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The Life of John Marshall, Volume 3: Conflict and construction, 1800-1815

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The debate ran into the month of March.272 Every possible phase of the subject was gone over time and again. All authorities which the ardent and tireless industry of the contending partisans could discover were brought to light. The pending case of Marbury vs. Madison was in the minds of all; and it was repeatedly dragged into the discussion. Samuel W. Dana of Connecticut examined it minutely, citing the action of the Supreme Court in the case of the application for a mandamus to the Secretary of War upon which the court acted February 14, 1794: "There does not appear to have been any question respecting the general power of the Supreme Court, to issue a mandamus to the Secretary of War, or any other subordinate officer." That was "a regular mode for obtaining a decision of the Supreme Court… When such has been the unquestioned usage heretofore, is it not extraordinary that there has not been prudence enough to say less about the case of Marbury against the Secretary of State?"273

Dana then touched upon the general expectation that Marshall would declare void the Repeal Act. Because of this very apprehension, the Republicans, a few days later, suspended for more than a year the sessions of the Supreme Court. So Dana threatened that if the Republicans should pass the bill, the Supreme Court would annul it; for, said he, the Judiciary were sworn to support the Constitution, and when they find that instrument on one side and an act of Congress on the other, "what is their duty? Are they not to obey their oath, and judge accordingly? If so, they necessarily decide, that your act is of no force; for they are sworn to support the Constitution. This is a doctrine coeval with the existence of our Government, and has been the uniform principle of all the constituted authorities."274 And he cited the position taken by National judges in 1792 in the matter of the pension commission.275

John Bacon, that stanch Massachusetts Republican,276 asserted that "the Judiciary have no more right to prescribe, direct or control the acts of the other departments of the Government, than the other departments of the Government have to prescribe or direct those of the Judiciary."277

The Republicans determined to permit no further delay; for the first time in its history the House was kept in session until midnight.278 At twelve o'clock, March 3, 1802, the vote was taken on the final passage of the bill, the thirty-two Federalists voting against and the fifty-nine Republicans for the measure.279 "Thus ended this gigantic debate," chronicles the historian of that event.280 No discussion in Congress had hitherto been so widely reported in the press or excited such general comment. By the great majority of the people the repeal was received with enthusiasm, although some Republicans believed that their party had gone too far.281 Republican papers, however, hailed the repeal as the breaking of one of those judicial fetters which shackled the people, while Federalist journals bemoaned it as the beginning of the annihilation of all that was sane and worthy in American institutions.

"The fatal bill has passed; our Constitution is no more," exclaimed the Washington Federalist in an editorial entitled

"Farewell, a long Farewell, to all our Greatness."

The paper despaired of the Republic – nobody could tell "what other acts, urged by the intoxication of power and the fury of party rage" would be put through. But it announced that the Federalist judges would disregard the infamous Republican law: "The judges will continue to hold their courts as if the bill had not passed. 'Tis their solemn duty to do it; their country, all that is dear and valuable, call upon them to do it. By the judges this bill will be declared null and void… And we now ask the mighty victors, what is your triumph?.. What is the triumph of the President? He has gratified his malice towards the judges, but he has drawn a tear into the eye of every thoughtful patriot … and laid the foundation of infinite mischief." The Federalist organ declared that the Republican purpose was to force a "dissolution of the Union," and that this was likely to happen.

This significant editorial ended by a consideration of the Republican purpose to destroy the Supreme Court: "Should Mr. Breckenridge now bring forward a resolution to repeal the law establishing the Supreme Court of the United States, we should only consider it a part of the system to be pursued… We sincerely expect it will be done next session… Such is democracy."282

Senator Plumer declared, before the final vote, that the passage of the Republican Repeal Bill and of other Republican measures meant "anarchy."283

 

The ultra-Federalist Palladium of Boston lamented: "Our army is to be less and our navy nothing: Our Secretaries are to be aliens and our Judges as independent as spaniels. In this way we are to save everything, but our reputation and our rights284… Has Liberty any citadel or fortress, has mob despotism any impediments?"285

The Independent Chronicle, on the other hand, "congratulated the public on the final triumph of Republicanism, in the repeal of the late obnoxious judiciary law."286 The Republicans of Boston and Cambridge celebrated the event with discharges of artillery.

Vans Murray reported to King that "the principle of … disorganizing … goes on with a destructive zeal. Internal Taxes – Judicial Sanctity – all are to be overset."287 Sedgwick was sure that no defense was left against "legislative usurpation."288 "The angels of destruction … are making haste," moaned Fisher Ames.289

"The angels of destruction" lost no time in striking their next blow. On March 18, two weeks after the threat of the Washington Federalist that the Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional the Republican Repeal Act, a Senate committee was appointed to examine further the National Judiciary establishment and report a bill for any improvements considered necessary.290 Within a week the committee laid the measure before the Senate,291 and on April 8 it was passed292 without debate.

When it reached the House, however, the Federalists had taken alarm. The Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801 had fixed the terms of the Supreme Court in December and June instead of February and August. This new bill, plainly an afterthought, abolished the June session of the Supreme Court, directed that, thereafter, that tribunal should convene but once each year, and fixed the second Monday of February as the time of this annual session.

Thus did the Republicans plan to take away from the Supreme Court the opportunity to pass upon the repeal of the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801 until the old and defective system of 1789, which it restored, was again in full operation. Meanwhile, the wrath of the new National judges, whom the repeal left without offices, would wear itself down, and they would accept the situation as an accomplished fact.293 John Marshall should have no early opportunity to overturn the Repeal Act, as the Republicans believed he would do if given the chance. Neither should he proceed further with the case of Marbury vs. Madison for many months to come.294

Bayard moved that the bill should not go into effect until July 1, thus permitting the Supreme Court to hold its June session; but, said Nicholson, that was just what the Republicans intended to prevent. Was a June session of the Supreme Court "a source of alarm?" asked Bayard. "The effect of the present bill will be, to have no court for fourteen months… Are gentlemen afraid of the judges? Are they afraid that they will pronounce the repealing law void?"295

Nicholson did not care whether the Supreme Court "pronounced the repealing law unconstitutional or not." The Republican postponement of the session for more than a year "does not arise from any design … to prevent the exercise of power by the judges." But what of the Federalists' solicitude for an early sitting of the court? "We have as good a right to suppose gentlemen on the other side are as anxious for a session in June, that this power may be exercised, as they have to suppose we wish to avoid it, to prevent the exercise."296

Griswold could not credit the Republicans with so base a purpose: "I know that it has been said, out of doors, that this is the great object of the bill. I know there have been slanders of this kind; but they are too disgraceful to ascribe to this body. The slander cannot, ought not to be admitted." So Griswold hoped that Republicans would permit the Supreme Court to hold its summer session. He frankly avowed a wish for an early decision that the Repeal Act was void. "I think the speedier it [usurpation] is checked the better."297

Bayard at last flatly charged the Republicans with the purpose of preventing the Supreme Court from holding the Repeal Act unconstitutional. "This act is not designed to amend the Judicial system," he asserted; "that is but pretense… It is to prevent that court from expressing their opinion upon the validity of the act lately passed … until the act has gone into full execution, and the excitement of the public mind is abated… Could a less motive induce gentlemen to agree to suspend the sessions of the Supreme Court for fourteen months?"298

But neither the pleading nor the denunciation of the Federalists moved the Republicans. On Friday, April 23, 1802, the bill passed and the Supreme Court of the United States was practically abolished for fourteen months.299

At that moment began the movement that finally developed into the plan for the secession of the New England States from the Union. It is, perhaps, more accurate to say that the idea of secession had never been entirely out of the minds of the extreme New England Federalist leaders from the time Theodore Sedgwick threatened it in the debate over the Assumption Bill.300

Hints of withdrawing from the Union if Virginia should become dominant crop out in their correspondence. The Republican repeal of the Judiciary Act immediately called forth many expressions in Federalist papers such as this from the Boston Palladium of March 2, 1802: "Whether the rights and interests of the Eastern States would be perfectly safe when Virginia rules the nation is a problem easy to solve but terrible to contemplate… As ambitious Virginia will not be just, let valiant Massachusetts be zealous."

Fisher Ames declared that "the federalists must entrench themselves in the State governments, and endeavor to make State justice and State power a shelter of the wise, and good, and rich, from the wild destroying rage of the southern Jacobins."301 He thought the Federalists had neglected the press. "It is practicable," said he, "to rouse our sleeping patriotism – sleeping, like a drunkard in the snow… The newspapers have been left to the lazy or the ill-informed, or to those who undertook singly work enough for six."302

 

Pickering, the truculent, brave, and persistent, anticipated "a new confederacy… There will be – and our children at farthest will see it – a separation… The British Provinces, even with the assent of Britain, will become members of the Northern Confederacy."303

The more moderate George Cabot, on the contrary, thought that the strong defense made by the Federalists in Congress would induce the Republicans to cease their attacks on the National courts. "The very able discussions of the Judiciary Question," he wrote, "& great superiority of the Federalists in all the debates & public writings have manifestly checked the career of the Revolutionists."304 But for once Cabot was wrong; the Republicans were jubilant and hastened to press their assault more vigorously than ever.

The Federalist newspapers teemed with long arguments against the repeal and laboriously strove, in dull and heavy fashion, to whip their readers into fighting humor. These articles were little more than turgid repetitions of the Federalist speeches in Congress, with a passage here and there of the usual Federalist denunciation. For instance, the Columbian Centinel, after restating the argument against the Repeal Act, thought that this "refutes all the absurd doctrines of the Jacobins upon that subject, … and it will be sooner or later declared by the people, in a tone terrible to the present disorganizing party, to be the true construction of their constitution, and the only one compatible with their safety and happiness."305

The Independent Chronicle, on the other hand, was exultant. After denouncing "the impudence and scurrility of the Federal faction," a correspondent of that paper proceeded in this fashion: "The Judiciary! The Judiciary! like a wreck on Cape Cod is dashing at every wave"; but, thank Heaven, "instead of the 'Essex Junto's' Judiciary we are sailing by the grace of God in the Washington Frigate– our judges are as at first and Mr. Jefferson has thought fit to practice the old navigation and steer with the same compass by which Admiral Washington regulated his log book. The Essex Junto may be afraid to trust themselves on board but every true Washington American will step on board in full confidence of a prosperous voyage. Huzza for the Washington Judiciary– no windows broke – no doors burst in – free from leak – tight and dry."306

Destiny was soon again to call John Marshall to the performance of an imperative duty.

CHAPTER III
MARBURY VERSUS MADISON

To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. (Jefferson.)

The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. This is the very essence of judicial duty. (Marshall.)

To have inscribed this vast truth of conservatism upon the public mind, so that no demagogue not in the last stages of intoxication denies it – this is an achievement of statesmanship which a thousand years may not exhaust or reveal all that is good. (Rufus Choate.)

"Rawleigh, Jany: 2 1803

"My dearest Polly

"You will laugh at my vexation when you hear the various calamaties that have befallen me. In the first place when I came to review my funds, I had the mortification to discover that I had lost 15 silver dollars out of my waist coat pocket. They had worn through the various mendings the pocket had sustained & sought their liberty in the sands of Carolina.

"I determined not to vex myself with what coud not be remedied & orderd Peter to take out my cloaths that I might dress for court when to my astonishment & grief after fumbling several minutes in the portmanteau, staring at vacancy, & sweating most profusely he turned to me with the doleful tidings that I had no pair of breeches. You may be sure this piece of inteligence was not very graciously receivd; however, after a little scolding I determined to make the best of my situation & immediately set out to get a pair made.

"I thought I should be a sans culotte only one day & that for the residue of the term I might be well enough dressd for the appearance on the first day to be forgotten. But, the greatest of evils, I found, was followed by still greater! Not a taylor in town coud be prevaild on to work for me. They were all so busy that it was impossible to attend to my wants however pressing they might be, & I have the extreme mortification to pass the whole time without that important article of dress I have mentiond. I have no alleviation for this misfortune but the hope that I shall be enabled in four or five days to commence my journey homeward & that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you & our dear children in eight or nine days after this reaches you.

"In the meantime I flatter myself that you are well & happy.

"Adieu my dearest Polly
I am your ever affectionate
J Marshall."307

With the same unfailing light-heartedness which, nearly a quarter of a century before, had cheered his comrades at Valley Forge, John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States, thus went about his duties and bore his troubles. Making his circuit in a battered gig or sulky, which he himself usually drove, absent-minded and laughing at himself for the mishaps that his forgetfulness and negligence continually brought upon him, he was seemingly unperturbed in the midst of the political upheaval.

Yet he was not at ease. Rufus King, still the American Minister to Great Britain, had finally settled the controversy over the British debts, upon the very basis laid down by Marshall when Secretary of State.308 But Jefferson's Administration now did not hesitate to assert that this removal of one cause of conflict with Great Britain was the triumph of Republican diplomacy. Marshall, with unreserve so unlike him, reveals to King his disgust and sense of injury, and in doing so portrays the development of political conditions.

"The advocates of the present administration ascribe to it great praise," wrote Marshall to our Minister in London, "for having, with so much dexterity & so little loss, extricated our country from a debt of twenty-four million of dollars in which a former administration had involved it… The mortifying reflection obtrudes itself, that the reputation of the most wise & skilful conduct depends, in this our capricious world, so much on accident. Had Mr. Adams been reelected President of the United States, or had his successor been [a Federalist] … a very different reception … would have been given to the same measure.

"The payment of a specific sum would then have been pronounced, by those who now take merit to themselves for it, a humiliating national degradation, an abandonment of national interest, a free will offering of millions to Britain for her grace & favor, by those who sought to engage in a war with France, rather than repay, in part, by a small loan to that republic, the immense debt of gratitude we owe her."

So speaks with bitter sarcasm the new Chief Justice, and pessimistically continues: "Such is, & such I fear will ever be human justice!" He tells King that the Federalist "disposition to coalesce" with the Republicans, which seemed to be developing during the first few months after Jefferson's inauguration, had disappeared; "but," he adds, "the minority [Federalist Party] is only recovering its strength & firmness. It acquires nothing." Then, with the characteristic misgivings of a Federalist, he prophesies: "Our political tempests will long, very long, exist, after those who are now toss'd about by them shall be at rest."309

For more than five years310 Marshall had foreseen the complicated and dangerous situation in which the country now found itself; and for more than a year311 he had, in his ample, leisurely, simple manner of thinking, been framing the constructive answer which he was at last forced to give to the grave question: Who shall say with final authority what is and what is not law throughout the Republic? In his opinion in the case of Marbury vs. Madison, to which this chapter is devoted, we shall see how John Marshall answered this vital question.

The philosophy of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions had now become the ruling doctrine of the Republican Party. The writer of the creed of State Rights sat in the Executive chair, while in House and Senate Virginia and her daughter Kentucky ruled the Republican majority. The two States that had declared the right and power of any member of the Union to pronounce a National law unconstitutional, and that had actually asserted a National statute to be null and void, had become the dominant force in the National Government.

The Federalist majority in the legislatures of ten States,312 it is true, had passed resolutions denouncing that anti-National theory, and had vigorously asserted that the National Judiciary alone had the power to invalidate acts of Congress.313 But in none of these States had the Republican minority concurred. In all of them the Republicans had vigorously fought the Federalist denial of the right and power of the States to nullify National laws, and had especially resisted the Federalist assertion that this power was in the National Judiciary.

In the New York Legislature, forty-three Republicans voted solidly against the Federalist reply to Virginia and Kentucky, while the Federalists were able to muster but fifty votes in its favor. In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, the Republican opposition was determined and outspoken.

The thirty-three Republicans of the Vermont Legislature cited, in their protest, the position which Marshall had taken on the Sedition Law in his campaign for Congress:314 "We have ever been of an opinion, with that much and deservedly respected statesman, Mr. Marshall, (whose abilities and integrity have been doubted by no party, and whose spirited and patriotic defence of his country's rights, has been universally admired)315 that 'it was calculated to create unnecessarily, discontents and jealousies, at a time, when our very existence as a nation may depend on our union.'"316

In Southern States, where the Federalists were dominant when Kentucky and Virginia adopted their famous Resolutions, the Republicans were, nevertheless, so strong that the Federalist majority in the Legislatures of those States dared not attempt to deny formally the new Republican gospel.317

So stood the formal record; but, since it had been written, the Jeffersonian propaganda had drawn scores of thousands of voters into the Republican ranks. The whole South had now decisively repudiated Federalism. Maryland had been captured; Pennsylvania had become as emphatically Republican as Virginia herself; New York had joined her forces to the Republican legions. The Federalists still held New England and the States of Delaware and New Jersey, but even there the incessant Republican assaults, delivered with ever-increasing strength, were weakening the Federalist power. Nothing was plainer than that, if the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions had been submitted to the Legislatures of the various States in 1801-1803, most of them would have enthusiastically endorsed them.

Thus the one subject most discussed, from the campaign of 1800 to the time when Marshall delivered his opinion in Marbury vs. Madison, was the all-important question as to what power, if any, could annul acts of Congress.318 During these years popular opinion became ever stronger that the Judiciary could not do so, that Congress had a free hand so far as courts were concerned, and that the individual States might ignore National laws whenever those States deemed them to be infractions of the Constitution. As we have seen, the Republican vote in Senate and House, by which the Judiciary Act of 1801 was repealed, was also a vote against the theory of the supervisory power of the National Judiciary over National legislation.

Should this conclusion go unchallenged? If so, it would have the sanction of acquiescence and soon acquire the strength of custom. What then would become the condition of the country? Congress might pass a law which some States would oppose and which they would refuse to obey, but which other States would favor and of which they would demand the enforcement. What would this entail? At the very least it would provoke a relapse into the chaos of the Confederation and more probably civil war. Or a President might take it upon himself to pronounce null and void a law of Congress, as Jefferson had already done in the matter of the Sedition Law,319 and if House and Senate were of a hostile political party, Congress might insist upon the observance of its legislation; but such a course would seriously damage the whole machinery of the National Government.

The fundamental question as to what power could definitely pass upon the validity of legislation must be answered without delay. Some of Marshall's associates on the Supreme Bench were becoming old and feeble, and death, or resignation enforced by illness, was likely at any moment to break the Nationalist solidarity of the Supreme Court;320 and the appointing power had fallen into the hands of the man who held the subjugation of the National Judiciary as one of his chief purposes.

Only second in importance to these reasons for Marshall's determination to meet the issue was the absolute necessity of asserting that there was one department of the Government that could not be influenced by temporary public opinion. The value to a democracy of a steadying force was not then so well understood as it is at present, but the Chief Justice fully appreciated it and determined at all hazards to make the National Judiciary the stabilizing power that it has since become. It should be said, however, that Marshall no longer "idolized democracy," as he declared he did when as a young man he addressed the Virginia Convention of 1788.321 On the contrary, he had come to distrust popular rule as much as did most Federalists.

A case was then pending before the Supreme Court the decision of which might, by boldness and ingenuity, be made to serve as the occasion for that tribunal's assertion of its right and power to invalidate acts of Congress and also for the laying-down of rules for the guidance of all departments of the Government. This was the case of Marbury vs. Madison.

Just before his term expired,322 President Adams had appointed forty-two persons to be justices of the peace for the Counties of Washington and Alexandria in the District of Columbia.323 The Federalist Senate had confirmed these nominations,324 and the commissions had been signed and sealed, but had not been delivered. When Jefferson was inaugurated he directed Madison, as Secretary of State, to issue commissions to twenty-five of the persons appointed by Adams, but to withhold the commissions from the other seventeen.325

Among the latter were William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper. These four men applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions. The other thirteen did not join in the suit, apparently considering the office of justice of the peace too insignificant to be worth the expense of litigation. Indeed, these offices were deemed so trifling that one of Adams's appointees to whom Madison delivered a commission resigned, and five others refused to qualify.326

When the application of Marbury and his associates came before Marshall he assumed jurisdiction, and in December, 1801, issued the usual rule to Madison ordering him to show cause at the next term of the Supreme Court why the writ of mandamus should not be awarded against him. Soon afterward, as we have seen, Congress abolished the June session of the Supreme Court;327 thus, when the court again convened in February, 1803, the case of Marbury vs. Madison was still pending.

Marshall resolved to make use of this unimportant litigation to assert, at the critical hour when such a pronouncement was essential, the power of the Supreme Court to declare invalid acts of Congress that violate the Constitution.

Considering the fact that Marshall was an experienced politician, was intimately familiar with the political methods of Jefferson and the Republican leaders, and was advised of their purposes, he could not have failed to realize the probable consequences to himself of the bold course he now determined to take. As the crawling months of 1802 wore on, no signs appeared that the Republican programme for overthrowing the independence of the Judiciary would be relinquished or modified. On the contrary, the coming of the new year (1803) found the second phase of the Republican assault determined upon.

At the beginning of the session of 1803 the House impeached John Pickering, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. In Pennsylvania, the recently elected Republican House had impeached Judge Alexander Addison, and his conviction by a partisan vote was assured. Already the Republican determination to remove Samuel Chase from the Supreme Bench was frankly avowed.328

Moreover, the Republicans openly threatened to oust Marshall and his Federalist associates in case the court decided Marbury vs. Madison as the Republicans expected it would. They did not anticipate that Marshall would declare unconstitutional that section of the old Federalist Judiciary Act of 1789 under which the suit had been brought. Indeed, nobody imagined that the court would do that.

Everybody apparently, except Marshall and the Associate Justices, thought that the case would be decided in Marbury's favor and that Madison would be ordered to deliver the withheld commissions. It was upon this supposition that the Republican threats of impeachment were made. The Republicans considered Marbury's suit as a Federalist partisan maneuver and believed that the court's decision and Marshall's opinion would be inspired by motives of Federalist partisanship.329

There was a particular and powerful reason for Marshall to fear impeachment and removal from office; for, should he be deposed, it was certain that Jefferson would appoint Spencer Roane of Virginia to be Chief Justice of the United States. It was well known that Jefferson had intended to appoint Roane upon the death of Chief Justice Ellsworth.330 But Ellsworth had resigned in time to permit Adams to appoint Marshall as his successor and thus thwart Jefferson's purpose. If now Marshall were removed, Roane would be given his place.

Should he be succeeded by Roane, Marshall knew that the great principles of Nationalism, to the carrying-out of which his life was devoted, would never be asserted by the National Judiciary. On the contrary, the Supreme Court would become an engine for the destruction of every theory of government which Marshall held dear; for a bolder, abler, and more persistent antagonist of those principles than Spencer Roane did not exist.331 Had he become Chief Justice those cases in which Marshall delivered opinions that vitalized the Constitution would have been decided in direct opposition to Marshall's views.332

272In sour disgust Morris notes in his diary: "The House of Representatives have talked themselves out of self-respect, and at headquarters [White House] there is such an abandonment of manner and such a pruriency of conversation as would reduce even greatness to the level of vulgarity." (March 10, 1802, Morris, ii, 421.)
273Annals, 7th Cong. 1st Sess. 904. Dana's statement is of first importance and should be carefully noted. It was at the time the universally accepted view of the power of the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus. Neither Federalists nor Republicans had ever questioned the Constitutional right of the Supreme Court to entertain original jurisdiction of mandamus proceedings in proper cases. Yet just this was what Marshall was so soon to deny in Marbury vs. Madison. (See infra, chap. iii.)
274Annals, 7th Cong. 1st Sess. 920.
275Ib. 923-26.
276See supra, chap, i, 43.
277Annals, 7th Cong. 1st Sess. 983.
278Hildreth, v, 441.
279Bayard to Bassett, March 3, 1802, Bayard Papers: Donnan, 150; and see Annals, 7th Cong. 1st Sess. 982. One Republican, Dr. William Eustis of Boston, voted with the Federalists.
280Hist. Last Sess. Cong. Which Commenced 7th Dec. 1801 (taken from the National Intelligencer), 71.
281Tucker: Life of Thomas Jefferson, ii, 114.
282Washington Federalist, March 3, 1802. Too much importance cannot be attached to this editorial. It undoubtedly expressed accurately the views of Federalist public men in the Capital, including Marshall, whose partisan views and feelings were intense. It should not be forgotten that his relations with this newspaper were believed to be intimate. (See vol. ii, 532, 541, of this work.)
283Plumer to Upham, March 1, 1802, Plumer MSS. Lib. Cong.
284March 12, 1802.
285March 23, 1802.
286March 15, 1802.
287Vans Murray to King, April 5, 1802, King, iv, 95.
288Sedgwick to King, Feb. 20, 1802, ib. 73.
289Ames to Dwight, April 16, 1802, Ames, i, 297.
290Annals, 7th Cong. 1st Sess. 201.
291Ib. 205.
292Ib. 257.
293They never occupied the bench under the Federalist Act of 1801. They were appointed, but the swift action of Jefferson and the Republicans prevented them from entering upon the discharge of their duties.
294This case was before the Supreme Court in December, 1801, and, ordinarily, would have been decided at the next term, June, 1802.
295Annals, 7th Cong. 1st Sess. 1228-29.
296Annals, 7th Cong. 1st Sess. 1229.
297Ib. 1229-30.
298Annals, 7th Cong. 1st Sess. 1235-36.
299Ib. 1236. See also Channing, U.S. iv, 280-81.
300See vol. ii, 62, of this work.
301Ames to Gore, Dec. 13, 1802, Ames, i, 310.
302Ib. Here is another characteristic passage from Ames, who accurately expressed New England Federalist sentiment: "The second French and first American Revolution is now commencing… The extinction of Federalism would be followed by the ruin of the wise, rich, and good." (Ames to Smith, Dec. 14, 1802, ib. 313-16.)
303Pickering to Peters, Dec. 24, 1803, New-England Federalism: Adams, 338.
304Cabot to King, March 27, 1802, King, iv, 94.
305Columbian Centinel, April 7, 1802.
306"Bowling" in the Independent Chronicle of April 26, 1802. An example of Jefferson's amazing skill in directing public opinion is found in the fact that the people were made to feel that the President was following in Washington's footsteps.
307Marshall to his wife, Jan. 2, 1803, MS.
308See vol. ii, 502-05, of this work.
309Marshall to King, May 5, 1802, King, iv, 116-18.
310Since the adoption of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions in 1798. (See vol. ii, chaps. x, xi, xii, of this work.)
311Since the Republican repeal of the Federalist Judiciary Act was proposed. See supra, 51.
312Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island.
313The Federalist majority in Vermont resolved that: "It belongs not to State Legislatures to decide on the constitutionality of laws made by the general government; this power being exclusively vested in the Judiciary Courts of the Union." (Records of Governor and Council of Vermont, iv, 529.) The Federalist majority in the Maryland Legislature asserted that "no state government … is competent to declare an act of the federal government unconstitutional, … that jurisdiction … is exclusively vested in the courts of the United States." (Anderson, in Am. Hist. Rev. v, 248.) The New York Federalists were slow to act, but finally resolved "that the right of deciding on the constitutionality of all laws passed by Congress … appertains to the judiciary department." (Ib. 248-49.) Connecticut Federalists declared that the Kentucky and Virginia plan was "hostile to the existence of our national Union." (Ib. 247.) In Delaware the then dominant party decided that the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were "not a fit subject" for their consideration. (Ib. 246.) The Pennsylvania Federalist majority resolved that the people "have committed to the supreme judiciary of the nation the high authority of ultimately and conclusively deciding the constitutionality of all legislative acts." (Anderson, in Am. Hist. Rev. v, 245.) On February 8, 1799, Massachusetts replied to the Virginia Resolutions that: "This legislature are persuaded that the decision of all cases in law or equity, arising under the Constitution of the United States, and the construction of all laws made in pursuance thereof, are exclusively vested by the people in the Judicial Courts of the U. States." (Mass. Senate Journal, 1798-99, xix, 238, MS. volume Mass. State Library.) Such was the general tenor of the Federalists' pronouncements upon this grave problem. But because the people believed the Sedition Law to be directed against free speech, the Federalist supremacy in many of the States that insisted upon these sound Nationalist principles was soon overthrown. The resolutions of the Republican minorities in the Legislatures of the Federalist States were emphatic assertions that any State might declare an act of Congress unconstitutional and disregard it, and that the National Judiciary did not have supervisory power over legislation.
314See vol. ii, 387-89, of this work.
315Referring to Marshall's conduct in the French Mission. (See vol. ii, chaps. vii, viii, ix, of this work.)
316Anderson, in Am. Hist. Rev. v, 249.
317Ib. 235-37.
318The questions raised by the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions were principal themes of debate in State Legislatures, in the press, in Congressional campaigns, and in the Presidential contest of 1800. The Judiciary debate of 1802 was, in part, a continuance of these popular discussions.
319See supra, 52.
320Within a year after Marbury vs. Madison was decided, Albert Moore, one of the Federalist Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, resigned because of ill health and his place was filled by William Johnson, a Republican of South Carolina.
321See vol. i, 410, of this work.
322March 2, 1801.
323Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, i, 388.
324Ib. 390.
325Ib. 404. Jefferson did this because, as he said, the appointees of Adams were too numerous.
326Journal, Exec. Proc. Senate, i, 417.
327See supra, 94-97.
328See infra, chap. iv.
329This belief is strikingly shown by the comment of the Republican press. For example, just before Marshall delivered his opinion, a correspondent of the Independent Chronicle of Boston sent from Washington this article: "The efforts of federalism to exalt the Judiciary over the Executive and Legislature, and to give that favorite department a political character & influence, may operate for a time to come, as it has already, to the promotion of one party and the depression of the other; but will probably terminate in the degradation and disgrace of the Judiciary. "Politics are more improper and dangerous in a Court of Justice, if possible, than in the pulpit. Political charges, prosecutions, and similar modes of official influence, ought never to have been resorted to by any party. The fountains of justice should be unpolluted by party passions and prejudices. "The attempt of the Supreme Court of the United States, by a mandamus, to control the Executive functions, is a new experiment. It seems to be no less than a commencement of war between the constituted departments. "The Court must be defeated and retreat from the attack; or march on, till they incur an impeachment and removal from office. But our Republican frame of Government is so firm and solid, that there is reason to hope it will remain unshaken by the assaults of opposition, & the conflicts of interfering departments. "The will of the nation, deliberately and constitutionally expressed, must and will prevail, the predictions and exertions of federal monarchists and aristocrats to the contrary notwithstanding." (Independent Chronicle, March 10, 1803.) Marshall's opinion was delivered February 24. It took two weeks of fast traveling to go from Washington to Boston. Ordinary mail required a few days longer. The article in the Chronicle was probably sent while Marbury vs. Madison was being argued.
330Dodd, in Am. Hist. Rev. xii, 776. Under the law Marshall's successor must come from Virginia or North Carolina.
331As President of the Court of Appeals of Virginia he later challenged Marshall and brought about the first serious conflict between the courts of a State and the supreme tribunal of the Nation; and as a pamphleteer he assailed Marshall and his principles of Nationalism with unsparing rigor. (See vol. iv, chaps. iii, and vi, of this work.)
332For example, in Fletcher vs. Peck, Roane would have held that the National Courts could not annul a State statute; in Martin vs. Hunter's Lessees and in Cohen vs. Virginia, that the Supreme Court could not review the judgment of a State court; in McCulloch vs. Maryland, that Congress could not exercise implied powers, but only those expressly granted by the specific terms of the Constitution, etc. All this we know positively from Roane's own writings. (See vol. iv, chaps. iii, vi, and vii, of this work.)