Protestantism exalts to an incredible degree the pretensions of kings, by attacking the spiritual power of the Pope, by painting in the darkest colors the dangers of his temporal power, and especially by establishing the fatal doctrine, that the supreme civil power has ecclesiastical affairs totally under its direction; and by accusing of abuse, of usurpation, of unbounded ambition, the independence which the Church claims by virtue of the sacred canons, of the guarantee afforded by the civil law, of the traditions of fifteen centuries, and above all, of the institution of her Divine Founder. He had no need of the permission, of any civil power to send His apostles to preach the Gospel, and to baptize in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. A glance at the history of Europe at the epoch here mentioned will convince us of the evil consequences of such a doctrine, and show us how agreeable it must have been to the ears of power, which it invested with unbounded faculties, even in matters purely religious. This exaggeration of the rights of civil power, coinciding with the efforts made on the other hand to repress the pontifical authority, must have favored the doctrine which attempted to place the power of kings upon a level, in every respect, with that of Popes; and consequently, it was very natural that its authors should wish to establish, that sovereigns received their power from God, in the same manner as the Popes, without any difference whatever. The doctrine of direct communication, although very susceptible, as we have seen, of a reasonable explanation, might involve a more extensive meaning, which would have made the people oblivious of the special and characteristic manner in which the supreme power of the Church was instituted by God himself. What I have just advanced cannot be considered as merely conjectural; the whole is supported by facts which cannot have been forgotten. The reigns of Henry VIII. and of Elizabeth of England, and the usurpations and violence in which Protestant powers indulged against the Catholic Church, are a sufficient confirmation of these sad truths. But, unfortunately, even in countries where Catholicity remained triumphant, attempts were then, have since been, and still are witnessed, that show clearly enough how strong was the impulse given in this sense to the civil power; for even now it is but too prone to transgress its legitimate bounds.
The circumstances under which the two illustrious theologians above cited, Bellarmin and Suarez, wrote, are another reason in support of what I have just adduced. I have quoted remarkable passages from a work by Suarez, written in refutation of a publication of King James of England. This King could not bear the idea of Cardinal Bellarmin's having established that the power of kings does not emanate directly from God, but is communicated through the medium of society, which receives it in a direct manner. Possessed, as is well known, with the mania for theological debates and decisions, King James did not confine himself to simple theory; he reduced his theory to practice, and said to his Parliament: "that God had appointed him absolute master; and that all privileges which co-legislative bodies enjoyed were pure concessions proceeding from the bounty of kings." His courtiers, in their adulations, decreed him the title of the modern Solomon; he might well, therefore, feel displeased with the Italian and Spanish theologians for endeavoring to humble the pride of his presumptuous wisdom, and restrain his despotism. If we reflect upon the words of Bellarmin, and especially on those of Suarez, we shall find that the aim of these eminent theologians was to point out the difference between the civil and ecclesiastical powers, with respect to the mode of their origin. They admit that both powers come from God; that it is an indispensable duty to be subject to them; and that to resist them is to resist the ordinance of God; but not finding, either in the Scripture or in tradition, the least foundation for establishing that civil power, like that of the Sovereign Pontiffs, has been instituted in a special and extraordinary manner, they are anxious that this difference should remain obvious, and seek to avoid the introduction, in a point of such import, of a confusion of ideas, from which dangerous errors might arise. "This opinion," says Suarez, "is new, singular, and apparently invented to exalt the temporal over the spiritual power." (See above.) Hence, in discussing the question of the origin of civil power, they require you to bear in mind the influence of society. "By means of man's counsel and election," says Bellarmin; thus reminding the King, that how sacred soever his authority might be, it had been very differently instituted from that of the Sovereign Pontiff. The distinction between direct and indirect communication served, in a particular manner, to prove the difference in question; for this very distinction recalled to mind that civil power, although established by God, owed its existence to no extraordinary measure, and could not be considered as supernatural, but was to be looked upon as dependent upon human and natural right, sanctioned, nevertheless, in an express manner, by right divine.
These theologians would not, perhaps, have forcibly insisted upon this distinction, had it not been for the efforts made by others to efface it. It was a matter of consequence with them to humble the pride of power, to prevent it from assuming, whether in respect to its origin or its rights, titles not appertaining to it; to prevent its ascribing to itself an unlawful supremacy, even in religious affairs, and thus causing monarchy to degenerate into a sort of Oriental despotism, in which the governing power is every thing, the people and their affairs nothing. If we weigh their words attentively, we shall find that the predominating idea with them was that which I have just stated. At first sight, their language appears exceedingly democratical, from their frequent use of the words community, state, society, people; but on examining closely their system of doctrine, and paying attention to the expressions they use, we perceive that they had no subversive design, and that anarchical theories never once entered their minds. They advocated on the one hand the rights of authority, whilst they protected on the other those of the subject, thus endeavoring to resolve the problem which formed the continual occupation of all honest political writers; to limit power without destroying it, or placing it under too great restraint; to protect society against the disorder of despotism, without rendering it at the same time refractory or turbulent. From the above reasoning we see that the distinction between direct and indirect communication may be of great or of little importance, according to the view we take of it. It is of great importance when serving to remind the civil power that the establishment of governments and the regulation of their forms has in some way been dependent upon society itself, and that no individual, no family, can presume upon having received from God the government of the people without regard to the laws of the country, as if those laws, in whatever form, were a free offering made by them to the people. This same distinction serves, in short, to establish the origin of civil power as an emanation from the Deity, the Author of nature, but not as instituted in an extraordinary manner, as something supernatural, as in the case of the supreme ecclesiastical power. From this latter consideration two consequences follow, one of which is of more importance than the other to the legitimate liberties of mankind and the independence of the Church. To call in the intervention, express or tacit, of society for the establishment of governments and the regulation of their forms, is to prevent the concealment of their origin under any veil of mystery; it is simply and plainly to define their object, consequently to explain their duties, as well as to point out their faculties. By these means a restraint is put upon the disorders and abuses of authority, which it is thenceforth clearly seen are not to find support in enigmatical theories.
The independence of the Church is thus established upon a solid basis. Whenever the civil power attempts to offer it violence, the Church may say: "My authority is established directly and immediately by God in a special, extraordinary, and miraculous manner; yours likewise emanates from God, but through the intervention of man, through the intermediary of the laws, in the ordinary course pointed out by nature and determined by human prudence; but neither man nor the civil power has a right to destroy or change what God Himself, deviating from the course of nature and making use of ineffable prodigies, has thought proper to institute." So long as the ideas here set forth are respected, so long as direct communication is not received in too extensive a sense, and care taken not to confound things whose limits so gravely affect religion and society, the distinction here spoken of is of little importance. We have seen, even, that the two opinions may be reconciled with each other. At all events, this distinction will have served to illustrate with what exalted views Catholic theologians have discussed the grave questions of public right. Guided by sound philosophy, and without ever losing sight of the beacon of revelation, they have given equal satisfaction to the desires of both schools. They have not fallen into the errors of either; democratical without being anarchists, monarchical without being base adulators. In establishing the rights of the people, they were not, like modern demagogues, under the necessity of destroying religion, but made her the guardian of the rights of the people, as well as of those of kings. Liberty was not with them a synonyme for license and irreligion; in their opinion, men might be free without being rebellious or impious; liberty consisted in being subject to the law; and, as they could not conceive that law was possible without religion and without God; in like manner also they believed that liberty was not possible without God and religion. What reason, revelation, and history taught them has become evident to us by experience. Shall we be told of the dangers, grave or slight, in which theologians could involve governments? But people now-a-days are not led astray by affected and insidious declamations; and kings well know whether the schools of theologians have exiled royalty, and led it to the scaffold.29
CHAPTER LII.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER THE SPANISH MONARCHY
Extreme doctrines neither insure the liberty of the people, nor the force and stability of governments; both require truth and justice, the only foundations upon which we can build with any hope of the durability of the edifice. In general, maxims favorable to liberty are never carried to a higher pitch than on the eve of the establishment of despotism; and it is to be feared that the overthrow and ruin of governments are very near when undue adulations are lavished upon their power. When was the power of kings more extolled than about the middle of last century? Who is not aware of the exaggerations given to the prerogatives of royal power, when the Jesuits were to be expelled, and the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff impugned? In Portugal, Spain, Italy, Austria, and in France, the unanimous voice of the purest and most fervent royalism was heard; and yet what became of this great love, this lively zeal for monarchy, from the moment that the revolutionary storm had placed it in danger? Observe what, generally speaking, has been the conduct of men opposed to the ecclesiastical authority; they have united themselves to demagogues for destroying, at the same time, the authority of the Church and that of kings; they have forgotten their base adulations, and abandoned themselves to insults and violence. People and governments should never lose sight of this rule of conduct, so useful to men of sense, to mistrust flatterers, and to confide in those who warn and correct them. Let them beware whenever they are caressed with an affected tenderness, and their cause is maintained with especial warmth; it is a sure sign of an attempt to make use of them as tools for the furtherance of interests very different from their own. In France, at certain times, monarchical zeal was carried to such an extent as to call forth, in the assembly of the States-General, a motion for establishing, as a sacred principle, that kings receive their supreme authority immediately from God: this was not carried into effect, but the proposal shows how ardently the cause of the throne was then maintained. Now, what did all this ardor mean? Simply an antipathy against the Court of Rome, a dread of the extension of papal power; it was an obstacle to be opposed to the phantom of a universal monarchy. Louis XIV., so tenacious of the royal prerogative, assuredly did not foresee the misfortunes of Louis XVI.; and Charles III., in listening to the Count of Aranda and Campomanes, little thought that the constituent Cortes of Cadiz was so near.
In the midst of their splendor, monarchs forgot one principle predominating in the whole modern history of Europe, viz. that social organization is an emanation of religion, and, consequently, that the two powers to which the defence and preservation of society appertain ought to co-exist in perfect harmony.
The power of the Church cannot be diminished without injury to the civil power; he who sows schism will reap rebellion. During the last three centuries the most liberal and popular doctrines upon the origin of power have been circulated amongst us. What did it matter to the Spanish monarchy, since those very persons who advocated these doctrines were the first to condemn resistance to the lawful authorities, to inculcate the obligation of obedience to them, and to establish in all hearts, respect, love, and veneration for the sovereign? The disturbances of our epoch, and the dangers constantly besetting thrones, are not exactly attributable to the propagation of doctrines more or less democratical, but to the absence of moral and religious principles. What will be gained by asserting that power comes from God, if people believe not in God? Point out the sacred character of the duty of obedience, and what effect will it produce upon those who admit not the existence of moral order, and to whom duty is merely a chimerical idea? Suppose, on the contrary, that you have to deal with men penetrated with moral and religious principles, who bow to the will of God, and believe themselves bound to submit to it, so soon as it is manifested to them. What does it matter then whether civil power proceeds from God directly or indirectly? it is enough to convince them, in one way or another, that, whatever be its origin, God approves of it, and wills that it should be obeyed; they will immediately submit with pleasure, for they will see in this submission the accomplishment of a duty.
These considerations serve to explain the reason why certain doctrines appear more dangerous now than formerly: incredulity and immorality give them perverse interpretations, and apply them so as to create nothing but excesses and disorders. From the manner in which the despotism of Philip II. and his successors is now spoken of, we might be led to suppose that in their time no other doctrines than those in favor of the most rigid absolutism could be circulated; and yet we find that there were circulated, without the least apprehension on the part of power, works maintaining theories which, even in our days, would be esteemed too bold. Is it not, therefore, remarkable, that the famous book of Father Mariana, intituled De Rege et Regis institutione, which was burned at Paris by the hand of the public executioner, had been published in Spain eleven years before, without the least obstacle to its publication, either on the part of the ecclesiastical or civil authority? Mariana undertook his task at the instigation and request of D. Garcia de Loaisa, tutor to Philip III., and subsequently Bishop of Toledo; so that the work, strange to say, was intended for the instruction of the heir-apparent. Never was more freedom used in speaking to kings; never was tyranny condemned in a louder voice; never were more popular doctrines proclaimed; and the work was, nevertheless, published at Toledo, in 1599, in the printing-office of Pedro Rodrigo, printer to the king, with the approbation of P. Fr. Pedro de Ona, provincial of the Mercenaries of Madrid, with the permission of Stephen Hojeda, visitor of the Society of Jesus in the province of Toledo, under the generalship of Claude Aquaviva; and, what is still more forcible, with the royal sanction, and a dedication to the king himself. We should also observe, that Mariana was not satisfied with this dedication placed at the commencement of the book, but he makes the very title itself serve to show to whom it was addressed: De Rege et Regis institutione. Libri 3, ad Philippum 3, Hispaniæ Regem Catholicum; and, as if this were not sufficient, in dedicating his Spanish version of the History of Spain to Philip III., he says to him: "I last year dedicated to your majesty a work of my own composition, upon the virtues which ought to exist in a good king, my desire being that all princes should read it carefully and understand it." "El año pasado presenté á V. M. un libro que compuse de las virtudes que debe tener un buen Rey, que deseo lean y entiendan todos los principes con cuidado."
We will pass over his doctrine upon tyrannicide, which was the principal cause of its condemnation in France, where there existed, without doubt, motives of alarm, since kings were perishing there by the hand of the assassin. On examining his theory upon power, we find it as popular and liberal as those of modern democrats could be. Mariana ventures to express his opinions without evasion or disguise. For example, drawing a parallel between the king and the tyrant, he says: "The king exercises with great moderation the power which he has received from his subjects… Hence, he does not, like the tyrant, oppress his subjects as slaves, but governs them as free men; and having received his power from the people, he takes particular care that during his life, the people shall voluntarily yield him submission." "Rex quam a subditis accepit potestatem singulari modestia exercet… Sic fit, ut subditis non tanquam servis dominetur, quod faciunt tyranni, sed tanquam liberis præsit, et qui a populo potestatem accepit, id in primis curæ habet ut per totam vitam volentibus imperet." (Lib. 1, cap. 4, p. 57.) This was said in Spain by a simple religious, was sanctioned by his superiors, and attentively listened to by kings. To what grave reflections does this simple fact lead us! Where is that strict and indissoluble alliance which the enemies of the Church have imagined to exist between her dogmas and those of slavery? If such expressions as the above were tolerated in a country in which Catholicity predominated so extensively, how can it be maintained that such a religion tends to enslave the human race, and that its doctrines are favorable to despotism? Nothing would be easier than to fill whole volumes with remarkable passages of our writers, both lay and clerical, showing the extreme liberty granted upon this point, as well by the Church as by the civil government. What absolute monarch in Europe would approve of one of his high functionaries expressing the origin of power after the manner of our immortal Saavedra? "It is from the centre of justice," says he, "that the circumference of the crown has been drawn. The latter would not be necessary, if we could dispense with the former.
Hac una reges olim sunt fine creati,
Dicere jus populis, injustaque tollere facta.
In the first age, there was no necessity for penalties, because the law did not take cognisance of transgressions; rewards were equally unnecessary, because integrity and honor were loved for their own sakes. But vice, growing with the age of the world, intimidated virtue; simple and confiding, the latter, till then, dwelt in the country. Equality was despised, modesty and chastity lost, ambition and force introduced, and after them domination. Prudence, forced by necessity, and aroused by the light of nature, reduced men to a state of civil society, to exercise therein those virtues to which reason inclines them. By means of the articulate voice with which nature had gifted them, they could explain to each other their mutual thoughts, manifest to each other their sentiments, and explain their wants, instruct, counsel, and protect each other. Society once formed, a power was created by common consent, in the whole of this community, enlightened by the law of nature, for preserving its different parts, for maintaining them in justice and peace, by punishing vice and rewarding virtue. As this power could not remain spread through the whole body of the people, on account of the confusion which would have arisen from the resolutions and their execution, and as it was absolutely necessary that there should be some to command, and others to obey, one portion divested itself of this power, and vested it in one member, or in a small, or in a great, number of members, that is to say, in one of the three forms of every state government – monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. Monarchy was the first; because men selected for their government, out of their families, and afterwards even from among the whole people, some one who excelled the rest in goodness: his greatness increasing, they honored his hand with the sceptre, and encircled his head with a crown as an emblem of majesty, and as a badge of the supreme power which they had conferred upon him. This power, however, consists chiefly in that justice which ought to maintain the people in peace; this justice failing, the order of the state fails, and the office of king ceases, as was the case in Castile, when the government by judges was substituted for that by kings, on account of the injustice of D. Ordona and of D. Fruela." (Character of a Christian Prince's Policy, set forth in a hundred Devices, by D. Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, Knight of the Order of St. James, Member of his Majesty's Supreme Council for the Indies, device 22.)
The words people, pact, consent, have ended in becoming the dread of men of sound ideas and upright intentions, on account of the deplorable abuses which have been made of them in those immoral schools which ought rather to be qualified with the epithet of irreligious than with that of democratical. No, it was not the desire of ameliorating the condition of the people which led them to overthrow the world, by overturning thrones and shedding torrents of blood in civil discord; the real cause was a blind rage for reducing to ashes the work of ages, by especially attacking religion, the main support of every thing wise, just, and salutary, that European civilization had acquired. And, in fact, have we not seen impious schools, whilst boasting of their liberty, bend under the hand of despotism, whenever they thought it useful to their designs? Previous to the French Revolution, were they not the basest adulators of kings, whose prerogatives they extended immeasurably, with the intention of making regal power the means of oppressing the Church? After the revolutionary epoch, did we not see them assembled round Napoleon; and even yet, do they not almost deify him? And why? Because Napoleon was revolution personified, the representative and executor of the new ideas sought to be substituted for the old ones. In the same manner Protestantism extols its Queen Elizabeth; because it was she who placed the Establishment upon a solid foundation. Revolutionary doctrines, besides the evils they inflict upon society, produce indirectly another effect, which may, at first sight, appear salutary, but which, in reality, is not so. They occasion dangerous reactions in the order of events, and check the progress of knowledge, by narrowing and debasing men's ideas, leading them to condemn as erroneous and pernicious, or to view with mistrust, principles which would previously have been looked upon as sound, or that would, at all events, have been regarded as mere harmless errors. The reason of all this is, simply, that liberty has no worse enemy than licentiousness.
In support of this last observation, it may be well to show, that the most rigorous doctrines in political matters have originated in countries in which anarchy had made the greatest ravages, and precisely at the time when the evil, still present, or very recent, was most keenly felt. The religious revolution of the sixteenth century, and the political commotions consequent upon it, were principally felt in the north of Europe; the south, and especially Italy and Spain, were almost entirely preserved from them. Now, these last two countries are precisely those in which the dignities and prerogatives of civil power have been the least exaggerated, as well as those in which they were not disparaged in theory, and were respected in practice. Of all modern nations, England was the first in which a revolution, properly so called, was realized; for I do not consider as such the insurrection of the German peasantry, which, in spite of the terrible catastrophe which it caused, never effected any change in the state of society; or that of the United Provinces, which may be considered a war of independence. Now, it was precisely in England that the most erroneous doctrines in favor of the supreme authority of civil power appeared. Hobbes, who, whilst he refused to allow the rights of the Creator, attributed unbounded authority to the monarchs of the earth, lived at the most agitated and turbulent epoch in the annals of Great Britain. He was born in 1588, and died in 1679.
In Spain, where the impious and anarchical doctrines, which had troubled Europe since the schism of Luther, did not penetrate until the latter part of the eighteenth century, we have seen that the greatest license of expression was permitted upon the most important points of public right, and that doctrines were maintained which, in any other country, would have been looked upon as dangerous. Error gave rise to exaggeration; the rights of monarchs were never so much extolled as under the reign of Charles III.; that is, at the time when the modern epoch was inaugurated among us.
Religion, which predominated in all consciences, maintained them in the obedience due to the sovereign, without there being any need of giving this obedience any extraordinary titles, when its real ones were sufficient, as they certainly were. For him who knows that God has prescribed obedience to lawful authority, it matters little whether this authority emanate from Heaven directly or indirectly, or whether society has more or less taken part in the determination of political forms, or in the election of the persons or families who are to exercise the supreme command. Hence we find that in Spain, although the words people, consent, pacts, were spoken of, monarchs were held in the most profound veneration, so much so that modern history does not mention a single attempt upon their persons. Popular tumults were also of rare occurrence; and those which did happen are not attributable to either of the two above-mentioned doctrines. How does it happen that, at the end of the sixteenth century, the Council of Castile was not alarmed at the bold principles of Mariana, in his book De Rege et Regis institutione, whilst those of the Abbé Spedalieri, at the end of the eighteenth century, were such a terror to it? The reason of this lies not so much in the contents of the works, as in the epoch of their publication. The former appeared at a time when the Spanish nation, confirmed in religious and moral principles, might be compared to those robust constitutions capable of bearing food difficult of digestion. The latter was introduced among us when the doctrines and deeds of the French Revolution were shaking all the thrones of Europe, and when the propagandism of Paris was beginning to pervert us by its emissaries and books. In a nation in which reason and virtue prevail, in which evil passions are never excited, in which the well-being and prosperity of the country are the only aim of every citizen, the most popular and liberal forms of government may exist without danger; for in such a nation numerous assemblies produce no disorder, merit is not obscured by intrigue, nor are worthless persons raised to the government, and the names of public liberty and felicity do not serve as means to raise the fortunes or satisfy the ambition of individuals. So also in a country in which religion and morality rule in every breast, in which duty is not looked upon as an empty word, in which it is considered really criminal to disturb the tranquillity of the state, to revolt against the lawful authorities: in such a country, I say, it is less dangerous to discuss, with more or less freedom, questions arising from theories on the formation of society and the origin of the civil power, and to establish principles favorable to popular rights. But when these conditions do not exist, it is of little use to proclaim rigorous doctrines. To abstain from pronouncing the name of people, as a sacrilegious word, is a useless precaution. How can it be expected, that he who respects not Divine Majesty, should respect human? The conservative schools of our age, proposing to place a restraint upon the revolutionary torrent, and to tranquillize agitated nations, have almost always been infected with a certain failing, which consists in forgetting the truth which I have just noticed: royal majesty, authority of the government, supremacy of the law, parliamentary sovereignty, respect for established forms, and order: such are the terms they are constantly making use of. This is their palladium of society; and they condemn with all their might the state, insubordination, disobedience to the laws, insurrection, riot, anarchy; but they forget that these doctrines will not suffice, unless there be some fixed point to which the first link of the chain may be riveted. These schools, generally speaking, originate in the bosom of revolution; they are directed by men who have figured in revolutions, who have contributed to prepare them, who have given them their force, and who, in order to attain the object of their ardent desires, feared not to ruin the edifice at its foundation, by diminishing the ascendency of religion and opening the way to moral relaxation. Hence they become powerless when prudence, or their own interests, bid them say, "We have gone far enough;" and, hurried on like the rest by the furious whirlwind, they have neither the means of stopping the movement nor of giving it a proper direction.