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A Journal of a Young Man of Massachusetts, 2nd ed.

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No. XIX

Dartmoor, April 14, 1815.

Sir—Yours, of the 12th inst. came to hand this morning. It is with astonishment we note its contents, that the officers who came to inquire into the circumstances of the late unfortunate affair, should have informed you, that the prisoners stated to them the cause of that event was that their government or its agent had neglected them. This is a most deliberate falsehood, let your authors be who they may. We deny not that the anxiety of the prisoners to get released from here, has been great; they have even censured you as being dilatory in your preparations for that purpose—but their government they have never implicated—and you may rest assured, that they have too much of the genuine spirit of Americans, to apply to the officer of a foreign government for relief, or to make them a party in any dispute with the government or its agents.



We solemnly assure you, that whatever anxiety among the prisoners, or want of confidence in your exertions, as above stated, may have existed among them, that it can in no way be construed to have any collusion or connection with the late event, and was expressly so stated to the admiral, who came here from Plymouth.



We, on the contrary, in the name of the five thousand prisoners confined here, accuse Shortland of a deliberate, pre-determined act of atrocious murder—we have sufficient evidence in our possession to prove it to the world, and we call on you (there being at present no accredited minister, or charge des affairs at the court of London) to make strict inquiries into the circumstances of the case, and procure all the evidence necessary for a proper investigation into the same; for well do we feel assured, that our government will not thus suffer its citizens to be sacrificed, for the gratification of national prejudice, malice or revenge, of the petty officers of a foreign state.



We are at no loss to impute the misrepresentation of the British officers to their proper motives. They artfully wish to excite in your breast a spirit of enmity and resentment against the prisoners, that you might use less perseverance, or feel yourself less interested in making the proper inquiries into the late affair.



With much respect, we remain, Sir, your most obedient and humble servants,



WILLIAM HOBART,

WALTER COLTON,

HENRY ALLEN.

R. G. Beasly, Esq. Agent for Prisoners, London.



No. XX

Second Letter from Mr. Beasly to the American Committee.



Gentlemen—My letter to you of the 12th inst. on the subject of the melancholy event, was written under an impression which I received from a report of it, transmitted to me by this government: I have since received your report of the circumstances. Had I been in possession of the information therein contained, the letter would have been differently expressed. I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,



R. G. BEASLY.

Committee of American Prisoners, Dartmoor.



P. S. I subjoin an extract of the report alluded to from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty:



"The rioters, it appears, endeavored to overpower the guard, to force the prison, and had actually seized the arms of some of the soldiers, and made a breach in the walls of the depot, when the guard found itself obliged to have recourse to their fire arms, and five of the rioters were killed, and thirty-four wounded, after which the tumult subsided, and the depot was placed in a state of tranquillity and security.



"Admiral Sir J. T. Duckworth, Commander in Chief at Plymouth, having received information of this unfortunate event, lost no time in directing Rear Admiral Sir Josias Rowley, Baronet, K. C. B. and Schornberg, the two senior officers at that port, to proceed to Dartmoor, and to inquire into the circumstances. Those officers accordingly repaired to the depot, where they found, on examination of the officers of the depot, and

all the American prisoners who were called before them

, that the circumstances of the riot were as before stated; but that no excuse could be assigned for the conduct of the prisoners, but their impatience to be released; and the Americans unanimously declared, that their complaint of delay was not against the British government, but against their own, which ought to have sent means for their early conveyance home, and in replies to distinct questions to that effect they declared they had no ground of complaint whatsoever."



No. XXI

Dartmoor, April 17, 1815.

To Rear Admiral Sir J. T. Duckworth.



Sir—The officers whom you sent to this place to inquire into the circumstance of the unfortunate occurrence of the 6th inst. whatever right they had to represent the conduct of Captain Shortland in the most favorable manner, we conceive it an act of gross injustice that they should have given to you such a false and scandalous representation of what they were told by the prisoners.



In the report from the admiralty board to Mr. Beasly, (a copy of which he has transmitted to us) it is stated that the prisoners, when called upon to give an account of the circumstances of the 6th, exonerated Captain Shortland and the English government from any blame respecting the same, and accused their own government and its agent of being the cause.



We, on the contrary, solemnly declare, that it was expressly stated to Admiral Rowley, that whatever anxiety might have existed among the prisoners for a speedy release, could, in no way whatever, be construed to have had any collusion or connection with that event.—That the prisoners, so far from having any idea of attempting to break out, if the gates had been opened, and every one suffered to go who might wish to do so, not one in a hundred would have left the prison, having no means of subsistence in a foreign country, and being likewise liable to impressment, when by staying a few days longer, they would, probably, be embarked for their native country.



They, on the contrary, accused Captain Shortland of being the sole mover and principal perpetrator of the unprovoked and horrid butchery.



Conceiving, from your well known character in the British navy for integrity and candor, that you would not wish to have your name the medium of imposing such a gross misrepresentation and such direct falsehoods on the admiralty board and the British public, we have taken the liberty of thus addressing you, and have the honor to subscribe ourselves, your most obedient and very humble servants,



Wm. Hobart, Walter Colton, Henry Allen, Thomas B. Mott, Wm. B. Orne,

Committee of American Prisoners, Dartmoor.



City of New York, ss.

Archibald Taylor

, late commander of the Paul Jones, private armed vessel of war, being duly sworn, doth depose and say—



That he was a prisoner in Dartmoor prison at the time of the late massacre of Americans; that after the affair of the 6th of April, and on the night of the same day, he was in the prison No. 3, assisting Thomas Smith, late his boatswain, who was shot through his leg by the soldiers in the yard, when an order was received to have all the wounded removed from the prisons to the hospital; and while this deponent was carrying the said Thomas Smith to the door of the prison, to deliver him to the guards selected to receive him, some of the soldiers observed to this deponent, "this is in turn for the affair at New Orleans, where you killed our men, and now we have our revenge"—and further this deponent saith not.



ARCHIBALD TAYLOR.

Sworn before me, this 28th June, 1815.



AARON H. PALMER,

Notary Public

.

KING AND LARPENT'S REPORT

Plymouth, 18th April, 1815.

We the undersigned commissioners, appointed on behalf of our respective governments, to inquire into and report upon, the unfortunate occurrence of the 6th April inst. at Dartmoor Prison; having carefully perused the proceedings of the several courts of inquiry, instituted immediately after that event, by the orders of Admiral Sir John T. Duckworth and Major-General Brown, respectively, as well as the depositions taken at the coroner's inquest upon the bodies of the prisoners, who lost their lives upon that melancholy occasion; upon which inquest the jury found a verdict of justifiable homicide; proceeded immediately to the examination upon oath in the presence of one or more of the magistrates of the vicinity, of all the witnesses, both American and English, who offered themselves for that purpose; or who could be discovered as likely to afford any material information on the subject, as well as those who had been previously examined before the coroner, as otherwise, to the number in the whole of about eighty. We further proceeded to a minute examination of the prisons, for the purpose of clearing up some points which, upon the evidence alone, were scarcely intelligible; obtaining from the prisoners, and from the officers of the depot, all the necessary assistance and explanation; and premising, that we have been from necessity compelled to draw many of our conclusions from statements and evidence highly contradictory, we do now make upon the whole proceedings the following report:—

 



During the period which has elapsed since the arrival in this country of the account of the ratification of the treaty of Ghent, an increased degree of restlessness and impatience of confinement appears to have prevailed amongst the American prisoners at Dartmoor, which, though not exhibited in the shape of any violent excesses, has been principally indicated by threats of breaking out if not soon released.



On the 4th of this month in particular, only two days previous to the events which are the subject of this inquiry, a large body of the prisoners rushed into the market-square, from whence, by the regulations of the prison they are excluded, demanded bread instead of biscuit, which had on that day been issued by the officers of the depot; their demands having been then almost immediately complied with, they returned to their own yards, and the employment of force on that occasion became unnecessary.



On the evening of the 6th, about 6 o'clock, it was clearly proved to us, that a breach or hole had been made in one of the prison walls, sufficient for a full sized man to pass, and that others had been commenced in the course of the day near the same spot, though never completed.



That a number of the prisoners were over the railing erected to prevent them from communicating with the sentinels on the walls, which was of course forbidden by the regulations of the prison, and that in the space between the railing and those walls they were tearing up pieces of turf, and wantonly pelting each other in a noisy and disorderly manner.



That a much more considerable number of the prisoners was collected together at that time in one of their yards near the place where the breach was effected, and that although such collection of prisoners was not unusual at other times (the Gambling Tables being commonly kept in that part of the yard) yet, when connected with the circumstances of the breach, and the time of the day, which was after the hour the signal for the prisoners to retire to their respective prisons had ceased to sound, it became a natural and just ground of alarm to those who had charge of the depot.



It was also in evidence that in the building formerly the petty officers' prison, but now the guard barrack, which stands in the yard to which the hole in the wall would serve as a communication, a part of the arms of the guard who were off duty, were usually kept in the racks, and though there was no evidence that this was, in any respect, the motive which induced the prisoners to make the opening in the wall, or even that they were ever acquainted with the fact, it naturally became at least a further cause of suspicion and alarm, and an additional reason for precaution.



Upon these grounds captain Shortland appears to us to have been justified in giving the order, which about this time he seems to have given, to sound the alarm bell, the usual signal for collecting the officers of the depot and putting the military on the alert.



However reasonable and justifiable this was as a measure of precaution, the effects produced thereby in the prisons, but which could not have been intended, were most unfortunate, and deeply to be regretted. A considerable number of the prisoners in the yards where no disturbance existed before, and who were either already within their respective prisons, or quietly retiring as usual towards them, immediately upon the sound of the bell rushed back from curiosity (as it appears) towards the gates, where, by that time, the crowd had assembled, and many who were at the time absent from their yards, were also from the plan of the prison, compelled, in order to reach their own homes, to pass the same spot, and thus that which was merely a measure of precaution, in its operation increased the evil it was intended to prevent. Almost at the same instant that the alarm bell rung, (but whether before or subsequent is upon the evidence doubtful, though captain Shortland states it positively as one of his further reasons for causing it to ring) some one or more of the prisoners broke the iron chain, which was the only fastening of No. 1 gate, leading into market square by means of an iron bar; and a very considerable number of the prisoners immediately rushed towards that gate; and many of them began to press forwards as fast as the opening would permit into the square.



There was no direct proof before us of previous concert or preparation on the part of the prisoners, and no evidence of their intention or disposition to effect their escape on this occasion, excepting that which arose by inference from the whole of the above detailed circumstances connected together.



The natural and almost irresistible inference to be drawn, however, from the conduct of the prisoners by captain Shortland and the military was, that an intention on the part of the prisoners to escape was on the point of being carried into execution, and it was at least certain that they were by force passing beyond the limits prescribed to them at a time when they ought to have been quietly going in for the night. It was also in evidence that the outer gates of the market square were usually opened about this time to let the bread waggons pass and repass to the store, although at the period in question they were in fact closed.



Under these circumstances, and with these impressions necessarily operating upon his mind, and a knowledge that if the prisoners once penetrated through the square, the power of escape was almost to a certainty afforded to them, if they should be so disposed; captain Shortland in the first instance proceeded down the square towards the prisoners, having ordered a part of the different guards, to the number of about fifty only at first, (though they were increased afterwards) to follow him. For some time both he and Dr. Magrath endeavored by quiet means and persuasion, to induce the prisoners to return to their own yards, explaining to them the fatal consequences which must ensue if they refused, as the military would in that case be necessarily compelled to employ force. The guard was by this time formed in the rear of captain Shortland, about two thirds of the way down the square—the latter is about one hundred feet broad, and the guard extended nearly all across. Captain Shortland, finding that persuasion was all in vain, and that although some were induced by it to make an effort to retire, others pressed on in considerable numbers, at last ordered about 15 file of the guard, nearly in front of the gate which had been forced, to charge the prisoners back to their own yards.



The prisoners were in some places so near the military, that one of the soldiers states that he could not come fairly down to the charge; and the military were unwilling to set against an enemy. Some struggling ensued between the parties, arising partly from intention, but mainly from the pressure of those behind preventing those in front from getting back. After some little time, however, this charge appears to have been so far effective, and that with little or no injury to the prisoners, as to have driven them for the most part quite down out of the square, with the exception of a small number who continued their resistance about No. 1 gate.



A great crowd still remained collected after this in the passage between the square and the prisoners' yards, and in the part of those yards in the vicinity of the gates.—This assemblage still refused to withdraw, and according to most of the English witnesses and some of the American, was making a noise, hallowing, insulting and provoking, and daring the military to fire, and according to the testimony of several of the soldiers, and some others, were pelting the military with large stones, by which some of them were actually struck. This circumstance is, however, denied by many of the American witnesses; and some of the English, upon having the question put to them, stated that they saw no stones thrown previously to the firing, although their situation at the time was such as to enable them to see most of the proceedings in the square.



Under these circumstances the firing commenced.—With regard to any order having been given to fire the evidence is very contradictory. Several of the Americans swear positively, that captain Shortland gave that order; but the manner in which from the confusion of the moment, they described this part of the transaction, is so different in its details that it is very difficult to reconcile their testimony. Many of the soldiers and other English witnesses, heard the word given by some one, but no one of them can swear it was by captain Shortland, or by any one in particular, and some, amongst whom is the officer commanding the guard, think, if captain Shortland had given such an order that they must have heard it, which they did not. In addition to this captain Shortland denies the fact; and from the situation which he appears to have been placed at the time, even according to the American witnesses, in front of the soldiers, it may appear somewhat improbable that he should then have given such an order.



But, however, it may remain a matter of doubt whether the firing first began in the square by order, or was a spontaneous act of the soldiers themselves, it seemed clear that it was continued and renewed both there and elsewhere without orders; and that on the platforms, and in several places about the prison, it was certainly commenced without any authority.



The fact of an order having been given at first, provided the firing was under the existing circumstances justifiable, does not appear very material in any other point of view, than as shewing a want of self possession and discipline in the troops if they should have fired without order.



With regard to the above most important consideration, of whether the firing was justifiable or not, we are of opinion, under all the circumstances of the case, from the apprehension which the soldiers might fairly entertain, owing to the numbers and conduct of the prisoners, that this firing to a certain extent was justifiable in a military point of view, in order to intimidate the prisoners, and compel them thereby to desist from all acts of violence, and to retire as they were ordered, from a situation in which the responsibility of the agents, and the military, could not permit them with safety to remain.



From the fact of the crowd being so close and the firing at first being attended with very little injury, it appears probable that a large proportion of the muskets were, as stated by one or two of the witnesses, levelled over the heads of the prisoners; a circumstance in some respects to be lamented, as it induced them to cry out "blank cartridges," and merely irritated and encouraged them to renew their insults to the soldiery, which produced a repetition of the firing in a manner much more destructive.



The firing in the square having continued for some time, by which several of the prisoners sustained injuries, the greater part of them appear to have been running back with the utmost precipitation and confusion to their respective prisons, and the cause for further firing seems at this period to have ceased. It appears, accordingly, that captain Shortland was in the market square exerting himself and giving orders to that effect, and that lieutenant Fortye had succeeded in stopping the fire of his part of the guard.



Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to find any justification for the further continuance and renewal of the firing, which certainly took place both in the prison yards and elsewhere; though we have some evidence of subsequent provocation given to the military, and resistance to the turnkeys in shutting the prisons, and of stones being thrown out from within the prison doors.



The subsequent firing rather appears to have arisen from the state of individual irritation and exasperation on the part of the soldiers, who followed the prisoners into their yards, and from the absence of nearly all of the officers who might have restrained it as well as from the great difficulty of putting an end to a firing when once commenced under such circumstances. Captain Shortland was from this time busily occupied with the turnkeys in the square, receiving and taking care of the wounded. Ensign White remained with his guard at the breach, and lieutenants Ayelyne and Fortye, the only other subalterns known to have been present, continued with the main bodies of their respective guards.

 



The time of the day, which was the officers' dinner hour, will in some measure explain this, as it caused the absence of every officer from the prison whose presence was not indispensable there. And this circumstance which has been urged as an argument to prove the intention of the prisoners to take this opportunity to escape, tended to increase the confusion, and to prevent those great exertions being made which might perhaps have obviated a portion at least of the mischief which ensued.



At the same time that the firing was going on in the square, a cross fire was also kept up from several of the platforms on the walls round the prisoners where the sentries stand, by straggling parties of soldiers who ran up there for that purpose. As far as this fire was directed to disperse the men assembled round the breach, for which purpose it was most effectual, it seems to stand upon the same ground as that in the first instance in the square.—That part which it is positively sworn was directed against straggling parties of prisoners running about the yards and endeavoring to enter in the few doors which the turnkeys, according to their usual practice, had left open, does seem, as stated, to have been wholly without object or excuse, and to have been a wanton attack upon the lives of defenceless, and at that time, unoffending individuals.



In the same, or even more severe terms, we must remark upon what was proved as to the firing in the door-ways of the prisons, more particularly into that of No. 3 prison, at a time when the men were in crowds at the entrance. From the position of the prison and the door, and from the marks of the balls which were pointed out to us, as well as from the evidence, it was clear this firing must have proceeded from soldiers a very few feet from the door way; and although it was certainly sworn that the prisoners were at the time of part of the firing at least, continuing to insult and occasionally to throw stones at the soldiers, and that they were standing in the way of, and impeding the turnkey, who was there for the purpose of closing the door, yet still there was nothing stated which could, in our view, at all justify such excessively harsh and severe treatment of helpless and unarmed prisoners, when all idea of escape was at an end.



Under these impressions, we used every endeavor to ascertain if there was the least prospect of identifying any of the soldiers who had been guilty of the particular outrages here alluded to, or of tracing any particular death, at that time to the firing of any particular individual, but without success; and all hopes of bringing the offenders to punishment would seem to be at an end.



In conclusion, we, the undersigned, have only to add, that whilst we lament, as we do most deeply, the unfortunate transaction which has been the subject of this inquiry, we find ourselves unable to suggest any steps to be taken as to those parts of it which seem to call for redress and punishment.



Plymouth, April 26, 1815.

SIR—In pursuance of the instructions received from Messrs. Clay and Gallatin, I have now the honor to transmit to you the report prepared by Mr. Larpent and myself on behalf of our respective governments, in relation to the unfortunate transactions at Dartmoor Prison of War, on the 6th of the present month. Considering it of much importance that the report, whatever it might be, should go forth under our joint signatures, I have forborne to press some of the points which it involves, as far as otherwise I might have done, and it therefore may not be improper in this letter to enter into some little explanation of such parts of the report.



Although it does appear that a part of the prisoners were on that evening in such a state, and under such circumstances as to have justified in the view which the commander of the depot could not but take of it, the intervention of the military force, and even in a strict sense, the first use of fire arms, yet I cannot but express it as my settled opinion, that by conduct a little more temporising this dreadful alternative of firing upon unarmed prisoners might have been avoided. Yet as this opinion has been the result of subsequent examination, and after having acquired a knowledge of the comparatively harmless state of the prisoners, it may be but fair to consider, whether in such a moment of confusion and alarm, as that appears to have been, the officer commanding could have fairly estimated his danger, or have measured out with precision the extent and nature of the force necessary to