The Life of Yakoob Beg; Athalik Ghazi, and Badaulet; Ameer of Kashgar

But as the former could provide him with better weapons for his army, and warmer clothes for his people, in addition to trinkets for his serai, their presence, if only they came in limited numbers, and at stated intervals, could be tolerated; but when he perceived they were about to descend on his state, like so many birds of prey on an abandoned carcase, and when he surmised that in all likelihood they would endeavour to mix themselves up in the political divisions of Kashgar as they had in Bokhara and Khokand, he determined to impose some other check on their visits besides that insignificant 2½ per cent. on goods that returned a profit of cent. per cent. He had given his plighted word, however, that merchants should receive fair treatment, and how could he find a loophole to avoid fulfilling what he had promised, and yet at the same time escape bringing about an open rupture with the Russian Government. The matter required most delicate manipulation, but Yakoob Beg proved himself equal to the occasion. It was not to be expected, however, that Yakoob Beg could accomplish his task of discouraging Russian enterprise without giving some umbrage to the government.

Despite the friendly reception of Baron Kaulbars, there still remained some uncertainty in the minds of individuals, whether the Athalik Ghazi was as sincere in his protestations as he would have it believed. There was, consequently, some disinclination among the merchants of Kuldja to be the first to send a caravan to Kashgar. They were all willing enough to share the profits, but it was a risky experiment all the same; and each would prefer that his neighbour should inaugurate the enterprise. In commercial circles, there was much discussion on the new state, and the prospects of trade therewith, and there was much talk as to "who should bell the cat." The hesitation, if indeed so natural a sentiment deserves to be specified here, soon passed off, and Mr. Pupyshef, a merchant, who had had very large business connections with most parts of Central Asia, resolved to send the first consignment of merchandise to Kashgar. Mr. Pupyshef was, however, unable to go in person, so his caravan set out under the charge of his clerk Somof. It arrived without "let or hindrance" in Kashgar, where Mr. Somof was provided with accommodation in the Caravanserai specially set apart for foreign merchants. But a change was at once perceptible in the sentiments of the ruler, as the personal freedom of the members of the expedition was curtailed, and all their movements were watched with the most exacting surveillance; and the residence of Mr. Somof was brief in the extreme, for the Athalik Ghazi himself bought up the whole of his stock of merchandise. Viewed as a commercial speculation, this result should have been eminently satisfactory; the Russian merchant had to experience no loss from delay in finding a purchaser for his articles. There was, however, another matter to be taken into consideration, and that was the mode of payment by the purchaser. Mr. Somof received so many Chinese coins at a value fixed by the Ameer himself, and Mr. Pupyshef, on the return of his representative, estimated the loss at 15,000 roubles. The Russian government took up the case of their subject, and presented a remonstrance at Kashgar, demanding the immediate restitution of the loss incurred by the Russian merchant. Yakoob Beg's reply to this summary request was a model of courtesy and tact. He denied altogether that Mr. Somof had in any way been interfered with. That gentleman was always at perfect liberty to do what, and to go where, he pleased, and he was quite mistaken in supposing that he, the Ameer, had purchased his goods. The Badaulet had nothing whatever to do with trade, which he left entirely to his subjects. He was simply a warrior and a follower of the Prophet. He had nevertheless instituted inquiries into the matter, and he had discovered that some of his officers, who should be punished, had purchased the merchandise in his name, hoping thereby to obtain it at a cheaper rate. The Athalik Ghazi expressed his regret at the occurrence, and would be most happy to refund whatever sum the Russian government considered their subject had lost by the transaction. A commission was appointed at Tashkent, to inquire into all the circumstances of the case, and after some discussion the demand of Mr. Pupyshef was reduced from 15,000 to 12,000 roubles. The Ameer acquiesced in the decision, but many months elapsed before Mr. Pupyshef received his money, and then it was again in a depreciated Chinese coinage. We are justified in assuming that this was all planned, and that the obstacles thrown in the path of Mr. Pupyshef were part and parcel of a systematic attempt to disgust Russian merchants with Kashgar. The Russian government, too, was afforded no clear case for complaint, as Yakoob Beg expressed his regret without reserve for the occurrence, all the responsibility of which he shifted on to the shoulders of some of "his officials whom he had ordered to be punished." He paid without a murmur the fair demands of Mr. Pupyshef, and if there was some delay in the refunding of the money, it must be attributed to the poverty of his exchequer, and not to any want of goodwill. The burden of his complaint was, "I am a poor prince; my country is impoverished by the wars that have occurred since the departure of the Chinese; and you will find little therein to repay you for your trouble and expense in entering it. Why therefore will you persist in coming to it? You can do neither yourselves nor my people any good by doing so, and you only cause me anxiety and trouble in preserving your countrymen from insult and injury, which you must admit I have ever done." There was an under-current of truth in this statement of the case, although it was not credited in Kuldja, where everything that went amiss was set down to the hostility of the Ameer. Yakoob Beg had, however, succeeded in throwing cold water on the enthusiastic preparations that were being made for exploiting Eastern Turkestan, and his mode of doing so had been quite original and characteristic. Few rulers would have foreseen that the best way to get rid of a troublesome visitor was to purchase what he had brought to sell to the people; and that the simple remedy of paying in a questionable currency would suffice to deter hundreds from following the example of Mr. Somof. Yakoob Beg, however, was not satisfied with leaving well alone. Having paid the claim of Mr. Pupyshef, it might have been supposed that he would maintain a discreet silence on his intentions in the future with regard to Russian merchants. He might have let the question, indeed, find, as it would have found, its own solution; but, in a weak moment, to place his own bona fides beyond suspicion, he desired the Russian government to send another merchant to Kashgar, and then it could judge by his reception whether the Ameer was not amicably disposed towards his "close allies," the Russians. The Russian authorities took him at his word, and after an interval of more than twelve months, during which Kashgar had been unvisited by a Russian merchant, another, a Mr. Morozof, came to put Yakoob Beg's assertions to the test. True to his word, the reception of this gentleman was most cordial. Facilities were placed in his way for getting purchasers of his articles, and the Ameer bought for his arsenals such of them as seemed suitable. Mr. Morozof returned to Kuldja, narrating how cordially he had been welcomed by the ruler himself, and how the enterprise had commercially been a success. Others followed his example, and during the last two and a half years of his rule Russian merchandise, either through Russian or native agents, found its way in considerable quantities into Kashgar. But this trade was always liable to periods of depression through the clouds that frequently darkened the political horizon, and the Russians did not derive the advantages from trade with this state, that they had previously convinced themselves they were to do. Indeed, English manufactures, after the year 1873, entered into keen competition with theirs in the cities of Kashgar, and had driven their goods out of the market of Yarkand at all events before the close of the year 1876. But this fact only served to impress more forcibly on the Russians the necessity either for annexing Kashgaria or establishing on its throne some puppet, who would be content with the post of deputy of the Czar. Indeed, many suggested that the Chinese should be brought back; but then they were so far off, and apparently so weak. The party advocating the absorption of Kashgaria every day became stronger and more pronounced; and all observers agree that it was only a question of time when the imperial fiat should go forth for the extinction of the rule of Yakoob Beg. Colonel Reinthal was sent in 1874, to endeavour to place matters on a more hopeful footing, but with little success. In addition to the question of trade privileges, the Russians, in negotiating with native states, or securing treaties at the point of the sword, always demanded the right of having consular agents in the chief cities of the state. The ostensible duty of these official representatives was to look after the interests of their government, and to protect the lives and property of Russian subjects as best they might be able. So far as these very necessary functions were concerned, Russia had a perfect right in demanding these safeguards, when such were deemed to be required. But unfortunately for the reputation of that country, the experience of Asiatics had amply demonstrated that these declared duties were the least important part of their office.

Their secret instructions were to lose no opportunity of discovering the drift of public sentiment in the state where they were stationed; to learn all the ramifications of the dynastic intrigues that unfortunately form the chief incidents in the history of these states, and to promote, by every means at their disposal, the interests of the great empire into whose service they had been admitted. When such latitude was allowed in their instructions, and so many private and public inducements were offered to raise their zeal, it cannot be matter of surprise if we find the government informed promptly of the shiftings of public opinion in the independent and semi-independent Khanates of Central Asia. Yakoob Beg was keenly alive to the dangers that would arise to him personally from the introduction of such a system into Kashgar, where the discordant elements out of which he had welded a military organization were far from being completely healed. If the presence of a mirza in Khokand and Bokhara had entailed a decade of troubles and of gradual subjection, what was he to expect, a mere military adventurer and a foreigner in the land, from their presence in Eastern Turkestan? But Baron Kaulbars had demanded this concession, perhaps more than any other, and Yakoob Beg had to yield something in form, if he did not surrender much in substance, to the importunities of his visitor. As a great favour he consented to the appointment of caravanbashis, or superintendents of the personal comforts of the merchants when they should arrive; but a caravan-bashi was an uneducated, unimportant personage, from whom nothing need be feared. This did not at all please the Russian administrators, and all their subsequent efforts were mainly devoted to the attempt to obtain an alteration of this unimportant personage into the prying and inquisitive mirza. To defeat their design Yakoob Beg was no less firmly resolved, and the history of the embassies, from that of Baron Kaulbars to that of Captain Kuropatkine, was one long course of fruitless efforts to force the hand of the Athalik Ghazi on this point. Colonel Reinthal was sent in 1874, after the successful journey of Mr. Morozof, to see if any better arrangement could be attained, but, although the Ameer entertained him very hospitably, he fared no better than any of his predecessors. In that year, too, Yakoob Beg's position had become firmer in his own state. The Tungani had been driven back north of the Tian Shan beyond Turfan, and into the regions east of Lake Lob; the disaffection, too, in the cities of Kucha and Korla was also, to all appearance, dying out; but, above all, the vast ægis of English protection had appeared to be thrown over the integrity of his state. However unjustified this supposition was by the treaty with Sir Douglas Forsyth, the Ameer made as much use as possible of his new-found ally; and the large section of Anglo-Indians, and authorities in this country on the affairs of Central Asia, who, either out of sympathy for the man, or from a belief in the identity of British interests with his cause, proclaimed the advisability of supporting him against Russian aggression, gave a colourable excuse to his declaration that England had extended for the first time in her Trans-Himalayan policy her protection to a native state lying north of her natural frontier. The Russian governments in Siberia and Turkestan, emphatically cautioned by their Foreign Office to give this country no cause for umbrage, were at first inclined to make that assertion an excuse for pushing their friendly relations with the Ameer; but their advances were not reciprocated, and as it became more clear that the importance of the Forsyth mission had been greatly exaggerated by the representations of the Ameer, the language of the Russian authorities became once more peremptory and menacing. In short, matters after more than two years' discussion had retrogressed to the condition they were in before the Kaulbars treaty. The Russians had not obtained their chief desire, the establishment of consular agents in Kashgar, and Yakoob Beg, as in the past, boldly met threat with threat. Relying on his increased reputation as the most orthodox and the most puissant of Mahomedans in Central Asia, and confident that England would intervene between the Russians and the collapse of his state, he even went so far as to temper his defiant, and almost bellicose, attitude with such irony as the following incident is a characteristic specimen of. Early in the year 1874 the Duke of Edinburgh married Marie Alexandrovna, the only daughter of the Czar; and Yakoob Beg seized the occasion to send a message of congratulation to the Czar of All the Russias on the auspicious event – saying, that he had heard that the son of his good ally, the Queen of England and of India, was about to wed the daughter of his friend the Czar, and that he hastened to send him his congratulations upon the event. To this effusive epistle no reply was deigned, and it is doubtful whether it ever got farther than Tashkent. There is no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that such exhibitions as this is an instance of detraction from the otherwise great and striking characteristics of the ruler of Kashgar. His opposition to Russia was most laudable; his maintenance of his privileges as an independent ruler was prudent and worthy of our respect; but his petty insults to Russia were neither wise nor dignified. He was clearly in the right in checking the aggressive instincts of Russia, clothed in the specious garb of commercial advantage; he commands not less our admiration for the energetic and persistent manner in which he thwarted every endeavour to introduce Russian espionage and intrigue into Kashgaria; but why should he have weakened the effect of these splendid achievements, why should he have risked all he had secured, by so senseless an insult as the message to the Czar that has been just referred to?

The authorities in Tashkent, perceiving that it was doubtful whether English public opinion was ripe yet for an active interference in Central Asia, reverted, despite all orders from the home authorities to the contrary, to their original intention of coercing the ruler of Kashgar. In 1874, therefore, all preparations for commencing the campaign in the approaching spring were made ready. Provisions and munitions of war were despatched to Naryn, and an auxiliary division was to make a flank movement by the Terek Pass on the west. It has been laid to the charge of the Russian generals in Asia, that expeditions are arranged for their mutual advantage, both in obtaining higher rank and orders. So seriously bitten had every officer since Perovsky become by the desire for promotion and distinction, that the disease became generally known as the St. George or the St. Ann Cross fever. Now during the seven years previous to the date at which we have arrived, if there had been a fair share of distinction and spoil for the soldiers and the lower ranks of the officers, some of those in higher posts considered that they were aggrieved by the monopoly of supreme credit obtained by General Kaufmann. This, indeed, had shown itself very clearly after the fall of Khiva, a success for which Kaufmann obtained all the credit, and yet towards which the division under his command contributed little or nothing. The etiquette, too, maintained in the little court at Tashkent, and the semi-regal state observed by the successful general, were irksome to officers more accustomed to the licence of a camp than to the punctilio of a palace. Nor were there wanting more sinister motives still among some of the chief general officers who filled the subordinate posts in the service of the Czar's representative. Prominent among them was the youthful Scobelef, who, burning to distinguish himself, clamoured loudly for some expedition which, when accomplished successfully, would be recompensed with the Cross of St. George. Strong as General Kaufmann may really be in the good opinion of his superiors, he was unable to resist, if he were inclined, the demands pressed upon him by Scobelef and his father, and the more warlike portion of his forces. It is said, that in addition to these palpable reasons there were others touching the family rivalries of the Kaufmanns and Scobelefs, who appear to have been at feud with each other when younger men in the service of the palace, when Nicholas was Czar. To remove these differences, and to satisfy the demands of his other subordinates, General Kaufmann consented that an expedition should be arranged against Kashgar, and entrusted to the command of the younger Scobelef. Towards the end of 1874 the war-cloud was drawing ominously over the Athalik Ghazi, and to all observers it seemed as if it were about to break with destructive violence on his devoted head. Loudly was it asserted that nothing but British intervention would save him, and it was only too clear that England's policy would be guided by events. The Viceroy had certainly not advised that an active participation should be undertaken in this question. The failure, too, of the Granville-Gortschakoff negotiations to define a neutral zone had convinced this country of the inutility of solving the question between the two countries by treaty. But it was not clear that, even if Kashgar were to fall into the power of Russia, our interests would suffer so much as to justify us in adopting an extreme remedy. The path being thus left clear for Russia to strike, every precaution was taken by Generals Kaufmann and Scobelef that the blow should be sharp and decisive. Not fewer than 20,000 Russian troops in all were to be directed against Yakoob Beg, who too late now attempted some concessions to his neighbours. Such troops as he could raise were massed in the neighbourhood of Kashgar, while another force under his son was stationed at Aksu. But of the result there could not be two opinions. Very few weeks' respite remained to the intended victim, when an event occurred which changed the whole current of Russian thought into a different channel. Yakoob Beg was saved by the outbreak of disturbances in Khokand, and, although the Russians never acknowledged that they were so serious as to prevent them persisting in their Kashgarian enterprise, still gradually the troops who had been despatched to the frontier were recalled, and those who had been ordered to set out for Naryn were retained in Tashkent and Hodjent, the two towns chiefly threatened. Although this event is not part of Kashgarian history, yet it performed so useful a function to that state, which indeed it may be said to have saved, that some brief account of it here may not be unwelcome.

Khudayar Khan, after the death of Alim Kuli, his hostile minister, in 1865, had been reinstated in his possession of Khokand, partly by the efforts of his own faction, and partly by Russian assistance. From that year to the year 1875 he was de facto as he was de jure Khan of Khokand, and, although imbroiled on several occasions with Russia and with his own subjects in those ten years, he still maintained a nominal independence in the western half of Khokand, with his capital at the city of the same name. For some reason, however, this Khan never was popular. So far as we know concerning him, he does not appear to have been any way worse than his neighbours; but one party in the state accused him of being a tool of the Russians, while another, urged on by the agents employed by that government, declared that he was gradually drifting the country into a hopeless contest with that Power. Widespread throughout the state there was dissatisfaction at his rule, and the occasion afforded by a commotion among the Kirghiz was eagerly seized by his subjects to rise for the purpose of subverting his power. At first this movement seemed to possess no importance for the Russians, and was regarded as one of those dynastic squabbles that had become too ordinary an occurrence to occasion any surprise. The insurrectionary party, too, had put on the throne Nasruddin, the eldest son of the Khan, a youth who was supposed to be friendly to Russia, and who was not likely to prove in any way formidable, having become passionately addicted to vodka drinking. But behind this ostensible ruler there were others who aspired to greater eminence than the king-makers of a petty state like Khokand. Chief among these was Khudayar's brother-in-law, Abderrahman Aftobatcha, who was entrusted with the chief control of the military arrangements. This chief was the son of Mussulman Kuli, the Kipchak minister of Khudayar's earlier days. Either incredulous of the maintenance of a neutral attitude by Russia, or urged on by a patriotic impulse to free the enslaved portion of Khokand, these confederates issued a proclamation of war against General Kaufmann. The border districts rose in response to the proclamation, the communications between Tashkent and Hodjent were severed, and confusion for a time reigned supreme within the Russian possessions. The Khokandian forces hesitated to make any serious attack and wasted their time in useless depredations in the mountains. Had a prompt move been made on Tashkent, or even on Hodjent, the insurrection might have been successful. Bokhara might have struck in at the critical moment, and Yakoob Beg awoke from the lethargy into which his warlike spirit was sinking. Such was not to be, however; and gradually the Russian scare wore off. Colonel Scobelef scoured the country with his Cossacks; telegraphic communication was restored between Hodjent and Tashkent; and the country was rapidly cleared of the rebels. The fugitives who had accompanied Khudayar in his flight were sent to the rear, and reinforcements were hastily summoned to take part in the necessary offensive measures against Khokand. It will be sufficient here to say that, having been defeated in the fight at Makhram and several other small engagements, the party of Nasruddin and Aftobatcha sued for peace. This was granted, but Khokand became the Russian province of Ferghana, Colonel Scobelef was raised to a major-general, and obtained his Cross of St. George by the battle of Makhram. This event, generally known as the revolt of the Khokandians against Russia of 1875, marks an important era, for it convinced the Khokandians and other Asiatics that any attempt to obtain their liberty, short of a concerted and organized movement, would be fruitless. There has been no renewal of the attempt that then failed, but which ought to have achieved more success.

To the discord unhappily existent among its victims has Russia been chiefly indebted for the facility with which her Asiatic conquests have been acquired, and to the same ally it seems probable that she will be chiefly indebted for their preservation. There is no clearer evidence of this than the history of this last war with Khokand. But when we endeavour to divide the share of culpability for this dissension, we are on this occasion bound to admit that the chief blame attaches to Yakoob Beg. More than any other Asiatic ruler had he assumed to himself the title of general protector of his religion and his order, against the conquering strides of Russia; more than any other had he fostered, by his bold and defiant attitude towards that state, the belief that there still remained some hope of coping with the danger by a united league of Central Asian states; more than any other had he seemed to justify this aspiration; and more than any other must he be held culpable when he permitted the moment that seemed most auspicious to slip by unutilized. Moreover, when this insurrection broke out in Khokand, he had made every preparation to defend himself against a Russian invasion. He saw the Russians compelled, by the very necessities of their position, to call off their forces to other quarters, and yet he abstained from striking a blow in defence of those interests which he had ever declared were most sacred to him. It is impossible to explain such apathy on so important an occasion as this was; and his refusal to strike in on the side of Aftobatcha must remain the greatest blot on an otherwise brilliant reputation. With the collapse of that effort, and the subsequent occupation of Ferghana, Russian attention seemed to become more occupied with the state of affairs on the Oxus and in Cabul, than with the fortunes or misfortunes of Kashgar. During the few months that intervened between the annexation of Khokand and the appearance of the Chinese north of the Tian Shan, Yakoob Beg adopted a more conciliatory policy towards Russia, and might in a short time have sunk into the position of a somewhat more important Khudayar or Mozaffur Eddin. Other events intervened, however, and gave a complete change to the question, as will be considered in a later chapter. We take our leave of this narrative of his dealings with Russia with an admiration that would be perfect but for the weakness he exhibited in 1875. Even that vacillation will scarcely destroy all the claim that his bold defiance and consistent opposition to all Russian pretensions to supremacy over Eastern Turkestan gives him to our respectful and admiring consideration.