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A Christian Directory, Part 4: Christian Politics

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Tit. 4. Cases of Conscience about Lending and Borrowing

Quest. I. May a poor man borrow money, who knoweth that he is unable to repay it, and hath no rational proof that he is very likely to be able hereafter?

Answ. No: unless it be when he telleth the lender truly of his case, and he is willing to run the hazard; else it is mere thievery covered with the cheat of borrowing; for the borrower desireth that of another, which he would not lend him, if he expected it not again; and to take a man's money or goods against his will is robbery.

Object. But I am in great necessity.

Answ. Begging in necessity is lawful; but stealing or cheating is not, though you call it borrowing.

Object. But it is a shame to beg.

Answ. The sin of thievish borrowing is worse than shame.

Object. But none will give me if I beg.

Answ. If they will give but to save your life at the present, you must take it, though they give you not what you would have: the poorest beggar's life is better than the thief's.

Object. But I hope God may enable me to pay hereafter.

Answ. If you have no rational way to manifest the soundness of that hope to another, it is but to pretend faith and hope for thievery and deceit.

Object. God hath promised, that those that fear him shall want no good thing. And therefore I hope I may be able to repay it.

Answ. If you want not, why do you borrow? If you have enough to keep you alive by begging, God maketh good all his promises to you; yea, or if you die by famine. For he only promiseth you that which is best; which for aught you know may be beggary or death. God breaketh not promise with his servants who die in common famine, no more than with them who die in plagues or wars. Make not God the patron of sin; yea, and your faith a pretence for your distrust. If you trust God, use no sinful means; if you trust him not, this pleading of his promise is hypocrisy.

Quest. II. May a tradesman drive a trade with borrowed money, when his success, and so his repayment, is utterly an uncertain thing?

Answ. There are some trades where the gain is so exceeding probable, next to certain, as may warrant the borrowing of money to manage them, when there is no rational probability of failing in the payment. And there are some tradesmen, who have estates of their own, sufficient to repay all the money which they borrow. But otherwise, when the money is rationally hazardous, the borrower is bound in conscience to acquaint the lender fully with the hazard, that he may not have it against his will. Otherwise he liveth in constant deceit or thievery. And if he do happen to repay it, it excuseth not his sin.

Quest. III. If a borrower be utterly unable to pay, and so break while he hath something, may he not retain somewhat for his food or raiment?

Answ. No: unless it be in order to set up again in hope to repay his debts: for all that he hath being other men's, he may not take so much as bread to his mouth, out of that which is theirs, without their consent.

Quest. IV. But if a man have bound himself to his wife's friends upon marriage to settle so much upon her or her children, and this obligation was antecedent to his debts, may he not secure that to his wife or children, without any injury to his creditors?

Answ. The law of the land must much decide this controversy. If the propriety be actually before transferred to wife or children, it is theirs, and cannot be taken from them; but if it were done after by a deed of gift to defraud the creditors, then that deed of gift is invalid, till debts be paid. If it be but an obligation and no collation of propriety, the law must determine who is to be first paid; and whether the wife be supposed to run the hazard of gaining or losing with the husband: and though the laws of several countries herein differ, and some give the wife more propriety than others do, yet must they in each place be conscientiously observed, as being the rule of such propriety. But we must see that there be no fraudulent intent in the transaction.

Quest. V. May not a tradesman retain somewhat to set up again, if his creditors be willing to compound for a certain part of the debt?

Answ. If he truly acquaint them with his whole estate, and they voluntarily allow him part to himself, either in charity, or in hope hereafter to be satisfied, this is no unlawful course; but if he hide part from them, and make them believe that the rest is all, this is but a thievish procurement of their composition or consent.

Quest. VI. May a borrower lawfully break his day of promised payment, in case of necessity?

Answ. True necessity hath no law: that is, a man is not bound to do things naturally impossible; but if he might have foreseen that necessity, or the doubtfulness of his payment at the day, it was his sin to promise it, unless he put in some limitation, If I be able, and acquainted the lender with the uncertainty. However it be, when the time is come, he ought to go to his creditor, and tell him of his necessity, and desire further time, and endeavour to pay it as soon as he is able: and if he be not able, to make him what satisfaction he can, by his labour, or any other lawful way.

Quest. VII. May I borrow of one to pay another, to keep my day with the first?

Answ. Yes, if you deal not fraudulently with the second, but are able to pay him, or acquaint him truly with your case.

Quest. VIII. Suppose that I have no probability of paying the last creditor, may I borrow of one to pay another, and so live upon borrowing; or must I rather continue in one man's debt?

Answ. If you truly acquaint your creditors with your state, you may do as is most to your convenience. If the first creditor be able and willing rather to trust you longer, than that you should borrow of another to pay him, you may continue his debtor, till you can pay him without borrowing, but if he be either poor or unwilling to bear with you, and another that is able be willing to venture, you may better borrow of another to pay him. But if they be all equally unwilling to stand to any hazard by you, then you must rather continue in the first man's debt, because if you wrong another you will commit another sin: nay, you cannot borrow in such a case, because it is supposed that the other will not lend, when he knoweth your case. And you must not at all conceal it from him.

Object. But it may be my ruin to open my full state to another.

Answ. You must not live upon cheating and thievery to prevent your ruin: and what can it be less to get another man's money against his will, if you hide your case, which if he knew he would not lend it you.

Object. But what if I tell him plainly, that I will pay him certainly by borrowing of another, though I cannot pay him for mine own, and though I be not like to pay the last?

Answ. If you truly thus open your case to every one that you borrow of, you may take it, if they will lend it; for then you have their consent: and it is supposed, that every one is willing to run the hazard of being the last creditor.

Quest. IX. May I lend upon pledges, pawns, or mortgages for my security?

Answ. Yes, so you take not that from a poor man for a pledge, which is necessary to his livelihood and maintenance: as the bed which he should lie on, the clothes which he should wear, or the tools which he should work with; and be not cruel on pretence of mercy.

Quest. X. May I take the forfeiture and keep a pledge or mortgage upon covenants?

Answ. If it be among merchants and rich men, an act of merchandise, and not of mere security for money lent, then it is another case: as if they make a bargain thus, Take this jewel or this land for your money; and it shall be yours if I pay you not at such a day: I am willing to stand to the hazard of uncertainty; if I pay you not, suppose it is for my own commodity, and not through disability. In this case it is lawful to take the forfeiture, or detain the thing. But if it be properly but a pledge to secure the money, then the final intent is but that your money may be repaid; and you may not take the advantage of breaking a day, to take that from another which is none of your own. Justice will allow you only to take so much as your money came to, and to give the overplus (if there be any) to the debtor. And mercy will require you rather to forgive the debt, than to keep a pledge which he cannot spare, but to his ruin and misery, (as his food, his raiment, his tools, his house, &c.) unless you be in as great necessity as he.

Quest. XI. May I take the bond or promise of a third person as security for my money?

Answ. Yes, in case that other be able and willing to be responsible; for you have his own consent; but great caution should be used, that you take no man that is insufficient, from whom mercy forbiddeth you to take it, in case the principal debtor fail; unless you take his suretiship but in terrorem, resolving not to take it of him: and also that you faithfully tell the sureties that you must require it of them in case of non-payment, and therefore try whether indeed they are truly willing to pay it: for if they be such as truly presume that you will not take it of them, or will take it ill to be sued for it, you should not take their suretiship, unless you purpose not to seek it (except in necessity).

Quest. XII. Is it lawful to lend upon usury, interest, or increase?

Answ. This controversy hath so many full treatises written on it, that I cannot expect that so few words as I must lay out upon it should satisfy the studious reader. All the disputes about the name of usury I pass by; it being, The receiving any additional gain as due for money lent, which is commonly meant by the word, and which we mean in the question. For the questions, Whether we may bargain for it, or tie the debtor to pay it? Whether we may take it after his gain as partaking in it, or before? Whether we must partake also in the loss, if the debtor be a loser? with other such like, are but subsequent to the main question, Whether any gain (called use) may be taken by the lender as his due for the money lent? My judgment is as followeth.

 

I. There is some such gain or usury lawful and commendable. II. There is some such gain or usury unlawful and a heinous sin. I shall first give my reasons of the first proposition.

I. If all usury be forbidden it is either by the law of nature, or by some positive law of supernatural revelation: if the latter, it is either by some law of Moses, or by some law of Christ: if the former, it is either as against the rule of piety to God, or against justice or charity to men. That which is neither a violation of the natural laws of piety, justice, or charity; nor against the supernaturally revealed laws of Moses or of Christ, is not unlawful. But there is some usury which is against none of all these; ergo there is some usury which is not unlawful.

I will first lay you down the instances of such usury, and then prove it. There is a parcel of land to be sold for a thousand pounds, which is worth forty pounds per annum, and hath wood on it worth a thousand pounds (some such things we have known): John N. is willing to purchase it; but he hath a poor neighbour, T. S. that hath no money, but a great desire of the bargain. J. N. loving his neighbour as himself, and desiring his wealth, lendeth him the thousand pounds upon usury for one year. T. S. buyeth the land, and selleth the wood for the same money, and repayeth it in a year, and so hath all the land for almost nothing; as if J. N. had purchased the land and freely given it him, after a year or two; the gift had been the same.

Object. Here you suppose the seller wronged by selling his land almost for nothing.

Answ. 1. That is nothing at all to the present case, but a different case by itself. 2. I can put many cases in which such a sale may be made without any wrong to the seller: as when it is done by some prince, or state, or noble and liberal person, purposely designing the enriching of the subjects, or after a war, as lately in Ireland. So that the question is, whether J. N. may not give T. S. a thousand or eight hundred pounds' worth of land, taking a year's rent first out of the land, or a year's use for the money, which cometh to the same sum.

Another: a rich merchant trading into the East Indies, having five thousand pounds to lay out upon his commodities in traffic, when he hath laid out four thousand five hundred pounds, lendeth in charity the other five hundred pounds to one of his servants to lay out upon a commodity, which when it cometh home will be worth two thousand pounds; and offereth him to secure the carriage with his own; requiring only the use of his money at six per cent. Here the taking of thirty pounds' use, is but the giving him one thousand four hundred and seventy pounds, and is all one with deducting so much of the gift.

Another instance: certain orphans having nothing left them but so much money as will by the allowed use of it find them bread and poor clothing; the guardian cannot lay it out in lands for them; and if he maintain them upon the stock, it will be quickly spent, and he must answer for it: a rich man that is their neighbour tradeth in iron works, (furnaces or forges,) or lead works, or other such commodities, in which he constantly getteth the double of the stock which he employeth, or at least twenty pounds or forty pounds in the hundred; the guardian dare not lend the money to any poor man, lest he break and never be able to pay it; therefore he lendeth it this rich man. And if he have it without usury, the poor orphans give the rich man freely twenty pounds or forty pounds a year, supposing their stock to be a hundred; if he take usury, the rich man doth but give the poor orphans some part of his constant gain.

Another instance: in a city or corporation where there is a rich trade of clothing or making silks, there is a stock of money given by legacy for the poor, and intrusted into the hands of the richest of the city, to trade with and give the poor the use of it: and there is another stock left to set up young beginners, who have not a stock to set up themselves; on condition that they give the third part of their gain to the poor, and at seven years' end resign the stock: the question is, Whether the poor should be without this use of their money, and let the rich go away with it? or whether they may take it?

Now I prove that such usury is not forbidden by God.

1. It is not forbidden us by the law of Moses: (1.) Because Moses's law never did forbid it: for, 1. It is expressly forbidden as an act of unmercifulness; and therefore forbidden only to the poor and to brethren, Exod. xxii. 25; Lev. xxv. 36, 37. Yea, when the poor are not named, it is the poor that are meant; because in that country they did not keep up stocks for merchandise or trading, but lent usually to the needy only: at least the circumstances of the several texts show, that it is only lending to the needy, and not lending to drive on any enriching trades, which is meant where usury is forbidden.157 2. And it is expressly allowed to be used to strangers, Deut. xxiii. 19, 20, to whom nothing unjust or uncharitable might be done; only such a measure of charity was not required towards them as unto brethren. And there were more merchants of strangers that traded with them in foreign commodities, than of Jews that fetched them home: so that the prohibition of usury is in the law itself restrained only to their lending to the poor; but in the prophets who do but reprove the sin, it is expressed without that limitation, partly because it supposeth the meaning of the law to be known, which the prophets did but apply, and partly because there was little or no lending used among the Jews, but to the needy as an act of charity.

(2.) And if it had been forbidden in Moses's law only, it would not extend to christians now; because the law of Moses, as such, is not in force: the matter of it is much of the law of nature indeed; but as Mosaical, it was proper to the Jews and proselytes, or at least extended not to the christian gentiles; as is plain in 2 Cor. iii. 7; Gal. iii. 19, 24; v. 3; Ephes. ii. 15; 1 Tim. i. 7; Heb. vii. 12, 16, 19. Moses's law as such never bound any other nations, but the proselytes that joined themselves to the Jews (nor was all the world obliged so to be proselyted as to take up their laws): much less do they bind us that are the servants of Christ, so long after the dissolution of their commonwealth. So much of them as are part of the law of nature, or of any positive law of Christ, or of the civil law of any state, are binding as they are such natural, christian, or civil laws. But not one of them as Mosaical: though the Mosaical law is of great use to help us to understand the law of nature in many particular instances, in which it is somewhat difficult to us.

2. There is no positive law of Christ forbidding all usury: as for Luke vi. 32, 35, it is plainly nothing to the case; for he saith not, Lend, looking for no gain or increase, but looking for nothing again. And the context showeth that the meaning must be one of these two; either, q. d. Lend not only to them that will lend to you again when you are in want; but even to the poor, that you can never hope to borrow of; or else, Lend not only to them that are able to pay you, and where your stock is secured, but to the needy where your money is hazarded; and though they will pay you if they are able, yet you have little or no hope that ever they should be able to repay: lend so, as to be willing to make a gift of it in case the borrower never repay it. And there is no other text that can be pretended against it in the New Testament.

3. And that the law of nature doth not forbid all usury, will appear by examining the several parts of it. The law of nature forbiddeth but three sorts of sins: 1. Those that are against piety to God. 2. Those that are against our own welfare. 3. Those that are against our neighbour's good: and that is, 1. Against justice. 2. Against charity. There is none that falleth not under some of these heads.

1. And that usury is not naturally evil as against piety to God; 2. Or as against ourselves, and our own welfare; I need not prove, because no reason nor reasonable person doth lay any such accusation against it. Though they that think it absolutely unlawful, say that it is consequently against God, as every violation of his law is. But that is nothing to the case.

3. Therefore there is no doubt but the whole controversy is resolved into this last question, Whether all usury be against justice or charity to our neighbour? Justice obligeth me to give him his own; charity obligeth me to give him more than his own, in certain cases, as one that love him as myself. That which is not against justice, may be against charity; but that which is against charity, is not always against justice strictly taken. And that which is an act of true charity, is never against justice; because he that giveth his neighbour more than his own, doth give him his own and more. There is a usury which is against justice and charity; there is a usury which is against charity, but not against mere justice; and there is a usury which is against neither justice nor charity. If I prove it charitable it is superfluous to say more.

All the instances before given are notoriously charitable. That which is for the preservation of the lives and comforts of the poor, and of orphans, or for the enriching of my neighbour, is an act of charity; but such is some usury, past all doubt, as is before declared. Where the contrary is an act of cruelty, the usury is not against charity, but for it. For the rich to deny to the poor and orphans a part of that gain, which they make by the improvement of their own money, is oppression and cruelty; if it be cruel to let a beggar die or starve, when we should feed and clothe him of our own; much more to let the poor and orphans starve and perish rather than give them the increase of their own, or part of it at least. As for them that say, It may be as well improved otherwise, they are unexperienced men; it is a known falsehood as to the most, though some few may meet with such opportunities. At least it is nothing to them that cannot have other ways of improving it; who are very many.

Moreover, when it is not an act of charity, yet it may be not against charity in these cases: 1. When the lender is poor and the borrower rich; yea, it may be a sin to lend it freely. "He that oppresseth the poor to increase his riches, and he that gives to the rich, shall surely come to want," Prov. xxii. 16. It is a giving to the rich to lend freely that money which they improve to the increase of their riches. 2. When the lender is not obliged to that act of charity, though the borrower be poorer than himself. Which falleth out in a hundred cases; and may be comprised under this one general, When the lender is obliged to expend that same money in some other greater, better work: as at the same time while a man that is worth but twenty pounds a year, is in debt to a man that hath a thousand pounds a year, there may be a hundred or a thousand poor people worth nothing, ready to perish, whom the rich is rather bound to succour, than him that hath but twenty pounds a year. And there may be works of piety (as to set up a school, or promote the preaching of the gospel) which may be as great as either. And the richest that is, cannot do all the good that is to be done, nor relieve all the persons that are in want; therefore when he must leave much undone, if he would give all his substance, it is (cæteris paribus) a sin, to give that to a man that can make shift without it, and pass by a hundred in much deeper necessity and distress; so that he who either exerciseth charity in his usury, or doth nothing against charity and justice, certainly sinneth not by that usury. For all the scriptures which speak against usury, speak against it as a cruel or uncharitable thing.

 

Object. But it is sometimes necessary for a law to forbid that which otherwise would be good, when it cannot be done, without encouraging others to a greater evil; such as ordinary usury is; and then that law must be observed.

Answ. This is true in thesi, that such cases there are; but it is unproved and untrue in this case; for, 1. There is no such law. 2. There is no such reason or necessity of such a law. For God can as well make laws against unrighteous or uncharitable increase or usury, without forbidding that which is charitable and just, as he can make laws against unrighteous or uncharitable buying or selling without condemning that which was good and just; or as he can forbid gluttony, drunkenness, idleness, pride, without forbidding eating, drinking, apparel, or riches. He can easily tell men of whom and in what case to take use, and when not.

He that would see all other objections answered, and the case fully handled, hath many treatises on both sides extant to inform him.

II. That there is a sort of usury which is evil I know of no man that doubteth, and therefore need not stand to prove.

Quest. When is usury sinful?

Answ. As is before said, When it is against either justice or charity. 1. When it is like cheating bargaining, which under pretence of consent and a form of justice doth deceive or oppress, and get from another that which is not truly ours but his. 2. When you lend for increase where charity obligeth you to lend freely; even as it is a sin to lend expecting your own again, when charity obligeth you to give it. 3. When you uncharitably exact that which your brother is disabled utterly to pay, and use cruelty to procure it (be it the use or the principal). 4. When you allow him not such a proportion of the gain as his labour, hazard, or poverty doth require; but because the money is yours, will live at ease upon his labours. 5. When in case of his losses you rigorously exact your due without that abatement, or forgiving debts, (whether use or principal,) which humanity and charity require. In a word, when you are selfish, and do not as, according to true judgment, you may desire to be done by, if you were in his case.

Quest. But when am I bound to exercise this charity in not taking use?

Answ. As I said before, 1. Whenever you have no more urgent, and necessary, and excellent work, to lay out that money on, which you are so to receive. 2. Yea, though another work may be in itself better, (as to relieve many poorer, better men with that money,) yet when you cannot take it, without the utter undoing of the debtor, and bringing him into as bad a case, as any single person whom you would relieve, it is the safer side to leave the other unrelieved, (unless it be a person on whom the public good much dependeth,) rather than to extort your own from such a one to give another. Because that which you cannot get without a scandalous appearance of cruelty, is quoad jus in re not yours to give, till you can better get possession of it; and therefore God will not expect that you should give it to another.

In all this I imply that as you must prefer the lives of others in giving alms, before your own conveniences and comforts, and must not say, I cannot spare it, when your necessity may spare it, though not your pleasure; so also in taking use of those that you are bound to show charity to, the same rule and proportions must be observed in your charity.

Note also, that in all this it appeareth, that the case is but gradually different, between taking the use and taking the principal. For when the reason for remitting is the same, you are as well bound to remit the principal as the use.

But this difference there is, that many a man of low estate may afford to lend freely to a poorer man for a little time, who cannot afford to give it. And prudence may direct us to choose one man to lend freely to for a time, because of his sudden necessity, when yet another is fitter to give it to.

Quest. XIII. Is lending a duty? If so, must I lend to all that ask me, or to whom?

Answ. Lending is a duty, when we have it, and our brother's necessity requireth it, and true prudence telleth us, that we have no better way to lay it out, which is inconsistent with that. And therefore rich men ordinarily should both lend and give as prudence shall direct. But there is an imprudent and so a sinful lending: as, 1. When you will lend that which is another's, and you have no power to lend. 2. When you lend that which you must needs require again, while you might easily foresee that the borrower is not like to pay. Lend nothing but what you have either great probability will be repaid, or else which you are willing to give in case the debtor cannot or will not pay; or at least when suing for it will not have scandalous and worse effects than not lending. For it is very ordinary when you come to demand it and sue for it, to stir up the hatred of the debtor against you, and to make him your enemy, and to break his charity by your imprudent charity; in such a case, if you are obliged to relieve him, give him so much as you can spare, rather than lend him that which you cannot spare, but must sue for. In such cases, if charity go not without prudence, nor prudence without charity, you may well enough see when to lend, and how much.

Quest. XIV. Is it lawful to take upon usury in necessity, when the creditor doth unjustly or unmercifully require it?

Answ. Not in case that the consequents (by encouraging sin or otherwise) be like to do more hurt, than the money will do you good. Else, it is lawful when it is for your benefit; as it is lawful to take part of your wages for your work, or part of the worth of your commodity, when you cannot have the whole; and as it is lawful to purchase your rights of an enemy, or your life of a thief; as is aforesaid. A man may buy his own benefit of an unrighteous man.

Quest. XV. Doth not contracting for a certain sum of gain, make usury to be in that case unlawful, which might lawfully be taken of one that is free?

Answ. Yes, in case that contracting determine an uncertain case without sufficient cause: as if you agree, that whether the borrower gain or lose, and be poor or rich, I will have so much gain; that is, whether it prove merciful or unmerciful, I will have it. But then in that case, if it so prove unmerciful, it may not be taken without contracting, if freely offered. No contract may tie the debtor to that which is against justice or charity; and no contract may absolutely require that which may prove uncharitable; unless there be a tacit condition or exception of such a case implied. Otherwise I see no scripture or reason, why a contract altereth the case, and may not be used to secure that increase which is neither unrighteous nor unmerciful: it may be the bond of equity, but not of iniquity. As in case of a certain gain by the borrower, a certain use may be contracted for; and in case of uncertain gain to the borrower, a conditional contract may be made. Yea, in case of merchandise, where men's poverty forbiddeth not such bargains, I see not but it is lawful to sell a greater uncertain gain, for a smaller certain gain; and so to make the contracts absolute (as Amesius Cas. Consc. on this question showeth). As all oppression and unmercifulness must be avoided, and all men must do as they would (judiciously) be done by; so it is a bad thing to corrupt religion, and fill the world with causeless scruples, by making that a sin which is no sin. Divines that live in great cities and among merchandise, are usually fitter judges in this case, than those that live more obscurely (without experience) in the country.

Tit. 5. Cases of Conscience about Lusory Contracts

Quest. 1. Is it lawful to lay wagers upon the credit or confidence of one another's opinions or assertions in discourse? As e. g. I will lay you so much that I am in the right?

Answ. Yes, if these three things concur: 1. That the true end of the wager is, to be a penalty to him that shall be guilty of a rash and false assertion, and not to gratify the covetousness of the other. 2. That it be no greater a sum than can be demanded and paid, without breach of charity, or too much hurt to the loser (as above the proportion of his error). 3. That it be no other but what both parties are truly willing to stand to the loss of, if either of them lose, and that beforehand they truly seem so willing to each other.

157Exod. xx. 21, "Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him." Exod. xxiii. 9, "Thou shalt not oppress a stranger," &c. So that usury to a stranger was no oppression.