This imputed usurpation must be proved upon him either by his own confession, or by the evidence of others; and it has not been yet pretended that he assumes the title of prime minister, or indeed, that it is applied to him by any but his enemies; and it may easily be conceived how weakly the most uncorrupted innocence would be supported, if all the aspersions of its enemies were to be received as proofs against it.
Nor does it appear, my lords, that any other evidence can be brought against him on this head, or that any man will stand forth and affirm that either he has been injured himself by this gentleman, or known any injury done by him to another by the exertion of authority with which he was not lawfully invested; such evidence, my lords, the laws of our country require to be produced before any man can be punished, censured, or disgraced. No man is obliged to prove his innocence, but may call upon his prosecutors to support their accusation; and why this honourable gentleman, whatever may have been his conduct, should be treated in a different manner than any other criminal, I am by no means able to discover.
Though there has been no evidence offered of his guilt, your lordships have heard an attestation of his innocence, from the noble duke who spoke first against the motion, of whom it cannot be suspected that he would, voluntarily, engage to answer for measures which he pursued in blind compliance with the direction of another. The same testimony, my lords, can I produce, and affirm with equal truth, that in the administration of my province, I am independent, and left entirely to the decisions of my own judgment.
In every government, my lords, as in every family, some, either by accident or a natural industry, or a superiour capacity, or some other cause, will be engaged in more business, and treated with more confidence than others; but if every man is willing to answer for the conduct of his own province, there is all the security against corruption that can possibly be obtained; for if every man's regard to his own safety and reputation will prevent him from betraying his trust, or abusing his power, much more will it incite him to prevent any misconduct in another for which he must himself be accountable. Men are, usually, sufficiently tenacious of power, and ready to vindicate their separate rights, when nothing but their pride is affected by the usurpation, but surely no man will patiently suffer his province to be invaded when he may himself be ruined by the conduct of the invader.
Thus, my lords, it appears to me to be not only without proof, but without probability, and the first minister can, in my opinion, be nothing more than a formidable illusion, which, when one man thinks he has seen it, he shows to another, as easily frighted as himself, who joins with him in propagating the notion, and in spreading terrour and resentment over the nation, till at last the panick becomes general, and what was at first only whispered by malice or prejudice in the ears of ignorance or credulity, is adopted by common fame, and echoed back from the people to the senate.
I have hitherto, my lords, confined myself to the consideration of one single article of this complicated charge, because it appears to me to be the only part of it necessary to be examined; for if once it be acknowledged that the affairs of the nation are transacted not by the minister but the administration, by the council in which every man that sits there has an equal voice and equal authority, the blame or praise of all the measures must be transferred from him to the council, and every man that has advised or concurred in them, will deserve the same censure or the same applause; as it is unjust to punish one man for the crimes of another, it is unjust to choose one man out for punishment from among many others equally guilty.
But I doubt not, my lords, when all those measures are equitably considered, there will be no punishment to be dreaded, because neither negligence nor treachery will be discovered. For, my lords, with regard to the treaty of Vienna, let us suppose our ministers deceived by ignorant or corrupt intelligence, let us admit that they were cautious where there was no danger, and neglected some opportunities, which, if they had received better information, they might have improved to the advantage and security of the nation. What have they done, even under all these disadvantageous suppositions, but followed the lights which they judged most clear, and by which they hoped to be conducted to honour and to safety?
Policy, my lords, is very different from prescience; the utmost that can be attained is probability, and that, for the most part, in a low degree. It is observed, that no man is wise but as you take into consideration the weakness of another; a maxim more eminently true of political wisdom, which consists, very often, only in discovering designs which could never be known but by the folly or treachery of those to whom they are trusted. If our enemies were wise enough to keep their own secrets, neither our ministers nor our patriots would be able to know or prevent their designs, nor would it be any reproach to their sagacity, that they did not know what nobody would tell them.
If therefore, my lords, the princes, whose interest is contrary to our own, have been at any time served by honest and wise men, there was a time when our ministers could act only by conjecture, and might be mistaken without a crime.
If it was always in our power to penetrate into the intentions of our enemies, they must necessarily have the same means of making themselves acquainted with our projects, and yet when any of them are discovered we think it just to impute it to the negligence of the minister.
Thus, my lords, every man is inclined to judge with prejudice and partiality. When we suffer by the prudence of our enemies, we charge our ministers with want of vigilance, without considering, that very often nothing is necessary to elude the most penetrating sagacity, but obstinate silence.
If we inquire into the transactions of past times, shall we find any man, however renowned for his abilities, not sometimes imposed upon by falsehoods, and sometimes betrayed by his own reasonings into measures destructive of the purposes which he endeavoured to promote? There is no man of whose penetration higher ideas have been justly formed, or who gave more frequent proofs of an uncommon penetration into futurity than Cromwell; and yet succeeding times have sufficiently discovered the weakness of aggrandizing France by depressing Spain, and we wonder now how so much policy could fall into so gross an errour, as not rather to suffer power to remain in the distant enemy, than transfer it to another equally divided from us by interest, and far more formidable by the situation of his dominions.
Cromwell, my lords, suffered himself to be hurried away by the near prospect of present advantages, and the apprehension of present dangers; and every other man has been, in the same manner, sometimes deluded into a preference of a smaller present advantage, to a greater which was more remote.
Let it not be urged, my lords, that politicks are advanced since the time of Cromwell, and that errours which might then be committed by the wisest administration, are now gross and reproachful; we are to remember that every part of policy has been equally improved, and that if more methods of discovery have been struck out, there have been likewise more arts invented of eluding it.
When, therefore, we inquire into the conduct, or examine the abilities of a minister, we are not to expect that he should appear never to have been deceived, but that he should never be found to have neglected any proper means of information, nor ever to have willingly given up the interest of his country; but we are not to impute to his weakness what is only to be ascribed to the wisdom of those whom he opposed.
If this plea, my lords, is reasonable, it will be necessary for those who support the motion, to prove, not only that the treaty of Vienna was never made, but that the falsehood of the report either was or might have been known by our ministers; otherwise, those who are inclined to retain a favourable opinion of their integrity and abilities, may conclude, that they were either not mistaken, or were led into errour by such delusions as would no less easily have imposed on their accusers, and that by exalting their enemies to their stations, they shall not much consult the advantage of their country.
This motion, therefore, my lords, founded upon no acknowledged, no indisputable facts, nor supported by legal evidence; this motion, which, by appealing to common fame, as the ultimate judge of every man's actions, may bring every man's life, or fortune, into danger; this motion, which condemns without hearing, and decides without examining, I cannot but reject, and hope your lordships will concur with me.
Lord CARLISLE spoke next, to the following purport:—My lords, the state of the question before us has, in my opinion, not been rightly apprehended by the noble lord who spoke last, nor is the innocence or guilt of the minister the chief question before us, because a minister may possibly mean well, and yet be, in some particular circumstances, unqualified for his station.
He may not only want the degree of knowledge and ability requisite to make his good intentions effectual, but, my lords, however skilful, sagacious, or diligent, he may be so unfortunate, in some parts of his conduct, as to want the esteem and confidence of the people.
That a very able and honest minister may be misinformed by his intelligence, disappointed by his agents, or baffled by other men of equal capacity and integrity with himself, cannot be controverted; but it must surely be owned likewise, that when this has happened so often, and in cases of such importance, as to deprive him entirely of the regard and affection of the people; when he is reduced to intrench himself behind his privileges, to employ all the influence of the crown for his own security, and make it his daily endeavour to create new dependencies, he ought to be pitied and discarded.
That this is the state of the minister whose removal is desired by the motion, cannot be denied; the exaltation of his adherents to places and preferments, the noble lord has been so far from questioning, that he has endeavoured to justify it, and has in plain terms inquired, who would have acted otherwise?
Every man, my lords, would have acted otherwise, whose character had not been blasted by general detestation; every man would have acted otherwise, who preferred the publick good to his own continuance in power; and every man has acted otherwise who has distinguished himself as a friend to the publick.
It is the interest of the nation, my lords, that every office should be filled by that man who is most capable of discharging it, whatever may be his sentiments with regard to the minister; and that his attention should be confined to his employment, rather than distracted by various concerns and opposite relations. It is, therefore, an injury to the publick, to thrust a skilful commissioner into the senate, or to embarrass an industrious senator with a post or commission.
Yet, my lords, that multitudes have obtained places, who have no acquaintance with the duties of their offices, nor any other pretensions to them, than that they have seats in the other house, and that by distinguishing himself in that assembly, any man may most easily obtain the preferments of the crown, is too obvious for controversy.
This practice, my lords, is a sufficient foundation for the motion; a practice so injurious to the nation, so long continued, and so openly avowed, requires to be vigorously opposed, lest it should become established by long custom, and entangle itself with our constitution.
If the minister, my lords, has made it necessary to employ none but his adherents and blind followers, this necessity is alone a sufficient proof how little he confides in his own prudence or integrity, how apprehensive he is of the censure of the senate, and how desirous of continuing his authority, by avoiding it. And, surely, my lords, it is our duty, as well as our right, to address the throne, that a minister should be removed who fears the people, since few men fear without hating, and nothing so much contributes to make any man an enemy to his country, as the consciousness that he is universally abhorred.
But, my lords, if this is done by him without necessity, if the general preference of his friends is only the consequence of mistaken judgment, or corrupt gratitude, this address is equally necessary, because the effects are equally pernicious.
When a minister, suspected of ill intentions, is continued in employment, discontent must naturally spread over the nation; and if the end of government be the happiness of the people; if suspicion and jealousy be contrary to a state of happiness; and if this suspicion which generally prevails, this discontent which fills the whole nation, can only be appeased by the removal of the minister; prudence, justice, and the examples of our ancestors, ought to influence us to endeavour that the affairs of the nation may be transferred to such whose greater integrity or wisdom has recommended them to the affection of the people.
In this motion, therefore, we need not be supposed to imply that the minister is either ignorant or corrupt, but that he is disliked by the people, disliked to such a degree, my lords, that it is not safe for his majesty to employ him.
It is, doubtless, our duty, my lords, to guard both the rights of the people, and the prerogatives of the throne, and with equal ardour to remonstrate to his majesty the distresses of his subjects, and his own danger. We are to hold the balance of the constitution, and neither to suffer the regal power to be overborne by a torrent of popular fury, nor the people to be oppressed by an illegal exertion of authority, or the more insupportable hardships of unreasonable laws.
By this motion, my lords, the happiness of the people, and the security of his majesty, are at once consulted, nor can we suppress so general a clamour without failing equally in our duty to both.
To what, my lords, is the untimely end of so many kings and emperours to be imputed, but to the cowardice or treachery of their counsellors, of those to whom they trusted that intercourse, which is always to be preserved between a monarch and his people? Were kings honestly informed of the opinions and dispositions of their subjects, they would never, or, at least rarely, persist in such measures, as, by exasperating the people, tend necessarily to endanger themselves.
It is the happiness of a British monarch, that he has a standing and hereditary council, composed of men who do not owe their advancement to the smiles of caprice, or the intrigues of a court; who are, therefore, neither under the influence of a false gratitude, nor of a servile dependence, and who may convey to the throne the sentiments of the people, without danger, and without fear. But, my lords, if we are either too negligent, or too timorous to do our duty, how is the condition of our sovereign more safe, or more happy than that of an emperour of Turkey, who is often ignorant of any complaints made against the administration, till he hears the people thundering at the gates of his palace.
Let us, therefore, my lords, whatever may be our opinion of the conduct of the minister, inform his majesty of the discontent of his subjects, since, whether it is just or not, the danger is the same, and whenever any danger threatens the king, we ought either to enable him to oppose, or caution him to avoid it.
Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, to the following effect:—My lords, I cannot but observe in this debate an ambition of popularity, in my opinion not very consistent with the freedom of debate, and the dignity of this assembly, which ought to be influenced by no other motive than the force of reason and truth.
It has been a common method of eluding the efficacy of arguments, to charge the opponent with blind adherence to interest, or corrupt compliance with the directions of a court; nor has it been less frequent to prevent inquiries into publick measures, by representing them as the clamours of faction, the murmurs of disobedience, and the prelude to rebellion.
So necessary, my lords, has it been always thought to be uninfluenced in our examinations by dependence or interest, that the most irrefragable reasons have lost the power of conviction, by the condition and characters of those by whom they were produced; and so much is it expected from innocence and justice to despise all foreign assistance, and to stand the test of inquiry without asking the support of power, that every man has been concluded guilty that has fled for shelter to the throne.
And surely, my lords, if that man's suffrage is of little weight, who appears determined to subscribe to the dictates of a minister, no greater credit can be assigned to another, who professes himself only the echo of the clamours of the populace. If it be a proof of a weak cause, and consciousness of misconduct, to apply to the crown for security and protection, it may be accounted an acknowledgment of the insufficiency of arguments, when the people is called in to second them, and they are only to expect success from the violence of multitudes.
That all government is instituted for the happiness of the people, that their interest ought to be the chief care of the legislature, that their complaints ought patiently to be heard, and their grievances speedily redressed, are truths well known, generally acknowledged, and, I hope, always predominant in the mind of every lord in this assembly. But, that the people cannot err, that the voice of fame is to be regarded as an oracle, and every murmur of discontent to be pacified by a change of measures, I have never before heard, or heard it only to disregard it.
True tenderness for the people, my lords, is to consult their advantage, to protect their liberty, and to preserve their virtue; and perhaps examples may be found sufficient to inform us that all these effects are often to be produced by means not generally agreeable to the publick.
It is possible, my lords, for a very small part of the people to form just ideas of the motives of transactions and the tendency of laws. All negotiations with foreign powers are necessarily complicated with many different interests, and varied by innumerable circumstances, influenced by sudden exigencies, and defeated by unavoidable accidents. Laws have respect to remote consequences, and involve a multitude of relations which it requires long study to discover. And how difficult it is to judge of political conduct, or legislative proceedings, may be easily discovered by observing how often the most skilful statesmen are mistaken, and how frequently the laws require to be amended.
If then, my lords, the people judge for themselves on these subjects, they must necessarily determine without knowledge of the questions, and their decisions are then of small authority. If they receive, implicitly, the dictates of others, and blindly adopt the opinions of those who have gained their favour and esteem, their applauses and complaints are, with respect to themselves, empty sounds, which they utter as the organs of their leaders. Nor are the desires of the people gratified when their petitions are granted; nor their grievances overlooked when their murmurs are neglected.
As it is no reproach to the people that they cannot be the proper judges of the conduct of the government, so neither are they to be censured when they complain of injuries not real, and tremble at the apprehension of severities unintended. Unjust complaints, my lords, and unreasonable apprehensions, are to be imputed to those who court their regard only to deceive them, and exalt themselves to reputation by rescuing them from grievances that were never felt, and averting dangers that were never near.
He only who makes the happiness of the people his endeavour, loves them with a true affection and a rational tenderness, and he certainly consults their happiness who contributes to still all groundless clamours, and appease all useless apprehensions, who employs his care, not only to preserve their quiet and their liberty, but to secure them from the fear of losing it, who not only promotes the means of happiness, but enables them to enjoy it.
Thus, it appears, my lords, that it is possible to be a friend, at the same time, to the people and the administration, and that no man can more deserve their confidence and applause, than he that dissipates their unreasonable terrours, and contributes to reconcile them to a good government.
That most of the clamours against the present government arise from calumnies and misrepresentations, is apparent from the sanction of the senate, which has been given to all the measures that are charged as crimes upon the administration.
That the army is supported by the consent of the senate, that the senate has approved the convention, and that our taxes are all imposed and continued by the senate, cannot be denied. What then is demanded by those that censure the conduct of publick affairs, but that their opinion should be considered as an overbalance to the wisdom of the senate, that no man should be allowed to speak but as they dictate, nor to vote but as they shall influence them by their rhetorick or example?
To repeat the particular topicks of accusation, and recapitulate the arguments which have been produced to confute it, would be a tedious and unnecessary labour; unnecessary, because it is well known that they once had the power of convincing this house, and that nothing has since happened to lessen their force, and because many of them now have been already repeated by the noble lords that have opposed the motion.
To search far backward for past errors, and to take advantage of later discoveries in censuring the conduct of any minister, is in a high degree disingenuous and cruel; it is an art which may be easily practised, of perplexing any question, by connecting distant facts, and entangling one period of time with another.
The only candid method of inquiry is to recur back to the state of affairs, as it then appeared, to consider what was openly declared, and what was kept impenetrably secret, what was discoverable by human sagacity, and what was beyond the reach of the most piercing politician.
With regard to the Hanover treaty, it is not, my lords, requisite that we should engage ourselves in a very minute examination; for it was not only not transacted by the right honourable gentleman whose behaviour is the subject of this debate, but cannot be proved to have been known by him till it was formally ratified. If he afterwards approved it either in the council or the senate, he cannot justly, how destructive or ridiculous soever that treaty may be thought, be charged with more than his share of the guilt, the bare guilt of a single vote.
But there is one accusation yet more malicious, an accusation not only of crimes which this gentleman did not commit, but which have not yet been committed, an accusation formed by prying into futurity, and exaggerating misfortunes which are yet to come, and which may probably be prevented. Well may any man, my lords, think himself in danger, when he hears himself charged not with high crimes and misdemeanours, not with accumulative treason, but with misconduct of publick affairs, past, present, and future.
The only charge against this gentleman, which seems to relate more to him than to any other man engaged in the administration, is the continuance of the harbour of Dunkirk, which, says the noble duke, he must be acquainted with as commissioner of the treasury; but if the title of first commissioner be denied, if his authority be but the same with that of his associates, whence comes it, my lords, that he is more particularly accused than they? Why is his guilt supposed greater if his power is only equal?
But, my lords, I believe it will appear, that no guilt has been contracted on this account, and that Dunkirk was always intended, even by those that demanded the demolition of it, to continue a harbour for small trading vessels, and that if larger ever arrived from thence, they lay at a distance from the shore, and were loaded by small vessels from the town.
With regard to other affairs, my lords, they were all transacted by the council, not by his direction, but with his concurrence; and how it is consistent with justice to single him out for censure, I must desire the noble lords to show who approve the motion.
If the people, my lords, have been, by misrepresentations industriously propagated, exasperated against him, if the general voice of the nation condemns him, we ought more cautiously to examine his conduct, lest we should add strength to prejudice too powerful already, and instead of reforming the errours, and regulating the heat of the people, inflame their discontent and propagate sedition.
The utmost claim of the people is to be admitted as accusers, and sometimes as evidence, but they have no right to sit as judges, and to make us the executioners of their sentence; and as this gentleman has yet been only condemned by those who have not the opportunities of examining his conduct, nor the right of judging him, I cannot agree to give him up to punishment.
Lord HALIFAX spoke next, in substance as follows:—My lords, though I do not conceive the people infallible, yet I believe that in questions like this they are seldom in the wrong, for this is a question not of argument but of fact; of fact discoverable, not by long deductions and accurate ratiocinations, but by the common powers of seeing and feeling.
That it is difficult to know the motives of negotiations, and the effects of laws, and that it requires long study and intense meditation to discover remote consequences, is indubitably true. And, with regard to the people in general, it cannot be denied, that neither their education qualifies them, nor their employments allow them to be much versed in such inquiries.
But, my lords, to refer effects to their proper causes, and to observe, when consequences break forth, from whence they proceed, is no such arduous task. The people of the lowest class may easily feel that they are more miserable this year than the last, and may inquire and discover the reason of the aggravation of their misery; they may know that the army is increased, or our trade diminished; that the taxes are heavier, and penal laws become more grievous.
Nor is it less easy for them to discover that these calamities are not brought upon them by the immediate hand of heaven, or the irresistible force of natural causes; that their towns are not ruined by an invasion, nor their trade confined by a pestilence; they may then easily collect, that they are only unhappy by the misconduct of their governours; they may assign their infelicity to that cause, as the only remaining cause that is adequate to the effect.
If it be granted, my lords, that they may be mistaken in their reasoning, it must be owned, that they are not mistaken without probabilities on their side: it is probable that the ministry must injure the publick interest when it decays without any other visible cause; it is still more probable, when it appears that among those whose station enables them to enter into national inquiries, every man imputes his calamities to the minister, who is not visibly dependent on his favour. It becomes more probable, yet, when it appears that it is the great business of the minister to multiply dependencies, to list accomplices, and to corrupt his judges.
At least, my lords, if it be granted, which, surely, cannot be denied, that the people may be sensible of their own miseries, it is their part to declare their sufferings, and to apply to this house for relief, and it is our business to discover the authors of them, and bring them to punishment.
That the people are very loud and importunate in their complaints, is daily evident; nor is it less apparent, that their complaints are just; if, therefore, their miseries must have an author, let the defenders of this gentleman point out the man whom they may more properly accuse.
But, my lords, nothing is more evident, than that the crimes and the criminal are equally known, that there is one man predominant in his majesty's councils, and that it has long been the practice of that man at once to oppress and ridicule the people, to plunder them, and set them at defiance.
Nothing is more known than that this man pretends to a superiour knowledge, and exerts a superiour power in the management of the publick revenues, and that they have been so ill managed for many years, that the expenses of peace have been almost equal to those of a most vigorous and extensive war.
Nothing is more probable, than that most of the foreign negotiations are conducted by his direction, nor more certain, than that they have generally tended only to make us contemptible.
That the excise was projected in his own head, that it was recommended by him upon his own conviction, and pressed upon the legislature by his influence, cannot be questioned; and if this were his only crime, if this were the only scheme of oppression that ever he planned out, it is such a declaration of war upon the publick liberty, such an attack of our natural and constitutional rights, as was never, perhaps, pardoned by any nation.
Nor is it less notorious, that the late infamous convention was transacted by one of his own dependents, that he palliated or concealed the losses of our merchants, that he opposed the declaration of war, and has since obstructed its operations.