67. Overwhelmed by these difficulties, and unable to reconcile the reality which space offers us with nothing, or to conceive in any thing created the immobility, infinity, and perpetuity which we imagine in space, some philosophers have put forth the opinion that space is the immensity of God. At first sight this seems an extravagant absurdity, but if we wish fairly to prove the falsity of this opinion, we must do justice not only to the right intention of those who have defended it, and the sound explanations which they brought to their assistance, but also to the reasons which forced them to this extremity, and which, though certainly not weighty or solid, are far from being so contemptible as one may imagine.
68. The argument in favor of this opinion may be put in the following form. Space is something. Before God created the world space existed. It is not possible to conceive bodies as existing without space in which they are extended. Before they exist, we conceive this capacity in which they may be placed, as already existing. Therefore, space is eternal. There is no motion without space; and in the first instant of the creation bodies could move and be moved. Though we suppose only one body in the world, it could be moved; and this motion could be infinitely continued. Therefore space is infinite. Annihilate now this body also, and the extension in which it moved will remain; in it new bodies, new worlds may be created. Therefore space is indestructible. But an eternal, infinite, and indestructible being cannot be created. Therefore, space is uncreated. Therefore it is God himself. But it must be God inasmuch as we conceive him in relation to extension; and, therefore, space is the immensity of God. Immensity is the attribute by which God is in every part; it is an attribute which relates to extension. Space is, therefore, the immensity of God. Only by adopting this theory can we reasonably admit that space is eternal, infinite, and indestructible.
69. The objection to this opinion is that it destroys the simplicity of God. If space is a property of God, it is God; for, whatever is in God, is God. Therefore, as space is essentially extended, God too must be extended.
Clarke saw the force of this argument; he was made to feel it by the arguments of his adversary, Leibnitz; but he answers it very weakly. He says that space has parts, but they are not separable. But, however this may be, it is certain that space has parts. True, in the idea of space we distinguish parts without separating them; but we really conceive them in it, and we cannot conceive space without them. Besides, if we should admit this theory, what would become of the proofs of the immateriality of the soul? If the infinite wisdom is extended, why may not the human soul with much more reason be so?
Carried away by his favorite idea, Clarke went so far as to write what we should not have expected from such a man, that: "In questions of this nature, when we speak of parts, we mean parts that are separable, composite, and disunited like those of matter, which for this reason is always a compound and never a simple substance. Matter is not one substance, but a composition of substances. This is why, in my opinion, matter is incapable of thinking. This incapacity does not proceed from extension, but from the parts being distinct substances, disunited, and independent of each other."45 This explanation tends to destroy the simplicity of thinking beings; for by simplicity has always been understood the absolute wanting of all parts and not the absence of this or that kind of parts. Inseparability does not destroy the existence of parts; it merely asserts the force of cohesion.
70. It is also to be feared that this doctrine opens the door to pantheism. It was even objected to Clarke that it made God the soul of the world, and although he defended himself from this charge, there still remains an objection which was not proposed to him, and which is a very serious one. If we say that God is space, or that space is a property of God, what hinders our saying that God is the world, or that the world is a property of God? The world is extended; but so is space. If God and space are not contradictory ideas in the same being, why are God and the universe contradictory? Clarke says that bodies are composed of different substances, that they are not one substance; but it is certain that all we know of bodies is that they are extended, and that they cause certain impressions in us. Since, then, extension is not repugnant to God, and much less so the causality of impressions, there can be no reason against saying that what Clarke calls distinct substances, are only the parts, or, if he prefers it, the properties of the infinite substance. Newton went so far as to say that space was the sensorium of God, and even Clarke maintained against Leibnitz that Newton's expression might bear a sound interpretation, as it was intended only as a comparison. But Leibnitz insists so strongly on this charge that it is plain that he had very great objections to this word.
71. Whatever tends to confound God with nature, or to place him in constant communication with it, otherwise than by pure acts of intellect and will, places us on a very slippery declivity, where we can hardly help being precipitated to the bottom, and at this bottom is pantheism, which is but a phasis of atheism.(30)
72. Clarke's opinion is very similar to that of Fenelon, who in his Treatise on the existence and attributes of God, explains immensity in a very surprising manner. He says: "After considering the eternity and immutability of God, which are the same thing, I ought to examine his immensity. Since he is by himself, he is sovereignly, and since he is sovereignly, he has all being in himself. Since he has all being in himself, he has without doubt extension; extension is a manner of being, of which I have an idea. I have already seen that my ideas upon the essence of things, are real degrees of being, which actually exist in God, and are possible out of him, because he can produce them. Therefore, extension is in him; he can produce it outside of himself, only because it is contained in the fulness of his being."
To a certain extent the words of Fenelon may be explained in a sense which most theologians would not reject. They distinguish two classes of perfections; those which involve no imperfection; such as wisdom, holiness, and justice; and those which involve imperfection, as, for example, all which belong to bodies, extension, form, etc. The former, which are also called perfections simpliciter, are in God formaliter; that is to say, just as they are, because their nature involves no kind of imperfection, and, therefore, in God, they do not diminish nor tarnish his infinite perfection. Those of the second class, which are called perfections secundum quid, are in God not formaliter; for the imperfection which they involve is repugnant to his infinite perfection, but virtualiter or eminenter; that is to say, that all the perfection, all the being which they contain is in God, who is infinite perfection, infinite being; and God can produce them exteriorly by his creative omnipotence. But inasmuch as they pre-exist in an infinite being, they are freed from all limitation and imperfection, and identified with the infinite essence, and have a mode of being far superior to what they are in reality. This is expressed by the term eminenter.
Among these perfections secundum quid, extension has always been numbered.
73. If the illustrious Archbishop of Cambrai had held to this sense, we should have nothing to say in relation to his doctrine, but the words which follow seem to show that he inclined to the opinion of those who maintain that space is the immensity of God.
"Whence, then," he adds, "is it that I do not call him extended and corporeal? It is because there is an extreme difference, as I have already remarked, between attributing to God all that is positive in extension, and attributing to him extension with a limit or negation. He that places extension without limits changes extension into immensity; he who places extension with limits, makes a corporeal nature." From these words it might be believed that Fenelon did not distinguish the two modes of being of extension as theologians do; but he gives to God all that is positive in extension, though he gives it to him without limit. From this it would seem to follow that God is really extended, although his extension is infinite. With all the respect due to the illustrious shade of one of the greatest ornaments of the Catholic Church, and one of the greatest men of modern times, I must say that such an opinion does not seem to me to be sustainable. A God really extended though with an infinite extension is not God. That which is extended is essentially composite; God is essentially simple. Therefore, God and extension are contradictory.
74. But let us hear the illustrious prelate continue the explanation and defence of his opinion. He says: "From the moment that you place no limit to extension, you take from it figure, divisibility, motion, and impenetrability; – figure, because this is only a mode of limiting by surfaces; – divisibility, because, as we have seen, that which is infinite cannot be diminished, therefore, it cannot be divided, and consequently, it is not composite and divisible; – motion, because, if you suppose a whole, which has no parts nor limits, it cannot move beyond its place, because there can be no place beyond the true infinite; neither can it change the arrangement and situation of its parts, because it has no parts of which it is composed; – impenetrability, in fine, because impenetrability can only be conceived by conceiving two limited bodies, one of which is not the other, and cannot occupy the same space as the other. There are no two such bodies in infinite and indivisible extension; therefore there is no impenetrability in this extension. These principles established, it follows that all that is positive in extension is in God, although God has no figure, is not movable, divisible, or impenetrable, and consequently is not palpable, nor measurable."
From this passage it is very evident that Fenelon was far from imagining a composite God, a God with parts. He expressly denies it more than once in these few lines. Not less was to be looked for from his deep penetration and the purity of his doctrines; but, although this saves the rectitude of his intention, it does not satisfy philosophical exactness. For my part, I honestly confess that if extension is to be taken in its true sense, I cannot conceive how taking away its limits destroys its parts. On the contrary, I should rather say that an infinite extension would have infinite parts. If it is infinite it will have no figure; because figure involves a limit; but if it be true extension, it is a sort of immense field on which all imaginable figures may be traced. It will have no essential figure of its own, but it will be the recipient of all figures, the inexhaustible sea from which they all arise. That which is traced in it, will be in it; the points which terminate the figures must be in it. Is not this to have parts, composition? Infinite extension could have no figure, not because it has no parts, or is simple, but because it has infinite parts, because its composition is infinite.
I agree that an infinite extension would not be divisible, if by dividing, is meant separating; because in that immense fulness everything would be in its position with infinite firmness. So also we imagine space, the place of all motion, with its parts immovable, the field of all separation, with its parts inseparable; but we are treating of division, not of separation. If there is true extension, it is divisible; we conceive space with its parts inseparable, but still divisible; for we measure them, count them, and it is by relation to them that we form an idea of the size, distance, and motion of bodies.
74. Such clear and conclusive reflections could not fail to present themselves to the mind of the illustrious philosopher; but he seems to have preferred inconsequence or obscurity of language to the fatal corollaries of his first proposition. He said plainly and without any restriction, that all that is positive in extension, except the limit, is in God. He had asserted that extension with limits is corporeal, and that to change extension into immensity it was only necessary to take away its limits. He consequently attributed to God a true, although infinite, extension, and then wishing to explain and strengthen his doctrine he tells us that this extension has no parts. What is extension without parts? Who can conceive it? Does not extension necessarily imply an order of things of which some are outside of others. It has been always so understood. To speak of an extension without parts is to speak of an extension improperly so called. When speaking of such extension it is not enough to say it has no limits, it should be added that it is of an entirely different nature, that the word extension is used in another sense. Fenelon seemed to know this, when, notwithstanding the obscurity of his former expressions, elevated on the wings of his religion and his genius, he says: "God is in no place, as in no time; for his absolute and infinite being has no relation to place or time, which are but limits and restrictions of being. To ask if he is beyond the universe, if he exceeds its extremities in length, breadth, and depth, is as absurd a question as to ask if he was before the world, and if he will still be when the world is no more. As there is neither past nor future in God, so there is neither hither nor thither. As his absolute permanence excludes all measure of succession, so also his immensity excludes all measure of extension. He has not been, he will not be, but he is. In the same manner, to speak properly, he is not here, he is not there, he is not beyond such a limit, but he is, absolutely. All expressions which place him in relation to any term, or fix him in a certain place, are improper and unbecoming. Where then is he? He is. He is in such a manner that we must not ask where. That which only half is, or with limits, is a certain thing in such a way that it is nothing else. But God is not any particular and restricted thing. He is all; he is being; or better and more simply, he is. For the fewer words we use, the more we say. He is. Beware of adding any thing to this."
76. While reading these magnificent words, I am carried away by the elevation and grandeur of his ideas of God and of his immensity, and I forget the objections to the first proposition, which, if not false or inexact, is not, to say the least, expressed with all the clearness that could be desired. Still, I do not hesitate to maintain that his opinion coincides with Clarke's; although the illustrious writer, Christian, and poet, seem to merit a pardon for the philosopher.
77. Descartes' opinion wholly confounds space and bodies, making the essence of bodies consist in extension, and asserting that wherever there is space, there is body. This opinion we have seen to be void of all reasonable foundation. Perhaps he would come nearer the truth who should say, that in reality space is nothing more than the extension of bodies, without reference to the question whether extension does or does not constitute the essence of bodies, and denying its infinity.
78. Let us examine this last opinion. Analyzing the origin of the idea of space, we find that it is merely the idea of extension taken in the abstract. If I hold before my eyes an orange, I may, by means of abstractions, arrive at the idea of a pure extension, equal to that of the orange. In order to do this, I begin by abstracting its color, taste, smell, and all its qualities which affect the senses. I then have left only an extended being, and if I take from it its mobility, it is reduced to a part of space equal to the size of the orange.
It is plain that the same abstraction is possible in relation to the universe, and the result will be the idea of all the space which the universe occupies.
79. Here I shall answer an objection which might be made to this explanation of the idea of space, and thereby take advantage of this opportunity to throw some light upon the origin of the idea of infinite, or imaginary space.
The difficulty is this. If we form the idea of space by the mere abstraction of the qualities which accompany extension, we can only conceive a space equal to the size of the body from which we have abstracted all its sensible qualities. The abstraction made upon an orange can only give a space equal to the size of the orange, and that made upon the universe can only give a space equal to what we conceive in the universe. Consequently, we can never, by this means, obtain the idea of a space without limits which always presents itself to our mind when we think of space considered in itself.
The solution of this difficulty is in the truth that abstraction rises from the particular to the general. From the idea of gold, by abstracting those properties which constitute gold, and attending only to those which it possesses as metal, I arrive at the much more general idea of metal, which belongs not only to gold, but to all other metals. By this abstraction I pass the limit which separates gold from other metals, and form an idea which extends to all, neither specifying, nor excluding any. If from the idea of metal I abstract all that constitutes metal, and attend only to what constitutes mineral, I pass another limit, and arrive at a still more general idea. Thus passing successively the idea of inorganic, of body, and of substance, until I come to the idea of being, I thus form the most general idea possible, and which includes every thing.46
Thus passing over the limits which distinguish and, as it were, separate objects, abstraction rises to the most general. If we apply this doctrine to the abstractions made upon bodies, we shall discover the reason of the illimitability of the idea of space.
When after the abstractions made upon the orange, I have left only the idea of its extension, the abstraction has not reached the highest point possible; for my conception is not that of extension in itself, but only of the extension of the orange; I conceive its extension, not extension itself. But if I abstract all that makes this extension the extension of the orange, and attend only to extension in itself, then the idea of figure disappears, the extension expands indefinitely, it is impossible for me to assign any term to it, for any limit would make it a determinate, a particular extension, not extension in itself. Then the frontiers of the universe, so to speak, disappear; for however great the universe may be, it is limited, and can give only a particular extension, not extension itself. This is the manner in which the idea of imaginary space seems to be formed.
80. An observation of the phenomena of the imagination will confirm what we have explained by the mere order of intelligence. When I imagine the extension of an orange, I imagine it with a limit, with this or that color, and with these or those qualities; since it is not possible for me to imagine a figure without lines which terminate it. This limit in the imagination is distinct both from the extension which it encloses, and from the extension which it excludes. If it were not so distinguished, we could not imagine it as limit, and it would not answer its object, which is to enable us to distinguish that which it encloses. Therefore, the abstraction is not complete. In the imagination there is always something determinate, which is the limit or the lines which constitute the limit. Destroy these limits, and the imagination expands, until it becomes lost in a sort of dark, unbounded abyss, such as we imagine beyond the universe.
A very simple example will make this explanation clearer. Our imagination may be compared to a black board on which a figure is marked with chalk. When we see the white line on the board which forms the figure, we see the figure also; but if we rub out the line, there remains only the uniform figure of the board. If we suppose the lines which terminate the black board to be indefinitely withdrawn, we shall look in vain for a figure; we see only a black surface indefinitely extended. There is a sufficient parity between this and the manner in which the imagination pictures to itself an endless space.
81. The idea of an abstract extension which is limited, is a contradiction. Limit takes from extension generality; and generality destroys the limit. There can, therefore, be no abstract idea of limited extension; but when we form an idea of extension in the abstract, we conceive it as unlimited, and the imagination attempting to follow the understanding, pictures to itself an indefinite space.
82. Summing up this doctrine, and deducing its inevitable consequences, we may say:
I. That space is nothing else than the extension of bodies.
II. That the idea of space is the idea of extension.
III. That the different parts conceived in space are the ideas of particular extensions, from which we have not taken their limits.
IV. That the idea of infinite space is the idea of extension in general, abstracted from all limit.
V. That indefinite space arises necessarily from the imagination, which destroys the limit in attempting to follow the generalizing march of the understanding.
VI. That where there is no body there is no space.
VII. That what is called distance is only the interposition of a body.
VIII. That if every intermediate body be taken away, distance ceases; there is then contiguity, and, consequently, absolute contact.
IX. That if there were only two bodies in existence, it would be metaphysically impossible for them to be distant from each other.
X. That all vacuum, of whatever kind, or however obtained, is absolutely impossible.
83. These are the consequences which follow from the principle explained in this chapter.
If the reader ask me what I think of them and of the principle on which they are based, I frankly confess that, although the principle seems true and the conclusions legitimate, still the strangeness of some of them, and yet more so with regard to others which I shall point out as we come to them, makes me suspect that there is some error concealed in the principle, or else the reasoning which deduces these consequences contains some defect which is not easy to discover. I do not put forth a settled opinion, so much as a series of conjectures, with the arguments in their favor. The reader may see by this what sense I attach to the word demonstration, when in the sequel he sees it often employed in treating of the deduction of certain consequences which are exceedingly strange, although, in my opinion, deserving a careful attention. I say this not only to explain what is passing in my own mind, but also to warn the reader against too great confidence on these points, whatever may be the opinion which he adopts. Before commencing these investigations on space, I remarked that the arguments on both sides seemed equally conclusive; which shows that the human reason has reached its bounds, and makes us suspect that this investigation is beyond the sphere to which the mind is restricted by a primary condition of its nature.
However this may be, let us continue to conjecture; and although we cannot pass beyond certain limits, let us exercise the understanding by examining them in their full extent. Thus, if we were placed on a very elevated ground with deep precipices on all sides, we should take pleasure in walking around the circumference, and gazing upon the immense depth under our feet.
I shall now proceed to deduce other results, and to solve as far as possible the difficulties which arise, making some applications, the immense importance of which produces uncertainty and causes fear.