The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. 12 (of 12)

The Lord Chancellor here said,—The opinion of the Lords can only be with me matter of conjecture. I certainly was not commanded by the House to state the observation that had occurred to me; but in the position in which it now stands, I feel no difficulty in saying, as my own judgment, that nothing can be matter in reply that does not relate to those articles that were pressed in the original charge; and therefore, in this position of the business of reply, you cannot go into new matter arising out of other articles that were not originally insisted upon.

Mr. Burke. We were aware of the objection that might be made to admitting our observations, if considered as observations upon the 17th article, but not when considered with reference to facts on the record before you, for the purpose of disproving the principles upon which the defendant and his counsel had relied: that was the purpose for which we proposed chiefly to make them. But your Lordship's [the Lord Chancellor's] own personal authority will have great weight with us, and, unless we perceive some other peer differ from you, we will take it in the course we have constantly done. We never have sent your Lordships out of the hall to consent [consult?] upon a matter upon which that noble lord appeared to have formed a decision in his own mind; we take for granted that what is delivered from the woolsack, to which no peer expresses a dissent, is the sense of the House; as such we take it, and as such we submit to it in this instance.

Therefore, leaving this upon the record as it stands, without observing upon it, and submitting to your Lordships' decision, that we cannot, according to order, observe in reply upon what was not declared by us to be a part of the charges we meant to insist upon, we proceed to another business.]

We have already stated to your Lordships, and we beg to remind you of it, the state and condition of the country of Oude when Mr. Hastings first came to it,—his subsequent and immediate usurpation of all the powers of government, and the use he made of them,—the tyranny he exercised over the Nabob himself,—the tyranny he exercised upon his mother and grandmother, and all the other females of his family, and their dependants of every description, to the number of about eight hundred persons,—the tyranny exercised (though we are not at liberty to press it now) upon his brethren. We have shown you how he confiscated the property of all the jaghiredars, the nobility of the country. We have proved to your Lordships that he was well acquainted with all the misery and distress occasioned by these proceedings, and that he afforded the sufferers no relief. We now proceed to review the effect of this general mass of usurpation, tyranny, and oppression upon the revenues and the prosperity of the country.

Your Lordships will first be pleased to advert to the state in which Mr. Hastings found the country,—in what state he found its revenues,—who were the executive ministers of the government,—what their conduct was, and by whom they were recommended and supported. For the evidence of these facts we refer your Lordships to your printed Minutes: there, my Lords, they stand recorded: they never can be expunged out of your record, and the memory of mankind, whether we be permitted to press them at this time upon your Lordships or not. Your Lordships will there find in what manner the government was carried on in Oude in 1775, before the period of Mr. Hastings's usurpation. Mr. Hastings, you will find, has himself there stated that the minister was recommended by the Begums; and you will remark this, because Mr. Hastings afterwards makes her interference in the government of her son a part of his crimination of the Begum.

The Resident at the court of Oude thus writes on the 2d of March, 1775.

"Notwithstanding the confidence the Nabob reposes in Murtezza Khân, the Begums are much dissatisfied with his elevation. They recommended to his Excellency to encourage the old servants of the government, whose influence in the country, and experience, might have strengthened his own authority, and seated him firmly on the musnud. In some measure this, too, may appear consistent with the interests of the Company; for, as Elija Khân and the old ministers have by frequent instances within their own knowledge experienced the power of our government, such men, I should conceive, are much more likely to pay deference to the Company than a person who at present can have but a very imperfect idea of the degree of attention which ought to be paid to our connection with the Nabob."

Your Lordships see that the Begums recommended the old servants, contrary to the maxims of Rehoboam,—those who had served his father and had served the country, and who were strongly inclined to support the English interest there. Your Lordships will remark the effects of the Begum's influence upon the state of things in 1775, that the Nabob had been advised by his mother to employ the confidential servants of his father,—persons conversant in the affairs of the country, persons interested in it, and persons who were well disposed to support the English connection. Your Lordships will now attend to a letter from Mr. Bristow, at Lucknow, to the board, dated 28th November, 1775.

"I also neglected no part of my duty on the spot, but advised the minister, even at Lucknow, according to my letter of the 3d instant, to recommend it to the Nabob to dismiss his useless and mutinous troops, which measure seems by present appearances to have succeeded beyond expectation: as the rest of the army do now pay the greatest attention to his Excellency's orders; already the complaints of the violences the troops used to commit are greatly decreased; they profess obedience; and, by the best intelligence I can obtain of their disposition, there seems to be little doubt that the example made by disbanding Bussunt's corps has every good effect we could wish, which had crossed the river and voluntarily surrendered their arms the day before yesterday to the Nabob."

His next letter is dated 13th June, 1776.

"Honorable Sir and Sirs,—It is Elija Khân's first object to regulate the Vizier's revenue; and I must do him the justice to say, that the short time he has been in office he has been indefatigable, and already settled the greater part of the province of Oude, and fixed on the districts for the assignments of the army subsidy; Corah and Allahabad he has disposed of, and called for the Dooab and Rohilcund accounts, in order to adjust them as soon as possible. This activity will, I hope, produce the most salutary effects,—as, the present juncture being the commencement of the season for the cultivation, the aumils, by being thus early placed in their offices, have the opportunity of advancing tukavy, encouraging the ryots, and making their agreements in their several districts, in letting under-farms, or disposing of the lands in such a manner as they may judge most expedient. If, though similar to the late minister's conduct, a delay of two or three months should occur in the settlement of the lands, the people throughout the country would be disheartened, and inevitably a very heavy balance accrue on the revenue. I have troubled the honorable board with this detail, in the first place, to show the propriety of Elija Khân's conduct, and, in the next, the essential service that will be rendered to the Vizier by continuing Colonel Parker's detachment during the whole rains in Corah, if required by the Vizier."

My Lords, you have now had a view of the state of Oude, previous to the first period of our connection with it. Your Lordships have seen and understand that part of the middle period, with which we do not mean to trouble you again. You will now be pleased to attend to a letter from Fyzoola Khân to the Governor-General, received the 13th of February, 1778.

"This country of Cuttah, which formerly depended on the Rohilla States, and which I consider as now appertaining to the Company, was very populous and flourishing; but since the commencement of the Nabob Vizier's government, the farmers appointed by his ministers have desolated the country. Its situation is at present very ruinous; thousands of villages, formerly populous, are now utterly deserted, and no trace left of them. I have already written to Roy Buckstowr Sing a full account of the tyranny and oppression exercised by the farmers, to be communicated to you: the constant revenue of a country depends on the care of its rulers to preserve it in a flourishing state. I have been induced to make the representation by my attachment to the interest of the Company; for otherwise it is no concern of mine. Should these oppressions continue one or two years longer, and the rulers take no measures to put a stop to them, the whole country will be a desert."

My Lords, upon these statements I have only to make this remark,—that you have seen the first state of this country, and that the period when it had fallen into the state last described was about two years after Mr. Hastings had obtained the majority in the Council and began to govern this country by his lieutenants. We know that the country was put by him under military collectors: you see the consequences. The person who makes this representation to Mr. Hastings of the state of the country, of its distress and calamity, and of the desolation of a thousand of the villages formerly flourishing in it, is no less a person than a prince of a neighboring country, a person of whom you have often heard, and to whom the cause of humanity is much indebted, namely, Fyzoola Khân,—a prince whose country the English Resident, travelling through, declares to be cultivated like a garden. That this was the state of the Rohilla country is owing to its having very fortunately been one of those that escaped the dominion of Mr. Hastings.

We will now read to your Lordships a letter from Sir Eyre Coote to the board at Calcutta, dated the 11th of September, 1779.

"Honorable Sir and Sirs,—The day before yesterday I encamped near Allahabad, where the Vizier did me the honor of a visit; and yesterday morning, in my way hither, I returned it, and was received by his Excellency with every mark of respect and distinction. This morning he called here, and we had some general conversation, which principally turned upon the subject of his attachment to the English, and his readiness to show the sincerity of it upon all occasions. It is to be wished we had employed the influence which such favorable sentiments must have given us more to the benefit of the country and ourselves; but I fear the distresses which evidently appear on the face of the one, and the failure of the revenues to the other, are not to be wholly ascribed to the Vizier's mismanagement."

This is the testimony of Mr. Hastings's own pensioner, Sir Eyre Coote, respecting the known state of the country during the time of this horrible usurpation, which Sir Eyre Coote mentions under the soft name of our influence. But there could be but one voice upon the subject, and that your Lordships shall now hear from Mr. Hastings himself. We refer your Lordships to the Minute of the Governor-General's Consultation, Fort William, 21st May, 1781: he is here giving his reasons for going into the upper provinces.

"The province of Oude having fallen into a state of great disorder and confusion, its resources being in an extraordinary degree diminished, and the Nabob Asoph ul Dowlah having earnestly entreated the presence of the Governor-General, and declared, that, unless some effectual measures are taken for his relief, he must be under the necessity of leaving his country, and coming down to Calcutta, to present his situation to this government,—the Governor-General therefore proposes, with the concurrence of Mr. Wheler, to visit the province of Oude as speedily as the affairs of the Presidency will admit, in hopes that, from a minute and personal observation of the circumstances of that country, the system of management which has been adopted, and the characters and conduct of the persons employed, he may possibly be able to concert and establish some plan by which the province of Oude may in time be restored to its former state of affluence, good order, and prosperity."

Your Lordships have now the whole chain of the evidence complete, with regard to the state of the country, up to the period of Mr. Hastings's journey into the country. You see that Mr. Hastings himself admits it to have been formerly in a most flourishing, orderly, and prosperous state. Its condition in 1781 he describes to you in words than which no enemy of his can use stronger, in order to paint the state in which it then was. In this state he found it, when he went up in the year 1781; and he left it, with regard to any substantial regulation that was executed or could be executed, in the state in which he found it,—after having increased every one of those grievances which he pretended to redress, and taken from it all the little resources that remained in it.

We now come to a subsequent period, at which time the state of the country is thus described by Mr. Bristow, on the 12th December, 1782.

"Despotism is the principle upon which every measure is founded, and the people in the interior parts of the country are ruled at the discretion of the aumil or foujdar for the time being. They exercise, within the limits of their jurisdiction, the powers of life and death, and decisions in civil and other cases, in the same extent as the sovereign at the capital. The forms prescribed by the ancient institutions of the Mogul empire are unattended to, and the will of the provincial magistrate is the sole law of the people. The total relaxation of the Vizier's authority, his inattention and dislike to business, leave the aumils in possession of this dangerous power, unawed, uncontrolled by any apprehension of retrospection, or the interference of justice. I can hardly quote an instance, since the Vizier's accession to the musnud, of an aumil having been punished for oppression, though the complaints of the people and the state of the country are notorious proofs of the violences daily committed: it is even become unsafe for travellers to pass, except in large bodies; murders, thefts, and other enormities shocking to humanity, are committed in open day."

In another paragraph of the same letter, he says,—

"Such has been the system of this government, that the oppressions have generally originated with the aumils. They have been rarely selected for their abilities or integrity, but from favor, or the means to advance a large sum upon being appointed to their office. The aumil enters upon his trust ruined in reputation and fortune; and unless he accomplishes his engagements, which is seldom the case, disgrace and punishment follow. Though the balance of revenue may be rigorously demanded of him, it has not been usual to institute any inquiry for oppression. The zemindars, thus left at the mercy of the aumils, are often driven to rebellion. The weak are obliged to submit to his exactions, or fly the country; and the aumil, unable to reduce the more powerful, is compelled to enter into a disgraceful compromise. Every zemindar looks to his fort for protection, and the country is crowded with them: Almas Ali Khân asserts there are not less than seven hundred in his districts. Hence it has become a general custom to seize the brother, son, or some near relation or dependant of the different zemindars, as hostages for the security of the revenue: a great aumil will sometimes have three or four hundred of these hostages, whom he is obliged to confine in places of security. A few men like Almas Ali Khân and Coja Ain ul Din have, from their regularity in the performance of pecuniary engagements, rendered themselves useful to the Vizier. A strict scrutiny into his affairs was at all times irksome to his Excellency, and none of the ministers or officers about his person possessing the active, persevering spirit requisite to conduct the detail of engagements for a number of small farms, it became convenient to receive a large sum from a great farmer without trouble or deficiency. This system was followed by the most pernicious consequences; these men were above all control, they exacted their own terms, and the districts they farmed were most cruelly oppressed. The revenue of Rohilcund is reduced above a third, and Almas Ali Khân's administration is well known to have been extremely violent."

We will next read to your Lordships an extract from Captain Edwards's evidence.

"Q. Had you any opportunity of observing the general face of the country in the time of Sujah Dowlah?—A. I had.—Q. Did you remark any difference in the general state of the country at that time and the period when you made your latter observation?—did you observe any difference between the condition of the country at that time, that of Sujah Dowlah in the year 1774, and the latter period you have mentioned?—A. I did,—a very material difference.—Q. In what respect?—A. In the general aspect that the country bore, and the cultivation of the country,—that it was infinitely better cultivated in 1774 than it was in 1783.—Q. You said you had no opportunity of observing the face of the country till you was appointed aide-de-camp to the Nabob?—A. No,—except by marching and countermarching. I marched in the year 1774 through the Nabob Sujah ul Dowlah's provinces into Rohilcund.—Q. Had you those opportunities from the time of your going there in 1774?—A. I had; but not so much as I had after being appointed aide-de-camp to the Vizier, because I was always before in a subordinate situation: I marched in a direct line before, with the troops; but afterwards, when I was aide-de-camp to his Excellency, I was my own master, and made frequent excursions into the different parts of the country.—Q. Had you an opportunity of observing the difference in the general happiness and disposition of the people?—A. I had.—Q. Did you observe a difference in that respect also between your first coming and the year 1783?—A. Yes, a very sensible difference: in Sujah ul Dowlah's time the country was in a very flourishing state, in merchandise, cultivation, and every article of commerce, and the people then seemed to be very happy under his government, which latterly was not the case; because the country in reality appeared in the year 1774 in a flourishing state, and in the year 1783 it appeared comparatively forlorn and desolate.—Q. Was the court of Asoph ul Dowlah, when you left India, equal in point of splendor to what it was in the time of Sujah ul Dowlah?—A. By no means: it was not equally splendid, but far inferior.—Q. Were the dependants and officers belonging to the court paid in the same punctual manner?—A. No: I really cannot say whether they were paid more regularly in Sujah Dowlah's time, only they appeared more wealthy and more able to live in a splendid style in his time than they ever have done since his death."

Here, then, your Lordships see the state of the country in 1783. Your Lordships may trace the whole progress of these evils, step by step, from the death of Sujah ul Dowlah to the time of Mr. Hastings's obtaining a majority in the Council, after which he possessed the sole and uncontrolled management of the country; you have seen also the consequences that immediately followed till the year 1784, when he went up a second time into the country.

I do not know, my Lords, that it is necessary to make any observation upon this state of things. You see that the native authority was, as we have proved, utterly extinguished by Mr. Hastings, and that there was no superintendent power but his. You have heard of the oppressions of the farmers of the revenues; and we have shown you that these farmers generally were English officers. We have shown you in what manner Colonel Hannay, one of these farmers sent by Mr. Hastings, acted, and particularly the accumulation of hostages which were made by him. We have shown you, that by their arbitrary and tyrannical proceedings all regular government was subverted, and that the country experienced the last and most dreadful effects of anarchy. We have shown you that no other security was left to any human being, but to intrench themselves in such forts as they could make, and that these forts, in one district only of the country, had increased in number to the amount of seven hundred. Your Lordships also know, that, when the prisons and mud forts in which Colonel Hannay kept his hostages confined were full, he kept them in uncovered cages in the open air. You know that all these farmers of revenue were either English and military men, or natives under an abject submission to them; you know that they had the whole country in assignments, that the jaghires were all confiscated for their benefits; and you find that the whole system had its origin at the time when Mr. Hastings alone formed in effect the authority of the Supreme Council. The weakness of the Nabob, as Sir Eyre Coote tells you, could not have been alone the cause of these evils, and that our influence over him, if not actually the cause of the utter ruin, desolation, and anarchy of that country, might have been successfully exerted in preventing.

When your Lordships shall proceed to judgment upon these accumulated wrongs, arising out of the usurped power of the prisoner at your bar, and redressed by him in no one instance whatever, let not the usurpation itself of the Nabob's power be considered as a trivial matter. When any prince at the head of a great country is entirely stripped of everything in his government, civil or military, by which his rank may be distinguished or his virtues exercised, he is in danger of becoming a mere animal, and of abandoning himself wholly to sensual gratifications. Feeling no personal interest in the institutions or in the general welfare of the country, he suffers the former (and many wise and laudable institutions existed in the provinces of the Nabob, for their good order and government) to fall into disuse, and he leaves the country itself to persons in inferior situations, to be wasted and destroyed by them. You find that in Oude, the very appearance of justice had been banished out of it, and that every aumil exercised an arbitrary power over the lives and fortunes of the people. My Lords, we have the proofs of all these facts in our hands; they are in your Lordships' minutes; and though we can state nothing stronger than is stated in the papers themselves, yet we do not so far forget our duty as not to point out to your Lordships such observations as arise out of them.

To close the whole, your Lordships shall how hear read an extract from a most curious and extraordinary letter, sent by him to the Court of Directors, preparatory to his return to England.

"My only remaining fear is, that the members of the Council, seeing affairs through a different medium from that through which I view them, may be disposed, if not to counteract the system which I have formed, to withhold from it their countenance and active support. While I myself remain, it will be sufficient if they permit it to operate without interruption; and I almost hope, in the event of a new administration of your affairs which shall confine itself to the same forbearance, and manifest no symptoms of intended interference, the objects of my arrangements will be effectually attained; for I leave them in the charge of agents whose interests, ambition, and every prospect of life are interwoven with their success, and the hand of Heaven has visibly blest the soil with every elementary source of progressive vegetation: but if a different policy shall be adopted, if new agents are sent into the country and armed with authority for the purpose of vengeance or corruption, to no other will they be applied. If new demands are raised on the Nabob Vizier, and accounts overcharged on one side with a wide latitude taken on the other to swell his debt beyond the means of payment,—if political dangers are portended, to ground on them the pleas of burdening his country with unnecessary defences and enormous subsidies,—or if, even abstaining from direct encroachment on the Nabob's rights, your government shall show but a degree of personal kindness to the partisans of the late usurpation, or by any constructive indication of partiality and disaffection furnish ground for the expectation of an approaching change of system, I am sorry to say that all my labors will prove abortive; for the slightest causes will be sufficient to deject minds sore with the remembrance of past conflicts, and to elevate those whose only dependence is placed in the renewal of the confusion which I have labored with such zeal to eradicate, and will of course debilitate the authority which can alone insure future success. I almost fear that this denunciation of effects from causes so incompetent, as they will appear to those who have not had the experience which I have had of the quick sensibility which influences the habits of men placed in a state of polity so loose, and subject to the continual variations of capricious and despotic authority, will be deemed overcharged, or perhaps void of foundation; nor, if they should come to pass, will it be easy to trace them with any positive evidence to their connection: yet it is my duty to apprise you of what I apprehend, on grounds which I deem of absolute certainty, may come to pass; and I rely on your candor for a fair interpretation of my intention."

Here, my Lords, the prisoner at your bar has done exactly what his bitterest accuser would do: he goes through, head by head, every one of the measures which he had himself pursued in the destruction of the country; and he foretells, that, if any one of those measures should again be pursued, or even if good cause should be given to suspect they would be renewed, the country must fall into a state of inevitable destruction. This supersedes all observation. This paper is a recapitulated, minute condemnation of every step which he took in that country, and which steps, are every one of them upon your Lordships' minutes.

But, my Lords, we know very well the design of these pretended apprehensions, and why he wished to have that country left in the state he speaks of. He had left a secret agent of his own to control that ostensible government, and to enable him, sitting in the place where he now sits, to continue to govern those provinces in the way in which he now governs them.

[A murmur having arisen here, Mr. Burke proceeded.]

If I am called upon to reword what I have just said, I shall repeat my words, and show strong grounds and reasons to indicate that he governs Oude now as much as he ever did.

You see, my Lords, that the reform which he pretended to make in 1781 produced the calamities which he states to have existed in 1784. We shall now show that the reform which he pretended to make in 1784 brought on the calamities which Lord Cornwallis states in his evidence to have existed in 1787.

We will now read two letters from Lord Cornwallis: the first is dated the 16th November, 1787.

"I was received at Allahabad and attended to Lucknow by the Nabob and his ministers with every mark of friendship and respect. I cannot, however, express how much I was concerned, during my short residence at his capital, and my progress through his dominions, to be witness of the disordered state of his finances and government, and of the desolate appearances of his country. The evils were too alarming to admit of palliation, and I thought it my duty to exhort him, in the most friendly manner, to endeavor to apply effectual remedies to them. He began with urging as apology, that, whilst he was not certain of the expense [extent?] of our demands upon him, he had no real interest in being economical in his expenses, and that, while we interfered in the internal management of his affairs, his own authority and that of his ministers were despised by his own subjects. It would have been useless to discuss these topics with him; but while I repeated my former declarations of our being determined to give no ground in future for similar complaints, he gave me the strongest assurances of his being resolved to apply himself earnestly to the encouragement of agriculture, and to endeavor to revive the commerce of his country."

The second is dated the 25th April, 1788.

"Till I saw the Vizier's troops, I was not without hope that upon an emergency he would have been able to have furnished us with some useful cavalry; but I have no reason to believe that he has any in his service upon which it would be prudent to place any dependence; and I think it right to add, that his country appears to be in so ruined a state, and his finances in so much disorder, that even in case of war we ought not to depend upon any material support from him."

My Lords, I have only to remark upon these letters, that, so far as they go, they prove the effects of Mr. Hastings's reformation, from which he was pleased to promise the Company such great things. But when your Lordships know that he had left his dependant and minister, Hyder Beg Khân, there, whose character, as your Lordships will find by a reference to your minutes he has represented as black as hell, to be the real governor there, and to carry on private correspondence with him here, and that he had left Major Palmer, his private agent, for a considerable time in that country to carry on his affairs, your Lordships will easily see how it has come to pass that the Vizier, such a man as you have heard him described to be, was not alone able to restore prosperity to his country.

My Lords, you have now seen what was the situation of the country in Sujah Dowlah's time, prior to Mr. Hastings's interference with the government of it, what it was during his government, and what situation it was in when Lord Cornwallis left it. Nothing now remains but to call your Lordships' attention to perhaps the most extraordinary part of these transactions. But before we proceed, we will beg leave to go back and read to your Lordships the Nabob's letter of the 24th February, 1780.