Atrocious Judges : Lives of Judges Infamous as Tools of Tyrants and Instruments of Oppression

Mr. Van Dyke, the district attorney, then said that the question now was whether a person, in contempt, had any standing in court whatever. So far as Mr. Williamson is concerned, he has no standing. The argument of the gentlemen on the other side must be taken as arguing against the adjudication of this court. How far can a man in contempt come into court and purge that contempt? How did the counsel get over the fact, that his client was in contempt? He must first submit himself to the court by asking to be permitted to purge himself of contempt.

Mr. Meredith closed the argument, and the proceeding was closed by an entry on the part of Judge Kane of the following order on the record.

The United States v. Williamson. And now, October the 29th, 1855, the court having heard argument upon the motion for leave to read and file among the records, in this case, a certain paper writing purporting to be the petition of Passmore Williamson, and having considered thereof, do refuse the leave moved for, inasmuch as it appears that the said Passmore Williamson is now remaining in contempt of this court, and that by the said paper writing he doth in no wise make purgation of his said contempt, nor doth he thereby pray that he may be permitted to make such purgation; wherefore the said Passmore Williamson hath not at this time a standing in this court.

To the end, however, that the said Passmore Williamson may, when thereunto minded, the more readily relieve himself of his said contempt, it is ordered that whenever by petition, in writing, to be filed with the clerk, Passmore Williamson shall set forth, under his oath or solemn affirmation that ‘he desires to purge himself of the contempt because of which he is now attached, and to that end is willing to make true answers to such interrogations as may be addressed to him by the court, touching the matters heretofore legally enquired of by the writ of habeas corpus to him directed, at the relation of John H. Wheeler,’ then the marshal do bring the said Passmore Williamson before the court, if in session, or if the court be not in session, then before the judge at his chambers, to abide the further order of the court in his behalf. And it is further ordered that the clerk do furnish copies of this order to the said Passmore Williamson, and to the attorney of the United States, and to the marshal.

Under this order Williamson presented the following petition:

United States of America v. Williamson, District Court of the United States, Eastern district of Pennsylvania

To the Honorable the Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania:

The petition of Passmore Williamson respectfully showeth: That he desires to purge himself of the contempt because of which he is now attached, and to that end is willing to make true answers to such interrogatories as may be addressed to him by the court, touching the matter heretofore inquired of him by the writ of habeas corpus to him directed at the relation of John H. Wheeler. Wherefore he prays that he may be permitted to purge himself of said contempt by making true answers to such interrogatories as may be addressed to him by the honorable court touching the premises.

P. WILLIAMSON.

Affirmed and subscribed before me, Nov. 2, 1855.

CHARLES F. HEAZLITT, U. S. Com.

Judge Kane hesitated to receive this petition because it did not conform to his order by containing the word legally, before the phrase “inquired of,” (thus confirming the legality of the proceedings under the original writ of habeas corpus directed to Williamson.) But finding that Williamson was resolved to make no such concession, Judge Kane finally concluded to receive the petition, and made the following reply to it:

‘Passmore Williamson: The court has received your petition, and, upon consideration thereof, have thought right to grant the prayer thereof. You will therefore make here in open court your solemn affirmation, that in the return heretofore made by you to the writ of habeas corpus, which issued from this court at the relation of John H. Wheeler, and in the proceedings consequent thereupon, you have not intended a contempt of this court or of its process. Moreover, that you are now willing to make true answers to such interrogatories as may be addressed to you by the court, touching the premises inquired of in the said writ of habeas corpus.’

The required affirmation was then made in the form dictated by the judge.

Mr. Van Dyke, the district attorney, then submitted an interrogatory in writing, which was not read aloud at that time.

Mr. Gilpin said Mr. Williamson was perfectly willing to answer the interrogatory submitted by the district attorney, but as he did not know what other interrogatories might follow this, he thought it best that it and its answer should be filed.

Mr. Van Dyke said he was willing either to file the interrogatory or to submit it for an immediate reply.

Mr. Gilpin and Judge Kane both remarked that they had understood the district attorney to intimate, that if the question propounded was answered in the affirmative, he would be satisfied. The court further said, that it was for the petitioner to make his election whether or not the interrogatories and the replies should be filed.

After consultation with his counsel, the petitioner preferred that the questions and answers should be filed.

The court directed that the interrogatories should be filed.

Mr. Gilpin then read the interrogatory that had been propounded, and the reply of Mr. Williamson.

The interrogatory was as follows:

‘Did you at the time of the service of the writ of habeas corpus, at the relation of John H. Wheeler, or at any time during the period intervening between the service of said writ and the making of your return thereto, seek to obey the mandate of said writ, by bringing before this honorable court the persons of the slaves therein mentioned? If to this interrogatory you answer in the affirmative, state fully and particularly the mode in which you sought so to obey said writ, and all that you did tending to that end.’

The reply made was as follows:

‘I did not seek to obey the writ by producing the persons therein mentioned before the court, because I had not, at the time of the service of the writ, the power over, the custody or control of them, and, therefore, it was impossible for me to do so. I first heard of the writ of habeas corpus on Friday, July 20, between one and two o’clock A. M., on my return from Harrisburg. After breakfast, about nine o’clock, I went from my house to Mr. Hopper’s office, when and where the return was prepared. At ten o’clock I came into court, as commanded by the writ. I sought to obey the writ by answering it truly; the parties not being in my possession or control, it was impossible for me to obey the writ by producing them. Since the service of the writ I have not had the custody, possession or power over them; nor have I known where they were, except from common rumor, or the newspaper reports in regard to their public appearance in the city or elsewhere.’

Some discussion arose between the district attorney and the counsel of Mr. Williamson. Mr. Van Dyke contended that the reply of the defendant was evasive and contradictory. The judge said the difficulty, he thought, could be easily overcome by amending the answer, and at the suggestion of the court it was amended in the following manner:

‘I did not seek to obey the writ by producing the persons in the writ mentioned before this court. I did not seek, because I verily believed that it was entirely impossible for me to produce the said persons, agreeably to the command of the court.’

This answer was then accepted by the court and ordered filed.

Mr. Van Dyke then submitted another interrogatory, the substance of which was, whether or not Mr. Williamson had been guilty of mental reservations in his reply to the first interrogatory?

The court overruled this interrogatory as superfluous and improper.

Mr. Van Dyke withdrew this interrogatory and offered another, which was also overruled by the court, on the ground that it led to such replies as had already been objected to by the district attorney.

Mr. Van Dyke also withdrew this question.

Judge Kane then remarked that the district attorney had been invited to aid the court in this case, but that he would bear in mind that his relation to Mr. Wheeler was now suspended. This was only an inquiry as to what injury had been done the process of the court.

Mr. Van Dyke said he was aware of the position he occupied.

Judge Kane then said: ‘The contempt is now regarded as purged and the party is released from custody. He is now reinstated in the position he occupied before the contempt was committed. Mr. Williamson is now before me on the return to the writ.’

Mr. Van Dyke then arose and addressed the court.

After Mr. Van Dyke had concluded, Mr. Meredith inquired: ‘Is Mr. Williamson discharged?’

Judge Kane replied, ‘He is. I understand from the remarks of the district attorney, that a nolle prosequi has been entered in the case in this court.’

The court then adjourned. Mr. Williamson was congratulated by his friends on his restoration to liberty.¹⁵⁸