The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. 10 (of 12)

SECOND DAY: SATURDAY, APRIL 25, 1789

My Lords,—When I last had the honor of addressing your Lordships, I endeavored to state with as much perspicuity as the nature of an intricate affair would admit, and as largely as in so intricate an affair was consistent with the brevity which I endeavored to preserve, the proofs which had been adduced against Warren Hastings upon an inquiry instituted by an order of the Court of Directors into the corruption and peculation of persons in authority in India. My Lords, I have endeavored to show you by anterior presumptive proofs, drawn from the nature and circumstances of the acts themselves inferring guilt, that such actions and such conduct could be referable only to one cause, namely, corruption; I endeavored to show you afterwards, my Lords, what the specific nature and extent of the corruption was, as far as it could be fully proved; and lastly, the great satisfactory presumption which attended the inquiry with regard to Mr. Hastings,—namely, that, contrary to law, contrary to his duty, contrary to what is owed by innocence to itself, Mr. Hastings resisted that inquiry, and employed all the power of his office to prevent the exercise of it, either in himself or in others. These presumptions and these proofs will be brought before your Lordships, distinctly and in order, at the end of this opening.

The next point on which I thought it necessary to proceed was relative to the presumptions which his subsequent conduct gave with regard to his guilt: because, my Lords, his uniform tenor of conduct, such as must attend guilt, both in the act, at the time of the inquiry, and subsequent to it, will form such a body of satisfactory evidence as I believe the human mind is not made to resist.

My Lords, there is another reason why I choose to enter into the presumptions drawn from his conduct and the fact, taking his conduct in two parts, if it may be so expressed, omission and commission, in order that your Lordships should more fully enter into the consequences of this system of bribery. But before I say anything upon that, I wish your Lordships to be apprised, that the Commons, in bringing this bribe of three lac and a half before your Lordships, do not wish by any means to have it understood that this is the whole of the bribe that was received by Mr. Hastings in consequence of delivering up the whole management of the government of the country to that improper person whom he nominated for it. My Lords, from the proofs that will be adduced before you, there is great probability that he received very nearly a hundred thousand pounds; there is positive proof of his receiving fifty; and we have chosen only to charge him with that of which there is such an accumulated body of proof as to leave no doubt upon the minds of your Lordships. All this I say, because we are perfectly apprised of the sentiments of the public upon this point: when they hear of the enormity of Indian peculation, when they see the acts done, and compare them with the bribes received, the acts seem so enormous and the bribes comparatively so small, that they can hardly be got to attribute them to that motive. What I mean to state is this: that, from a collective view of the subject, your Lordships will be able to judge that enormous offences have been committed, and that the bribe which we have given in proof is a specimen of the nature and extent of those enormous bribes which extend to much greater sums than we are able to prove before you in the manner your Lordships would like and expect.

I have already remarked to your Lordships, that, after this charge was brought and recorded before the Council in spite of the resistance made by Mr. Hastings, in which he employed all the power and authority of his station, and the whole body of his partisans and associates in iniquity, dispersed through every part of these provinces,—after he had taken all these steps, finding himself pressed by the proof and pressed by the presumption of his resistance to the inquiry, he did think it necessary to make something like a defence. Accordingly he has made what he calls a justification, which did not consist in the denial of that fact, or any explanation of it. The mode he took for his defence was abuse of his colleagues, abuse of the witnesses, and of every person who in the execution of his duty was inquiring into the fact, and charging them with things which, if true, were by no means sufficient to support him, either in defending the acts themselves, or in the criminal means he used to prevent inquiry into them. His design was to mislead their minds, and to carry them from the accusation and the proof of it. With respect to the passion, violence, and intemperate heat with which he charged them, they were proceeding in an orderly, regular manner; and if on any occasion they seem to break out into warmth, it was in consequence of that resistance which he made to them, in what your Lordships, I believe, will agree with them in thinking was one of the most important parts of their functions. If they had been intemperate in their conduct, if they had been violent, passionate, prejudiced against him, it afforded him only a better means of making his defence; because, though in a rational and judicious mind the intemperate conduct of the accuser certainly proves nothing with regard to the truth or falsehood of his accusation, yet we do know that the minds of men are so constituted that an improper mode of conducting a right thing does form some degree of prejudice against it. Mr. Hastings, therefore, unable to defend himself upon principle, has resorted as much as he possibly could to prejudice. And at the same time that there is not one word of denial, or the least attempt at a refutation of the charge, he has loaded the records with all manner of minutes, proceedings, and letters relative to everything but the fact itself. The great aim of his policy, both then, before, and ever since, has been to divert the mind of the auditory, or the persons to whom he addressed himself, from the nature of his cause, to some collateral circumstance relative to it,—a policy to which he has always had recourse; but that trick, the last resource of despairing guilt, I trust will now completely fail him.

Mr. Hastings, however, began to be pretty sensible that this way of proceeding had a very unpromising and untoward look; for which reason he next declared that he reserved his defence for fear of a legal prosecution, and that some time or other he would give a large and liberal explanation to the Court of Directors, to whom he was answerable for his conduct, of his refusing to suffer the inquiry to proceed, of his omitting to give them satisfaction at the time, of his omitting to take any one natural step that an innocent man would have taken upon such an occasion. Under this promise he has remained from that time to the time you see him at your bar, and he has neither denied, exculpated, explained, or apologized for his conduct in any one single instance.

While he accuses the intemperance of his adversaries, he shows a degree of temperance in himself which always attends guilt in despair: for struggling guilt may be warm, but guilt that is desperate has nothing to do but to submit to the consequences of it, to bear the infamy annexed to its situation, and to try to find some consolation in the effects of guilt with regard to private fortune for the scandal it brings them into in public reputation. After the business had ended in India, the causes why he should have given the explanation grew stronger and stronger: for not only the charges exhibited against him were weighty, but the manner in which he was called upon to inquire into them was such as would undoubtedly tend to stir the mind of a man of character, to rouse him to some consideration of himself, and to a sense of the necessity of his defence. He was goaded to make this defence by the words I shall read to your Lordships from Sir John Clavering.

"In the late proceedings of the Revenue Board it will appear that there is no species of peculation from which the Honorable Governor-General has thought it reasonable to abstain." He further says, in answer to Mr. Hastings, "The malicious view with which this innuendo" (an innuendo of Mr. Hastings) "is thrown out is only worthy of a man who, having disgraced himself in the eyes of every man of honor both in Asia and in Europe, and having no imputation to lay to our charge, has dared to attempt in the dark what malice itself could not find grounds to aim at openly."

These are the charges which were made upon him,—not loosely, in the heat of conversation, but deliberately, in writing, entered upon record, and sent to his employers, the Court of Directors, those whom the law had set over him, and to whose judgment and opinion he was responsible. Do your Lordships believe that it was conscious innocence that made him endure such reproaches, so recorded, from his own colleague? Was it conscious innocence that made him abandon his defence, renounce his explanation, and bear all this calumny, (if it was calumny,) in such a manner, without making any one attempt to refute it? Your Lordships will see by this, and by other minutes with which the books are filled, that Mr. Hastings is charged quite to the brim with corruptions of all sorts, and covered with every mode of possible disgrace. For there is something so base and contemptible in the crimes of peculation and bribery, that, when they come to be urged home and strongly against a man, as here they are urged, nothing but a consciousness of guilt can possibly make a person so charged support himself under them. Mr. Hastings considered himself, as he has stated, to be under the necessity of bearing them. What is that necessity? Guilt. Could he say that Sir John Clavering (for I say nothing now of Colonel Monson and Mr. Francis, who were joined with him) was a man weak and contemptible? I believe there are those among your Lordships who remember that Sir John Clavering was known before he went abroad, and better known by his conduct after, to be a man of the most distinguished honor that ever served his Majesty; he served his Majesty in a military situation for many years, and afterwards in that high civil situation in India. It is known that through every step and gradation of a high military service, until he arrived at the highest of all, there never was the least blot upon him, or doubt or suspicion of his character; that his temper for the most part, and his manners, were fully answerable to his virtues, and a noble ornament to them; that he was one of the best natured, best bred men, as well as one of the highest principled men to be found in his Majesty's service; that he had passed the middle time of life, and come to an age which makes men wise in general; so that he could be warmed by nothing but that noble indignation at guilt which is the last thing that ever was or will be extinguished in a virtuous mind. He was a man whose voice was not to be despised; but if his character had been personally as contemptible as it was meritorious and honorable in every respect, yet his situation as a commissioner named by an act of Parliament for the express purpose of reforming India gave him a weight and consequence that could not suffer Mr. Hastings, without a general and strong presumption of his guilt, to acquiesce in such recorded minutes from him. But if he had been a weak, if he had been an intemperate man, (in reality he was as cool, steady, temperate, judicious a man as ever was born,) the Court of Directors, to whom Mr. Hastings was responsible by every tie and every principle, and was made responsible at last by a positive act of Parliament obliging him to yield obedience to their commands as the general rule of his duty,—the Court of Directors, I say, perfectly approved of every part of General Clavering's, Colonel Monson's, and Mr. Francis's conduct; they approved of this inquiry which Mr. Hastings rejected; and they have declared, "that the powers and instructions vested in and given to General Clavering and the other gentlemen were such as fully authorized them in every inquiry that seems to have been their object … Europeans."²

Now after the supreme authority, to which they were to appeal in all their disputes, had passed this judgment upon this very inquiry, the matter no longer depended upon Mr. Hastings's opinion; nor could he be longer justified in attributing that to evil motives either of malice or passion in his colleagues. When the judges who were finally to determine who was malicious, who was passionate, who was or was not justified either in setting on foot the inquiry or resisting it, had passed that judgment, then Mr. Hastings was called upon by all the feelings of a man, and by his duty in Council, to give satisfaction to his masters, the Directors, who approved of the zeal and diligence shown in that very inquiry, the passion of which he only reprobated, and upon which he grounded his justification.

If anything but conscious guilt could have possibly influenced him to such more than patience under this accusation, let us see what was his conduct when the scene was changed. General Clavering, fatigued and broken down by the miseries of his situation, soon afterwards lost a very able and affectionate colleague, Colonel Monson, (whom Mr. Hastings states to be one of the bitterest of his accusers,) a man one of the most loved and honored of his time, a person of your Lordships' noble blood, and a person who did honor to it, and if he had been of the family of a commoner, well deserved to be raised to your distinction. When that man died,—died of a broken heart, to say nothing else,—and General Clavering felt himself in a manner without help, except what he derived from the firmness, assiduity, and patience of Mr. Francis, sinking like himself under the exertion of his own virtues, he was resolved to resign his employment. The Court of Directors were so alarmed at this attempt of his to resign his employment, that they wrote thus: "When you conceived the design of quitting our service, we imagine you could not have heard of the resignation of Mr. Hastings … your zeal and ability."³

My Lords, in this struggle, and before he could resign finally, another kind of resignation, the resignation of Nature, took place, and Sir John Clavering died. The character that was given Sir John Clavering at that time is a seal to the whole of his proceedings, and the use that I shall make of it your Lordships will see presently. "The abilities of General Clavering, the comprehensive knowledge he had attained of our affairs … to the East India Company."⁴

And never had it a greater loss. There is the concluding funeral oration made by his masters, upon a strict, though by no means partial, view of his conduct. My Lords, here is the man who is the great accuser of Mr. Hastings, as he says. What is he? a slight man, a man of mean situation, a man of mean talents, a man of mean character? No: of the highest character. Was he a person whose conduct was disapproved by their common superiors? No: it was approved when living, and ratified when dead. This was the man, a man equal to him in every respect, upon the supposed evil motives of whom alone was founded the sole justification of Mr. Hastings.

But be it, then, that Sir John Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis were all of them the evil-minded persons that he describes them to be, and that from dislike to them, from a kind of manly resentment, if you please, against such persons, an hatred against malicious proceedings, and a defiance of them, he did not think proper, as he states, to make his defence during that period of time, and while oppressed by that combination,—yet, when he got rid of the two former persons, and when Mr. Francis was nothing, when the whole majority was in his hand, and he was in full power, there was a large, open, full field for inquiry; and he was bound to re-institute that inquiry, and to clear his character before his judges and before his masters. Mr. Hastings says, "No: they have threatened me with a prosecution, and I reserve myself for a court of justice."

Mr. Hastings has now at length taken a ground, as you will see from all his writings, which makes all explanation of his conduct in this business absolutely impossible. For, in the first place, he says, "As a prosecution is meditated against me, I will say nothing in explanation of my conduct, because I might disclose my defence, and by that means do myself a prejudice." On the other hand, when the prosecution is dropped, as we all know it was dropped in this case, then he has a direct contrary reason, but it serves him just as well: "Why, as no prosecution is intended, no defence need be made." So that, whether a prosecution is intended or a prosecution dropped, there is always cause why Mr. Hastings should not give the Court of Directors the least satisfaction concerning his conduct, notwithstanding, as we shall prove, he has reiteratedly promised, and promised it in the most ample and liberal manner. But let us see if there be any presumption in his favor to rebut the presumption which he knew was irresistible, and which, by making no defence for his conduct, and stopping the inquiry, must necessarily lie upon him. He reserves his defence, but he promises both defence and explanation.

Your Lordships will remark that there is nowhere a clear and positive denial of the fact. Promising a defence, I will admit, does not directly and ex vi termini suppose that a man may not deny the fact, because it is just compatible with the defence; but it does by no means exclude the admission of the fact, because the admission of the fact may be attended with a justification: but when a man says that he will explain his conduct with regard to a fact, then he admits that fact, because there can be no explanation of a fact which has no existence. Therefore Mr. Hastings admits the fact by promising an explanation, and he shows he has no explanation nor justification to give by never having given it. Goaded, provoked, and called upon for it, in the manner I have mentioned, he chooses to have a feast of disgrace, (if I may say so,) to have a riot of infamy, served up to him day by day for a course of years, in every species of reproach that could be given by his colleagues, and by the Court of Directors, "from whom," he says, "I received nothing but opprobrious and disgraceful epithets," and he says "that his predecessors possessed more of their confidence than he had." Yet for years he lay down in that sty of disgrace, fattening in it, feeding upon that offal of disgrace and excrement, upon everything that could be disgustful to the human mind, rather than deny the fact and put himself upon a civil justification. Infamy was never incurred for nothing. We know very well what was said formerly:—

 
"Populus me sibilat; at mihi plaudo
Ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arca."
 

And never did a man submit to infamy for anything but its true reward, money. Money he received; the infamy he received along with it: he was glad to take his wife with all her goods; he took her with her full portion, with every species of infamy that belonged to her; and your Lordships cannot resist the opinion that he would not have suffered himself to be disgraced with the Court of Directors, disgraced with his colleagues, disgraced with the world, disgraced upon an eternal record, unless he was absolutely guilty of the fact that was charged upon him.

He frequently expresses that he reserves himself for a court of justice. Does he, my Lords? I am sorry that Mr. Hastings should show that he always mistakes his situation; he has totally mistaken it: he was a servant, bound to give a satisfactory account of his conduct to his masters, and, instead of that, he considers himself and the Court of Directors as litigant parties,—them as the accusers, and himself as the culprit. What would your Lordships, in private life, conceive of a steward who was accused of embezzling the rents, robbing and oppressing the tenants, and committing a thousand misdeeds in his stewardship, and who, upon your wishing to make inquiry into his conduct, and asking an explanation of it, should answer, "I will give no reply: you may intend to prosecute me and convict me as a cheat, and therefore I will not give you any satisfaction": what would you think of that steward? You could have no doubt that such a steward was a person not fit to be a steward, nor fit to live.

Mr. Hastings reserves himself for a court of justice: that single circumstance, my Lords, proves that he was guilty. It may appear very odd that his guilt should be inferred from his desire of trial in a court in which he could be acquitted or condemned. But I shall prove to you from that circumstance that Mr. Hastings, in desiring to be tried in a court of justice, convicts himself of presumptive guilt.

When Mr. Hastings went to Bengal in the year 1772, he had a direction exactly similar to this which he has resisted in his own case: it was to inquire into grievances and abuses. In consequence of this direction, he proposes a plan for the regulation of the Company's service, and one part of that plan was just what you would expect from him,—that is, the power of destroying every Company's servant without the least possibility of his being heard in his own defence or taking any one step to justify himself, and of dismissing him at his own discretion: and the reason he gives for it is this. "I shall forbear to comment upon the above propositions: if just and proper, their utility will be self-apparent. One clause only in the last article may require some explanation, namely, the power proposed for the Governor of recalling any person from his station without assigning a reason for it. In the charge of oppression," (now here you will find the reason why Mr. Hastings wishes to appeal to a court of justice, rather than to give satisfaction to his employers,) "though supported by the cries of the people and the most authentic representations, it is yet impossible in most cases to obtain legal proofs of it; and unless the discretionary power which I have recommended be somewhere lodged, the assurance of impunity from any formal inquiry will baffle every order of the board, as, on the other hand, the fear of the consequence will restrain every man within the bounds of his duty, if he knows himself liable to suffer by the effects of a single control." You see Mr. Hastings himself is of opinion that the cries of oppression, though extorted from a whole people by the iron hand of severity,—that these cries of a whole people, attended even with authentic documents sufficient to satisfy the mind of any man, may be totally insufficient to convict the oppressor in a court; and yet to that court, whose competence he denies, to that very court, he appeals, in that he puts his trust, and upon that ground he refuses to perform the just promise he had given of any explanation to those who had employed him.

Now I put this to your Lordships: if a man is of opinion that no public court can truly and properly bring him to any account for his conduct, that the forms observable in courts are totally adverse to it, that there is a general incompetency with regard to such a court, and yet shuns a tribunal capable and competent, and applies to that which he thinks is incapable and incompetent, does not that man plainly show that he has rejected what he thinks will prove his guilt, and that he has chosen what he thinks will be utterly insufficient to prove it? And if this be the case, as he asserts it to be, with an under servant, think what must be the case of the upper servant of all: for, if an inferior servant is not to be brought to justice, what must be the situation of a Governor-General? It is impossible not to see, that, as he had conceived that a court of justice had not sufficient means to bring his crimes to light and detection, nor sufficient to bring him to proper and adequate punishment, therefore he flew to a court of justice, not as a place to decide upon him, but as a sanctuary to secure his guilt. Most of your Lordships have travelled abroad, and have seen in the unreformed countries of Europe churches filled with persons who take sanctuary in them. You do not presume that a man is innocent because he is in a sanctuary: you know, that, so far from demonstrating his innocence, it demonstrates his guilt. And in this case, Mr. Hastings flies not to a court for trial, but as a sanctuary to secure him from it.

Let us just review the whole of his conduct; let us hear how Mr. Hastings has proceeded with regard to this whole affair. The court of justice dropped; the prosecution in Bengal ended. With Sir Elijah Impey as chief-justice, who, as your Lordships have seen, had a most close and honorable connection with the Governor-General, (all the circumstances of which I need not detail to you, as it must be fresh in your Lordships' memory,) he had not much to fear from the impartiality of the court. He might be sure the forms of law would not be strained to do him mischief; therefore there was no great terror in it. But whatever terror there might be in it was overblown, because his colleagues refused to carry him into it, and therefore that opportunity of defence is gone. In Europe he was afraid of making any defence, but the prosecution here was also soon over; and in the House of Commons he takes this ground of justification for not giving any explanation, that the Court of Directors had received perfect satisfaction of his innocence; and he named persons of great and eminent character in the profession, whose names certainly cannot be mentioned without highly imposing upon the prejudices and weighing down almost the reason of mankind. He quotes their opinions in his favor, and argues that the exculpation which they give, or are supposed to give him, should excuse him from any further explanation.

My Lords, I believe I need not say to great men of the profession, many of the first ornaments of which I see before me, that they are very little influenced in the seat of judgment by the opinions which they have given in the chamber, and they are perfectly in the right: because while in the chamber they hear but one part of the cause; it is generally brought before them in a very partial manner, and they have not the lights which they possess when they sit deliberately down upon the tribunal to examine into it; and for this reason they discharge their minds from every prejudice that may have arisen from a foregone partial opinion, and come uninfluenced by it as to a new cause. This, we know, is the glory of the great lawyers who have presided and do preside in the tribunals of this country; but we know, at the same time, that those opinions (which they in their own mind reject, unless supported afterwards by clear and authentic testimony) do weigh upon the rest of mankind at least: for it is impossible to separate the opinion of a great and learned man from some consideration of the person who has delivered that opinion.

Mr. Hastings, being conscious of this, and not fearing the tribunal abroad for the reason that I gave you, namely, his belief that it was not very adverse to him, and also knowing that the prosecution there was dropped, had but one thing left for his consideration, which was, how he should conflict with the tribunal at home: and as the prosecution must originate from the Court of Directors, and be authorized by some great law opinions, the great point with him was, some way or other, by his party, I will not say by what means or circumstances, but by some party means, to secure a strong interest in the executive part of the India House. My Lords, was that interest used properly and fairly? I will not say that friendship and partiality imply injustice; they certainly do not; but they do not imply justice. The Court of Directors took up this affair with great warmth; they committed it to their solicitor, and the solicitor would naturally (as most solicitors do) draw up a case a little favorably for the persons that employed him; and if there was any leaning, which upon my word I do not approve in the management of any cause whatever, yet, if there was a leaning, it must be a leaning for the client.

Now the counsel did not give a decided opinion against the prosecution, but upon the face of the case they expressed great doubts upon it; for, with such a strange, disorderly, imperfect, and confused case as was laid before them, they could not advise a prosecution; and in my opinion they went no further. And, indeed, upon that case that went before them, I, who am authorized by the Commons to prosecute, do admit that a great doubt might lie upon the most deciding mind, whether, under the circumstances there stated, a prosecution could be or ought to be pursued. I do not say which way my mind would have turned, upon that very imperfect state of the case; but I still allow so much to their very great ability, great minds, and sound judgment, that I am not sure, if it was res integra, I would not have rather hesitated myself (who am now here an accuser) what judgment to give.

It does happen that there are very singular circumstances in this business, to which your Lordships will advert; and you will consider what weight they ought to have upon your Lordships' minds. The person who is now the solicitor of the Company is a very respectable man in the profession,—Mr. Smith; he was at that time also the Company's solicitor, and he has since appeared in this cause as Mr. Hastings's solicitor. Now there is something particular in a man's being the solicitor to a party who was prosecuting another, and continuing afterwards in his office, and becoming the solicitor to the party prosecuted. It would be nearly as strange as if our solicitor were to be the solicitor of Mr. Hastings in this prosecution and trial before your Lordships. It is true, that we cannot make out, nor do we attempt to prove, that Mr. Smith was at that time actually Mr. Hastings's solicitor: all that we shall attempt to make out is, that the case he produced was just such a case as a solicitor anxious for the preservation of his client, and not anxious for the prosecution, would have made out.