"For Your Excellency's information (strictly confidential):
"1. The memorandum is written personally by His Majesty.
"2. Unrestricted submarine warfare is for the present deferred.
"Memorandum
"Your Excellency hinted to His Majesty in your last conversation at Charleville in April that President Wilson possibly would try towards the end of summer to offer his good services to the belligerents for the promotion of peace. The German Government has no information as to whether the President adheres to this idea, and as to the eventual date at which his step would take place. Meanwhile the constellation of war has taken such a form, that the German Government foresees the time at which it will be forced to regain the freedom of action that it has reserved to itself in the Note of May 4th last, and thus the President's steps may be jeopardized."
Mr. Gerard arrived in New York a few days after I had received the Emperor's memorandum. He was accompanied by the American journalist, Herbert Swope, a correspondent of The World, who had spent a considerable time in Berlin. This gentleman professed to be Mr. Gerard's confidant, and even from the ship sent wireless messages to his paper in which he reported that the unrestricted submarine campaign was imminent. The Ambassador also, after landing in New York, expressed himself, as I at once learned, to the same effect, and Mr. Swope continued his open Press-campaign in this direction.
Under these circumstances I considered it inopportune to give Mr. Gerard the Emperor's memorandum, as I assumed that he would read into it merely a confirmation of his view, and would discuss it in that light. If, however, the idea spread abroad that we were about to begin the unrestricted submarine campaign all prospect of success for peace mediation was lost. It was indeed clear that the Entente would not accept American mediation if they could hope for the submarine campaign and consequent declaration of war by the United States. It must continually be repeated that mediation could only succeed if the Entente had already abandoned all hope of American assistance. On these considerations I handed the memorandum to Colonel House, of whose discretion I had two years' experience. In this way it came into the hands of the equally unusually discreet President, without anyone else learning anything about it. The memorandum at once produced a great effect, as now the American authorities had no further doubt that the Imperial Government would accept the intended mediation. This could, however, not be speeded up because Mr. Wilson did not want to undertake a great political movement so shortly before the election.
At this time I sent the following report to the Chancellor:
Telegram in Cipher
"Washington, 17th October, 1916.
"For a week there has again been some excitement here about foreign policy. This is due to a variety of causes. At first the rumor was that Ambassador Gerard was bringing with him a peace proposal from the German Government. In spite of all denials this rumor was believed for a time, because it was started by one of the first bankers of New York. Unfortunately Mr. Gerard heard of this canard while he was still on the ship, and as he was travelling with Herbert Swope a denial, sent by wireless, appeared in The World, which was worse than the rumor itself. In this Swope reported that Mr. Gerard was coming over to announce the approaching beginning of ruthless submarine war. Just at this moment the U53 appeared at Newport, and two days later I had an audience of the President, which had been arranged a long time before, that I might hand to Mr. Wilson the reply of His Majesty the Emperor and King on the question of Polish relief.
"Colonel House, with whom, as is known, I am in constant communication, expected that on his landing Mr. Gerard would let fall some intentional or unintentional diplomatic lapsus linguœ, and therefore went in the early morning to the quarantine station in order to protect Gerard from the reporters. Mr. Gerard received a very hearty reception, which, however, had certainly been engineered for election purposes, because it is to the interest of the Democratic Administration to extol their ambassador and their foreign policy. Immediately after the reception Gerard breakfasted with House, and there everything was denied that had been actually said or implied.
"As I have known Mr. and Mrs. Gerard for many years I had a longish conversation with them on the day after their arrival. The quintessence of the ambassador's remarks was that he was completely neutral, but that Berlin expected more than that.
"Now everything has calmed down again here, and nothing is talked about except the election, which will be decided in three weeks' time. As I have several times had the honor to report, the result is most uncertain. While four months ago a Republican victory seemed certain, to-day Wilson's success is very possible. This is explained by the fact that Mr. Hughes has made no permanent impression as a speaker, whereas Roosevelt blew the war trumpet in his usual bombastic fashion. If Hughes should be defeated he can thank Roosevelt. The average American is, and remains a pacifist 'Er segnet Friede und Friedenszeiten,' and can only be drawn into war by passionate popular excitement."
With the facts contained in the above report the following telegram is also concerned, which I despatched after the visit to the President mentioned above:
Telegram in Cipher
"Washington, 11th October 1916.
"Wilson gave particular force to his remarks by pointing out that the leaders of the opposition Roosevelt, Lodge and Co., desired war with Germany, which he was quite unable to understand. His only desire was to remain neutral, and to help to bring the war to an end as a decision by force of arms seemed to him out of the question. He thought that neither of the belligerent parties would be able to gain a decisive victory. Therefore it was better to make peace to-day than to-morrow. But all prospect of ending the war would vanish if the United States were also drawn in.
"As Wilson always spoke as though he was holding himself in readiness, in case his services as mediator were required, I told him that in my opinion there was no prospect of any advances being made by the belligerent Powers.
"It was obvious that Wilson would have preferred to be directly encouraged to make peace before the election because in that case he would have been sure of being re-elected. If, however, he were re-elected without this, he would have to make up his mind to take the initiative himself. Result of the poll still very doubtful. Wilson surprisingly strong, as Hughes has little success as a speaker and Roosevelt does more harm than good."
To this I received the following reply from the Chancellor:
Cipher Telegram
"Berlin, 14th October, 1916.
"Demand for unrestricted submarine campaign increasing here with prolongation of war and improbability of decisive military blow, without, however, shaking the Government's attitude.
"Direct request for Wilson's mediation still impossible, in view of favor hitherto shown to Entente, and after last speeches of Asquith and Lloyd George. Spontaneous appeal for peace, towards which I again ask you to encourage him, would be gladly accepted by us. You should point out Wilson's power, and consequently his duty, to put a stop to slaughter. If he cannot make up his mind to act alone he should get into communication with Pope, King of Spain and European neutrals. Such joint action, since it cannot be rejected by Entente, would insure him re-election and historical fame.
"Bethmann-Hollweg."
The incident of the Emperor's memorandum closed with the following telegram sent by me:
Cipher Telegram
"Washington, 20th October, 1916.
"I thought it better to give memorandum to Gerard for House, as in this way greater discretion is assured. Latter was incautious in his utterances to Press here. House will speak with Gerard. Both gentlemen see Wilson shortly, and are accordingly in constant touch.
"It is still not to be expected that Wilson will make peace advances before the election. Nor that he will get into communication with Pope or King of Spain as hitherto every suggestion of joint action has met with immovable opposition, chiefly based on tradition. Meanwhile prospect of Wilson's re-election becomes obviously greater every day. Should this occur I believe that Wilson will very soon attempt mediation and with success, chiefly because the feeling against England has greatly increased, which England is seeking to hide. If peace is not concluded serious Anglo-American differences of opinion are to be expected. Until now every fresh dispute with Germany with regard to the submarine question has always been exploited by our enemies here to bridge the differences with England. Already the agitation in the German Press for unrestricted submarine warfare is persistently used for this purpose."
After a hard struggle Mr. Wilson was re-elected President. The pacifist tendency in the United States had won, for the battle was fought under the watchword that Mr. Wilson had preserved peace for the United States. "He kept us out of the war" had been the battle-cry of the Democrats. The few electioneering speeches made by the President breathed the spirit of neutrality and love of peace. It is particularly to be noticed that at that time, Mr. Wilson, in an address, dealt in a thoroughly objective way with the question of guilt for the origin of the war, which was later to be the determining factor in his attitude towards us. The way was now cleared for the opening of the peace movement. Public feeling had also become more favorable to us, inasmuch as the American war industry no longer attached so much importance to the prolongation of the war after the victorious Democratic party had drawn up an extensive armament programme and so indicated to the industry the prospect of great State contracts.
On the subject of my own attitude with regard to the election, innumerable legends have been spread through Germany. The few German-Americans who shared the views of the so-called "German-American Chamber of Commerce" have reproached me with having brought about Mr. Wilson's election by influencing the German-Americans. Anti-German-American newspapers maintained, on the other hand, that I had used every lever to bring about the election of the Republican candidate, Mr. Hughes, so as to punish Mr. Wilson for his attitude towards the submarine campaign. My position was an extraordinarily difficult one, as I could neither take part in the election nor give up the relations which naturally and in the course of my duty bound me to the German-Americans and pacifists. In general I may say that the vast majority of German-Americans had absolute confidence in me throughout. A splendid testimony of this was given at the great German bazaar which was held in New York in aid of the Red Cross. This undertaking made the astounding net profit of 800,000 dollars. At the opening nearly 30,000 people were present, who gave me an indescribably enthusiastic ovation simply because they believed that I had prevented war between Germany and the United States.
I never for a moment denied that I personally should be glad to see Mr. Wilson re-elected, as I was convinced that he had the determination and the power to bring about peace. It was at that time impossible for me to foresee that our Government would change its attitude to this question. All American pacifists belonged to the Democratic camp, all militarists belonged to the Republican party.
A change in our favor was, therefore, not to be expected from the election of Mr. Hughes. Apart from the usual relations with the pacifists and German-Americans already mentioned, which were in no way altered during the election, I held myself aloof as my position demanded. If it had been possible to accuse me of taking sides, the agents of the Entente would not have missed the opportunity of bringing me to book, as this they regarded as their object in life. I continually received letters from agents provocateurs, asking for my opinion on the elections. Of course I never replied to these. Neither were the false statements of anti-German newspapers any more successful which announced that on the day of the election I had openly shown my support of Mr. Hughes.
New York at night after the polling is one of the sights of America. All streets, squares, theatres and restaurants are filled to overflowing. The election results are displayed everywhere by electric light and cinematograph. Particularly when the result is very uncertain, as in 1916, the crowd are tremendously excited. At 11 p.m. the election of Mr. Hughes seemed certain, as the Eastern States had voted for him almost to a man, and it was said that a Democratic candidate can only gain the victory if he wins over New York State. Next day the picture changed, after the results had come gradually from the West, where the Democratic party was everywhere triumphant. The majority, however, was so slight that it was several days before Mr. Wilson's election was secure.
The malcontents among the German-Americans already mentioned maintain that if Mr. Hughes had been elected, Congress would have used the four months between the election and the 4th March, during which Mr. Wilson was powerless and Mr. Hughes had not yet got the reins into his hands, to rush through the warning of American citizens against travelling on British passenger-ships. In that case, Mr. Hughes, on assuming office, would have found himself faced with a situation which would have prevented him from entering the war, in view of the national inclination towards peace. Therefore, the German-Americans ought to have supported Hughes. This had been clear to the Germans in the East. They maintained that Wilson's re-election was due to the German votes in the Western States which had obeyed a more or less clear order from the German Embassy.
This line of argument is yet another proof that the Germans in question had no idea of the situation in America. They kept exclusively to themselves in the Deutscher Verein, and scarcely ever saw a real, true-bred American. To begin with, it is difficult to see why the Germans in the West should obey the alleged order from me if the Germans in the East did not do so. But the important thing is that Wilson had firmly made up his mind, in case Mr. Hughes was elected, to appoint him Secretary of State immediately and, after Hughes had informed himself on the political position in this office, to hand over the presidency and himself retire. Mr. Wilson considered it impossible to leave the country without firm leadership at such a dangerous moment.
Immediately after the official announcement of his reelection, Mr. Wilson wrote a Peace-Note, but unfortunately kept it in his desk, because, unhappily, just at that time a new anti-German wave swept over the country on account of the Belgian deportations. Mr. Wilson was at that time in the habit of typing the drafts of his Notes and speeches himself, and only submitting them to his advisers on points of law or other technicalities. Whether he still works in this way I do not know. If the unhappy measure of the Belgian deportations had not been adopted, and particularly just as we had informed the President that we did not want to annex Belgium, the history of the world would probably have taken a different course. The American mediation would have anticipated our peace offer and, therefore, would probably have succeeded, because we could not then have reopened the unrestricted submarine campaign without letting the mediation run its course.
In November several submarine incidents occurred in which there was a doubt as to whether the rules of cruiser warfare had been followed. The ships Marina and Arabia came under particular consideration. I will not go into these cases as they had no political importance. President Wilson caused the investigations to be carried on in a dilatory fashion because he did not want to see his peace move disturbed by controversies.
Of greater importance was the wish that was again cropping up in Berlin to open the so-called "intensified submarine campaign." I learned this in the following from Secretary of State von Jagow:
Cipher Telegram No. 112.
"Berlin, 8th November, 1916.
"Navy wishes at least torpedo armed enemy cargo-vessels without warning. Does Your Excellency consider this dangerous, apart from probable mistakes, particularly in view of fact that now many Americans are lured to travel on such steamers!
"Von Jagow."
As the "intensified submarine campaign" would have destroyed all prospect of American intervention, I advised strongly against it in the two following telegrams:
(1) Cipher Telegram No. 152
"Washington, 17th November, 1916.
"It is urgently desirable not to reopen disputes about armed merchantmen, especially in view of Wilson's peace plan."
(2) Cipher Telegram
"Washington, 20th November, 1916.
"In reply to telegram No. 112 which was delayed.
"Pursuant to Telegram No. 152.
"Urge no change in submarine war, until decided whether Wilson will open mediation. I consider this imminent."
At the same time I received the first news of the intended peace offer of the German Government. To begin with, the following telegram arrived from Secretary of State von Jagow:
Cipher Telegram
"Berlin, 16th November, 1916.
"Desirable to know whether President willing to take steps towards mediation, and if so, which and when? Question important for decision of possible steps in same direction elsewhere.
"How does Mexican question stand?
"Von Jagow."
Then followed a further telegram which read as follows:
Cipher Telegram
"Berlin, 22nd November, 1916.
"Strictly confidential.
"For Your Excellency's strictly personal information. So far as favorable military position permits we intend, in conjunction with our Allies, immediately to announce our readiness to enter into peace negotiations.
"Von Jagow."
To the first of these two telegrams I sent the following reply:
Cipher Telegram
"Washington, 21st November, 1916.
"Wilson spontaneously commissioned House to tell me in strict confidence that he is anxious to take steps towards mediation as soon as possible, probably between now and the New Year. He makes it a condition, however, that until then, mediation should be spoken and written of as little as possible, and further, that we should conduct the submarine war strictly according to our promises and not allow any fresh controversies to arise.
"Wilson's reasons for the above conditions are as follows: He believes that he can only resort to mediation provided that public opinion over here remains as favorable to us as it has been during the last few months. On this account he deplores the so-called Belgian deportations. Any new submarine controversy would again affect public feeling adversely for us, whereas if this question can be eliminated the tension with regard to England will increase. The British reply on the subject of the black lists and the English Press utterances on Wilson's election have created a bad impression in Government circles over here. The submarine question, however, will always divert this resentment against us again.
"Wilson still hesitates to intervene because the State Department expects a refusal on the part of our enemies, while House urges it strongly and is very hopeful. I have, according to instructions, encouraged him as much as possible, by telling him, that in my opinion, our enemies would be quite unable to refuse to enter into negotiations, and that is all that Wilson has in view. House seemed very much impressed when I reminded him how, throughout the whole war, the English Government had tried by lying and diplomatic trickery to bring public opinion on to their side. This house of cards, built on lies and deception, would immediately collapse if our enemies were now to refuse negotiations and thus would have to admit openly their desire for conquest. I am rather afraid that England may make a pretense of entering into negotiations and then try to put us in the wrong.
"I chose this line of argument because Wilson fears above all things the humiliation of a refusal. If it does come to negotiations, even unsuccessful, Wilson will have scored a great success. Whether the negotiations will lead to a definite result I cannot judge from here. In any case, if it should come to negotiations, strong pressure will be exerted by the Government over here in the direction of peace.
"The Mexican question is still in a state of stagnation as a result of diplomatic negotiations. This affair interests practically no one any more and proved to have no influence on the election.
"If Your Excellency still desires Wilson to intervene it is necessary, in view of the above, to get rid as soon as possible of the Marina and Arabia incidents without further controversy and not to allow any fresh controversies to arise. I think that, with the help of House, I can bury these two incidents without attracting much attention, as this is the wish of Wilson himself. As House said, the President takes a tragic view of these incidents, because, after the Sussex Note, he could not possibly write another Note, and therefore, there is nothing left but to break off diplomatic negotiations, should it be impossible to dispose of the matter privately and confidentially with me.
"Next week Gerard will be in Washington for a day or two: he will lunch with me and dine with Lansing. House keeps him in strict control. In case Gerard's return to Berlin is not desired, please send me instructions. Otherwise he should be there again at the end of the year."
To this telegram, which announced very definitely the American mediation, I received from the Foreign Office the following reply:
Cipher Telegram No. 121
"Berlin, 26th November, 1916.
"Replacement, or at least further retention, of Gerard in America desired in Berlin, provided that it is possible without wounding his vanity and sensitiveness to our disadvantage, that it is certain that this hint from our side will not become known in America and that a suitable successor is available.
"We should prefer Wilson's peace move to the step on our part mentioned in our telegram No. 116 of the 22nd November. For this reason it is eminently desirable that Wilson should make up his mind for immediate action if possible at the opening of congress or immediately afterwards. If it is put off until the New Year or later, the lull in military operations during the winter campaign would moderate the desire of public opinion for peace, and on the other hand would make preparations for the spring offensive necessary which would probably strengthen the military opposition of a peace movement. Please place this point of view cautiously and without empressement before House as your personal opinion and keep me closely instructed by telegram as to the position.
"Zimmermann."
To this telegram I sent the following replies:
Cipher Telegram No. 164
Reply to Telegram No. 121
"Washington, 1st December, 1916.
"To-morrow I shall see House in New York and will try to arrange that Gerard, who is to sail on 5th December, is kept back.
"Lansing expressed himself very strongly to me on the subject of the American protest with regard to the Belgian deportations. These have endangered the whole Belgian relief movement; in addition, feeling here has been poisoned against us, and that just at a moment when it looked as though peace negotiations might be begun. Lansing expressed the view that, if the Imperial Government could find a way of yielding to the protests of the neutrals, this would make a strong impression in our favor and that it would probably be possible immediately afterwards to propose the opening of peace negotiations. Hitherto, unfortunately, something has always intervened.
"The Federal Reserve Board's warning to the banks against unsecured promissory notes of foreign States is the first sign that the Government here wishes to put pressure on our enemies."
Cipher Telegram
"Washington, 4th December, 1916.
"Pursuant to Telegram No. 164 of the 1st inst.
"House told me in strict confidence question of Mr. Gerard's return has been thoroughly discussed by him with Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lansing. Mr. Gerard's unpopularity in Berlin and his unfriendly manner were well known here. However, no satisfactory successor was available, and Mr. Gerard is at least straightforward and does exactly what he is told. He has received very detailed instructions here, and is even quite enthusiastic over the idea of assisting in bringing about peace. In addition, Mr. Gerard was so pleased at the appointment of the Secretary of State that he is sure to adopt a more friendly attitude in future.
"As a matter of fact, Mr. Gerard has everywhere described the changes in the personnel at the Foreign Office as extraordinarily favorable for German-American relations, and laid particular stress on his personal friendship with the Secretary of State.
"Everything is prepared for a peace move, but with Mr. Wilson still hesitating, it is still doubtful when he will take action. All the authorities here have now been won over to favor such a step. This may then come at any time, especially if it is possible for us to adopt a conciliatory attitude on the Belgian question. Mr. Wilson believes that he is so hated in England that he won't be listened to. This train of thought largely explains his eagerness in the Belgian question. In any case, so much is certain, that House is continually urging Mr. Wilson to take action; moreover, peace propaganda here is steadily increasing, notwithstanding that it is for the moment very seriously hampered by the Belgian question. If Mr. Wilson – as is to be expected – finds a strong feeling for peace in Congress, he should at last make up his mind."
After a stay of about two months in America, Mr. Gerard, furnished with fresh instructions, left for Berlin on the 5th December. When later the Ambassador, at the much discussed Adlon dinner, declared that the relations between the United States and Germany had never been so good as at that moment since the beginning of the war, this speech was the keynote of his instructions. If on the other hand Herr Helfferich said that the exuberance of the Ambassador astonished him, this is explained by the fact that Berlin never believed in Mr. Wilson's intention to bring about peace. Why such incredulity should persist notwithstanding that Colonel House had twice travelled to Berlin for this very purpose, and that the President's peace policy had been the burden of all my reports, I shall never be able to understand, while, on the other hand, I can quite understand that Mr. Wilson's passivity with regard to the English breaches of international law had engendered strong distrust of him in Germany.
For the rest, Mr. Gerard seemed to be imperfectly informed about the situation in Berlin. He was certainly right in his prediction of the unrestricted submarine campaign, but in this case the wish was father to the thought. It accorded with Mr. Gerard's anti-German feeling, to which he gave expression later in his gossipy literature and film production, that he should welcome the submarine campaign, and with it the rupture with the United States, as well as our defeat. But after all, the Ambassador' proved at the Adlon dinner that he could sing another tune.
When Mr. Gerard lunched with me in Washington, I had just learned by cable from Berlin that Herr von Jagow had resigned and had been replaced by Herr Zimmermann. On hearing this news, the Ambassador said that now there would be no rupture between Germany and the United States, for Herr Zimmermann was his personal friend and was opposed to war, while Herr von Jagow, as an aristocrat, did not love the Americans, and looked down on bourgeois Gerard. A grosser misreading of the actual situation in Berlin can scarcely be conceived, as the unrestricted submarine campaign was only made possible by the resignation of Herr von Jagow, who was the chief opponent in Berlin of the submarine campaign, and the pillar on which the idea of American intervention rested. As long as Herr von Jagow remained Secretary of State, a breach with the United States was regarded as impossible. One of his last official acts was to write a private letter to me on the 20th November, 1916, concluding with the following sentence:
"As you have seen from your instructions, we are thoroughly in sympathy with the peace tendencies of President Wilson. His activity in this direction is to be strongly encouraged. Naturally his mediation tendencies must not extend to concrete proposals (because these would be unfavorable to us.)"
We now come to the moment in this account when the peace offer of the Imperial Government got involved with Mr. Wilson's plans for mediation. It is not my intention to go closely into the events that occurred in Berlin or the considerations that took effect there, as I only know them through their reaction on the instructions sent to me. I will only mention briefly, that, according to the statement of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg before the Commission of the National Assembly, the peace offer of the Imperial Government was made with a view to influencing the pacifist minorities in the Entente countries, and working, through the people, on the Governments. Beyond this there was no intention of cutting out Mr. Wilson's peace move, but the Imperial Government wanted to have "two irons in the fire." Finally, all the utterances of the Imperial Government, which do not seem to tally with these two principles of their policy, are to be regarded as based on purely tactical motives. Accordingly, the decisive turn in our policy did not occur until the 9th January, 1917, when the decision to resort to the unrestricted submarine war was taken. Until then the policy followed was that of "two irons in the fire."