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Protestantism and Catholicity

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Every impartial reader has already been able to form an opinion on the value of declamations against the right divine, and on that pretended affinity of Catholic doctrines with despotism and slavery. The exposition of these doctrines which I have just given is certainly not founded upon vain reasoning, sought out on purpose to darken the question. I have not in any way shunned the difficulty.



The question was, to know in what these doctrines consisted. I have shown clearly, that those who calumniate them do not understand them, and that we may even be allowed to suppose that they have never taken the trouble to examine them, such is the levity and ignorance with which they express themselves. Perhaps I have adduced too many facts and quotations; but let the reader bear in mind, that my object is not to present him with a code of doctrines, but to give to this point of doctrine an historical investigation. Now, history does not call for discourses, but facts; and in matters of doctrine, the sentiments of authors are facts. Whilst beholding the salutary reaction now taking place in favour of sound principles, let us avoid giving an incomplete statement of the truth. For the cause of religion it is highly important that its advocates should be free from even the most remote suspicion of dishonesty or dissimulation. On this account, I have, without hesitation, given in their integrity the doctrines laid down by Catholic writers, just as I find them in their works. By misrepresenting and confounding facts, Protestants and unbelievers have succeeded in deceiving; let me hope that, by explaining and elucidating them, I shall not be unsuccessful in removing the deception.



I purpose examining, in the remaining part of this work, some other questions relating to the same subject – questions perhaps not more important, but certainly more delicate. And for this reason, I was obliged to smooth the way, that I might proceed with more liberty and ease. I have hitherto made the cause of religion defend itself with its own weapons, without borrowing the support of auxiliaries which were superfluous. I shall proceed in the same course, fully convinced that Catholicity can only lose by any line of vindication that identifies it with political interests, and confines it within a circle too limited for its immensity. Empires appear and disappear; the Church of Christ will last till the end of time. Political opinions undergo changes and modifications; the august dogmas of our religion remain immutable. Thrones rise and fall; and the rock upon which Jesus Christ has built His Church stands unshaken throughout the course of time, ever defying the powers of hell. When we take up arms in her defence, let us be impressed with the importance of our mission; let there be no exaggeration, no flattery – the pure truth in measured, but accurate and firm language. In addressing ourselves to the people, in proclaiming the truth to kings, let us bear in mind that religion is above politics, and God above kings and people.



CHAPTER LIV.

ON RESISTANCE TO THE CIVIL POWER

The doctrines of Catholicity, therefore, in reference both to the origin and the exercise of civil power, are unobjectionable. Let us now proceed to another point – one of greater delicacy and difficulty, if not of more importance. To state the question frankly, without any subterfuge or evasion: "

Is it allowable in any case to resist the civil power?

" It is impossible to speak more distinctly, or to employ more precise and simple terms in stating this question, which is the most important, the most difficult, and the most startling of any that the subject we have in hand presents for our investigation. We know that Protestantism from its commencement proclaimed the right of insurrection against civil power; and no one is ignorant of the fact that Catholicity has ever preached up obedience to this power; so that if the former has been from its infancy an element of revolution and of overthrow, the latter has been an element of tranquillity and good order. This distinction might induce us to believe that Catholicity favors oppression, since it leaves the people without arms to defend their liberty. "You preach up obedience to the civil powers," our adversaries will say; "you pronounce, in all cases, an anathema upon any insurrection which attacks them; should tyranny prevail, therefore, you become its most powerful auxiliaries; for, by your doctrine, you arrest the arm ready to be raised in defence of liberty; you stifle with the cry of conscience the indignation awakened in generous hearts." This is a serious charge, which compels us to elucidate, as far as possible, this important point, and to distinguish in it truth from error, certainty from doubt.



Some men would shrink from the investigation of such questions, and prefer drawing a veil over them – a veil which they venture not to raise, lest they should find an abyss. And assuredly their timidity is not inexcusable; for there are abysses unfathomable, and dangers that strike the mind with awe. One false step may lead to destruction; one move in a wrong direction may let loose tempests that would lay society in ruins. Whilst, however, I willingly admit the pure intentions of such persons, I may be permitted to observe, that their prudence is quite thrown away, that their foresight and precaution are of no avail. Whether they investigate these questions or not, they are investigated, agitated, and decided, in a manner that we must deplore; and, worse still, the theories thence arising have been reduced to practice. Revolutions are no longer confined to books, they have become realities; quitting the quiet path of mere speculative philosophy, they are to be seen in the streets and in the public squares. Since, then, things have come to such a pass, why seek palliatives, make use of restrictions, or invoke silence? Let us tell the truth, just as it is, without concealment; since it is the truth, it will neither shrink before abundance of knowledge, nor the attacks of error. It is truth; its manifestation, its diffusion can have no injurious effect. In a word, God, who is the Author of societies, had no need of establishing them upon falsehood. This candor is the more necessary, because political changes may have led some persons to disavow the truths we are discussing, or no longer to understand them aright; whilst others imagine that obedience to legitimate authority has been taught only by a party anxious to make this doctrine the foundation of their tyranny. Men of erroneous opinions and evil intentions have their own codes, to which they have recourse whenever it will forward their designs: their fatal errors or their sordid interests form the rule of their conduct; this is the source of their knowledge and of their inspirations. Men, therefore, endowed with a pure heart and with upright intentions, should know what to hold by in political oscillations; it is no longer sufficient for them to have a general knowledge of the principle of obedience to the legitimate authorities; they must also be acquainted with their applications.



It is true that, in conflicts arising from civil discord, many men throw aside their own convictions to accommodate themselves to the exigencies of their interests; but it is no less certain, that there is still to be found a great number of conscientious men who adhere to them. We may also add, that the generality of the individuals composing a nation, not being usually in the urgent necessity of choosing between the sacrifice of their convictions and the risk of grave and imminent peril, those who entertain them usually find means to make their influence felt in preventing great evils or in remedying them. According to certain

pessimistes

, reason and justice are for ever banished from the earth, leaving it a prey to self-interest, and substituting for the dictates of conscience the designs of egotism. In their estimation, it is labor in vain to discuss and decide questions which may guide us in practice; for, according to them, whatever a man's conviction may be in theory, his practical decision will always be the same. It is my happiness, or misfortune, to take a different view of the case, and to believe that there still exist in the world, and particularly in Spain, men of profound convictions, and possessed of sufficient strength of mind to regulate their conduct by those convictions. The strongest proof that the inutility of doctrines is exaggerated, is the zeal evinced by all parties to lay hold of them. Whether from interest or from delicacy, all appeal to doctrines; and this interest or delicacy would not exist, if doctrines did not possess a powerful ascendency in society. Nothing, in discussion, is more perplexing than the introduction of several questions at the same time; and for this reason, I shall proceed in such a manner as to distinguish those which present themselves here. I will resolve, one by one, those which relate to our object, and pass over those which are foreign to it. Above all, we must bear in mind the general principle at all times inculcated by Catholicity, viz.

the obligation of obeying legitimate authority

. Let us now see how this principle is to be applied. In the first place,

Are we to obey the civil power when it commands something that is evil in itself?

 No, we are not; for the simple reason that what is evil in itself is forbidden by God; now,

we must obey God rather than men

.



In the second place,

Are we to obey the civil power when it interferes in matters not included in the circle of its faculties?

 No; for, with regard to these matters, it is not a power. From the very supposition that its faculties do not extend so far, we affirm that, in this point of view, it is not a real power. Besides, what I have advanced does not exactly and exclusively concern spiritual matters, to which I appear to allude. I apply this restriction of civil power also to matters purely temporal. It is necessary to refer here to what I have said in another part of this work, viz., that whilst we grant to civil power sufficient force and attributes for the maintenance of order and unity in the social body, it is just nevertheless, that we should not allow it to absorb the individual and the family, so as to destroy their individuality, to deprive them of their own sphere, and leave them only the means of acting as an integral part of society. This is one of the distinguishing features between Christian and pagan civilisation: the latter, in its zeal for the preservation of social unity, excluded every individual and family right; the former, on the contrary, has amalgamated the interests of the individual with those of families and society, so that they neither destroy nor embarrass each other. Thus, besides the sphere within which the action of the civil power is properly confined, there are others into which it has no right to enter, and in which individuals and families live without clashing with the colossal force of the government.

 



It is just to observe here, that Catholicity has done much for the maintenance of this principle, which is a strong guarantee of the liberty of the people. The separation of the two powers temporal and spiritual, the independence of the latter with respect to the former, the distinction of the persons in whom it is vested: such has been one of the principal causes of this liberty, which, under different forms of government, is the common inheritance of European nations. Ever since the foundation of the Church, this principle of the independence of the spiritual power has at all times served, by the mere fact of its existence, to remind men that the rights of civil power are limited, that there are things beyond its province, cases in which a man may say, and ought to say,

I will not obey

.



This is another of those cases in which Protestantism has given a wrong direction to the civilisation of Europe, and in which, far from opening the way to liberty, it has riveted the chains of slavery. Its first step was the abolition of the Pontifical authority, the overthrow of the hierarchy, the refusal to grant to the Church any kind of power whatever, and the placing of spiritual supremacy in the hands of princes; that is to say, it has retrograded towards pagan civilisation, in which we find the sceptre united with the pontificate. The grand political problem was precisely the separation of these two powers, in order to save society from subjection to one sole unlimited authority, exercising its faculties without restraint, and from which might consequently be expected vexation and oppression. This separation was effected without any political views, any fixed design on the part of men, wherever Catholicity was established; for her discipline required and her dogmas inculcated it. Is it not strange that the advocates of theories of equilibrium and counterpoise, who have so loudly extolled the utility of separating powers, and of dividing authority among them with a view to prevent it from being converted into tyranny, should not have noticed the profound wisdom of this Catholic doctrine, even when considered merely in a social and political point of view? But no; it is remarkable, on the contrary, that all modern revolutions have manifested a decided tendency towards the amalgamation of the civil and ecclesiastical powers – a convincing proof that these revolutions have proceeded from an origin contrary to the generative principle of European civilisation, and that instead of guiding it towards perfection, they have rather served to lead it astray. The union of Church and State in England, under the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, produced the most cruel despotism; and if that country at a later period acquired a higher degree of liberty, it was not assuredly owing to that religious authority given by Protestantism to the head of the state, but in spite of it. It is worthy of remark, that in later times, when England entered upon a more extensive sphere of liberty, it was owing to the diminution of the civil power on all matters appertaining to religion, and to a greater development of Catholicity, opposed in its very principles to this monstrous supremacy. In the North of Europe, where the Protestant system has also prevailed, civil authority has been unlimited; and even at the present time, we find the Emperor of Russia indulging in the most barbarous persecutions against Catholics; more distrustful of those who defend the independence of spiritual power, than of the revolutionary clubs. The autocrat is devoured with a thirst for unlimited authority, and a decided instinct urges him to attack in particular the Catholic religion, which forms his principal obstacle.



It is remarkable with what uniformity all power, in this respect, tends to despotism, whether under a revolutionary or monarchical form. Impatient of the restraint laid upon him by the spiritual power, Louis XIV. attempted to crush the power of Rome. He was urged to it by the same motives as the Constituent Assembly; the monarch rested his cause upon the rights of royalty, and the liberties of the Gallican Church – the Constituent Assembly invoked the rights of the nation, and the principles of philosophy; but in the main they were actuated by one and the same motive, that of ascertaining whether or not civil power should be restricted: in the former case, it was monarchy tending to despotism; in the latter, democracy advancing to the terrors of the Convention. When Napoleon wished to bruise the head of the revolutionary hydra, to reorganize society, to create a power, he made use of religion as the most potent element. Catholicity was the only predominating religion in France; to this he had recourse, and signed the

Concordat

. But, observe, that no sooner did he imagine his work of reparation complete, and the critical moment of the establishment of his power passed, than he began to think of extending it, of freeing himself from all restraint. He began to look upon that pontiff, whose presence at his coronation had so much gratified him, with a more supercilious eye. At first he had some serious disputes with him, and ended by becoming his most inveterate enemy.



These observations, to which I invite the attention of every reflecting mind, acquire more importance from the consideration of what has taken place in our own religious and most Catholic monarchy. In spite of the preponderating influence of the Catholic religion in Spain, the principle of resistance to the court of Rome has ever been preserved in a particular and remarkable manner; thus, whilst the Austrian dynasty and the Bourbons endeavoured to lay aside our old laws, so far as they were favourable to political liberty, they preserved as a sacred deposit the traditional resistance of Ferdinand the Catholic, of Charles V., and of Philip II. The deep root which Catholicity had taken in Spain doubtless prevented matters from being carried to extremes; but it is no less true that the germ existed, and was handed down from generation to generation, as if its complete development was expected at some more favourable period. This fact was placed in peculiarly strong relief at the time of the Bourbon accession, when the monarchy of Louis XIV. was introduced amongst us, and the last vestiges of the ancient liberties of Castile, Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia disappeared; the mania for kingly rights was at its height in the reigns of Charles III. and Charles IV. Strange coincidence! The epoch in which the greatest jealousy was entertained against the Court of Rome and the independence of Church authority, was exactly that in which ministerial despotism was in its greatest force, and in which there was seen something still worse – the despotism of a favorite, with all its pitiful show. True, the ideas of the French schools were at that time influencing Spain; and of this neither the King, nor, probably, some of his ministers, were aware: but this does not militate against the reflections we are making; on the contrary, it comes in support of them, by showing their applicability to circumstances quite dissimilar, and consequently their soundness and importance. The object here aimed at was the overthrow of the established authority, to make way for another equally unlimited; to effect this, it was necessary to urge on the former to abuse its prerogatives, and, at the same time, to establish precedents to fall back upon, so soon as the revolution should have displaced the absolute monarchy. What important reflections are here presented to us! What strange analogies rise to view between circumstances apparently most antagonistic! In our times, we have seen bishops brought to trial from the same motives that were alleged in a celebrated cause in the reign of Charles III.; and the

Supreme Tribunals

 of our own days have heard from the lips of their

fiscals

2

2


  Crown attorneys, charged with the prosecution of criminal and other causes.



 the same doctrines formerly propounded by those of the

Council

. Thus do doctrines meet, and thus, by different ways, do we arrive at the same end. According to the ancient

fiscals

, the authority of the king was every thing; the rights of the crown, like the ark of old, were held so sacred, that to touch, or even to look upon them, was accounted a sacrilege. Well, the ancient monarchy has disappeared – the throne is no longer any thing more than a shadow of what it once was – the Revolution has triumphed over it; and yet, despite a change so profound, it is not long since a

fiscal

 of the Supreme Tribunal, charging a bishop with an offence against the rights of the civil power, made use of these words: "In the state, a leaf cannot be plucked without the permission of government." These words need no comment; the writer of these lines heard them uttered; and this plain, unequivocal declaration of arbitrary power seemed to him to throw a new ray of light upon history.



The gravity and importance of this subject required this digression; it was incumbent on me to show how far the Catholic principle of the independence of spiritual power may serve the cause of true liberty. This principle, in fact, eminently teaches that the faculties of civil power are limited, and it is, consequently, a perpetual condemnation of despotism. To revert to the original question. It remains, then, established, that we are to be subject to the civil power so long as it does not go beyond its proper limits; but that the Catholic doctrine never enjoins obedience when civil power oversteps the limits of its faculties.



It will not be uninteresting to the reader to learn how the principle of obedience was understood by one of the most illustrious interpreters of Catholic doctrine – by the holy Doctor so often cited. According to him, whenever laws are unjust (and observe, that, in his opinion, they may be so in many ways), they are not binding on conscience, unless for fear of creating scandal, or causing greater evils; that is to say, that, in certain cases, an unjust law may become obligatory, not by virtue of any duty which it imposes, but from motives of prudence. These are his words, to which I crave the reader's particular attention: "Laws are unjust in two ways; either because they are opposed to the common weal; or on account of their aim, as is the case when a government imposes upon its subjects onerous laws, not for the good of the commonweal, but for the sake of self-interest or ambition; or on account of their author, as when any one makes a law without being invested with proper faculties; again, they may be unjust in form, as when the taxes are unequally divided among the multitude, although in other respects tending to the public good. Such laws are rather outrages than laws; since, as St. Augustin observes (lib. i.

de Lib. Arb.

 cap. 5), 'An unjust law does not appear to be a law.' Such laws, therefore, are not binding in conscience, unless, perhaps, for the avoiding of scandal and trouble – a motive which ought to induce man to give up his right, as St. Matthew observes: 'And whosoever shall force thee to go one mile, go with him other two; and if any man will go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also.' Laws may also be unjust in another point of view, when they are contrary to the will of God; as the laws of tyrants enforcing idolatry, or anything else contrary to divine law. With respect to such laws, it is not allowable, under any circumstances, to obey them; for, as it is said in the Acts of the Apostles, 'We must obey God rather than man.'" "Injustæ autem sunt leges dupliciter; uno modo per contrarietatem ad bonum commune e contrario prædictis, vel ex fine, sicut cum aliquis præsidens leges imponit onerosas subditis non pertinentes ad utilitatem communem, sed magis ad propriam cupiditatem vel gloriam; vel etiam ex auctore, sicut cum aliquis legem fert ultra sibi commissam potestatem; vel etiam ex forma cum inæqualiter onera multitudinis dispensantur, etiamsi ordinentur ad bonum commune; et hujusmodi magis sunt violentiæ quam leges, quia sicut Augustinus dicit (lib. i.

de Lib. Arb.

 cap. 5, parum a princ.) lex esse non videtur quæ justa non fuerit, unde tales leges in foro conscientiæ non obligant, nisi forte propter vitandum scandalum vel turbationem, propter quod etiam homo juri suo cedere debet secundum illud Math. cap. v. 'Qui te angariaverit mille passus, vade cum eo alia duo, et qui abstulerit tibi tunicam da ei et pallium.' Alio modo leges possunt esse injustæ per contrarietatem ad bonum divinum, sicut leges tyrannorum inducentes ad idololatriam, vel ad quodcumque aliud quod sit contra legem divinam, et tales leges nullo modo licet observare, quia sicut dicitur Act. cap. v.: 'Obedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus.'" (

D. Th.

 1, 2, quæst. 90, art. 1.)

 



This doctrine furnishes us with the following rules:



1. We cannot, under any circumstances, obey the civil power when its commands are opposed to the divine law.



2. When laws are unjust, they are not binding in conscience.



3. It may become necessary to obey these laws from motives of prudence; that is, in order to avoid scandal and commotions.



4. Laws are unjust from some one of the following causes:



When they are opposed to the common weal – when their aim is not the good of the commonweal – when the legislator outsteps the limits of his faculties – when, although in other respects tending to the good of the commonweal, and proceeding from competent authority, they do not observe suitable equity; for instance, when they divide unequally the public imposts.



We have quoted and copied the venerable text whence these rules are derived: their illustrious author has been the guide of all the theological schools during the last six centuries; his authority has never been called in question in these schools on points of dogma or morality; these rules may, therefore, be regarded as the recapitulation of the doctrines of Catholic theologians with reference to the obedience due to authority. We may now, without doubt, appeal with entire confidence to every man of good sense. Let him judge whether these doctrines are in the least inclined to despotism, whether they have the least tendency to tyranny, in fine, whether they aim the slightest blow at liberty. It is vain to seek in them the slightest appearance of flattery to the civil power, whose limits are marked out with rigorous severity; if it outsteps them, it is openly told, "Thy laws are not laws, but outrages; they are not binding in conscience; and if, in some instances, thou art obeyed, it is not owing to any obligation, but to prudence, in order to avoid scandal and commotion; it is thenceforth such a dishonor to thee, that thy triumph, far from entitling thee to renown, assimilates thee to the robber who despoils the peaceable man of his garment, and to whom the latter, for the sake of peace, gives up his cloak also." If these are doctrines of oppression and despotism, we also are advocates for such oppression and despotism; for we cannot conceive doctrines more favorable to liberty.



Upon these principles the admirable institution of European monarchy was founded. This teaching has created the moral defences by which that monarchy is surrounded; defences restraining it within the limits of its duties, even where political guarantees do not exist. The mind, wearied with foolish declamations against the

tyranny of kings

, and, on the other hand, not less tired of the boisterous adulations lavished upon power in modern times, expands and rejoices on meeting with this pure, disinterested, and sincere expression of the rights and duties of governments and of people, on hearing this language, impressed with as much of wisdom as of upright intention and generous freedom. What books were consulted by men making use of such language? The Scriptures, the Fathers, the collections of ecclesiastical documents. Could they have received their inspirations from the society which surrounded them? No; for in that same society disorder and confusion prevailed; sometimes a turbulent disobedience, at others despotism was predominant. And yet they speak with as much discretion, tact, and calmness as if they were living in the midst of well-regulated society. They were guided by divine revelation, which taught them truth. How often did they see it forgotten and trampled under foot! But uninfluenced by circumstances, h