190. Is it necessary that whatever exists should be in some place? This question may seem strange, but it is profoundly philosophical. To be is not the same as to be in a place. To be, whether taken substantively as signifying to exist, or copulatively, as expressing the relation of the predicate to the subject, does not involve the idea of being in a place. The relation of an object to place is not necessary to it; for it is not contained in the notion of object. It is something added to the object, whether it is given to the object with more or less foundation by ourselves, or the object has it in reality by communication from some other.
The imagination can represent nothing which does not occupy a place, but the understanding may conceive things that are not situated in any place. When we reflect on the essence of objects, what position does our mind give them? The intellectual act is always accompanied by sensible representations, which sometimes assist it, and sometimes embarrass and confuse it; but in either case the act of the understanding is always distinct from these representations.
191. There is no reason for saying that every thing must occupy a place. The imagination cannot see how any thing can exist otherwise, but the understanding finds no absurdity in it, and it is in accordance with the principles of philosophy. If place considered in itself is only a part of space terminated by a surface, and space abstracted from bodies is nothing, the relation to place or to points in space must be nothing. We must have bodies in order to have a term of the relation; therefore, if we suppose a being which has no relation to bodies, it is not necessary that it should be in any place.
192. The relation of a being to bodies may be of three kinds: that of commensuration, as is the relation of lines, surfaces, and solids to each other; that of generation, as we conceive the line generated by the point; and that of action in general, as we conceive the relation of pure spirits to matter. The first cannot exist if the object has no dimensions; for then it cannot be measured; the second can exist only in unextended or infinitesimal points, from which extension is generated; therefore these two relations can only exist between bodies, or their generative elements. Therefore, nothing which is not a body or an element of body, can occupy place under either of these aspects. As to the third relation, that of action of a cause upon a body, it may be found in all agents capable of acting upon matter; but it is evident that the position which results from this, is something very different from that which we conceive in bodies or their elements; it is something of a wholly distinct order, and belongs rather to the pure idea of causality than to the intuition of space.
193. We can conceive a being which is not a body, nor an element of body, and which does not exercise any action on bodies; in this case, this being has none of the three relations of which we have spoken, consequently it is not in any place, and to say that it is here, or that it is there, that it is near or distant, would be using words without meaning.
194. Viewed from the point of this doctrine, the following questions are easy to answer:
Where must a pure spirit be which has no relation of causality nor influence of any kind upon the corporeal world? Nowhere. The answer will not seem strange to one who understands that the question is absurd. In the case supposed, there is no where, for this involves a relation and there are no relations here.
Where would the pure spirits be if the world did not exist? Nowhere, unless we have a mind to say they would be in themselves. But, the word to be does not mean the position of which we are speaking here, but only the existence of the spirit, or its identity with itself.
Where was God before the world was created? He was, but he was not in any place; for he has no parts.
195. I wish here to expose an error of Kant. This philosopher believed that space was conceived by us as a condition of all existence in general, and on this he founded one of his arguments that space was a purely subjective form. In the second edition of his Critic of pure Reason, explaining the subjectiveness of space, he seems to hold, that we do not even conceive things in the pure intellectual order, without referring them to space. He observes that in natural theology, when treating of things which cannot be the object of intuition either for us or for themselves, we are very careful not to attribute to this intuition or manner of perception time and space, which are the conditions of human intuition. "But," he adds, "by what right do we proceed thus, when time and space have already been established as the forms of things in themselves, and conditions of their existence a prior, subsisting still after all else has been annihilated by thought? As conditions of all existence in general, they must be the conditions of the existence of God. If we do not make space and time the objective forms of all things, it only remains for us to make them the subjective forms of our mode of intuition, as well internal as external." Kant is right in saying that space and time ought not to be considered as real forms, not susceptible of annihilation, and therefore necessary and eternal; but I do not see the necessity of the disjunctive by which he asserts that if we do not make space and time the objective forms of all things, we must make them the subjective forms, and that, otherwise, we should make space and time conditions of the existence of God.
196. We regard space as an actual condition of things, which occupy place, but not of all things. We conceive existence in pure spirits without the necessity of any relation to place, and, consequently, independent of all position in space.
On this point, as on all relating to the pure intellectual order, we find in the theologians doctrines which are highly important, and deserve to be consulted by all who wish to go deeply into philosophical questions. The author of the Critic of Pure Reason would have found there some observations which would have cleared up the difficulties which embarrassed him. He would have found how incorrect it is to say that space is a condition of the existence of all things, in the beautiful as well as profound theory by which many of the scholastics explain the presence of God in the corporeal world, and the presence of the angels in different places, their motion from one point to another without passing through the intermediate points, and the manner in which the soul is wholly in the whole body and in every part of the body. In these works, unfortunately so little consulted, the German philosopher would have learned that the presence of a spirit in a place is something different from the presence of a body, and has no relation to the intuition of space, whether regarded as the basis of sensible representations or as a geometrical idea.
197. St. Thomas54 asks if God is in all things, and answers that he is. In proving this assertion he does not consider the necessity of every thing being in some place, but on the contrary seems rather to forget the idea of space, and regards only causality.
"As God," he says, "is being itself by his essence, created being must be his effect, as to burn is the effect of fire. But God causes this effect in things not only when they begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; thus the light is caused in the air by the sun as long as air remains illuminated. As long therefore as things retain their being, God is necessarily present to them, according to the manner in which they have their being. But being is that which is most internal, and most closely inherent in every thing because it is the form of all that is in it, God therefore is in all things internally."
To be situated in space is to be contained in it; so, at least, we conceive whatever we consider situated in space. St. Thomas rejects this meaning as applied to spiritual beings, and says, that although corporeal beings are contained in things, spiritual beings on the contrary contain the things in which they are.
In the second article he asks whether God is in all places (ubique); and, he says, that as God is in all things, giving them being and the power of acting, so he is in all places giving them being and capacity (virtutem locativam). He states as an objection that incorporeal things are not in any place, and answers in the following philosophical words: "Incorporeal things are not in place by the contact of measurable quantity, like bodies; but by the contact of activity (virtutis)." Then explaining how the indivisible can be in different places, he says: "The indivisible is of two kinds; first, it is the limit of the continued, as a point in permanent things, and a moment in successive things. The indivisible in permanent things, cannot be in different parts of place or in different places, because it has a determinate position; and in the same manner the indivisible in action or in motion cannot be in different parts of time, because it has a determinate order in action or motion. But there is another indivisible which is beyond all kind of continuation, and in this sense incorporeal substances, as God, the angels, and the soul, are called indivisible. The indivisible in this manner, is not applied to the continued as any thing which belongs to it, but only as reaching it by its activity; therefore as its activity may extend to one or many, to the small or to the great, it may be in one place or in many places, in a small place or in a great place."
What can be clearer, relatively to the intuition of space, than that when any thing is in a place it cannot be out of that place? But the holy Doctor, rising above sensible representations, boldly maintains that God may be whole in the whole, and in every part of the whole, as the soul is whole in every part of the body. And why? Because what is called totality in corporeal things relates to quantity, but the totality of incorporeal things relates to essence, and cannot be measured by quantity, and is not confined to any place.
In the Treatise on the Angels,55 he says that the expression to be in place is used equivocally (œquivoce),56 when applied to angels and bodies. Bodies are in place by the contact of measurable quantity, but angels by virtual quantity, that is to say, by the action which they may exercise upon a body. We cannot, therefore, say that an angel has a position in the continued (quod habeat situm in continuo). In the Treatise on the Soul57 he maintains that the soul is whole in every part of the body. He distinguishes the totality of essence from the totality of quantity, and makes use of an argument similar to that which he used with respect to the angels. The more we reflect on this doctrine the more profound it appears; those who have made light of it, have shown that they never penetrated beyond the surface in all that concerns the relations of spiritual to corporeal things. It is generally dangerous to laugh at opinions held by great men; for if they are not certain, they have, at least, powerful arguments in their favor. Nothing is more contrary to sensible representations than the possibility of any thing being in different places at the same time, but we shall find nothing more in conformity with the principles of sound philosophy than this possibility, after we have profoundly analyzed the relations of extension with unextended things, and discovered the difference between the position of quantity and the position of causality.
198. From these doctrines it may be concluded, that to be in space is not a general condition of all existences, even according to the manner of existences; for we can conceive existences without relation to any place. Many have confounded imagination with understanding on this point, and believed that what is impossible for the former is equally so for the latter. It is certain that we can imagine nothing without referring it to points of space, and even in purely intellectual objects there is always a sensible representation, but the understanding regards these representations as false and does not conform to them. As imagination is a sort of continuation of sensibility, or an internal sense, and the basis of sensations is extension; it is impossible for us to exercise this internal sense, without the presence of space, which, as we have shown, is only the idea of extension in general. Position in space is consequently a general condition of all things, as perceived by the senses, but not as perceived by the intellect.
199. Position in place is the relation of a body to other bodies. Is this relation necessary? I distinguish: conditionally, yes; essentially, no. God has established this relation, and therefore it is necessary; but God might have ordered it otherwise, and can even now change it, without varying the essence of things.
If we admit, as we must, a correspondence between the subjective and the objective, or between the appearance and the reality, we cannot deny that the relations of bodies are constant, and this constancy must proceed from some necessity. But that the existing order is subject to fixed laws, does not prove that these laws have their root in the essence of things, in such a manner that, supposing the existence of objects, their relations could not have been very different from what they actually are.
200. In order to assert that the existing order of the universe is intrinsically necessary, we must know the essence of things; but this is not possible for us, because objects are not immediately present to our understanding, and we see them only under one aspect, that which places them in relation with our sensitive faculties. The best proof of our ignorance of the essence of bodies is the great division of opinion on this subject. Some maintain that the essence of bodies is extension or dimensions; and others that extension is merely an accident, not only distinct, but even separable from corporeal substance.
The great obscurity in which the investigation of the constitutive elements of bodies is involved, proves that their essence is unknown to us, and that we know nothing of them except their relation to our sensibility.
201. It is not necessary that the aspect under which being is presented to us should contain its whole nature. To say that bodies contain nothing besides what we perceive in them, is to make our faculties the type of things in themselves, a ridiculous pretension in a being which finds its activity limited at every step and is almost always passive in its relations to bodies, and which, in order to exercise its faculties externally, is forced to submit to the laws of the external world, or else to encounter obstacles which are absolutely insurmountable.
If we are ignorant of the essence of bodies we can have no certain knowledge of what is intrinsically necessary in them; with the exception of composition, which even the sensible order presents to us, and which we cannot take from bodies without seeming to run into a contradiction. Simplicity and composition in the same object are incompatible and contradictory.
202. Hence, in all that pertains to the relations of bodies we must abstain from judging absolutely, and speak only conditionally. We may say: "This happens now; this must happen according to the order now established;" but we cannot say: "This happens, and it is absolutely necessary that it should happen." The transition from the first proposition to the second, implies the knowledge of what no man can know, that the aspect under which the external world is presented to us is the image of its essence.
203. One of the greatest errors of Descartes was, that he did not make sufficient account of this difference: he placed the essence of bodies in dimensions, which is to confound the real world with the phenomenal, and to take one aspect of things for their nature. It is true that whatever affects us has extension, and that extension is the basis of the relations of our sensibility with the external world; but it does not follow that the essence of this world is nothing more than what is presented to us in its dimensions. We might as well say that the essence of man is the lines which mark his form.
204. The different aspects under which the external world is presented to our senses, ought to prevent us from confounding what is absolute in it with what is relative. A man deprived of one sense would not reason well if he should conclude that the world has no other aspects than those which he perceives. What do we know of the manner in which objects are presented to pure spirits, or of the many other phases which they might offer to our sensibility?
Let us then leave nature its secrets; and let us not limit omnipotence by saying, that the order of the world is so intrinsically necessary that its present relations cannot be changed without contradiction. When we examine the possibility of a new order of relations between the beings which we call bodies, let us not settle the question too quickly, taking for our only type of the possible the vain impotence of our faculties. What should we think of a blind man who should laugh at those who see, if he heard them speak of the relations of objects as seen? Yet we present the same spectacle to a pure spirit when we talk of the impossibility of an order different from what our senses perceive.
205. The principles of physical science are in great part conditional; for they are true only on the supposition of the reality of the data furnished by experience. If position and relation to place are not essential to bodies, distance and motion are conditional facts true only under certain suppositions. All the natural sciences, as we have seen, are reduced to the calculation of extension and motion; they do not reach the essence of things, but are limited to one aspect, that presented by experience. In these sciences there is consequently nothing strictly absolute; in this respect, they are far below metaphysics, which knows things that are absolutely necessary. A further explanation of this doctrine is required, and will be given in the following chapters.
206. Must not the theory which supposes the relations of bodies to be variable, put an end to all the natural sciences? Can there be science without a necessary object? and can there be a necessity which is compatible with variability?
The natural sciences have two parts: one physical, and the other geometrical. The first supposes the data furnished by experience; the second forms its calculations relative to these data. Change the relations of external beings, and the data will be different, you will have a new experience producing a new physical science: the calculation will be the same, only new results will be obtained from the new data. The difficulty thus disappears. All the physical sciences are based on observation, all their combinations are made from data furnished by experience; therefore the physical sciences are not wholly absolute, but they have a part which is conditional. The theory of universal gravitation is developed as a body of geometrical science, but it starts from the data furnished by experience. Destroy these data and from a body of physical science it becomes a body of pure geometry. In mechanics, the problems of the composition and decomposition of forces have a physical signification, inasmuch as they presuppose the data of experience; suppress these data and there remains only a composition of lines which mean nothing when we call them forces. Therefore mechanics is only a system of geometrical applications.
207. Here another difficulty arises which is apparently more serious than the other. If the relations of bodies are not essential, but are subject to variation; if our calculations upon them are not founded upon data which are intrinsically necessary, it seems that geometry is destroyed, or limited in such a way to the ideal order, that it cannot be sure that on descending to the field of experience it will not find that false which it regarded as true, and that true which it reputed false. For example, the distances of bodies are calculated by considerations of geometry: if the relation of distance is variable, and a body may be in many places at the same time, geometry turns out false. Such a supposition is no more than the application of the foregoing theory; for, if the relations are variable, this variation may affect distance, which is only a relation. I said this difficulty was more serious than the other, because it leaves the field of experience, and attacks the order of our ideas, an order which we must hold to be indestructible, unless we wish to give up our reason. What would become of our reason if geometry were contradicted by the reality? what would become of an order of ideas in contradiction to facts? Still I repeat that the force of this difficulty is only apparent, and if analyzed will be found of no more weight than the objection which we have already answered.
A body which is a hundred yards distant from another, cannot be only one yard distant; geometry would be opposed to it. But if the relations of bodies are variable this proposition can mean nothing with respect to the reality. Therefore geometry is false. I admit the consequence; but the principle on which it is based involves a supposition contrary to my theory. If you alter or destroy the relations of bodies, you destroy distance, which is a relation, consequently you cannot have a distance of one hundred yards, nor of one yard, nor any distance at all, and if there is no distance there is no contradiction. If, then, you ask how great is the distance between them, your question is absurd; for it supposes a distance, whereas there is no distance at all.
208. This solution rests on a fundamental principle which we ought never to lose sight of. Geometrical truth is true in reality when the conditions of geometry exist in reality; if these conditions do not exist, there is no real geometry. There is nothing strange in this: in fact, the same occurs in the purely ideal order; even there, geometry rests on certain postulates, without which it is impossible. Two triangles with the same base and altitude are equivalent to each other. This is a true proposition, but only on the supposition that there are those orders of points which are called lines, and that the lines form angles, and are united at three points. If these relations are not presupposed, the geometrical theorem has no meaning.
209. Geometry in itself, or in the purely ideal order, is founded on the principle of contradiction. The truth of this principle being absolutely necessary, that of geometry is equally so. But the principle of contradiction, like all purely ideal principles, abstracts existence, and is applied to nothing in practice, unless we suppose some fact to support it. Yes and no at the same time are impossible; but the principle determines nothing for or against either of the extremes. It only affirms that one excludes the other; if we suppose yes, it excludes no, and if we suppose no, it excludes yes; that is to say, it always needs a condition, a datum which only experience can furnish.
It is the same with geometry. All its theorems and problems refer to the ideal field within us, where there are certain conditions which lead to certain results, by virtue of the principle of contradiction: whenever the conditions exist, the results are true; but if the former fail the latter are false. Ideal sciences consider the connection of conclusions with principles in the order of possibility, but take no note of facts. If the connection is admitted the science is true.