Let us imagine the Europeans of the fifteenth century invading the East and West Indies, without any check, guided only by the inspirations of cupidity, and by the caprices of arbitrary power, full of the pride of conquerors, and of the contempt with which the Indians must have inspired them, on account of the inferiority of their knowledge, and of their backwardness in civilization and refinement: what must have happened? If, in spite of the incessant cries of religion, in spite of the influence which she had on laws and manners, the conquered nations have had so much to suffer, would not the evil have been carried to an intolerable extent, without those powerful causes which incessantly combated, prevented or diminished it? The conquered would have been reduced into slavery en masse; they would have been condemned en masse to perpetual degradation; they would have been deprived even of the hope of one day entering on the career of civilization.
If the conduct of Europeans at that time with respect to men of other races – if the conduct of some nations of our own days is to be deplored, it cannot be said at least that the Catholic religion has not opposed such excesses with all her strength; it cannot be said that the Head of the Church has ever allowed these evils to pass without raising his voice to recall to mind the rights of men, to stigmatize injustice, to excite abhorrence of cruelty, and energetically to plead the cause of humanity, without distinction of races, climates, or colors.
Whence does Europe derive this lofty idea and this generous feeling, which urge her to declare herself so strongly against the traffic in men, and to demand the complete abolition of slavery in the colonies? When posterity shall call to mind these glorious facts; when it shall adopt them as marking a new era in the annals of civilization; when, studying and analyzing the causes which have conducted European legislation and manners to so high a pitch, and, passing over temporary and unimportant motives, insignificant circumstances, and secondary agents, it shall seek for the vital principle which impelled European civilization towards so glorious an end, it will find that this principle was Christianity; and if, desiring to fathom the question more and more, it should inquire whether this was Christianity, under a vague and general form – Christianity without authority – Christianity without Catholicity – the answer of history will be this: Catholicity, exclusively prevailing in Europe, abolished slavery among the European races; she introduced the principle of the abolition of slavery into European civilization, by showing practically, and in opposition to the opinion of antiquity, that slavery was not necessary for society; and she made it understood, that the sacred work of enfranchisement was the foundation of all great and life-giving civilization. She has therefore inoculated European civilization with the principle of the abolition of slavery; it is owing to her that, wherever this civilization has come into contact with slavery, it has been profoundly disturbed – an evident proof that there were at the bottom two opposite elements, two contending principles, which were compelled to struggle incessantly, until the more powerful, noble, and fruitful prevailing, and reducing the other under the yoke, in the end annihilated it. I will say more: by searching whether facts really confirm this influence of Catholicity, not only in all that concerns the civilization of Europe, but also in the countries which Europeans have conquered two centuries ago, in the East and West, we shall meet with Catholic Bishops and priests working without intermission in improving the lot of colonial slaves; we shall call to mind what is due to the Catholic missions; we shall read and understand the apostolical letters of Pius II., issued in 1482, and mentioned above; those of Paul III., in 1537; those of Urban VIII., in 1639; those of Benedict XIV., in 1741; and those of Gregory XVI., in 1839.
In these letters there is taught and defined all that has been or can be said on this point in favor of humanity. We shall there find blamed, condemned, and punished, all that European civilization has at length resolved to condemn and punish; and when calling to mind also that it was Pius VII., who, at the beginning of this century, zealously interposed his good offices with men in power for the complete abolition of slavery among Christians, we shall not be able to avoid acknowledging and confessing that Catholicity has had the principal share in this great work. It is she indeed who has laid down the principle on which the work rests, who has established the precedents which guide it, who has constantly proclaimed the principles which have suggested it and has constantly condemned those who have opposed it; it is she, in fine, who at all times has declared open war against cruelty and cupidity, – the support and perpetual motives for injustice and inhumanity. Let us hear the testimony of a celebrated Protestant author, Robertson, the historian of America: "From the time that ecclesiastics were sent as instructors into America, they perceived that the rigor with which their countrymen treated the natives rendered their ministry altogether fruitless. The missionaries, in conformity with the mild spirit of that religion which they were employed to publish, soon remonstrated against the maxims of the planters with respect to the Americans, and condemned the repartimientos, or distributions, by which they were given up as slaves to their conquerors, as no less contrary to natural justice and the precepts of Christianity, than to sound policy. The Dominicans, to whom the instruction of the Americans was originally committed, were the most vehement in attacking the repartimientos. In the year 1511, Motesino, one of their most eminent preachers, inveighed against this practice in the great church at St. Domingo, with all the impetuosity of his natural eloquence. Don Diego Columbus, the principal officers of the colony, and all the laymen who had been his hearers, complained of the monk to his superiors; but they, instead of condemning, applauded his doctrine, as equally pious and seasonable. The Franciscans, influenced by the spirit of opposition and rivalship which subsists between the two orders, discovered some inclination to take part with the laity, and to espouse the defence of the repartimientos. But as they could not with decency give their approbation to a system of oppression so repugnant to the spirit of religion, they endeavored to palliate what they could not justify, and alleged in excuse for the conduct of their countrymen, that it was impossible to carry on any improvement in the colony, unless the Spaniards possessed such dominion over the natives, that they could compel them to labor. The Dominicans, regardless of such political and interested considerations, would not relax in any degree the rigor of their sentiments, and even refused to absolve, or admit to the sacrament, such of their countrymen as continued to hold the natives in servitude. Both parties applied to the king for his decision in a matter of such importance. Ferdinand empowered a committee of his Privy Council, assisted by some of the most eminent civilians and divines in Spain, to hear the deputies sent from Hispaniola in support of their respective opinions. After a long discussion, the speculative point in controversy was determined in favor of the Dominicans; the Indians were declared to be a free people, entitled to all the natural rights of man; but notwithstanding this decision, the repartimientos were continued upon their ancient footing. As this determination admitted the principle upon which the Dominicans founded their opinion, they renewed their efforts to obtain relief for the Indians with additional boldness and zeal. At length, in order to quiet the colony, which was alarmed by their remonstrances and censures, Ferdinand issued a decree of his Privy Council (1513), declaring that after mature consideration of the apostolic Bull, and other titles by which the Crown of Castile claimed a right to its possessions, in the new world, the servitude of the Indians was warranted both by the laws of God and man; that unless they were subjected to the dominion of the Spaniards, and compelled to reside under their inspection, it would be impossible to reclaim them from idolatry, or to instruct them in the Christian faith; that no further scruple ought to be entertained concerning the lawfulness of the repartimientos, as the King and Council were willing to take the charge of that upon their own consciences; and that therefore the Dominicans, and monks of other religious orders, should abstain for the future from those invectives which, from an excess of charitable but ill-informed zeal, they had uttered against the practice. That his intention of adhering to this decree might be fully understood, Ferdinand conferred new grants of Indians upon several of his courtiers. But in order that he might not seem altogether inattentive to the rights of humanity, he published an edict in which he endeavored to provide for the mild treatment of the Indians under the yoke to which he subjected them; he regulated the nature of the work which they should be required to perform; he prescribed the mode in which they should be clothed and fed, and gave directions with respect to their instruction in the principles of Christianity. But the Dominicans, who, from their experience of what had passed, judged concerning the future, soon perceived the inefficacy of those provisions, and foretold that, as long as it was the interest of individuals to treat the Indians with rigor, no public regulations would render their servitude mild or tolerable. They considered it as vain to waste their own time and strength in attempting to communicate the sublime truths to men whose spirits were broken, and their faculties impaired by oppression. Some of them, in despair, requested the permission of their superiors to remove to the continent, and pursue the object of their mission among such of the natives as were not hitherto corrupted by the example of the Spaniards, or alienated by their cruelty from the Christian faith. Such as remained in Hispaniola continued to remonstrate, with decent firmness, against the servitude of the Indians.
"The violent operations of Albuquerque, the new distributor of the Indians, revived the zeal of the Dominicans against the repartimientos, and called forth an advocate for that oppressed people who possessed all the courage, the talents, and the activity requisite in supporting such a desperate cause. This was Bartholomew de las Casas, a native of Seville, and one of the clergymen sent out with Columbus in his second voyage to Hispaniola, in order to settle in that Island. He early adopted the opinion prevalent among ecclesiastics with respect to the unlawfulness of reducing the natives to servitude; and that he might demonstrate the sincerity of his conviction, he relinquished all the Indians who had fallen to his share in the division of the inhabitants among their conquerors, declaring that he should ever bewail his own misfortune and guilt, in having exercised for a moment this impious dominion over his fellow-creatures. From that time he became the avowed patron of the Indians; and by his bold interpositions in their behalf, as well as by the respect due to his abilities and character, he had often the merit of setting some bounds to the excesses of his countrymen." (History of America, book 3.)
It would be too long to relate here the energetic efforts of De las Casas in favor of the colonies of the new world; all know them – all must know that, filled with zeal for the liberty of the Indians, he conceived and undertook an attempt at civilization analogous to that which was realized later, to the immortal honor of the Catholic clergy, in Paraguay. If the efforts of De las Casas had not all the success that might naturally have been expected, we find the cause of this in the thousand passions with which history makes us acquainted, and perhaps also in the impetuosity of this man, whose sublime zeal was not always accompanied by the consummate prudence which the Church displays.
However this may be, Catholicity has completely accomplished her mission of peace and love; without injustice or catastrophe, she has broken the chains under which a large portion of the human race groaned; and if it had been given her to prevail for some time in Asia and Africa, she would have achieved their destruction in the four quarters of the globe, by banishing the degradations and the abominations introduced and established in those countries by Mahometanism and idolatry. It is melancholy, no doubt, that Christianity has not yet exercised over these latter countries all the influence which would have been necessary to ameliorate the social and political condition of those nations, by changing their ideas and manners. But if we seek for the causes of this lamentable delay, we certainly shall not find them in the conduct of Catholicity. This is not the place to point out these causes; nevertheless, while reserving the analysis and complete examination of this matter for another part of the work, I will make the remark en passant, that Protestantism may justly criminate itself for the obstacles which, during three centuries, it has opposed to the universality and efficacy of the Christian influence on infidel nations. These few words will suffice here; we shall return to this important subject later.
Note 16, p. 131
We can scarcely believe how far the ideas of the ancients went astray with regard to the respect which is due to man. Can it be believed that they went so far, as to regard the lives of all who could not be useful to society as of no value? and yet nothing is more certain. We might lament that this or that city had adopted a barbarous law; that a ferocious custom was introduced among a people by the effect of particular circumstances; yet as long as philosophy protested against such attempts, human reason would have been unstained, and could not have been accused without injustice of taking part in infamous attempts at abortion or infanticide. But when we find crime defended and taught by the most important philosophers of antiquity; when we see it triumph in the minds of the most illustrious men, who, with fearful calmness and serenity, prescribe the atrocities which we have named, we are confounded, and our blood runs cold; we would fain shut our eyes, not to see so much infamy thrown upon philosophy and human reason. Let us hear Plato in his Republic, in that book in which he undertook to collect all the theories in his opinion the most distinguished and the best adapted to lead human society towards its beau ideal. This is his scandalous language: "Oportet profecto secundum ea quæ supra concessimus, optimos viros mulieribus optimis ut plurimum congredi: deterrimos autem contra, deterrimis. Et illorem quidem prolem nutrire, horum minime, si armentum excellentissimum sit futurum. Et hæc omnia dum agantur, ab omnibus præterquam a principibus ignorari, si modo armentum custodum debeat seditione carere." "Prope admodum;" "Very good," replies another speaker. (Plat. Rep. l. v.)
Behold, then, the human race reduced to the condition of mere brutes; in truth, the philosopher had reason to use the word flock (armentum)! There is this difference, however, that magistrates imbued with such feelings must have been more harsh towards their subjects than a shepherd towards his flock. If the shepherd finds among the lambs which have just been born a weak and lame one, he does not kill it or allow it to die of hunger; he carries it to the sheep who ought to nourish it, he caresses it to stop its cries.
But perhaps the expressions which we have just quoted escaped the philosopher in a moment of inadvertence; perhaps the idea which they reveal was only one of those sinister inspirations which glide into the mind of a man, and pass away without leaving any more impression than is made by a reptile moving through the grass. We wish it were so, for the fame of Plato; but unhappily he returns to it so often, and insists on the point with so systematic a coldness, that no means of justifying him are left. "With respect," he says lower down, "to the children of citizens of inferior rank, and even those of other citizens, if they are born deformed, the magistrates shall hide them, as is proper, in some secure place, which it shall be forbidden to reveal." "Yes," replies one of the interlocutors; "if we desire to preserve the race of warriors in its purity."
Plato also lays down various rules with respect to the relations of the two sexes; he speaks of the case in which the man and woman shall have reached an advanced age: "Quando igitur jam mulieres et viri ætatem generationi aptam egressi fuerint, licere viris dicemus, cuicumque voluerint, præterquam filiæ atque matri et filiarum natis matrisve majoribus: licere et mulieribus cuilibet, præterquam filio atque patri, ac superioribus et inferioribus eorumdem. Cum vero hæc omnia mandaverimus, interdicemus fœtum talem (si contigeret) edi et in lucem produci. Si quid autem matrem parere coegerit, ita exponere præcipiemus, quasi ei nulla nutritio sit."
Plato seems to have been very well pleased with his doctrine; for, in the very book in which he writes what we have just seen, he lays down the famous maxim, that the evils of states will never be remedied, that societies will never be well governed, until philosophers shall become kings, or kings become philosophers. God preserve us from seeing on the throne a philosophy such as his! Moreover, his wish for the reign of philosophy has been realized in modern times. What do I say? It has had more than empire; it has been deified, and divine honors have been paid to it in public temples. I do not believe, however, that the happy days of the worship of reason are now much regretted.
The horrible doctrine which we have just seen in Plato was transmitted with fidelity to future schools. Aristotle, who on so many points took the liberty of departing from the doctrines of his master, did not think of correcting those which regard abortion and infanticide. In his Politics he teaches the same crimes with the same calmness as Plato: "In order," he says, "to avoid nourishing weak or lame children, the law should direct them to be exposed or made away with." "Propter multitudinem autem liberorum, ne plures sint quam expediat, si gentium instituta et leges vetent procreata exponi, definitum esse oportet procreandorum liberorum numerum. Quod si quibus inter se copulatis et congressis, plures liberi, quam definitum sit, nascantur, priusquam sensus et vita inseratur, abortus est fœtui inferendus." (Polit. l. vii. c. 16.)
It will be seen how much reason I had to say that man, as man, was esteemed as nothing among the ancients; that society entirely absorbed him; that it claimed unjust rights over him, and regarded him as an instrument to be used when of service, and which it had a right to destroy.
We observe in the writings of the ancient philosophers, that they make of society a kind of whole, consisting of individuals, as the mass of iron consists of the atoms that compose it; they make of it a sort of unity, to which all must be sacrificed; they have no consideration for the sphere of individual liberty; they do not appear to dream that the object of society is the good, the happiness of individuals and families. According to them, this unity is the principal good, with which nothing else can be compared; the greatest evil that can happen is, that this unity should be broken – an evil which must be avoided by all imaginable means. "Is not the worst evil of a state," says Plato, "that which divides it, and makes many out of one? and is not the greatest excellence of a state, that which binds all its parts together, and makes it one?" Relying on this principle, and pursuing the development of his theory, he takes individuals and families, and kneads them, as it were, in order to form them into ONE compact whole. Thus, besides education and life in common, he wishes also to have women and children in common; he considers it injurious that there should be personal enjoyments or sufferings; he desires that all should be common and social; he allows individuals to live, think, feel, and act only as parts of a great whole. If you read his Republic with attention, and particularly the fifth book, you will see that the prevailing idea of this philosopher is what we have just explained. Let us hear Aristotle on the same point: "As the object of society," he says, "is one, it is clear that the education of all its members ought necessarily to be one and identical. Education ought to be public, and not private; as things now are, each one takes care of his children as he thinks proper, and teaches them as he pleases. Each citizen is a particle of society, and the care to be given to a particle ought naturally to extend to what the whole requires." (Polit. l. viii. c. 1.) In order to explain to us what he means by this common education, he concludes by quoting with honor the education which was given at Sparta, which every one knows consisted in stifling all feelings except a ferocious patriotism, the traits of which still make us shudder.
With our ideas and customs, we do not know how to confine ourselves to considering society in this way. Individuals among us are attached to the social body, forming a part of it, but without losing their own sphere – that of the family; and they preserve around them a vast career, where they are allowed to exert themselves, without coming into collision with the colossus of society. Nevertheless, patriotism exists; but it is no longer a blind instinctive passion, urging man on to the sacrifice, like a victim, with bandaged eyes, but it is no reasonable, noble, and exalted feeling, which forms heroes like those of Lepanto and Baylen; which converts peaceful citizens, like those of Gyronna and Saragossa, into lions; which, as by an electric spark, makes a whole people rise on a sudden without arms, and brave death from the artillery of a numerous and disciplined army: such was Madrid, following the sublime Mourons of Daoiz and of Velarda.
I have already hinted, in the text, that society among the ancients claimed the right of interfering in all that regards individuals. I will add, that the thing went to a ridiculous extent. Who would imagine that the law ought to interfere in the food of a woman who was enceinte, or in the exercise which she should take every day? This is what Aristotle gravely says: "It is necessary that women who are enceinte should take particular care of their bodies; that they should avoid indulgence in luxury, and using food which is too light and weak. The legislator easily attains his end by prescribing and ordering them a daily walk, in order to go to honor and venerate the gods, to whom it has been confided by fate to watch over the formation of beings. Atque hoc facile assequitur scriptor legum, si eis iter aliquod quotidianum ad cultum venerationemque deorum eorum, quibus sorte obtigit, ut præsint gignendis animantibus, injunxerit ac mandaverit." (Polit. l. vii. c. 16.)
The action of laws extended to every thing; it seems that, in certain cases, even the tears of children could not escape this severity. "Those," says Aristotle, "who, by means of laws, forbid children to cry and weep, are wrong; cries and tears serve as exercise for children, and assist them in growing; they are an effort of nature, which relieves and invigorates those who are in pain." (Polit. l. vii. c. 17.)
These doctrines of the ancients – this manner of considering the relations of individuals with society – very well explain how castes and slavery could be regarded as natural among them. Who can be astonished at seeing whole races deprived of liberty, or regarded as incapable of partaking of the rights of other superior classes, when we see generations of innocent beings condemned to death, and these conscientious philosophers not having the slightest scruple with respect to the legitimacy of so inhuman an act? It was not that these philosophers had not happiness in view as the object of society; but they had monstrous ideas with respect to the means of obtaining that happiness.
Note 17, p. 146
The reader will easily dispense with my entering into details on the abject and shameful condition of women among the ancients, and in which they still are among the moderns where Christianity does not prevail; moreover, my pen would be checked every moment by strict laws of modesty, if I were to attempt to represent the characteristic features of this wretched picture. The inversion of ideas was such, that we hear men the most renowned for their gravity and moderation rave in the most incredible manner on this point. We will lay aside hundreds of examples which it would be easy to adduce; but who is ignorant of the scandalous advice of the sage Solon, with respect to the lending of women for the purpose of improving the race? Who has not blushed to read what the divine Plato, in his Republic, says of the propriety and manner of making women share in the public games? Let us throw a veil over recollections so dishonourable to human wisdom. When the chief legislators and sages so far forgot the first elements of morality, and the most ordinary inspirations of nature, what must have been the case with the vulgar? How fearfully true those words of the sacred text which represent to us the nations deprived of the light of Christianity as sitting in darkness and in the shadow of death!
There is nothing more fatal to woman, nothing more apt to degrade her, than that which is injurious to modesty; and yet we see that the unlimited power granted to man over woman contributed to this degradation, and reduced her, among certain nations, to be nothing but a slave. Losing sight of the manners of other nations, let us consider those of the Romans for a moment. Among them the formula, ubi tu Cayus ego Caya, seemed to indicate a subjection so slight, that it might almost be called an equality; but in order to appreciate this equality, it is enough to recollect that, at Rome, a husband could put his wife to death by his own authority, and that not only in the case of adultery, but for offences infinitely less serious. In the time of Romulus, Egnacius Menecius was acquitted of a similar crime, although his wife had done nothing more than drink wine from a cask. These traits describe a nation, whatever importance you may besides think proper to attach to the solicitude of the Romans to prevent their matrons from becoming addicted to wine. When Cato directed an embrace, as a proof of affection, among relations, for the purpose, as Pliny relates, of ascertaining whether the women smelt of wine, an temetum olerent, it is true he showed his strictness; but it was an unworthy outrage offered to the honor of the women themselves whose virtue it pretended to preserve. There are some remedies worse than the disease.
Note 18, p. 157
The antichristian philosophy must have had considerable influence on the desire to find among the barbarians the origin of the elevation of the female character in Europe, and of some other principles of our civilization. Indeed as soon as you discover the source of these admirable qualities in the forests of Germany, Christianity is stripped of a portion of its honors; and what was its own and peculiar glory is divided among many. I will not deny that the Germans of Tacitus are sufficiently poetical; but it is difficult to believe that the real Germans were so to any extent. Some passages inserted in the text add great force to our conjecture; but what appears to me eminently calculated to dissipate all these illusions is, the history of the invasion by the barbarians, above all that which has been written by eye-witnesses. The picture, far from continuing poetical, then becomes disgusting in the extreme. This interminable succession of nations passes before the eyes of the reader, like an alarming vision in an evil dream; and certainly the first idea which occurs to us at the sight of this picture is, not to seek for any of the qualities of modern civilization in these invading hordes; but the great difficulty is, to know how this chaos has been reduced to order, and how it has been possible to produce from such barbarism the noblest and most brilliant civilization that has ever been seen on earth. Tacitus appears to be an enthusiast; but Sidonius, who wrote at no great distance from the barbarians, who saw them, and suffered from meeting them, does not partake of this enthusiasm. "I find myself," he said, "among long-haired nations, compelled to hear the German language, and to applaud, at whatever cost, the song of the drunken Burgundian, with hair plastered with rancid grease. Happy your eyes who do not see them; happy your ears who do not hear them?" If space permitted, it would be easy for me to accumulate a thousand passages which would evidently show what the barbarians were, and what could be expected from them in all respects. It is as clear as the light of day, that it was the design of Providence to employ these nations to destroy the Roman empire, and change the face of the world. The invaders seem to have had a feeling of their terrible mission. They march, they advance, they know not whither they go; but they know well that they go to destroy. Attila called himself the scourge of God. The same barbarian himself defined his formidable duty in these words: "The star falls, the sea is moved; I am the hammer of the earth. Where my horse passes, the grass never grows." Alaric, marching towards the capital of the world, said: "I cannot stop; there is some one urges me, who excites me to sack Rome." Genseric prepares a naval expedition; his troops are on board, he himself embarks: no one knows the point towards which he will direct his sails. The pilot approaches the barbarian, and asks him; "My lord, against what nations will you wage war?" "Against those who have provoked the anger of God," replies Genseric.