Za darmo

The Journal of Negro History, Volume 4, 1919

Tekst
Autor:
0
Recenzje
Oznacz jako przeczytane
Czcionka:Mniejsze АаWiększe Aa

Further consideration regarding these seizures was postponed indefinitely by the 15th article of the commercial treaty entered into between the United Provinces and England in September, 1662.240 In accordance with its provisions the ships which the Dutch had seized on the African coast were included in the lists of damages which the English submitted against the United Provinces. Thereafter the ships formed no important part in the negotiations between the two nations.

Thus far the Company of Royal Adventurers which had sent out the expedition under Captain Robert Holmes had not been more active on the Gold Coast than numerous private traders of England. The seizure of ships by the Dutch had been a matter of much apprehension to all the traders on the coast, but from now on it mainly concerned the Royal Adventurers. The company was anxious to establish new forts and factories in Africa in order to build up a lucrative trade. Its agents therefore began to erect a lodge at Tacorary, a village not far from Cape Corse. The Dutch, although they had not succeeded in recovering Cape Corse from the natives, considered that the fort and the surrounding territory belonged to them. On May 24, 1662, they bade the English to desist from further invasion of their rights at Tacorary or any other place under Dutch obedience.241 The English, however, disregarded the Dutch protest and notwithstanding their opposition the factory was completed.242 In less than a month from this time the natives drove the Dutch out of their factory in Comany.243 Thereupon the Dutch determined to continue even more vigorously their policy of blockading the whole coast and, by cutting off the trade of the natives with the English, to force the Negroes into subjection and to recover Comany and the fort at Cape Corse.

In October, 1662, two ships of the Royal Adventurers, the "Charles" and the "James," were prevented from trading to Komenda by the "Golden Lyon" and two other Dutch men-of-war.244 When asked as to the reason for this interruption of trade the Dutch general, Dirck Wilree, replied that he had caused the ports of Comany and Cape Corse to be blockaded until the natives rendered satisfaction for the injuries which they had committed against the Dutch.245 When the two English ships continued their effort to trade at Cape Corse and other villages, the "Golden Lyon" followed them from place to place, and on one occasion seized a small skiff which was attempting to land some goods. Discouraged at the treatment accorded to them the English officers finally gave up the attempt to trade on the Gold Coast, and returned home with their ships, after delivering to the Dutch a solemn protest against the injuries which they had suffered.246

When Secretary Williamson informed Sir George Downing of the misfortunes of the two ships, "Charles" and "James," and asked him to interfere in behalf of the Royal Company at The Hague, Downing promised to do what he could, but since he was so well acquainted with the Dutch method of treating such complaints he did not anticipate favorable results. "God help them," he declared, "if they (the Royal Company) depend upon paper relief." With the duke of York at the head of the Company and the king as well as many of his courtiers greatly concerned in its welfare, he considered that it would be well cared for. "Whatever injuries the Dutch do them," he exclaimed, "let them be sure to do the Dutch greater, & then let me alone to mediate between them, but without this all other wayes will signify not a rush."247

Downing demanded of the States General whether Dirck Wilree had been given any authority to blockade the entire coasts of Comany and to forbid all English trade with the natives.248 In this way he hoped either to have the States General disavow Wilree's action or to raise the question whether the West India Company had a right to institute such a blockade. In letters to Clarendon and Bennet, Downing maintained that the Dutch were accustomed both in West Africa and in the East Indies, to declare war on the natives and to cut them off from all trade with foreigners until they agreed to sell their goods only to the Dutch. Downing declared that the English had already lost a great deal of trade on account of such impositions, and that if they were continued the East India and African companies would be ruined. "Pay them in their own kind & sett their subjects a crying as well as his Majties, & you will have a very faire correspondence, & they will take heed what they doe, and his Majtie shall be as much honored & loved here as he hath been dispised, for they love nor honor none but them that they thinck both can & dare bite them."249 After urging the king to take immediate action concerning their ships the members of the Royal Company requested Downing "to drive the States to the most positive reply." They declared that any answer would, at least, expedite matters, and "if those states will owne that Wilrey had their orders to warrant his action, wee will hope, it may begett some parelel resolution of state here. If they disclaim it, and leave their West India Company to be responcible, they will send us to a towne where there is noe house, unlesse wee pay ourselves, per legem talionis."250

In answer to Downing's memorial concerning the "Charles" and the "James" the West India Company confined itself to a justification of Wilree's actions, and omitted to say anything about the authority by which they had been committed.251 Although Downing insisted that a definite answer be given him on this point, the States General also evaded the issue by maintaining that nothing had been done by the company but what justice and necessity required. They supported the company in its contention that Cape Corse and Comany were effectually blockaded, and therefore the ships "Charles" and "James" had no right to trade there.252

 

Such a justification of the West India Company's actions could scarcely be satisfactory to Downing or to those in charge of foreign affairs in England. The Royal Company was very much concerned also lest the Dutch would continue to interrupt the ships which it sent to the Gold Coast. To add to this adverse condition news arrived that, about the first of June, 1663,253 the Dutch had at last succeeded in regaining possession of Cape Corse. At this there was much satisfaction in Holland. Downing wrote that since the Dutch now had the two important castles of Elmina and Cape Corse, commanding the most important trade in all Guinea, they intended to prohibit all other nations from trading to that region.254 Over this turn of events there was great disappointment among the members of the Royal Company, who had confidently expected to obtain Cape Corse from the natives. In fact, they had intended to make Cape Corse their main stronghold and at that place establish their principal trade.255

Charles II decided that it was time to come to the assistance of the Royal Company, and on September 5, 1663, he lent three of his ships to it for a voyage to Africa.256 Later, he also ordered several additional royal vessels commanded by Sir Robert Holmes to accompany these ships. The preparation and departure of the fleet was short and remained a close secret with the officials immediately concerned.

The king instructed Holmes to protect the company's agents, ships, goods, and factories from all injury; and to secure a free trade with the natives. Also, he declared, "If (upon consultacon with such commandrs as are there present) you judge yourself strong enough to maintaine the right of his Matie's subjects by force, you are to do it, and to kill, sink, take, or destroy such as oppose you, & to send home such ships as you shall so take." If the two ships "Golden Lyon" and "Christiana," the first of which was the chief assailant of the company's ships "Charles" and "James" in November, 1662, were encountered. Holmes was instructed to seize them. All other ships which had committed such injuries on the vessels of the Royal Company257 were likewise to be seized and taken to England. On his arrival at the mouth of the Gambia River in January, 1664, Holmes discovered that since his visit in 1661 the relations of the Dutch and English had been anything but friendly. The English commander on Charles Island had given Petro Justobaque and other Dutch factors from Cape Verde permission to trade up and down the river. Holmes heard that they had endeavored to stir up the native king of Barra against the English in December, 1661.258 On the 21st of June, 1662, Justobaque with a ship again appeared on the Gambia. In order to compel him to recognize the English rights on the river, the English commander at James Island fired at the ship. The Dutch ship paid no heed to the demand of the English and returned the fire until it was a safe distance away. A few days later when returning to Cape Verde the English shot away the main mast of the Dutch ship, but Justobaque managed to escape.259

Although these incidents had happened more than a year and a half before Holmes' arrival at James Island, he was incensed at the actions of the Dutch. When it was reported to him that a large Dutch vessel had arrived at Cape Verde, he assumed that it was the "Golden Lyon" which had sailed from Holland about the same time as he had departed from England. Several English ships were expected on the Gambia and for fear of their capture by the "Golden Lyon," Holmes sailed at once for Cape Verde where, according to his statement, without any provocation he was fired upon by the Dutch. Holmes returned the fire, and after suffering some damage withdrew from the attack. On the following morning he was surprised, he declared, to see that the Dutch had hung out a white flag and were sending a boat to him offering to surrender the fort. He called a council which, after considering the former hazards of the English trade on the Gambia, decided "that the better to protect our trade for a tyme and sooner to bring in Hollander's West India Compa to adjust our nation's damages sustained by them, and to that end we accepted the surrender of that place."260

Holmes' explanation of the taking of Cape Verde, although simple and direct, is probably incomplete. His whole career shows him to have been a man who was likely to take the initiative, so that it is not surprising to learn from the depositions of various Dutchmen that, previous to the battle of Cape Verde, Holmes had seized two Dutch vessels, and that after receiving an unfavorable reply to his demand to surrender, Holmes attacked the fort at Cape Verde, which capitulated together with several Dutch vessels.261

From the conflicting statements made by the Dutch and the English it is difficult to ascertain the truth regarding the events immediately preceding the attack on Cape Verde, but the fact remains that Holmes had obtained a number of Dutch vessels and was master of one of their most important forts on the west coast of Africa. Since he had discovered the ease with which the Dutch possessions could be seized, Holmes next set out down the coast toward Elmina. On the way he despoiled the Dutch factory at Sestos, on the pretext that at that place the Dutch had stirred up the natives against the English.262 Shortly afterwards, he encountered and captured the "Golden Lyon" which had added to its notorious career by preventing the "Mary," a ship belonging to the Royal Adventurers, from trading on the Gold Coast in March, 1663.263 Finally he seized the Dutch factory at Anta, on the ground that it was commanded by the former captain of the "Christiana," one of the Dutch ships designated for seizure in the king's instructions.264

Before leaving the Gambia, Holmes had been apprised of what had taken place on the Gold Coast since the Dutch had captured Cape Corse in June, 1663. After the Dutch had taken possession of this fortress General Valckenburg despatched a very strong protest to the chief English factory at Kormentine, in which he maintained that the Dutch had a right to the exclusive possession of the whole Gold Coast by reason of their conquest of the Portuguese. He required the English to leave the lodge which they had recently built at Tacorary and demanded that they refrain from all trade on the Gold Coast. He even had the temerity to claim that the English had injured the Dutch trade at Cape Corse and Tacorary to the extent of sixty marks of gold per month, and that the Dutch had lost one thousand marks on account of the interference of English ships such as the "Charles" and the "James."265

 

In answer to Valckenburg's sweeping assertions Francis Selwin, the English chief at Kormentine, and John Stoakes, commander of one of the English ships, replied that the English had more right to Cape Corse and other places on the Gold Coast than the Dutch, because they had first settled and fortified Cape Corse with the consent of the natives in 1649.266 As a further indication that they were not intimidated by the hostile attitude of Valckenburg the English commenced to build another factory at Anashan in the Fantin region. In September, 1663, this brought forth another vigorous protest from Valckenburg, who declared that he would not tolerate the continuance of this factory.267 By way of enforcing these threats the Dutch prevented the "Sampson," another ship belonging to the Royal Adventurers, from engaging in any trade at the factory of Komenda.268 Thereupon Stoakes declared that, although the English greatly desired to live in peace with the Dutch, they would not under any circumstances abandon their factory at Anashan.269

At this time the English had factories and settlements at Kormentine, Komenda, Tacorary, Anto, Anashan, Ardra, and Wiamba. The forts and lodges of the two companies were all located within a few miles of one another and for either company to increase the number of its settlements only made the instances of friction between them more numerous.270 It seemed that whichever company was able to overcome the other would be sure to do so. It was under these circumstances that Sir Robert Holmes made his appearance on the Gold Coast. The fact that the Dutch had laid claim to the whole Gold Coast was sufficient excuse for his interference, although, if we may believe the Dutch version, Holmes exceeded their claims by reasserting the English right to the whole of the west coast of Africa, as he had done at Cape Verde in 1661.271

Be this as it may, according to Holmes' account, Captain Cubitt of the Royal Company endeavored to induce Valckenburg to come to an amicable adjustment of the troubles on the Gold Coast. Holmes expected that his previous seizures would induce such a settlement, but Valckenburg obstinately refused Holmes' demand to evacuate Cape Corse.272 Since he had failed to intimidate the Dutch, Holmes sailed to Cape Corse where he visited the Danish fort of Fredericksburg. The Dutch fired at him from Cape Corse, an act which Holmes regarded as the beginning of war.273 He called a council of officers and factors of the Royal Company on May 7, 1664, where, after considering "theire (the Dutch) unjust possessing of that very castle of Cape Coast indubitably ours, … wee then resolved att that councell … for the better securitye of that trade, our interest in that countrye, and to regaine our nacion's rights, to reduce that castle of Cape Coast wch accordingly succeeded."274 On pretexts of much the same character Holmes seized the Dutch factories of Agga and Anamabo, together with several ships. By this time the Dutch were stripped of all their settlements on the African coast except the main fortress of Elmina. In finishing his account of the expedition Holmes blandly remarked, "I hope I have nott exceeded my instructions, they being to concerve our comerce."

Since it is not essential to follow Holmes across the Atlantic to New Amsterdam one may return to the negotiations which were proceeding in Europe subsequent to his departure from England. So closely had the secret of Holmes' expedition to Africa been guarded that it is even doubtful if Sir George Downing at The Hague was aware of it.275 As far as the purpose of the voyage was concerned nothing could have been nearer the advice which he had been urging for months. Moreover, Downing was not alone in his opinion that negotiation regarding affairs in Africa would be fruitless. The Danish resident at The Hague, Carisius, who was pressing the Danish claims for the possession of Cape Corse, confessed to Downing that nothing could be obtained from the Dutch unless it was "attended with some thing that was reall & did bite."276 Since this was the case Downing pointed out that the Danish fort at Fredericksburg would probably fall into the hands of the Dutch. To avoid this misfortune he advised the Royal Company to induce the Danes to transfer Fredericksburg to it, granting them in return a free commerce at that place. As the Royal Company did not see fit to follow this suggestion277 Downing began to form other plans. In order that Carisius might continue to worry the Dutch with his claims Downing submitted a memorial to the States General protesting against the Dutch treatment of the Danes in Guinea.278 Indeed he was so friendly toward the Danish pretensions that the king of Denmark sent him a special letter thanking him for his services.279

In the main, however, Downing was persistently urging the Dutch to make a settlement of the cases of the Royal Company's two ships, the "Charles" and the "James," and of the right of the Dutch to blockade the Gold Coast on the pretext of war with the natives. In December, 1663, at the instigation of the West India Company, the States General maintained that only a few ships were necessary to blockade the small native states on the Gold Coast, since in each case there were but one or two outlets to the sea.280 On February 1, 1664, Downing obtained a conference with DeWitt and the representatives of the States General and the West India Company. The company's representatives boldly admitted that they had hindered the English ships from trading at Komenda and Cape Corse, because the natives had burned their factory at the former place and had seized their fortress at Cape Corse. This irritating assumption of their ownership of Cape Corse aroused Downing. So far, he had contented himself in supporting the Danish and even the Swedish claims to Cape Corse. Now, notwithstanding the inconsistency of his position, he remarked that, if it was a question of the ownership of Cape Corse, the English could show more rights to the place than any one, since they had been the first to settle it and to trade there; and that even if the Dutch were in possession of it, the English still had a right to trade to the Danish fort of Fredericksburg which was located in the same harbor.281

When the discussion turned on the requirements of an effective blockade the Dutch advocate stoutly maintained that "it is nott for any other to prescribe how and in what manner the company shall proceed to retake their places, that if they think that the riding with a few shipps before a place and that att certaine times onely whereby to hinder other nations from trading with it, be a sufficient meanes for the retaking thereof, they have no reason to be att further charge or trouble." He further declared that a certain sickness in that region, known as "Serenes," caused by the falling dew, made it impossible for Europeans to engage in a blockade by land, and therefore "in this case itt was to be counted sufficient and to be called a besieging, though the place were onely blocked up by sea."282 Downing scoffed at this as an unheard of theory and asked what would happen if the Royal Company instituted blockades of this character and pretended "Serenes" whenever it seemed convenient. With such a display of feeling it is no wonder little could be done toward adjusting the difficulties. DeWitt suggested a new treaty for the regulation of such affairs both in Europe and abroad. Downing flatly refused to consider such a proposition if it was meant thereby to dispose of the cases of the "Charles" and the "James." He remained firm in his demand for reparation for these two ships.283 A few days after this conference Downing learned of the misfortunes which had befallen the Royal Company's ship, the "Mary," during the previous year. On February 16, he apprised the States General of this additional cause for complaint and demanded satisfaction as in the case of the other two vessels284.

If Downing was becoming exasperated, the people in England were scarcely less so when they heard of the troubles of the "Mary" and other similar occurrences. Secretary Cunaeus declared that the animosity in England towards Holland was growing exceedingly among the common people. Led by the duke of York, governor of the Royal Company, the courtiers had also become exceedingly indignant at the treatment accorded the company's ships and factories in Africa285. One of Valckenburg's statements regarding the Dutch ownership of the Gold Coast had been circulated on the Royal Exchange, where it became the chief topic of conversation. Indeed so great was the sensation it stirred up that Samuel Pepys declared on April 7, 1664, that everybody was expecting a war286. On the 21st of April the members of the House of Commons resolved that the damages inflicted by the Dutch in India, Africa, and elsewhere constituted a very great obstruction to English trade. They, therefore, petitioned the king for redress for these various injuries, and promised to support any action he took with their lives and fortunes.

At last the Dutch realized that the African situation was becoming serious, and Downing therefore found it somewhat easier to bring them to a discussion of the subject. DeWitt proposed that the case of the three Royal Company's ships as well as that of two East India ships, the "Bona Esperanza" and the "Henry Bonaventure," should be included in the list of damages provided for by the treaty of September, 1662. Downing absolutely refused to consider such a makeshift on the ground that the ships of the Royal Company had been injured after the treaty had been signed, and therefore in accordance with its provisions these losses should be submitted to the Netherlands for compensation.287

Since he had failed to induce Downing to permit the three ships to be included in the list of damages, DeWitt had exhausted the last means of delay. On May 6, 1664, Downing announced in letters to Bennet and Clarendon that DeWitt had at last consented to accommodate the matter of the three ships. He was willing, moreover, to enter into an agreement, for the prevention of all such future troubles, along the lines which Downing had laid down. Regarding the two East India ships, however, whose case was quite different from those of the Royal Company, DeWitt would not alter his stubborn refusal of compensation. Downing was intent on gaining a complete victory and at once rejoined that no new commercial regulations could be considered until entire satisfaction had been rendered for the damages which the Dutch had committed.288

Although an attempt was made to suppress the first tidings of Holmes' actions on the Gambia, the rumor of them soon spread. It was not long until it was well known in London and Amsterdam that he had taken Cape Verde and captured several Dutch vessels.289 The West India Company bitterly accused the English of having covered their designs in Africa with a cloak of complaints regarding the Royal Company's ships. The company reminded the States General that this was the same Holmes who, in 1661, had set up a claim to the whole coast and who was to have been exemplarily punished on his return by the king of England. Since it was evident that all the Dutch factories and forts in Guinea were in danger of capture from Holmes, the company asked the States General for some vessels of war which should be sent to the African coast for the protection of its property290.

It was now the turn of the Dutch to seek compensation and restitution of their property. Since Downing was a very exasperating man with whom to deal they were undoubtedly pleased when toward the end of May, 1664, he suddenly returned to England291. The Dutch, therefore, decided to send VanGogh to London, with the hope that he could obtain more satisfactory results there than had ever been possible with Downing at The Hague. VanGogh was instructed to seek for the restitution of the West India Company's property; to remind the king of the unfulfilled promises which he had made regarding Holmes and the voyage of 1661;292 and to seek for new commercial regulations which would prevent future trouble on the African coast293.

Very soon after his arrival in England VanGogh gained an audience with the king who, in reply to his demands, answered that as yet his knowledge of the Holmes' affair was very imperfect; that he had not given Holmes orders to seize Cape Verde; and that in case he had exceeded his instructions he would be punished upon his return, according to the exigency of the case294. Such a reply sounded too much like the king's former promise of August 14, 1661, to satisfy DeWitt. He instructed VanGogh to insist that his Majesty make these promises in writing295. VanGogh answered DeWitt that it was hopeless to think of inducing the English to return Cape Verde, in view of the preparations then in progress for carrying on trade to the west coast of Africa. He declared that already they were boasting in London that a contract was to be made with the Spanish for the delivery of 4,000 slaves per annum296. As early as the middle of June the Royal Company had eight ships loading in London with goods worth 50,000 pounds destined for the Guinea coast297.

In midsummer, 1664, Andries C. Vertholen and other Dutchmen, whom Holmes had carried from Cape Verde to the Gold Coast, returned to Holland, where they reported at length Holmes' actions at Cape Verde and on the way to the Gold Coast298. These details did not tend to DeWitt's peace of mind. Hence it is no wonder, upon Downing's return to Holland, that the two men "fell very hard upon the busines of Cabo Verde" in their very first conversation. As he had instructed VanGogh to do, so DeWitt demanded of Downing that the English king make a written promise that no more hostilities would be committed on the Guinea Coast, or the Dutch would be in duty bound to assist their company. Downing, who now felt the advantage which the success of Holmes' expedition gave him, replied to DeWitt as follows: "I must say," that the West India Company has "ever since his Majtye's return played the devills & pirats, worse thn Argiers, taken 20 English ships, hindered others, putt out a declaration whereby they claymed al the coast to thmselves; & was it lawfull for thm so to demean thmselves & only lawfull for the English to suffer, tht yet his Majty did not intermeddle, but only the one company against the other, & no wonder if at last the English did stirr a little; & tht Holms was the companye's servt & tht should his Majty have given or lent thm an old ship or two, yet he had nothing to doe in the ordering their designe." Furthermore, he declared that if the Dutch took it upon themselves to assist the West India Company "his Majty would find himself equally obliged to assist his company."299

To every one it now seemed as if an open conflict must come. Toward the last of July, Pepys declared that all the talk was of a Dutch war,300 although even Coventry, a director of the Royal Company, admitted that there was little real cause for it and that the damage done to the company, which had brought on Holmes' expedition, did not exceed the paltry sum of two or three hundred pounds.301 In Holland, also, the disposition toward war was increased by the realization that the next report from Holmes might bring news of the total loss of the Gold Coast, including the main fortress of Elmina. Under these circumstances the king's promise to punish Holmes according to the exigency of the case meant little or nothing. The maritime provinces, especially Holland, were determined to assist the West India Company against English aggression in Africa.

When Downing discussed the situation with DeWitt, however, he was surprised to hear him still express the possibility of giving satisfaction for the seizure of the Royal Company's ships, and not "so hott" for sending a fleet immediately to Guinea as he had been at first.302 Even Downing was for the time being deceived. His spy, who was well within DeWitt's immediate circle, for once was not on duty to give his usual faithful report to his benefactor. DeWitt was accustomed to resort to the same trickery and deceitful diplomacy that was so characteristic of Downing. Indeed it would be difficult to decide which of these two men was the greater master of this questionable art. The English had sent Holmes to Africa totally unknown to the Dutch and had taken half the coast from them before they were even aware of the expedition. It is little wonder then that the idea occurred to DeWitt to retaliate in kind on the English and to keep his plans a profound secret.

In 1661 the Dutch had sent a fleet under Admiral DeRuyter to the Mediterranean Sea in conjunction with an English squadron commanded by Sir John Lawson, for the purpose of punishing the Algerian and other pirates who had been infesting Dutch and English commerce. DeRuyter and Lawson had succeeded in making a number of favorable treaties with the pirates, though the task of quelling them was by no means complete. DeWitt realized that a fleet could scarcely be dispatched to Guinea from Holland without being discovered. Therefore, he together with six of his councillors decided to send secret orders to DeRuyter to sail at once for the coast of Guinea. On account of a peculiarity of the Dutch government, however, it was impossible to dispatch these orders without first securing a resolution of the States General. DeWitt was well aware that somehow these resolutions of the States General usually became known to Downing and the English. He therefore determined that, while the States General should pass the order, he would arrange the matter so that no one would know of it, except those who were already in the plan. On August 11, 1664, the secretary of the States General read the resolution very quickly, during which time DeWitt and his six cohorts raised so much disturbance by loud conversation that no one in the room heard what was being read.303 The trick succeeded admirably. DeWitt was now in possession of the necessary authority, and orders were dispatched at once to DeRuyter to leave his post in the Mediterranean and to sail for the west coast of Africa without revealing his destination to Lawson, the English commander. He was instructed to recover for the West India Company those places which Holmes had seized and to deliver to Valckenburg, the Dutch general on the Gold Coast, all the effects of the English which were not necessary for the different factories of the company.304

240Dumont, Corps Universel Diplomatique, VI, part 2, pp. 424, 425.
241Index op het Register en Accorden met de Naturellen, Wilree to Edmund Young, May 24, 1662 (N. S.).
242S. P., Holland, 176, f. 119.
243Add. MSS., 22,919, f. 262.
244Ibid., 22,920, f. 24, affidavit of William Crawford and others, before the Admiralty High Court, February 13, 1663/4.
245Ibid., 22,919, f. 262, Wilree to the officers of the ship James, November 9, 1662 (N. S.).
246Ibid., 22,920, f. 24, affidavit of Crawford and others, February 13, 1663/4.
247S. P., Holland, 167, f. 251, Downing to Williamson, September 11, 1663. O.S.
248Add. MSS., 22,920, ff. 13, 14, Downing to S. G., September 17/27, 1663.
249Clar. St. Paps., 106, f. 192, Downing to Clarendon, September 18, 1663. O. S.; S. P., Holland, 167, ff. 271, 272, Downing to Bennet.
250Add. MSS., 22,920, f. 22, Royal Company to Downing, September 25, 1663.
251Clar. St. Paps., 106, f. 223, Downing to Clarendon, October 2, 1663 O. S.
252S. P., Holland, 168, ff. 41, 42.
253Ibid., 176, f. 121.
254Ibid., 167, f. 284, Downing to Bennet, September 25, 1664 (O. S.).
255Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan den Raadpensionaris, Cunaeus to DeWitt, November 2, 1663 (N. S.).
256C. S. P., Col., 1661-1668, p. 159, warrant to duke of York, Sept. 5, 1663.
257S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, f. 53. These instructions are not preserved in their complete form.
258C. O. 1: 16, f. 157, oath of William Quick and others at Charles Island, June 1, 1662.
259C. O. 1: 18, f. 154, deposition of Stephen Ustick, June 7, 1664; S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, ff. 147, 148.
260S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, f. 148, Holmes' narrative. After taking the island Holmes sent for as many men as could be spared by the Royal Company's factors on the Gambia. Accordingly they took possession of it in the name of the company. C. O. 1: 18, f. 24.
261Aitzema, XI, 294, deposition of Andries C. Vertholen, June 9, 1664 (N. S.); Lias, West Indien, 1658 tot 1665, depositions, June 19 and July 19, 1664 (N. S.).
262C. O. 1: 18, f. 90, resolution of the council of war on board the Jersey, April 9, 1664.
263Loketkas, Staten Generaal, Engeland, deposition of John Denn, commander of the ship Mary, December 3, 1663 (O. S.).
264S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, f. 149, Holmes' narrative.
265S. P., Holland, 176, ff. 118-123, June 7, 1663 (N. S.). A mark of gold was supposed to be worth about £28. 16s.
266Index op het Register der Contracten, letters dated June 13, 14, 1663. 1663.
267S. P., Holland, 167, ff. 258-260, September 12, 1663. This protest with that of Valckenburg of June 7, 1663, was sent to England, where both were regarded as very important.
268C. O. 1: 17, ff. 153, 154, Mr. Brett to the Royal Company, August 31, 1663; Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten Generaal, Downing to S. G., September 15, 1664 (O. S.).
269Index op het Register der Contracten, September 17, 1663.
270C. O. 1: 17, ff. 153, 154, contains a number of extracts of letters from factors of the Royal Company to the company dated from June to September, 1663. They mention many other conflicts with the Dutch, including the charge that the Dutch had hired the natives to attack the fort at Kormentine.
271Aitzema, XI, 295, deposition of Andries C. Vertholen, June 9, 1664 (N. S.).
272C. O. 1: 18, f. 39, order of the council of war held on board the Jersey, May 7, 1664.
273S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, ff. 51, 52, Holmes' examination. In his examination before the Privy Council Holmes asserted that in one of the ships captured from the Dutch, orders had been found from the States General commanding the Dutch factors to seize the English fort at Kormentine. There is no evidence to support this assertion and the States General afterwards characterized the statement as "an errand invention & a fowle lye." S. P., Holland, 181, f. 10.
274S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, ff. 150, 151, Holmes' account; C. O. 1: 18, f. 39, order of the council of war held on board the Jersey, May 7, 1664.
275S. P., Holland, 174, f. 32, Downing to Bennet, January 10, 1664/5 (O. S.). This letter, written over a year later, shows that Downing was not acquainted with Holmes' instructions.
276Lister, Thomas Henry, Life and Administration of Edward, first Earl of Clarendon, III, 259, Downing to Clarendon, November 6, 1663 (O. S.).
277S. P., Holland, 168, f. 230, Downing to Bennet, December 18, 1663.
278Clar. St. Paps., 107, f. 101, Downing to S. G., February 8, 1663/4 (O. S.).
279Add. MSS., 22,920, f. 26, Schested to Downing, February 10, 1664; S. P., Denmark, 17, f. 150, Frederick III to Schested, December 15, 1663.
280Loketkas, Staten Generaal, Engeland, W. I. C. to S. G., read December 1, 1663 (N. S.); ibid., S. G. to Downing, December, 1663.
281S. P., Holland, 169, ff. 120, 121, Downing to (Bennet), February 12, 1663/4 (O. S.).
282Ibid., f. 121.
283Ibid., ff. 122, 124.
284S. P. Holland, 169, f. 132, Downing to S. G., February 16, 1663/4 (O. S.).
285Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en W. F., Cunaeus to DeWitt, March 11/21, 1664.
286Pepys, Diary, IV, 103; Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en W. F., Cunaeus to DeWitt, (April 8/18, 1664, N. S.).
287Clar. St. Paps., 107, f. 147, Downing to Clarendon, April 1, 1664 (O. S.); Dumont, Corps Universel Diplomatique, VI, part 2, p. 424, article XIV.
288S. P., Holland, 170, ff. 16-18, Downing to Bennet, May 6, 1664 (O. S.); Clar. St. Paps., 107, ff. 195, 196, Downing to Clarendon, May 6, 1664 (O. S.).
289Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en W. F., Cunaeus to DeWitt, May 6/16, 1664; Secretekas, Engeland, no. 123, Cunaeus to the directors of W.I.C., May 6/16, 1664.
290Secretekas, Engeland, no. 123, W. I. C. to S. G., May 23, 1664 (N. S.).
291S. P., Holland, 173, f. 129, Downing to Bennet, December 30, 1664 (O. S.).
292Resolution of S. G., June 13, 1664 (N. S.).
293Ibid., June 5, 1664 (N. S.).
294S. P., Holland, 171, f. 174, VanGogh to S. G., June 24/July 4, 1664.
295DeWitt, Brieven (DeWitt, Johan, Brieven, geschreven ende gewisselt tusschen den Heer Johan de Witt), IV, 311, DeWitt to VanGogh, July 11, 1664 (N. S.).
296Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en W. F., VanGogh to DeWitt, July 15/25, 1664.
297P. C. R., Charles II, 4: 122; S.P., Dom., Charles II, 99, f. 170, petition of the Royal Company for a convoy for its ships. It was also reported that the duke of York was fitting out a frigate at his own expense to send to Guinea. C. S. P., Dom., 1663-1664, p. 264, newsletter, September 2, 1663.
298S. P., Holland, 171, f. 238, W. I. C. to S. G., July 21, 1664 (N. S.).
299Clar. St. Paps., 108, ff. 39-41, Downing to Clarendon, July 22, 1664 (O. S.).
300Pepys, Diary, IV, 202.
301Ibid., 42, 143.
302Clar. St. Paps., 108, ff. 48, 49, Downing to Clarendon, July 29, 1664 (O. S.).
303Brandt, Gerard, La Vie de Michel de Ruiter, pp. 212-213.
304Brandt, Vie de Ruiter, pp. 213, 214, 217.