Constitución y emergencia sanitaria

Publicación

editada

en el Perú

por Palestra Editores

Cultura Nazca (100 - 800 d.C.)

CONSTITUCIÓN Y EMERGENCIA SANITARIA

Volumen III

CONSTITUCIÓN Y EMERGENCIA SANITARIA

Volumen III

César Landa Arroyo (Coordinador)

Primera edición Digital, enero 2021

© Área de Derecho Constitucional de la Facultad de

Derecho de la Pontificia Univeridad Católica del Perú

© 2021: Palestra Editores S.A.C.

Plaza de la Bandera 125 Lima 21 - Perú

Telf. (511) 6378902 - 6378903

palestra@palestraeditores.com

www.palestraeditores.com

Diagramación y Digitalización:

Gabriela Zabarburú Gamarra

Hecho el depósito legal en la Biblioteca Nacional del Perú N° 2021-01215

ISBN Digital: 978-612-325-165-9

Todos los derechos reservados. Queda prohibida la reproducción total o parcial de esta obra, bajo ninguna forma o medio, electrónico o impreso, incluyendo fotocopiado, grabado o almacenado en algún sistema informático, sin el consentimiento por escrito de los titu lares del Copyright.

Contenido

PRESENTACIÓN

COVID AND THE US CONSTITUTION

Tom Ginsburg

SERVIRSE DE LA PANDEMIA PARA ACENTUAR EL AUTORITARISMO: EL CASO VENEZOLANO

Jesús María Casal Hernández

1. El estado de alarma: contexto y pretexto

2. La declaración del estado de alarma

3. La inconstitucionalidad del estado de alarma

4. Las principales medidas adoptadas invocando el estado de alarma

5. El aprovechamiento autoritario del estado de alarma

Bibliografía

RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LA PANDEMIA EN COLOMBIA

Néstor Osuna Patiño

1. Estados de emergencia

2. Restricciones a las libertades, en especial a la movilidad

3. Plan de vacunación

DOS ESTACIONES EN UN VIAJE CONOCIDO: EMERGENCIA Y DESEQUILIBRIO DE PODERES

Pablo Riberi

1. Ideas preliminares

2. Derecho Constitucional comparado

3. Las emergencias en el orden constitucional argentino

4. En caso de emergencia: rompa el vidrio

5. Reflexión final

Bibliografía

PONDERACIÓN DE DERECHOS EN TIEMPOS DE PANDEMIA: ESPECIAL REFERENCIA A URUGUAY

Martín Risso Ferrand

1. La situación en Uruguay

2. Conflictos de derechos

3. Reflexión final

JUSTICIA DIGITAL Y EMERGENCIA SANITARIA

Edwin Figueroa Gutarra

1. Ideas previas

2. Un nuevo contexto judicial a partir de la pandemia: justicia digital

3. Cambios futuros e inteligencia artificial

Bibliografía

LOS DESAFÍOS CONSTITUCIONALES DE LA JUSTICIA PENITENCIARIA EN TIEMPOS DE COVID-19

Richard Llacsahuanga Chávez

1. Introducción

2. Problemática carcelaria y COVID-19

3. Medidas adoptadas por el estado peruano en materia carcelaria frente al COVID-19

4. Retos y desafíos

VISIÓN INTERCULTULTURAL Y POLIÉTNICA DE LA POLÍTICA SANITARIA NACIONAL: A PROPÓSITO DE LA PANDEMIA

Bruno Novoa Campos

1. El camino hacia la Política Sectorial de Salud Intercultural

2. Aspectos relevantes de la Política Sectorial de Salud Intercultural

3. Experiencia desde las rondas campesinas de Chota, Cajamarca

Bibliografía

RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS ESTADOS EN ORDEN AL DEBER DE PROGRESIVIDAD DE LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES

Dévora Franco García

1. Introducción

2. Derechos sociales y deberes del Estado

3. Justiciabilidad de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales

4. Responsabilidad del Estado peruano en torno a la obligación de progresividad

5. Conclusiones

Bibliografía

SOBRE LOS AUTORES

Presentación

Desde el segundo semestre del 2020, la primera ola de la pandemia del COVID-19 se fue controlando en Asia y Europa, y, en principio en Norteamérica, América Latina, África y Oceanía, con diferente éxito en el número de contagio y muertos. No obstante, al inicio del año 2021 a nivel mundial ya se han producido más de 83 millones de contagiados y nos acercamos lenta, pero de forma segura, a los 2 millones de muertes. Ello debido a que aún no se tiene una vacuna —segura y eficiente— a nivel mundial, sino apenas de forma simbólica o testimonial en algunos países no solo centrales, aun cuando sean autorizadas por sus gobiernos de forma urgente y/o provisoria por razones de la emergencia sanitaria.

Al respecto, se puede señalar que, en situaciones límites, las personas, al igual que los Estados, muestran las cualidades y valores, o las debilidades o temores, con que toman las decisiones y/o medidas de gobierno. Este es el caso peruano, que habiendo iniciado tempranamente la emergencia sanitaria, los estados de emergencia y demás restricciones de derechos y libertades sin los resultados esperados, pudo iniciar negociaciones con grandes corporaciones químico-farmacéuticas de Estados Unidos, Reino Unido, China y participar del programa COVAX Facility de la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS). Así, a la fecha, el Gobierno ha asegurado la compra de la vacuna Sinopharm de China, que ha llevado a cabo ensayos clínicos en doce mil peruanos

Lo claro es que las condiciones de negociación asimétrica impuestas al Estado peruano por empresas como Pfizer-Biontech han ralentizado la contratación de la vacuna con estas, debido al establecimiento de cláusulas irrazonables por ser vejatorias de la soberanía nacional, al exigir que el Estado ponga sus legaciones diplomáticas, naves de bandera nacional o patrimonio cultural prestados a museos como garantías de pago, en el caso que una discrepancia llevará a la empresa querer cobrarse directamente lo adeudado fuera del territorio nacional.

Sin perjuicio de ello, el Gobierno sigue negociando con esa y otras empresas, lo cual no es óbice para que, en un mundo globalizado, los gobiernos, las instituciones y los ciudadanos observen cotidianamente el avance de la llegada de la vacuna en diferentes condiciones, cuando según la OMS correspondería el acceso equitativo y universal de la inmunización.

Por eso, en el Área de Derecho Constitucional de la Facultad de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, seguimos atentos en los Desayunos Constitucionales en un formato virtual, la presentación y debate de profesores(as) invitados(as) nacionales e internacionales, sobre los desafíos al Estado Constitucional en la lucha contra el COVID-19.

De allí que este tercer volumen del libro electrónico Constitución y Emergencia Sanitaria se caracteriza por continuar con el análisis constitucional comparado. Por ello, hemos reunido en dos secciones las ponencias de nuestros expositores; por un lado, se presentan las respuestas constitucionales en la lucha contra el COVID-19 de países con un amplio arco ideológico, desde los Estado Unidos, Venezuela, Argentina y Uruguay, con resultados igualmente extremos. Por otro lado, se continúa dando cuenta de la experiencia nacional, pero a partir de la interpretación constitucional que se tiene desde el interior del Perú, en particular de las regiones del norte y sur —Arequipa, Ayacucho, Cajamarca y Lambayeque— en la lucha contra el COVID-19.

En ese sentido, el profesor Tom Ginsburg, de la Chicago University, presenta el rol de la Constitución federal de los Estados Unidos en la administración del Presidente Trump en su fracaso en la lucha contra el COVID-19, al ser el país con más contagiados y muertos del mundo; asimismo el profesor Jesús María Casal, de la Universidad Católica Andrés Bello de Venezuela, fundamenta cómo la pandemia ha servido para acentuar el autoritarismo del Gobierno del Presidente Maduro, al punto que se ha ampliado el Estado de alarma sin Estado de Derecho; por su parte, el profesor Néstor Osuna, de la Universidad del Externado de Colombia, realiza un recuento de las medidas y la legislación de emergencia adoptadas por el gobierno, sin que la Corte Constitucional haya declarado inconstitucional ninguna, así como, las etapas de las restricciones de derechos fundamentales, y, la de la contratación de las vacunas.

El profesor Pablo Riberi, de la Universidad de Nacional de Córdoba en Argentina, desde la teoría constitucional y la filosofía política analiza el estado de emergencia y el desequilibrio de poderes en la historia política, donde Argentina no ha sido una excepción, aun cuando las medidas de emergencia acercan a la biopolítica, las instituciones constitucionales han podido morigerar sus efectos. El profesor Martín Risso, de la Universidad Católica del Uruguay, realiza una presentación del sistema constitucional y de la administración pública de salud —que cerró el 2020 con menos de cien fallecidos y poco más de mil contagios— sin el uso de facultades de emergencia, sino de la ponderación; lo cual, en última instancia, se explica en la confianza ciudadana y la transparencia del Gobierno.

La perspectiva de la lucha constitucional contra el COVID-19 desde el interior del Perú la realiza el profesor y Juez Superior de Lambayeque Edwin Figueroa, quien, desde una perspectiva de la justicia digital, presenta los avances del acceso a la justicia virtual en tiempos de pandemia; asimismo, el profesor y Juez Superior de Ayacucho Richard Llacsahuanga realiza una reflexión crítica de las personas en situación carcelaria en medio de la pandemia, dando cuenta de las medidas gubernamentales, incluida la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional.

Por su parte, el profesor Bruno Novoa realiza un enfoque constitucional pluricultural e intercultural del derecho a la salud, en el cual las rondas campesinas de Cajamarca han jugado un rol central en el control del COVID-19, y; finalmente la profesora Dévora Franco, de la Universidad Católica San Pablo de Arequipa, realiza una presentación del deber de progresividad de los derechos sociales como la salud, que exigen el respeto de estándares internacionales frente a situaciones como la pandemia del COVID-19.

Finalmente, el inicio de la segunda ola del COVID-19 sacude nuevamente a los sistemas de salud pública del Perú, la región y el mundo; pero, con la experiencia adquirida y las reformas introducidas, incluidas la presupuestales, se encuentran mejor preparados para un impacto menos dantesco, hasta que la vacuna se haga una realidad eficaz en la contención del COVID-19. Todo ello requiere una mayor constitucionalización de los procesos de negociación, distribución y aplicación de la vacuna bajo principios de gratuidad, solidaridad, equidad, justicia, transparencia, eficacia, progresividad, y cautela del interés general.

Lima, 12 de enero de 2021

César Landa Arroyo

Coordinador

Área de Derecho Constitucional

COVID and the US Constitution*

Tom Ginsburg

* La versión traducida oralmente al castellano se encuentra en el siguiente enlace: <https://fb.watch/3fo2_uq3wD/>

The COVID response in the United States has been extremely poor from a public health perspective. The country has the highest number of deaths in the world and is in the top ten countries in terms of cases per capita, as of this writing. President Trump has declined to wear a mask in public, and after catching the virus told Americans not to let it rule their lives. State and local governments have in many cases undermined mask-wearing, which is widely accepted as a prophylactic measure. And American citizens successfully pressured their governments to re-open quickly, leading to a major second wave of cases. Surely this is an enormous governmental failure on a scale rarely seen in democratic countries.

Yet from a constitutional and democratic perspective, the failure may not be so great. While we can say with confidence that early lockdowns would have prevented spread of the pandemic, once the virus arrived on a mass scale, it is not clear what the universally optimal policy is, in terms of the severity of a lockdown. Surely a complete and total lockdown such as occurred in Wuhan China would be good for eliminating the virus, but it also had significant costs in terms of the associated economic shutdown and in restrictions on civil liberties. Quarantines also create their own risks and put pressure on mental health. A pandemic response must balance public health, economic, and libertarian considerations, with lots of complicated tradeoffs. In a democracy, the balance should be determined by political processes, informed by technical information.

Despite all its messiness, and its poor policy outcome, the coronavirus response in the United States has been successful in responding to the preferences of the public. This public is highly misinformed and distrustful of expertise. It important to remember that the United States is in something of an epistemic crisis, in which large segment of the population believes in conspiracy theories and distrusts science as a matter of course. The fact that around half of Republicans believe, falsely, that President Trump won the November 2020 election is evidence of this, and of course reflects his cult-like power over them. But this is not just a feature of Trumpism. We also have a longstanding libertarian tradition distrustful of all government as a matter of principle. The United States has had an extended constitutional conversation, involving state governments, courts at both states and the federal level, legislatures, scientific agencies, and the public itself, about the response. While a failure from a public health perspective it is a good response from the perspective of reflecting democratic references.

From a comparative perspective, the United States Constitution, drafted in 1787, is one of a small number without any provision for a state of emergency. The drafters of the document were skeptical about such provisions and thought law could do little to regulate crises. Indeed, they feared that executives might use emergency provisions to consolidate power, a phenomenon that has come to pass in many other constitutional systems. The absence of clear provisions on emergency has meant that the ordinary rules of governance have remained in place during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the federal system of the United States, the “police power” is primarily located at the states, giving them the authority and duty to protect and regulate health and safety. These powers are limited by federal constitutional rights, as well as acts of Congress within its own sphere of authority. All states have emergency statutes that allow the Governor, the chief executive of the state, to call an emergency and to take extraordinary steps thereafter for a limited period. Governors were the primary determiners of policy response in the COVID-19 pandemic, and their solutions varied a good deal. In highly urban states like California, the response was early and strong. In some rural states, the response was slow and weak. These states became the primary locus of the second wave of the virus. But the second wave spread throughout the land.

Once governors began to impose lockdowns, a dialogue followed about the nature of the response. Owners of gun shops challenged the application of general lockdown orders to their businesses, claiming that the constitutional right to bear arms contained in the Second Amendment meant that they should have special protection in this regard. Faced with this argument, many cities and states reclassified gun shops as “essential businesses” that could remain open. Another challenge was to certain state laws that discriminated against out-of-state travelers, such as Rhode Island Governor’s order to stop all cars with New York license plates.

The next major set of challenges came from religious groups, which claimed that bans on gatherings of more than ten people, for example, infringed on freedoms of worship. In one case, a governor refused to allow an Easter service in which worshipers would remain in their cars, prompting a lawsuit. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that lockdowns that singled out religious services without comparable restrictions on secular activities violated the First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court stayed away from these cases for several months, but in November issued a decision that generated a good deal of attention. In Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, the Court ruled that a New York ban on religious gatherings of more than ten people constituted an unconstitutional interference with the First Amendment provisions protecting the free exercise of religion. The Court pointed out that the Governor’s order limited the number of people without regard to the size of the building, and hence was not narrowly tailored to the goal. In other cases, the Court argued, governors had allowed casinos, restaurants, and marijuana dispensaries to remain open while restricting religious services. This was clearly an inappropriate burden on religion.

The Federal government’s role in pandemic response is most apparent in providing a response. Using several statutory authorities, the Department of Health and Human Services declared a state of emergency on January 31, allowing expanded telemedicine and the release of national stockpiles of masks and other personal protective equipment. President Trump invoked the Defense Production Act, which allows the government to order private firms to prioritize its own orders and to control distribution. In March he declared an emergency under a statute, allowing the Federal Emergency Management Agency to get involved. Later, the Congress approved a public-private partnership called Operation Warp Speed, which successfully funded the development of vaccines by private companies.

As the lockdowns dragged on and the economic carnage became apparent, protestors began to chafe under the restrictions, and demonstrations emerged. Most came from the political right, but some came from the so-called “anti-vaxxers” on the political left, who oppose the taking of vaccines. Some lawsuits were filed in April, but courts were generally unwilling to question the decisions of the elected representatives. As time went on and the economic costs mounted, the President announced that the pandemic response had to end, and the economy had to re-open. Of course, under the federal system this was not his decision. Governors seemed to ignore the President: Republicans like Georgia’s Brian Kemp re-opened even before Trump gave the green light; Democrats like New York’s Andrew Cuomo and California’s Gavin Newsom kept restrictions in place, and as a second wave of the virus hit in June, ramped up some restrictions again.

As a practical matter, the lockdown restrictions on large assemblies became impossible to enforce after the emergence of mass demonstrations in May, prompted by the killing of a black man named George Floyd by police in Minneapolis. As these protests spread around the country, police found themselves unable to enforce restrictions on mass gatherings. Indeed, the presence of the lockdown demonstrators, only a month earlier, may have made the government less able to respond to the anti-policing protests. After all, the First Amendment prohibits the government from favoring one type of speech over another. Indeed, a Federal District Court in New York enjoined the state from enforcing prohibitions against religious services, pointing out the Mayor Bill de Blasio appeared without a mask at a demonstration that far exceeded the 25-person limit imposed by state law.1

Politically, many Americans seemed to have a strong aversion to the wearing of masks, a simple step that would do much to prevent the spread of the disease. The Governor of Nebraska threatened to withhold funds from any counties that did require masks. Judges began to get involved in calibrating the response: a federal judge in Michigan, for example, held that there was no rational basis for keeping gyms closed, and ordered the Governor to reopen them. But this order was stayed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Most of the state statutes allowing Governors to use emergency measures have temporal limitations, typically 30 days. After the initial period expired, most governors extended the lockdowns by unilateral order. Some lawsuits challenged these decisions but none to my knowledge has been successful. The standard of judicial review for all these matters was whether the government had a “rational basis” for its decision, which is a very easy standard for the government to meet, given the obvious risks from a pandemic.

A special issue arose regarding elections, a challenge faced by many countries around the world. The United States had a presidential election in November, and preparations for it were complicated by the pandemic. A major conflict arose in the State of Wisconsin, which has been ground zero for Republican efforts to lock in their power. The elections scheduled for May 2020 included a primary for the presidential election, and also a vacant state supreme court seat. With trouble find poll workers, the state’s Governor Tony Evers, a Democrat, sought to postpone the election. But the legislature, controlled by Republicans, disagreed. There were major technical problems with absentee ballots not being mailed in time. A federal district judge allowed the Governor to extend the period by which absentee ballots could be postmarked, but the Republican party challenged this decision. In an extraordinary intervention, the US Supreme Court by a vote of five to four overturned the District Court decision, saying the election had to go on just as scheduled. People stood in long lines to vote, and several dozen caught coronavirus because of the primary election, but it led to the defeat of the Republican candidate for the supreme court.

The pandemic has involved judges deeply in election law, leading them to engage in robust review. The Supreme Court was inundated with cases before November, sometimes issuing orders and other times not. Federal and state courts have ordered state election officials to change deadlines, to hold elections which they had decided to cancel, and to allow all voters to cast absentee voting in states in which those ballots were limited. This is a very unusual development because normally American courts do not consider government omissions to be a source of constitutional violations. For example, the Sixth Circuit held the rules requiring a certain number of signatures to appear on a state ballot were a significant burden on the right to vote, under the circumstances of COVID. Virginia’s requirement that an absentee ballot be signed by a witness would not be a burden in normal times, but in light of the pandemic became a burden.2 These are significant changes, and move courts toward guaranteeing participation as if that is a positive right, rather than a negative right to be free from government interferences As Rick Pildes has noted, courts are thus saying that laws that would be constitutional in normal times are unconstitutional during the pandemic.3 In November, there was record turnout that led to the defeat of populist demagogue Trump. This was a major constitutional success during the pandemic, and perhaps a public health success as well.

The best way to characterize the American constitutional response to the coronavirus pandemic is as one of a dialogue among governmental institutions. The primary actors have been state governors, and they have generally been very popular during this period. Loud and vocal groups have challenged them, mainly about the duration and extent of lockdowns. Freedom of assembly was in great evidence throughout the period of the coronavirus pandemic, as was freedom of speech. Various coronavirus deniers could promulgate their views, which seem to be popular among a large portion of the electorate.

Courts have been active in monitoring governmental measures, and in some cases have stepped in to ensure the protection of constitutional rights. In some states, legislatures have pushed back against the governors, channeling popular discontent. This presumably informed the decisions to gradually lift the lockdowns, but the exact rules vary widely across the fifty states. This is of course appropriate in a large and diverse country.

The response has been very politicized, in keeping with the current state of the American polity. A large and powerful minority is deeply distrustful of science, experts, and government. These voices exist in a democracy and have had a friend in President Trump. So, while the constitution has shown its efficacy in allowing a response that reflects the popular views, that response has also led to massive number of needless deaths. For this, we cannot blame the Constitution, but rather ourselves in the current state of the polity. However, the presidential election result showed that the public, in the end, rejected the “COVID deniers.” We must hope it is a moment of renewal for our constitutional democracy as well.

1 Soos v. Cuomo, 1:20-cv-651, (S.D.N.Y. 2020)

2 League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. Of Elections, No. 6:20-CV-00024, 2020 WL 2158249, at *8 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2020).

3 Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutional Emergency Powers of Federal Courts (manuscript).