It was no doubt to this that St. Paul alluded when, admonishing the faithful of the obligation of obeying authority, he told them that "such was the will of God, that by acting thus they might put to silence the imprudence of foolish men." (Epist. i. c. 2.) We also know from St. Jerome, that in the beginning of the Church, some, hearing the Gospel liberty preached, imagined that universal liberty also was meant. The necessity of inculcating a duty, the fulfilment of which is indispensable for the preservation of society, will be clearly perceived if we consider with what ease an error so flattering to proud and rebellious minds might take root. After fourteen centuries had passed away, we see the error reproduced in the time of Wickliff and John Huss. The Anabaptists made a dreadful application of it when they inundated Germany with blood. At a later period, the fanatical sectaries of England raised the greatest disorders and brought about fearful catastrophes by a similar doctrine, condemning alike the civil and ecclesiastical power.
The religion of Jesus Christ, the law of peace and love, when preaching liberty, spoke of that liberty which draws us from the slavery of sin and the power of the devil, renders us co-heirs of Jesus Christ, and participators of grace and glory. But she was very far from propagating doctrines which could favor disorder, or subvert law and authority. It was, then, of the greatest importance to her to disprove the calumnies by which her enemies attempted to injure her; it was necessary for her to proclaim, by her words and acts, that the public interest had nothing to fear from her doctrines. We also see that after the Apostles had inculcated this sacred obligation on several occasions, the Fathers of the earliest times insist again and frequently on the same point. St. Polycarp, quoted by Eusebius, (lib. iv. Hist. cap. 15,) says, when speaking to the proconsul: "It is ordained to render to the magistrates and powers appointed by God the honor which we owe them." St. Justin, in his Apology for the Christians, also recalls the precept of Jesus Christ touching the payment of tributes: Tertullian, in his Apology, chapter third, reproaches the Gentiles with the persecution they directed against the Christians, even at the time when the latter, with their hands raised to heaven, were praying for the safety of the emperors. The zeal of the saints who were charged with the instruction and direction of the faithful succeeded in inculcating this precept so well, that the Christians were everywhere a model of submission and obedience. Thus Pliny, writing to the Emperor Trajan, avowed that, religion excepted, he could not accuse them of being at all wanting in the fulfilment of the laws and imperial edicts.
Nature herself has pointed out the persons in whom resides the paternal power; the wants of the family mark the limits of this power; the feelings of the heart prescribe its object and regulate its conduct. In society it is otherwise: the rights of the civil power are tossed about by the storms of human events; here this right resides in one person, there in several; to-day it belongs to one family, to-morrow to another; one day it is exercised under one form, the next under another very different. The infant who weeps at his mother's bosom reminds her of the obligation of nourishing and watching over it; woman, weak and unsupported, calls unmistakably on man to protect her and her child; youth, without strength to sustain or knowledge to direct itself, shows parents their obligation of care and guardianship. We see clearly the will of God; the order of nature forcibly expresses it; the tenderest feelings are its echo and interpreter; we do not require any thing else to show us what is the will of God; we do not need any refinement to convince us that the parental power is from above. The rights and duties of parents and children are written in characters as distinct as they are beautiful. But where shall we find, with respect to the civil power, an expression as unequivocal? If power comes from God, by what means does he communicate it? In what channel is it conveyed? This leads us to other secondary questions, which all conduce to the explanation and solution of the principal question.
Was there ever a man who by natural right found himself invested with civil power? It is clear that in this case power would have no other origin than paternal authority; that is to say, in that case, the civil power ought to be considered as an amplification of that authority, as a transformation of domestic into civil power. We immediately see the difference between the domestic and the social order, their separate objects, the diversity of rules by which they must be regulated, and we see how different are the means which they both use for their government. I do not deny that the type of society is found in the family, and that society is in the most desirable condition when it most resembles the family in command and in obedience; but mere analogies do not suffice to establish rights, and it always remains indubitable that those of the civil power must not be confounded with those of the paternal.
On the other hand, the nature of things shows that Providence, in ordaining the destinies of the world, did not establish the paternal as the source of the civil. Indeed, we do not see how such a power could have been transmitted, and the legitimacy of its claims have been justified. We can easily understand the limited rule of an old man, governing a society, composed of two or three generations only, who were descended from him; but as soon as this society increased, extended to several countries, and consequently was divided and subdivided, the patriarchal power must have disappeared, its exercise must have become impossible, and we can no longer understand how the pretenders to the throne could come to an understanding with each other and the rest of the people, to justify and legitimize their rule. The theory which acknowledges the paternal as the origin of the civil power may be as promising as you please; it may sustain itself on the example of the patriarchal government, which we observe in the cradle of society; but there are two things against it. First, it asserts, but does not prove; second, it has no means of attaining the end for which it was intended, viz. the consolidation of government, for it cannot establish itself by proving its legitimacy. The greatest of kings and the humblest of subjects equally know that they are the sons of Noe; nothing more. I have not been able to find this theory either in St. Thomas, or in any of the other principal theologians; and to go still higher, I do not know that it can find any authority in the doctrines of the Fathers, in the tradition of the Church, or in Scripture itself. It is consequently a mere philosophical opinion, of which the explanation and proof belong to those who advance it. Catholicity says nothing either for or against it.
It is then demonstrated that the civil power does not reside in any man of natural right, and on the other hand, we know that power comes from God. Who receives this power from God, and how does he receive it? It is necessary first to observe, that the Catholic Church, while acknowledging the divine origin of the civil power, an origin which is expressly stated in Scripture, does not define any thing either as to the form of this power, or the means which God employs in communicating it. So that after the Catholic doctrine is established, there still remains to be examined and discussed, who immediately receives the power, and how it is transmitted? This is acknowledged by theologians when they have treated of this matter; this should be enough to remove the prejudices of those who consider the doctrine of the Church on this point as conducive to popular degradation. The Church teaches the obligation of obeying legitimate authority, and adds that the power which it exercises emanates from God; this doctrine is as applicable to republics as to absolute monarchies, and does not prejudge either the forms of government or the particular claims of legitimacy. As to these latter questions they cannot be answered in general terms; they depend upon a variety of circumstances into which the general principles which are the foundation of the good order and peace of society cannot enter. I think it is so important to give clear ideas on this point, and to state the doctrines of the most distinguished Catholic divines, that I consider it necessary to devote an entire chapter to this subject.
There is nothing more instructive or more interesting, than the study of public law in those writers who, pretending not to pass for statesmen, and entertaining no views of ambition, express themselves without flattery and without bitterness; and explain these matters with as much calmness and tranquillity as they would theories of rare application and limited extent. At the present time it is almost impossible to open a book without immediately perceiving to which of the two contending parties the author belongs; it seldom happens that his ideas are not affected by passion, or adapted to serve particular designs; and it not unfrequently happens that, without conviction, he speaks according to the dictates of his interest.
It is not so with the old writers, of whom we are speaking. Let us render them at least this justice; that their opinions are conscientious, their language loyal and sincere; and whatever may be the judgment with respect to them, whether we consider them as real sages, or as ignorant men and fanatics, we cannot call in question their sincerity; that they are animated by a religious idea, that they develop a philosophical system, that their pens are the faithful interpreters of their thoughts.
Rousseau attempts to seek the origin of society, and of the civil power; and begins the first chapter of his work with these words: "Man is born free, and he is everywhere in fetters." Do you not immediately perceive the tribune under the mantle of the philosopher? Do you not observe that, instead of addressing himself to the reason, the writer appeals to the passions; and wounds the most susceptible of them – viz. pride. It is in vain for the philosopher to endeavor to make us believe that he does not intend to reduce his doctrines to practice; his language betrays his design. In another place, where he attempts nothing less than to give advice to a great nation, he has hardly begun when he holds over Europe the torch of an incendiary.
"When we read ancient history, we fancy ourselves transported to another world, and among other beings. What have the French, the English, the Russians, in common with the Greeks and Romans? Hardly any thing but the form. The great souls of the latter appear to the others as exaggerations of history. How can they, who feel themselves to be so little, imagine that such great men ever existed? They did exist, however; and they were human like ourselves. What hinders our being men like them? Our prejudices, our low philosophy, and grovelling passions, combined with the egotism of men's hearts, by absurd institutions, directed by men of little minds." (Considerations on the Government of Poland, &c., Chap. 2.) Do you not observe the poison conveyed in these words of the publicist? And is it not palpable that he had something more in view than enlightening the mind? See with what address he attempts to produce a feeling of irritation, by harsh and indecent reproaches.
Let us take the opposite extreme of the comparison, and see in how different a tone St. Thomas of Aquin, in his work De Regimine Principum, begins his explanation on the same subject, and gives directions for good government.a1
"If man," he says, "was intended to live alone, like many animals, he would not require any one to govern him; every man would be his own king, under the supreme command of God; inasmuch as he would govern himself by the light of reason given him by the Creator. But it is in the nature of man to be a social and political animal, living in community, differently from all other animals; a thing which is clearly shown by the necessities of his nature. Nature has provided for other animals food; skins for a covering, means of defence, – as teeth, horns, claws, – or, at least, speed in flight; but she has not endowed man with any of those qualities; and instead she has given him reason, by which, with the assistance of his hands, he can procure what he wants. But to procure this, one man alone is not enough; for he is not in a condition to preserve his own life; it is, therefore, in man's nature to live in society. Moreover, nature has granted to other animals the power of discerning what is useful or injurious to them: thus the sheep has a natural horror of his enemy the wolf. There are also certain animals who know by nature the herbs which are medicinal to them, and other things which are necessary for their preservation. But man has not naturally the knowledge which is requisite for the support of life, except in society; inasmuch as the aid of reason is capable of leading from universal principles to the knowledge of particular things, which are necessary for life. Thus, then, since it is impossible for man alone to obtain all this knowledge, it is necessary that he should live in society, one aiding another; each one applying to his own task; for example, some in medicine; some in one way, and some in another. This is shown with great clearness in that faculty peculiar to man, language – which enables him to communicate his thoughts to others. Indeed, brute animals mutually communicate their feelings; as the dog communicates his anger by barking, and other animals their passions by various ways. But man, with respect to his fellows, is more communicative than any other animal; even than those who are the most inclined to live in union, as cranes, ants, and bees. In this sense, Solomon says, in Ecclesiastes: 'It is better, therefore, that two should be together than one; for they have the advantage of their society.' Thus, if it be natural for man to live in society, it is necessary that some one should direct the multitude; for if many were united, and each one did as he thought proper, they would fall to pieces, unless somebody looked after the public good, as would be the case with the human body, and that of any other animal, if there did not exist a power to watch over the welfare of all the members. Thus Solomon says: 'Thus, where there is no one to govern, the people will be dispersed.' In man himself the soul directs the body; and in the soul, the feelings of anger and concupiscence are governed by the reason. Among the members of the body, there is one principal one, which directs all; as the heart or the head. There ought, then, to be in every multitude some governing power." (St. Thomas, De Regimine Principum, lib. i. cap. 1.)
This passage, so remarkable for profound wisdom, clearness of ideas, solidity of principles, vigor and exactness of deductions, contains, in a few words, all that can be said with respect to the origin of society, and of power; to the rights enjoyed by the latter, and the obligations incumbent upon it: the matter being considered in general, and by the light of reason alone. In the first place, it was required to show, with clearness, the necessity of the existence of society; and this the holy doctor does by this very simple reasoning – man is of such a nature that he cannot live alone, and then he has need of being united to his fellows. If a proof of this fundamental truth be required, it is found in the fact that he is endowed with speech; this is a sign that by nature he is destined to communicate with other men, and consequently to live in society. After having proved this invincible necessity, it remained to demonstrate a necessity not less absolute – viz. the necessity of a power to govern society. In order to make this demonstration, St. Thomas does not invent extravagant systems, or unfounded theories; he does not appeal to absurd suppositions; he is satisfied with a reason founded on the nature of things, dictated by common sense, and supported by daily experience – viz. that in all bodies of men, there is a director requisite; since, without him, disorder, and even dispersion, are inevitable; for in all societies there must be a chief.
It must be allowed that this clear and simple explanation enables us to understand the theory of the origin of society much better than all the subtilties of explicit and implicit pacts; it is enough for a thing to be founded on nature itself, for it to be viewed as demonstrated as a real necessity, in order that its existence may be easily conceived; why then seek, by subtilties and suppositions, what is apparent at the first view?
Let us not, however, suppose that St. Thomas does not acknowledge divine right, or is ignorant that the obligation of obedience to power may be founded on it: far from it; this truth he establishes in many places in his works; but he does not forget the natural and the human law, which, on this point, are combined and allied with the divine, in such a way, that the latter is only a confirmation of, and gives a sanction to, the others. We ought thus to interpret the passages in which the holy doctor attributes the civil power to human law, considering this law with that of grace. For example, when examining whether infidels can have dominion or supremacy over the faithful, he says:b "It is necessary here to consider that dominion or supremacy is introduced by virtue of human law; the distinction between the faithful and infidels, is by divine law. Divine law, which emanates from grace, does not take away human law, which is founded on the law of natural reason; therefore the distinction between the faithful and infidels, considered in itself, does not take away the dominion or supremacy of infidels over the faithful."
When inquiring, in another place, if the prince who has apostatized from the faith by this fact loses dominion over his subjects, so that they are no longer called upon to obey him, he expresses himself thus:c "As has been said before, infidelity does not destroy dominion itself; for dominion was introduced by the law of nations, which is human right; while the distinction between the faithful and infidels is by a divine, which does not take away the human right." Again; when examining if man is obliged to obey another man, he says:d "As natural actions proceed from natural powers, so human operations proceed from the human will. In natural things, it was necessary that inferior things should be brought into their respective operations by the excellence of the natural virtue which God has given to superior things. In the same way, also, it is necessary that in human things, those which are superior should urge on the inferior, by the force of authority ordained by God. To move, by means of reason and the will, is to command; and as, by virtue of the natural order instituted by God, inferior things in nature are necessarily subject to the motion of superior things, so also, in human things, those which are inferior ought, by natural and divine right, to obey those which are superior."
On the same question, St. Thomas examines whether obedience is a special virtue, and he answers,e "That to obey a superior is a duty conformable to the divine order communicated to things." In the 6th article, he states the question whether Christians are obliged to obey the secular powers, and says:f "The faith of Christ is the principle and cause of justice, according to what is said in the Epistle to the Romans, chap. iii. 'the justice of God by the faith of Jesus Christ.' Thus the faith of Christ does not take away the law of justice, but rather confirms it. This law wills that inferiors should obey their superiors; for without that, human society could not be preserved; and thus the faith of Christ does not exempt the faithful from the obligation of obeying the secular powers." I have quoted at some length these passages from St. Thomas, in order to show that he does not understand the divine right in the sense in which the enemies of Catholicity have made it a reproach to us; but that, properly speaking, while he adheres to a dogma so expressly taught in the sacred text, he considers the Divine law as a confirmation and sanction of the natural and human law. We know that for six centuries Catholic doctors have regarded the authority of St. Thomas as worthy of the highest respect in all that concerns faith and morality.
We have just seen that this angel of the schools establishes, as founded on the natural, human, and divine law, the duty of obeying authority, affirming that the source of all power is found in God, without entering into the question whether God communicates this power directly or indirectly to those who exercise it, and leaving a vast field where human opinions may debate without violating the purity of faith. In the same way, the most eminent doctors who have succeeded him in the Catholic pulpits have contented themselves with establishing and enforcing the doctrine, without rashly making use of the authority of the Church in its application. To prove this I will here insert some passages from distinguished theologians. Cardinal Bellarmin expresses himself in these words:g "It is certain that public authority comes from God, from whom alone emanate all things good and lawful, as is proved by St. Augustin throughout almost all the forty-five books of the City of God. Indeed, the Wisdom of God, in the Book of Proverbs, chap. viii., cries out, 'It is by Me that kings reign;' and further on, 'It is by Me that princes rule.' The prophet Daniel, in the second chapter, 'The God of heaven has given thee the kingdom and the empire;' and the same prophet, in the fourth chapter, 'Thy dwelling shall be with cattle and with wild beasts, and thou shalt eat grass as an ox, and shalt be wet with the dew of heaven, and seven years shall pass over thee, till thou know that the Most High ruleth over the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever He will.'" After having proved, by the authority of the Holy Scriptures, this dogma, via. that the civil power comes from God, the illustrious writer explains the sense in which it ought to be understood:h "But," he says, "it is necessary to make some observations here. In the first place, political power, considered in general, and without descending in particular to monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, emanates immediately from God alone; for being necessarily annexed to the nature of man, it proceeds from Him who has made that nature. Besides, that power is by natural law, since it does not depend upon men's consent, since they must have a government whether they wish it or not, under pain of desiring the destruction of the human race, which is against the inclination of nature. It is thus that the law of nature is divine law, and government is introduced by divine law; and it is particularly this which the Apostle seems to have had in view when he says to the Romans, chap. xiii., 'He who resists authority, resists the ordinance of God.'"
This doctrine destroys all the theory of Rousseau, who makes the existence of society and the right of the civil power depend on human conventions; it also overturns the absurd systems of some Protestants, and other heretics, their predecessors, who, in the name of Christian liberty, pretended to condemn all authority. No! the existence of society does not depend on the consent of man; society is not his work; it satisfies an imperious necessity, which, if it were not satisfied, would entail the destruction of the human race. God, when he created man, did not deliver him to the mercy of chance; He has given him the right of fulfilling his necessities, and has imposed on him the care of his own preservation as a duty; therefore the existence of the human race includes also the existence of government, and the obligations of obedience. There is no theory so clear, simple, and solid. Shall it be called the enemy and oppressor of human freedom? Is it any disgrace to man to acknowledge himself the creature of God? to confess that he has received from Him what is necessary for his preservation? Is the intervention of God any infringement of human liberty, and cannot man be free without being an Atheist? It is absurd to say there is any thing favorable to servitude in a doctrine which tells us "God wills not that you should live like wild beasts: He commands you to be united in society, and for this purpose He orders you to live in submission to an authority legitimately established." If this be called servitude and oppression, we desire this servitude, we willingly give up the right which is pretended to be granted to us of wandering in the woods like wild beasts: true liberty does not exist in man when he is stripped of the finest attribute of his nature, that of acting in conformity with reason.
Such is the explanation of divine right according to the illustrious commentator whom we have just quoted; let us now see the applications which he makes of it, and learn in what way, according to him, God communicates the civil power to those who are charged with its exercise. After the words quoted above, Bellarmin continues:i "In the second place, observe, that this power resides immediately, as in its subject, in all the multitude, for it is by divine right. The divine right has not given this power to any man in particular, for it has given it to the multitude; besides, the positive law being taken away, there is no reason why one should rule rather than another, among a great number of equal men; therefore power belongs to the whole multitude. In fine, society should be a perfect state; it should have the power of self-preservation, and, consequently, that of chastising the disturbers of the peace."
This doctrine has nothing in common with the foolish assertions of Rousseau and his followers; no one who has studied public law will confound things so different. Indeed, what the Cardinal establishes in the passage quoted, viz. that power resides immediately in the multitude, is not in opposition to what he himself taught a little before, when he said that it comes from God, and is not owing to human conventions. His doctrine may be conveyed in this form. Suppose a number of men without any positive law; there is then no reason why any one of them should have a right to rule the rest. Nevertheless, this law exists, nature itself indicates its necessity, God ordains a government; therefore there exists among this number of men the legitimate power of instituting one. To explain more clearly the ideas of this illustrious theologian, let us suppose that a considerable number of families, perfectly equal among themselves and absolutely independent of each other, were thrown by a tempest on a desert island. The vessel being destroyed, they have no hope either of returning home or of pursuing their journey. All communication with the rest of mankind is become impossible: we ask, whether these families could live without government? No. Has any one among them a right of governing the rest? Clearly not. Can any individual among them pretend to such a right? Certainly not. Have they a right to appoint the government of which they stand in need? Certainly they have. Therefore in this multitude, represented by the fathers of families or in some other way, resides the civil power, together with the right of transmitting it to one or more persons, according as they shall judge proper. It is difficult to make any valid objection to the doctrine placed in this point of view. That this is the real meaning of his words is clearly shown by the observations which follow:k "In the third place," he says, "observe that the multitude transfers this power to one person or more by natural right; for the republic not being able to exercise it by itself, is obliged to communicate it to one or to a limited number; and it is thus that the power of princes, considered in general, is by natural and divine law; and the whole human race, if assembled together, could not establish the contrary, viz. that princes or governors did not exist."
But the fundamental principle being once established, Bellarmin allows to society an ample right of appointing the form of government which they think proper. This ought to refute the accusations made against the Catholic doctrine, of favoring servitude; for if all forms of government are reconcilable with this doctrine, it is evident that it cannot justly be accused of being incompatible with liberty. Hear how the same author continues on this point:l "Observe, in the fourth place," he says, "that particular forms of government are by the law of nations, and not by divine law, since it depends upon the consent of the multitude to place over themselves a king, consuls, or other magistrates, as is clear; and, for a legitimate reason, they can change royalty into aristocracy, or into democracy, or vice versâ, as it was done in Rome.
"Observe, in the fifth place, that it follows, from what we have said, that this power in particular comes from God, but by means of the counsel and election of man, like all other things which belong to the law of nations; for the law of nations is, as it were, a conclusion drawn from the natural law by human reasoning. Thence follows a twofold difference between the political and the ecclesiastical power: first, difference with regard to the subject, since political power is in the multitude, and ecclesiastical in a man immediately, as in its subject; second, difference with respect to the cause, since political power, considered generally, is by divine law, and in particular by the law of nations, while the ecclesiastical power is in every way by divine law, and emanates immediately from God."