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The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 10

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Sir Robert WALPOLE replied:—Sir, the present business of this assembly is to examine the clause before us; but to deviate from so necessary an inquiry into loud exclamations against the whole bill, is to obstruct the course of the debate, to perplex our attention, and interrupt the senate in its deliberation upon questions, in the determination of which the security of the publick is nearly concerned.

The war, sir, in which we are now engaged, and, I may add, engaged by the general request of the whole nation, can be prosecuted only by the assistance of the seamen, from whom it is not to be expected that they will sacrifice their immediate advantage to the security of their country. Publick spirit, where it is to be found, is the result of reflection, refined by study and exalted by education, and is not to be hoped for among those whom low fortune has condemned to perpetual drudgery. It must be, therefore, necessary to supply the defects of education, and to produce, by salutary coercions, those effects which it is vain to expect from other causes.

That the service of the sailors will be set up to sale by auction, and that the merchants will bid against the government, is incontestable; nor is there any doubt that they will be able to offer the highest price, because they will take care to repay themselves by raising the value of their goods. Thus, without some restraint upon the merchants, our enemies, who are not debarred by their form of government from any method which policy can invent, or absolute power put in execution, will preclude all our designs, and set at defiance a nation superiour to themselves.

Sir John BARNARD then said:—Sir, I think myself obliged by my duty to my country, and by my gratitude to those by whose industry we are enriched, and by whose courage we are defended, to make, once more, a declaration, not against particular clauses, not against single circumstances, but against the whole bill; a bill unjust and oppressive, absurd and ridiculous; a bill to harass the industrious and distress the honest, to puzzle the wise and add power to the cruel; a bill which cannot be read without astonishment, nor passed without the violation of our constitution, and an equal disregard of policy and humanity.

All these assertions will need to be proved only by a bare perusal of this hateful bill, by which the meanest, the most worthless reptile, exalted to a petty office by serving a wretch only superiour to him in fortune, is enabled to flush his authority by tyrannising over those who every hour deserve the publick acknowledgments of the community; to intrude upon the retreats of brave men, fatigued and exhausted by honest industry, to drag them out with all the wantonness of grovelling authority, and chain them to the oar without a moment's respite, or perhaps oblige them to purchase, with the gains of a dangerous voyage, or the plunder of an enemy lately conquered, a short interval to settle their affairs, or bid their children farewell.

Let any gentleman in this house, let those, sir, who now sit at ease, projecting laws of oppression, and conferring upon their own slaves such licentious authority, pause a few moments, and imagine themselves exposed to the same hardships by a power superiour to their own; let them conceive themselves torn from the tenderness and caresses of their families by midnight irruptions, dragged in triumph through the streets by a despicable officer, and placed under the command of those by whom they have, perhaps, been already oppressed and insulted. Why should we imagine that the race of men for whom those cruelties are preparing, have less sensibility than ourselves? Why should we believe that they will suffer without complaint, and be injured without resentment? Why should we conceive that they will not at once deliver themselves, and punish their oppressors, by deserting that country where they are considered as felons, and laying hold on those rewards and privileges which no other government will deny them?

This is, indeed, the only tendency, whatever may have been the intention of the bill before us; for I know not whether the most refined sagacity can discover any other method of discouraging navigation than those which are drawn together in the bill before us. We first give our constables an authority to hunt the sailors like thieves, and drive them, by incessant pursuit, out of the nation; but lest any man should by friendship, good fortune, or the power of money, find means of staying behind, we have with equal wisdom condemned him to poverty and misery; and lest the natural courage of his profession should incite him to assist his country in the war, have contrived a method of precluding him from any advantage that he might have the weakness to hope from his fortitude and diligence. What more can be done, unless we at once prohibit to seamen the use of the common elements, or doom them to a general proscription.

It is just that advantage, sir, should be proportioned to the hazard by which it is to be obtained, and, therefore, a sailor has an honest claim to an advance of wages in time of war; it is necessary to excite expectation, and to fire ambition by the prospect of great acquisitions, and by this prospect it is that such numbers are daily allured to naval business, and that our privateers are filled with adventurers. The large wages which war makes necessary, are more powerful incentives to those whom impatience of poverty determines to change their state of life, than the secure gains of peaceful commerce; for the danger is overlooked by a mind intent upon the profit.

War is the harvest of a sailor, in which he is to store provisions for the winter of old age, and if we blast this hope, he will inevitably sink into indolence and cowardice.

Many of the sailors are bred up to trades, or capable of any laborious employment upon land; nor is there any reason for which they expose themselves to the dangers of a seafaring life, but the hope of sudden wealth, and some lucky season in which they may improve their fortunes by a single effort. Is it reasonable to believe that all these will not rather have recourse to their former callings, and live in security, though not in plenty, than encounter danger and poverty at once, and face an enemy without any prospect of recompense?

Let any man recollect the ideas that arose in his mind upon hearing of a bill for encouraging and increasing sailors, and examine whether he had any expectation of expedients like these. I suppose it was never known before, that men were to be encouraged by subjecting them to peculiar penalties, or that to take away the gains of a profession, was a method of recommending it more generally to the people.

But it is not of very great importance to dwell longer upon the impropriety of this clause, which there is no possibility of putting in execution. That the merchants will try every method of eluding a law so prejudicial to their interest, may be easily imagined, and a mind not very fruitful of evasions, will discover that this law may be eluded by a thousand artifices. If the merchants are restrained from allowing men their wages beyond a certain sum, they will make contracts for the voyage, of which the time may very easily be computed, they may offer a reward for expedition and fidelity, they may pay a large sum by way of advance, they may allow the sailors part of the profits, or may offer money by a third hand. To fix the price of any commodity, of which the quantity and the use may vary their proportions, is the most excessive degree of ignorance. No man can determine the price of corn, unless he can regulate the harvest, and keep the number of the people for ever at a stand.

But let us suppose these methods as efficacious as their most sanguine vindicators are desirous of representing them, it does not yet appear that they are necessary, and to inflict hardships without necessity, is by no means the practice of either wisdom or benevolence. To tyrannise and compel is the low pleasure of petty capacities, of narrow minds, swelled with the pride of uncontroulable authority, the wantonness of wretches who are insensible of the consequences of their own actions, and of whom candour may, perhaps, determine, that they are only cruel because they are stupid. Let us not exalt into a precedent the most unjust and rigorous law of our predecessors, of which they themselves declared their repentance, or confessed the inefficacy, by never reviving it; let us rather endeavour to gain the sailors by lenity and moderation, and reconcile them to the service of the crown by real encouragements; for it is rational to imagine, that in proportion as men are disgusted by injuries, they will be won by kindness.

There is one expedient, sir, which deserves to be tried, and from which, at least, more success may be hoped than from cruelty, hunger, and persecution. The ships that are now to be fitted out for service, are those of the first magnitude, which it is usual to bring back into the ports in winter. Let us, therefore, promise to all seamen that shall voluntarily engage in them, besides the reward already proposed, a discharge from the service at the end of six or seven months. By this they will be released from their present dread of perpetual slavery, and be certain, as they are when in the service of the merchants, of a respite from their fatigues. The trade of the nation will be only interrupted for a time, and may be carried on in the winter months, and large sums will be saved by dismissing the seamen when they cannot be employed.

By adding this to the other methods of encouragement, and throwing aside all rigorous and oppressive schemes, the navy may easily be manned, our country protected, our commerce reestablished, and our enemies subdued; but to pass the bill as it now stands, is to determine that trade shall cease, and that no ship shall sail out of the river.

 

Mr. PITT spoke to the following purport:—Sir, it is common for those to have the greatest regard to their own interest who discover the least for that of others. I do not, therefore, despair of recalling the advocates of this bill from the prosecution of their favourite measures, by arguments of greater efficacy than those which are founded on reason and justice.

Nothing, sir, is more evident, than that some degree of reputation is absolutely necessary to men who have any concern in the administration of a government like ours; they must either secure the fidelity of their adherents by the assistance of wisdom, or of virtue; their enemies must either be awed by their honesty, or terrified by their cunning. Mere artless bribery will never gain a sufficient majority to set them entirely free from apprehensions of censure. To different tempers different motives must be applied: some, who place their felicity in being accounted wise, are in very little care to preserve the character of honesty; others may be persuaded to join in measures which they easily discover to be weak and ill-concerted, because they are convinced that the authors of them are not corrupt but mistaken, and are unwilling that any man should be punished for natural defects or casual ignorance.

I cannot say, sir, which of these motives influences the advocates for the bill before us; a bill in which such cruelties are proposed as are yet unknown among the most savage nations, such as slavery has not yet borne, or tyranny invented, such as cannot be heard without resentment, nor thought of without horrour.

It is, sir, perhaps, not unfortunate, that one more expedient has been added, rather ridiculous than shocking, and that these tyrants of the administration, who amuse themselves with oppressing their fellow-subjects, who add without reluctance one hardship to another, invade the liberty of those whom they have already overborne with taxes, first plunder and then imprison, who take all opportunities of heightening the publick distresses, and make the miseries of war the instruments of new oppressions, are too ignorant to be formidable, and owe their power not to their abilities, but to casual prosperity, or to the influence of money.

The other clauses of this bill, complicated at once with cruelty and folly, have been treated with becoming indignation; but this may be considered with less ardour of resentment, and fewer emotions of zeal, because, though, perhaps, equally iniquitous, it will do no harm; for a law that can never be executed can never be felt.

That it will consume the manufacture of paper, and swell the books of statutes, is all the good or hurt that can be hoped or feared from a law like this; a law which fixes what is in its own nature mutable, which prescribes rules to the seasons and limits to the wind. I am too well acquainted, sir, with the disposition of its two chief supporters, to mention the contempt with which this law will be treated by posterity, for they have already shown abundantly their disregard of succeeding generations; but I will remind them, that they are now venturing their whole interest at once, and hope they will recollect, before it is too late, that those who believe them to intend the happiness of their country, will never be confirmed in their opinion by open cruelty and notorious oppression; and that those who have only their own interest in view, will be afraid of adhering to those leaders, however old and practised in expedients, however strengthened by corruption, or elated with power, who have no reason to hope for success from either their virtue or abilities.

Mr. BATHURST next spoke to this effect:—Sir, the clause now under our consideration is so inconsiderately drawn up, that it is impossible to read it in the most cursory manner, without discovering the necessity of numerous amendments; no malicious subtilties or artful deductions are required in raising objections to this part of the bill, they crowd upon us without being sought, and, instead of exercising our sagacity, weary our attention.

The first errour, or rather one part of a general and complicated errour, is the computation of time, not by days, but by calendar months, which, as they are not equal one to another, may embarrass the account between the sailors and those that employ them. In all contracts of a short duration, the time is to be reckoned by weeks and days, by certain and regular periods, which has been so constantly the practice of the seafaring men, that, perhaps, many of them do not know the meaning of a calendar month: this, indeed, is a neglect of no great importance, because no man can be deprived by it of more than the wages due for the labour of a few days; but the other part of this clause is more seriously to be considered, as it threatens the sailors with greater injuries: for it is to be enacted, that all contracts made for more wages than are here allowed shall be totally void.

It cannot be denied to be possible, and in my opinion it is very likely, that many contracts will be made without the knowledge of this law, and consequently without any design of violating it; but ignorance, inevitable ignorance, though it is a valid excuse for every other man, is no plea for the unhappy sailor; he must suffer, though innocent, the penalty of a crime; must undergo danger, hardships, and labour, without a recompense, and at the end of a successful voyage, after having enriched his country by his industry, return home to a necessitous family, without being able to relieve them.

It is scarcely necessary, sir, to raise any more objections to a clause in which nothing is right; but, to show how its imperfections multiply upon the slightest consideration, I take the opportunity to observe, that there is no provision made for regulating the voyages performed in less time than a month, so that the greatest part of the abuses, which have been represented as the occasion of this clause, are yet without remedy, and only those sailors who venture far, and are exposed to the greatest dangers, are restrained from receiving an adequate reward.

Thus much, sir, I have said upon the supposition that a regulation of the sailors' wages is either necessary or just; a supposition of which I am very far from discovering the truth. That it is just to oppress the most useful of our fellow-subjects, to load those men with peculiar hardships to whom we owe the plenty that we enjoy, the power that yet remains in the nation, and which neither the folly nor the cowardice of ministers have yet been able to destroy, and the security in which we now sit and hold our consultations; that it is just to lessen our payments at a time when we increase the labour of those who are hired, and to expose men to danger without recompense, will not easily be proved, even by those who are most accustomed to paradoxes, and are ready to undertake the proof of any position which it is their interest to find true.

Nor is it much more easy to show the necessity of this expedient in our present state, in which it appears from the title of the bill, that our chief endeavour should be the increase and encouragement of sailors, and, I suppose, it has not often been discovered, that by taking away the profits of a profession greater numbers have been allured to it.

The high wages, sir, paid by merchants are the chief incitements that prevail upon the ambitious, the necessitous, or the avaricious, to forsake the ease and security of the land, to leave easy trades, and healthful employments, and expose themselves to an element where they are not certain of an hour's safety. The service of the merchants is the nursery in which seamen are trained up for his majesty's navies, and from thence we must, in time of danger, expect those forces by which alone we can be protected.

If, therefore, it is necessary to encourage sailors, it is necessary to reject all measures that may terrify or disgust them; and as their numbers must depend upon our trade, let us not embarrass the merchants with any other difficulties than those which are inseparable from war, and which very little care has been hitherto taken to alleviate.

Mr. HAY replied:—Sir, the objections which have been urged with so much ardour, and displayed with such power of eloquence, are not, in my opinion, formidable enough to discourage us from prosecuting our measures; some of them may be, perhaps, readily answered, and the rest easily removed.

The computation of time, as it now stands, is allowed not to produce any formidable evil, and therefore did not require so rhetorical a censure: the inconveniency of calendar months may easily be removed by a little candour in the contracting parties, or, that the objection may not be repeated to the interruption of the debate, weeks or days may be substituted, and the usual reckoning of the sailors be still continued.

That some contracts may be annulled, and inconveniencies or delays of payment arise, is too evident to be questioned; but in that case the sailor may have his remedy provided, and be enabled to obtain, by an easy process, what he shall be judged to have deserved; for it must be allowed reasonable, that every man who labours in honest and useful employments, should receive the reward of his diligence and fidelity.

Thus, sir, may the clause, however loudly censured and violently opposed, be made useful and equitable, and the publick service advanced without injury to individuals.

Sir Robert WALPOLE next rose, and spoke as follows:—Sir, every law which extends its influence to great numbers in various relations and circumstances, must produce some consequences that were never foreseen or intended, and is to be censured or applauded as the general advantages or inconveniencies are found to preponderate. Of this kind is the law before us, a law enforced by the necessity of our affairs, and drawn up with no other intention than to secure the publick happiness, and produce that success which every man's interest must prompt him to desire.

If in the execution of this law, sir, some inconveniencies should arise, they are to be remedied as fast as they are discovered, or if not capable of a remedy, to be patiently borne, in consideration of the general advantage.

That some temporary disturbances may be produced is not improbable; the discontent of the sailors may, for a short time, rise high, and our trade be suspended by their obstinacy; but obstinacy, however determined, must yield to hunger, and when no higher wages can be obtained, they will cheerfully accept of those which are here allowed them. Short voyages, indeed, are not comprehended in the clause, and therefore the sailors will engage in them upon their own terms, but this objection can be of no weight with those that oppose the clause, because, if it is unjust to limit the wages of the sailors, it is just to leave those voyages without restriction; and those that think the expedient here proposed equitable and rational, may, perhaps, be willing to make some concessions to those who are of a different opinion.

That the bill will not remove every obstacle to success, nor add weight to one part of the balance without making the other lighter; that it will not supply the navy without incommoding the merchants in some degree; that it may be sometimes evaded by cunning, and sometimes abused by malice; and that at last it will be less efficacious than is desired, may, perhaps, be proved; but it has not yet been proved that any other measures are more eligible, or that we are not to promote the publick service as far as we are able, though our endeavours may not produce effects equal to our wishes.

Sir John BARNARD then spoke, to this effect:—Sir, I know not by what fatality it is that nothing can be urged in defence of the clause before us which does not tend to discover its weakness and inefficacy. The warmest patrons of this expedient are impelled, by the mere force of conviction, to such concessions as invalidate all their arguments, and leave their opponents no necessity of replying.

If short voyages are not comprehended in this provision, what are we now controverting? What but the expedience of a law that will never be executed? The sailors, however they are contemned by those who think them only worthy to be treated like beasts of burden, are not yet so stupid but that they can easily find out, that to serve a fortnight for greater wages is more eligible than to toil a month for less; and as the numerous equipments that have been lately made have not left many more sailors in the service of the merchants than may be employed in the coasting trade, those who traffick to remoter parts, must shut up their books and wait till the expiration of this act, for an opportunity of renewing their commerce.

 

To regulate the wages for one voyage, and to leave another without limitation, in time of scarcity of seamen, is absolutely to prohibit that trade which is so restrained, and is, doubtless, a more effectual embargo than has been yet invented.

Let any man but suppose that the East India company were obliged to give only half the wages that other traders allow, and consider how that part of our commerce could be carried on; would not their goods rot in their warehouses, and their ships lie for ever in the harbour? Would not the sailors refuse to contract with them? or desert them after a contract, upon the first prospect of more advantageous employment?

But it is not requisite to multiply arguments in a question which may not only be decided without long examination, but in which we may determine our conclusions by the experience of our ancestors. Scarcely any right or wrong measures are without a precedent, and, amongst others, this expedient has been tried by the wisdom of former times; a law was once made for limiting the wages of tailors, and that it is totally ineffectual we are all convinced. Experience is a very safe guide in political inquiries, and often discovers what the most enlightened reason failed to foresee.

Let us, therefore, improve the errours of our ancestors to our own advantage, and whilst we neglect to imitate their virtues, let us, at least, forbear to repeat their follies.

Mr. PERRY spoke to this purpose:—Sir, there is one objection more which my acquaintance with foreign trade impresses too strongly upon my mind to suffer me to conceal it.

It is well known that the condition of a seaman subjects him to the necessity of spending a great part of his life at a distance from his native country, in places where he can neither hear of our designs, nor be instructed in our laws, and, therefore, it is evident that no law ought to affect him before a certain period of time, in which he may reasonably be supposed to have been informed of it. For every man ought to have it in his power to avoid punishment, and to suffer only for negligence or obstinacy.

It is quite unnecessary, sir, to observe to this assembly, that there are now, as at all times, great numbers of sailors in every part of the world, and that they, at least, equally deserve our regard with those who are under the more immediate influence of the government.

These seamen have already contracted for the price of their labour, and the recompense of their hazards, nor can we, in my opinion, without manifest injustice, dissolve a contract founded upon equity, and confirmed by law.

It is, sir, an undisputed principle of government, that no person should be punished without a crime; but is it no punishment to deprive a man of what is due to him by a legal stipulation, the condition of which is, on his part, honestly fulfilled?

Nothing, sir, can be imagined more calamitous than the disappointment to which this law subjects the unhappy men who are now promoting the interest of their country in distant places, amidst dangers and hardships, in unhealthy climates, and barbarous nations, where they comfort themselves, under the fatigues of labour and the miseries of sickness, with the prospect of the sum which they shall gain for the relief of their families, and the respite which their wages will enable them to enjoy; but, upon their return, they find their hopes blasted, and their contracts dissolved by a law made in their absence.

No human being, I think, can coolly and deliberately inflict a hardship like this, and, therefore, I doubt not but those who have, by inadvertency, given room for this objection, will either remove it by an amendment, or what is, in my opinion, more eligible, reject the clause as inexpedient, useless, and unjust.

Sir William YONGE spoke next to this effect:—Sir, this debate has been protracted, not by any difficulties arising from the nature of the questions which have been the subject of it, but by a neglect with which almost all the opponents of the bill may be justly charged, the neglect of distinguishing between measures eligible in themselves, and measures preferable to consequences which are apprehended from particular conjunctures; between laws made only to advance the publick happiness, and expedients of which the benefit is merely occasional, and of which the sole intention is to avert some national calamity, and which are to cease with the necessity that produced them.

Such are the measures, sir, which are now intended; measures, which, in days of ease, security, and prosperity, it would be the highest degree of weakness to propose, but of which I cannot see the absurdity in times of danger and distress. Such laws are the medicines of a state, useless and nauseous in health, but preferable to a lingering disease, or to a miserable death.

Even those measures, sir, which have been mentioned as most grossly absurd, and represented as parallel to the provision made in this clause only to expose it to contempt and ridicule, may, in particular circumstances, be rational and just. To settle the price of corn in the time of a famine, may become the wisest state, and multitudes might, in time of publick misery, by the benefit of temporary laws, be preserved from destruction. Even those masts, to which, with a prosperous gale, the ship owes its usefulness and its speed, are often cut down by the sailors in the fury of a storm.

With regard to the ships which are now in distant places, whither no knowledge of this law can possibly be conveyed, it cannot be denied that their crews ought to be secured from injury by some particular exception; for though it is evident in competitions between publick and private interest, which ought to be preferred, yet we ought to remember that no unnecessary injury is to be done to individuals, even while we are providing for the safety of the nation.

Mr. FAZAKERLY spoke to this effect:—Sir, though I cannot be supposed to have much acquaintance with naval affairs, and, therefore, may not, perhaps, discover the full force of the arguments that have been urged in favour of the clause now under consideration, yet I cannot but think myself under an indispensable obligation to examine it as far as I am able, and to make use of the knowledge which I have acquired, however inferiour to that of others.

The argument, sir, the only real argument, which has been produced in favour of the restraint of wages now proposed, appears to me by no means conclusive; nor can I believe that the meanest and most ignorant seaman would, if it were proposed to him, hesitate a moment for an answer to it. Let me suppose, sir, a merchant urging it as a charge against a seaman, that he raises his demand of wages in time of war, would not the sailor readily reply, that harder labour required larger pay? Would he not ask, why the general practice of mankind is charged as a crime upon him only? Inquire, says he, of the workmen in the docks, have they not double wages for double labour? and is not their lot safe and easy in comparison with mine, who at once encounter danger and support fatigue, carry on war and commerce at the same time, conduct the ship and oppose the enemy, and am equally exposed to captivity and shipwreck?