CHAPTER LVI.
HOW THE CIVIL POWER MAY BE LAWFULLY RESISTED
From what has been said in the foregoing chapters it follows, that it is allowable to resist illegitimate power by force. The Catholic religion does not enjoin obedience to governments existing merely de facto; for morality does not admit a mere fact, unsupported by right and justice. However, when power is in itself lawful, but in its exercise tyrannical, does our religion prohibit, in every instance, resistance by physical force; so that not to resist at all, forms a part of her dogmas? Is insurrection never allowable, in any supposition, for any motive? Although I have already eliminated many questions, it is necessary to draw here a fresh distinction, in order to fix exactly the point at which dogma ends, and opinions begin. It is evident, in the first place, that an individual has no right to kill a tyrant on his own authority. The Council of Constance, in its 15th session, condemned the following proposition as heretical: "Any vassal or subject may and should, lawfully and meritoriously, kill any tyrant. He may even, for this purpose, avail himself of ambushes, and wily expressions of affection or adulation; notwithstanding any oath or pact imposed upon him by the tyrant; and without waiting for the sentence or order of any judge." "Quilibet tyrannus potest et debet licite et meritorie occidi per quemcumque vassallum suum vel subditum, etiam per clanculares insidias, et subtiles blanditias vel adulationes, non obstante quocumque præstito juramento, seu confœderatione factis cum eo, non expectata sententia vel mandato judicis cujuscumque."
But does this decision of the Council of Constance constitute a prohibition of every kind of insurrection? No; it speaks of the murder of a tyrant by any particular individual; but every case of resistance is not maintained by a single individual; neither is it the aim of every insurrection to destroy a tyrant. This doctrine only serves to prevent murder, and a train of evils which would overwhelm society if it were established that any individual had a right of his own authority to kill the supreme ruler. Who will venture to accuse this doctrine of being favorable to tyranny? The liberty of the people should not be based upon the horrid right of assassination; the defence of the rights of society should not be confided to the dagger of a fanatic. The attributes of public power are so extensive and various, that their exercise must necessarily and frequently inconvenience some individuals. Man, inclined to extremes and revenge, easily enlarges upon the grievances which he suffers; passing from a particular to a general, he is inclined to look upon those who injure or oppose him as villains. At the slightest shock which he receives from government, he cries out that tyranny is insupportable; the act of arbitrary power, real or imaginary, committed against him, becomes, in his mouth, one of the many iniquities perpetrated, or the commencement of those that are to be. Grant, therefore, to the individual the right of killing a tyrant; proclaim to the people that, to render such an act lawful and meritorious, there is no need of a sentence, or any judicial condemnation; and from that time this horrible crime will become frequent. The wisest, the justest kings will fall victims to the parricidal dagger, or the poisoned cup. You will have furnished no guarantee to the liberty of the people, and you will have exposed the dearest interests of society to dreadful hazards.
The Catholic Church, by this solemn declaration, has conferred an immense service on humanity. The violent death of him who holds the supreme power seldom happens without causing bloodshed and great commotion. It provokes measures of suspicious precaution, easily converted into tyranny. It follows, then, that any crime instigated by excessive hatred of tyranny contributes to establish it in a form still more absolute and cruel. Modern nations should feel grateful to the Catholic Church for having established this sacred and saving principle. A person must be possessed of very mean sentiments, or very ferocious instincts, not to appreciate it, or to regret the bloody scenes of the Roman Empire and the barbarian monarchy. We have seen, and we still see, powerful nations delivered up to dreadful troubles, by the neglect of this Catholic maxim. The history of the last three centuries, and the experience of this, prove that this august precept of the Church was given to the people in anticipation of the dangers which were threatening them. In it we find no flattery for kings; for they are not the only ones benefited by it; it is a general proposition, including all others, whatever be their titles, who exercise supreme authority, whatever be the form of government, from the Russian autocrat to the most democratical republic.
It is worthy of remark, that modern constitutions, proceeding from the bosom of revolutions, have universally rendered a solemn homage to this Catholic maxim; they have declared the person of the monarch sacred and inviolable. What does this mean, but that this person should be placed under an impenetrable safeguard? You reproach the Catholic Church with placing a sort of shield before the person of kings, and yet you yourselves declare that person inviolable. The anointing of kings you ridicule, and yet you yourself declare that the king is sacred. Since you are forced to imitate the Church, her dogmas and her discipline must have contained an eternal truth, and high political principles; with this difference, however, that you represent as the work of the will of man what she esteems the work of the will of God. But if supreme power makes a scandalous abuse of its faculties, if it outsteps its just bounds, if it tramples under foot fundamental laws, if it persecutes religion, corrupts morality, outrages public dignity, attacks the honor of citizens, exacts illegal and disproportionate contributions, alienates national property, dismembers provinces, inflicts death and ignominy upon the people: in such cases, does Catholicity also prescribe obedience? does it forbid resistance? does it command subjects to remain tranquil, like a lamb in the claws of a wild beast? May there not exist, either in an individual, or in the principal bodies, or in the most distinguished classes of society, or in the entire mass of the nation, somewhere, in fine, the right of opposing, of resisting, after all means of mildness, representation, counsel, and entreaty have failed? In such disastrous circumstances, does the Church leave the people without hope, and tyrants without restraint?
In such extremities, certain very renowned theologians think that resistance is allowable; but the dogmas of the Church do not descend to these details. The Church abstains from condemning the opposite doctrines. In such extreme circumstances, non-resistance is not a dogmatical prescription. The Church has never taught such a doctrine; if any one will maintain that she has, let him bring forward a decision of a Council or of a Sovereign Pontiff to that effect. St. Thomas of Aquin, Cardinal Bellarmin, Suarez, and other eminent theologians, were well versed in the dogmas of the Church; and yet, if you consult their works, so far from finding this doctrine in them, you will find the opposite one. Now the Church has not condemned them, she has not confounded them with those seditious writers in whom Protestantism abounds, nor with modern revolutionists, who are continually disturbing social order. Bossuet and other authors of repute differ from St. Thomas, Bellarmin, Suarez; and this gives credit to the opposite opinion, but does not convert it into a dogma. Upon certain points of the highest import, the opinions of the illustrious Bishop of Meaux suffered contradiction; and we know that upon this case of an excess of tyranny, the Pope at another period was acknowledged to possess faculties which Bossuet refuses him.
The Abbé de Lamennais, in his impotent and obstinate resistance to the Holy see, adduced the doctrines of St. Thomas, and those of some other theologians, pretending that to condemn his own works was to condemn schools hitherto held irreproachable. (Affaires de Rome.) The Abbé Gerbet, in his excellent refutation of M. de Lamennais, after having very judiciously remarked, that the Sovereign Pontiff's object in reproving modern doctrines was, to prevent a renewal of the errors of Wickliffe, observes, at the epoch of this heresiarch's condemnation, the doctrines of St. Thomas and of other theologians were well known, and that, nevertheless, no one believed that they were included in the condemnation. The excellent author of this refutation deemed this sufficient to deprive M. de Lamennais of the shield under which he sought to defend and cover his apostacy; and for this reason, he abstains from drawing a parallel between the two doctrines. In fact, this reflection alone is sufficient to convince any judicious man that the doctrines of St. Thomas bear no resemblance to those of M. de Lamennais. It may, however, be useful to give in few words a comparison of the two doctrines. At the present time, and in these matters, it is very proper to know, not only that these doctrines differ, but likewise wherein they differ. M. de Lamennais' theory may be stated in the following terms: A natural equality among men, and, as necessary consequences, 1. Equality of rights, political rights included; 2. The injustice of every social and political organization not establishing this equality completely, as is the case in Europe and in the whole universe; 3. Expediency and legitimacy of insurrection, to destroy governments, and change social organization; 4. Abolition of all government, as the object of the progress of the human race.
The doctrines of St. Thomas on the same points may be thus expressed: A natural equality among men; that is to say, an essential equality, but exclusive of physical, intellectual, and moral gifts – an equality among men in the eyes of God – an equality in their destination, inasmuch as they are all created to enjoy God – an equality of means, inasmuch as they are all redeemed by Christ, and may all receive His grace; but exclusive of the inequalities which it may please God to establish by gifts of grace and glory. 1. An equality of social and political rights. According to the holy doctor, such an equality is impossible. He rather supports the utility and legitimacy of certain hierarchies; the respect due to those established by law; the necessity of there being some to command and others to obey; the obligation of being subject to the established laws of the country, whatever be the form of government; the preference for monarchical governments. 2. The injustice of every social and political organization not establishing a complete equality. St. Thomas looks upon this as an error opposed to reason and to faith. Nay, more; not only is it true that the inequality founded upon the very nature of man and of society is an effect and punishment of original sin, in as far as it entails upon man injury or inconvenience; but, according to the holy Doctor, this inequality would have existed among men even in a state of innocence. 3. Expediency and legitimacy of insurrection, to destroy governments, and to change the social organization. An erroneous and fatal opinion. We ought to submit to legitimate governments; it is expedient even to tolerate such as make an improper use of their power; we must exhaust every means of entreaty, of counsel and representation, before we have recourse to others. We can only appeal to force in the greatest extremities, on rare occasions, and then only under many restrictions, as will be seen elsewhere. 4. Abolition of all government, as the object of the progress of the human race. An absurd proposition – a dream that cannot be realized. The necessity of government in every society; arguments founded upon the nature of man; analogies from the human body, from the very order of the universe; the existence of government even in a state of innocence. Such are the doctrines of De Lamennais and St. Thomas respectively. Let the reader compare them, and judge for himself.
It is impossible to adduce the words of the holy Doctor – they would fill the volume. Should any reader wish to consult them himself, let him read, in addition to the passages inserted in this work, the whole treatise, De Regimine Principum, the commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans, and those passages of the Summa in which the holy Doctor treats of the soul, of the creation of man, of the state of innocence, of the angels and of their hierarchy, of original sin and its effects, and, above all, his valuable Treatise on Laws and that on Justice, in which he discusses the origin of the right of property and of inflicting punishments. After that he will be convinced of the truth of what I have just advanced; he will then see the injustice of M. de Lamennais in attempting to make the illustrious writers and saints venerated on our altars the accomplices of his apostacy. In grave and delicate matters confusion produces error, the enemies of truth are interested in spreading darkness, in establishing general and vague propositions susceptible of various interpretations. They seek with anxiety a text favorable to some one of the numerous interpretations that are possible, and proudly exclaim, "How unjust it is in you to condemn us; what we maintain was asserted centuries ago, by the most respected and celebrated writers." The Abbé de Lamennais must have reckoned in a singular manner upon the credulity of his readers, to think of making them believe that there was no honest man to be found at Rome capable of informing the Pope, that in condemning the doctrines of the apostle of revolution, he was condemning also those of the angel of the schools, and other distinguished theologians. It is possible that M. de Lamennais never read the authors except in haste and in fragments, but many persons at Rome have spent their lives in studying them.
We are not ignorant of the violent declamations of Luther, Zwinglius, Knox, Jurieu, and other leaders of Protestantism, to stir up the people to revolt against princes; we are not ignorant of the gross and violent invectives made use of by these sectaries to excite the multitude. Catholics look upon such extravagances with horror. In like manner, they look with dread upon the anarchical doctrine of Rousseau, establishing that "the clauses of the social contract are so determined by the very nature of the act, that the least modification of them would render them vain and null; so that every one then resumes his former rights and regains his natural liberty". (Contrat Social, l. i. c. 6.) The doctrine of the theologians above cited does not contain this fruitful germ of insurrection and disaster; but, on the other hand, they are not found timid and pusillanimous in the last extremities. They preach up resignation, patience, and longanimity; but there is a point at which they stop and exclaim, Enough. If they do not advocate insurrection, they do not prohibit it; it would be in vain to require them to teach as a dogmatical truth the obligation of not resisting in extreme cases. They cannot teach the people to consider as a dogma what they do not acknowledge as such. It is not their fault if the tempest bursts, if the roaring waves arise; no other hand can control them than that of God, who rides upon the north wind and sports with the tempest.
For many centuries there has been inculcated in Europe a doctrine much criticised by those who do not understand it, the intervention of the Pontifical authority between the people and their sovereigns. This doctrine was nothing less than Heaven descending as an arbiter and judge, to put an end to the disputes of the earth.
The temporal power of the Popes has served as a wonderful theme to the enemies of the Church to create alarm, and declaim against Rome; but this power is no less an historical fact and a social phenomenon, which has filled with admiration the most renowned men of modern times, including some Protestants. The Scriptures make it a duty for slaves to obey their masters, even when they are oppressive and unjust. All that can be inferred from this is, that a prince, by the simple fact of his being wicked, does not lose his authority over his subjects, which condemns beforehand the errors of those who make the right of commanding dependent upon the sanctity of its possessor. Such a principle is anarchical, and incompatible with the existence of every society. When it is once established, power remains unsafe and tottering; every disturber declares all those divested of authority whom he may deem culpable. But our question is of a different nature, and the opinion of theologians cited by us has nothing to do with this error. These theologians also on their part advocate obedience to rulers, even though they be oppressive and unjust; they also condemn insurrection, when founded on no other pretext than the vices of persons exercising supreme power; they do not admit that any abuse of power justifies resistance; but they do not consider that they impugn the sacred text by admitting that in extreme cases it is allowable to place a barrier against the excesses of a tyrant. "If governments do not lose their power by the simple fact of their being wicked, how," it will be said, "can we conceive resistance to them lawful?" This is certainly not allowable, so long as they do not outstep the bounds of their faculties; but when they do so, their commands, as St. Thomas says, are rather acts of violence than laws. "No one has the right of judging the supreme power." This is true; but above this power exist the principles of reason, morality, religion. Power, although supreme, is bound to the execution of its promises, to keep its oaths. Society is not formed upon the model of Rousseau's ideal contract; but there exist, in certain cases, real pacts between the rulers and the people, to which both are bound to adhere.
In the celebrated Catholic Proclamation to his pious Majesty Philip the Great, King of Spain and Emperor of the Indies by the Counsellors and the Council of One Hundred of the city of Barcelona, in 1640, an epoch so profoundly religious that the Counsellors quote, as a high title of glory, the zeal of the Catalonians for the Catholic faith, the devotion of the Catalonians to our lady the Blessed Virgin and the most holy Sacrament; – at that time, which pride and ignorance have so often taxed with fanaticism, these counsellors said to the king, "Besides civil obligation, the customs, constitutions, and acts of the court of Catalonia are binding on conscience, and to violate them would be a mortal sin; for the prince has no right to annul a contract; it is made freely, but cannot be revoked without injustice. If a contract is not subject to the civil law, it is subject to the law of reason; and although the prince may be the master of the laws, the contracts he makes with his vassals are inviolable, for in making them he is a mere individual, and the vassal acquires a right equal to his. A contract, in fine, should be made between equals. Hence, as the vassal cannot be unfaithful to his lord, the latter, in like manner, is bound to keep the promise he has made by solemn engagement; and indeed, the rupture of a pact ought least of all to be expected on the part of a prince. If the word of a king is law, that word given in a solemn contract is still more binding." (Catholic Proclamation, sect. 27.) The courtiers urged the monarch to measures of coercion to reduce the Catalonians to submission; the Castilian army was preparing to enter the principality. In this extremity, after exhausting all means of representation and entreaty, the counsellors thus expressed themselves: "Finally, men who have vowed an inveterate hatred against the Catalonians have been so successful in their continual persuasions, that the uprightness and equity of your majesty have been turned from the means of peace and tranquillity proposed by us, and which should have been admitted, were it only on the grounds of experience; and to fill up the cup of their malice, they now lay your majesty under an obligation of oppressing the principality still further, by sending an army to sack and pillage wherever the caprice of the soldier may lead him; which would place this country in a position to say (were it not for the love it has borne, still bears, and ever will bear to your majesty) that such a breach of sworn faith would leave it free, a thing of which the province is unwilling to think, and prays God to avert. Nevertheless, the principality knows from experience that these soldiers have neither respect nor pity for any thing or person, married women and innocent virgins, temples, or God Himself, images of the Saints or the sacred vessels of our churches, nay, even the blessed Sacrament has twice this year been committed to the flames by these soldiers. The principality is, therefore, everywhere in arms to defend, in such an urgent and irremediable extremity, fortune, life, honor, liberty, home, laws, and above all the sacred temples, the sacred images, and the holy Sacrament of the altar (be the same for ever praised). In such a case, the holy theologians do not merely affirm that resistance is lawful, but still further, that all persons, whether lay or clerical, may take up arms to avert the evil; that both secular and ecclesiastical property may and ought to contribute to the defence; that the nations invaded may, as the cause is universal, unite, confederate, and form juntas with a view to prevent such evils." (§ 36)
Such was the language addressed to kings, at a time when religion predominated over all things. The counsellors, according to the usage of the time, took care to make marginal notes of the sources of their information; and we are not aware that their doctrines have ever been condemned as heretical. These doctrines cannot, without manifest dishonesty, be confounded with those of many Protestants and modern revolutionists. A cursory perusal of these writings will enable any one to discover how widely they differ. By maintaining that it is not allowable in any case, in the greatest extremities, not even when the most precious and sacred interests are at stake, to offer resistance to the civil power, the thrones of kings are thought to be strengthened; for it is generally kings that are spoken of. But it should be remembered, that this doctrine affects every other supreme power, under every form of government. Since the texts of Scripture recommending obedience "to the powers that be," do not allude to kings only, but to all supreme powers, without exception or distinction, it follows that resistance cannot in any case be offered to the president of a republic. Will it be said that the faculties of a president are determined? Are not the faculties of a king also determined? Are there not, in absolute governments, laws fixing the limits of these faculties? And is not this the distinction constantly employed by the supporters of monarchy to repel the errors of their adversaries, who confound monarchy with despotism? "But," it will be said, "the president of a republic is only temporary." And what if he were perpetual? Besides, the faculties are neither increased nor diminished by the simple fact of their having to last a long or short period. If a council, a man, a family, is invested with a certain right, by virtue of a certain law; with certain restrictions, but with certain contracts and oaths; such a council, such a man or such a family is bound to adhere to the oath taken, whatever be the extent of its duration, temporary or perpetual. Such are the principles of natural right; so certain and simple, that they cannot present any difficulty.
Theologians, even those most attached to the Sovereign Pontiff, teach a doctrine which we must notice here, on account of the analogy it bears to the point under discussion. It is known that the Pope, when speaking ex cathedra, is acknowledged to be infallible, but not as a simple individual; and that, in this latter capacity, he might fall into heresy. In this case, theologians are of opinion that he would forfeit his dignity; some maintaining that he ought to be deposed, others that his deposition is the consequence of his having fallen from the faith. Whichever of these opinions be admitted, in this case resistance would become allowable, for this reason, that the Pope would have shamefully departed from the object of his institution, would have trampled on the basis of the laws of the Church, which is her dogmas, and would consequently have nullified the promises and oaths of obedience made to him. Spedalieri, in adducing this argument, observes, that kings are certainly not of higher rank than Popes, – that power has been granted to both in ædificationem non in destructionem; adding, that if Sovereign Pontiffs authorize this doctrine with relation to themselves, temporal sovereigns cannot object to its application to them.
It is strange that the monarchical zeal of Protestants and incredulous philosophers imputes to the Catholic religion as a crime, that she has allowed it to be maintained within her bosom, that, in certain cases, the subject may be released from his oath of allegiance; whilst other philosophers of the same school reproach it with having sanctioned despotism by its detestable doctrine of non-resistance, as Dr. Beatty expresses it. The direct, indirect, and declaratory powers of the Popes have served as an admirable bugbear to intimidate kings; the dangerous principles of theological works formed an excellent pretext for raising the cry of alarm, for representing Catholicity as a nest of seditious maxims. The hour of revolutions was struck, – circumstances were changed, – fresh necessities arose, and men adapted their language to the times. The Catholics, a short time before seditious and regicidal, were then declared abettors of despotism, fulsome adulators of civil power. Recently, the Jesuits, leagued with the infernal policy of Rome, were everywhere undermining thrones, to establish on their ruins the universal monarchy of the Pope; but the secret of this horrid plot was discovered, and fortunately so, for the world was otherwise about to experience a frightful catastrophe. But now that the Jesuits are expelled, and are expiating their crimes in exile, the French Revolution, the prelude to so many others, breaks out, and the aspect of affairs changes immediately. Protestants and unbelievers, the supporters of ancient discipline, the zealous adversaries of the abuses of the Court of Rome, fully comprehending the new situation of affairs, hasten to conform to it. From that moment, the Jesuits, the Catholics, the Pope, are no longer seditious or tyrannicides, but Machiavellian supporters of tyranny, enemies of the liberty of the people; and just as a league had been supposed to exist between the Jesuits and the Pope for the foundation of a universal theocracy, there is now discovered, thanks to the investigations of these eminent philosophers and strict, incorruptible Christians, an infamous pact between the Pope and kings to oppress, enslave, and degrade the unfortunate human race.
The answer to this enigma may be thus briefly expressed. So long as kings maintain their power and the peaceable possession of their thrones, so long as Providence restrains the tempest, and the monarch, raising his proud head towards heaven, commands the people with a lofty air, the Catholic Church does not flatter him. "Thou art dust," she says to him, "and into dust thou shalt return; power was given thee not unto destruction, but unto edification; thy faculties are great, but not boundless. God is thy judge, as well as that of the lowest of thy subjects." The Church is then accused of insolence; and if any theologian should venture to investigate the origin of civil power, to point out, with generous freedom, the duties to which this power is subject; to write, in a word, with prudence upon public right, but without servility, the Catholics are then declared seditious. But the tempest bursts, thrones are overturned, revolution prevails, spills the blood of the people in torrents, cuts off royal heads, and all in the name of liberty. The Church says: "This is no liberty, but a succession of crimes; the fraternity and equality which I have taught, were never your orgies and guillotines." The Church then becomes a vile flatterer; her words, her actions, have indubitably revealed that the Sovereign Pontiff is the surest anchor of despotism; it has been proved that the Court of Rome has been polluted by an infamous pact.33