tyranno: namque ille non semper singulis facit injuriam, atque si invaderent, id solum possent efficere, quod ad suam defensionem sufficeret. At vero tota Respublica posset bello insurgere contra ejusmodi tyrannum, neque tunc excitaretur propia seditio (hoc siquidem nomen in malam partem sumi consuevit). Ratio est: quia tunc tota Respublica superior est Rege: nam, cum ipsa dederit illi potestatem, ea conditione dedisse censetur, ut politice, non tyrannice regeret, alias ab ipsa posset deponi. Est tamen observandum, ut ille vere, et manifeste tyrannice agat; concurrantque aliæ conditiones ad honestatem belli positas. Lege Divum Thomum 1 de regimine Principum, cap. 6.
Dico tertio: Bellum Reipublicæ contra Regem neutro modo tyrannum, est propiissime seditio, et intrinsece malum. Est certa, et inde constat: quia deest tunc et causa justa, et potestas. Ex quo etiam e contrario constat, bellum Principis contra Rempublicam sibi subditam, ex parte potestatis posse esse justum, si adsint aliæ conditiones; si vero desint, injustum omnino esse.5